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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was signed into law by Presi-
dent Barack Obama on March 23, 2010. A week later, on March 30, he signed the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act into law, which expanded and 
amended the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (in short, Affordable Care 
Act or ACA). Together they constitute Obamacare, Obama’s signature legislation, 
and a major achievement after nearly a century of failed attempts to enact compre-
hensive health care policy in the United States. 
The health care coverage system that results from the ACA was strongly influ-
enced and constrained by American politics and history. It built on the existing 
health system, creating a mixed market-based system with some government inter-
vention. Universal coverage is based on three pillars: an employer mandate that 
compels businesses to offer health care to their employees, an individual mandate 
that compels every person to carry health insurance, and an extension of Medicaid, 
the government health insurance program for the poor (just as before, Medicare co-
vers people over age 65). Before the enactment of Obamacare, a majority of Ameri-
cans already had health insurance through their employer, but this was not manda-
tory. Similarly, Medicaid has existed since 1965, but the ACA substantially expanded 
the eligibility criteria to include all able-bodied adults without children based on 
their income. The individual mandate was new, but the idea had been advocated by 
conservatives since the late 1980s.  
Obamacare sought to address the increasingly pressing problem of health care 
costs, for which the ACA established a series of cost-containment measures. The 
ACA particularly focused on increasing health insurance costs. Thus the Act regu-
lates health insurance policies and defines the type of benefits that an insurance poli-
cy must cover. To make insurance more affordable for Americans, the government 
now heavily subsidizes insurance purchase. For people purchasing their insurance 
on the marketplace, the government provides tax credits based on their income level 
to help meet the insurance costs. For employer-provided health insurance, the ACA 
continues the system that was already in place, meaning the tax exemption for health 
insurance expenditures. The Medicaid extension provides government-financed 
health insurance for the poorest populations. 
 The ACA put in place the health exchanges, at federal and state levels. Those 
exchanges are marketplaces that allow people to determine their eligibility in this 
complex system and to find out whether they qualify for Medicaid or subsidies. 
Moreover, the exchanges help them shop for a suitable insurance policy, by provid-
ing tools to compare the different health plan offers. 
The ACA also addresses some major problems that existed in the American 
health care system. For example, before the passage of the ACA, insurers could ex-
clude or overcharge clients for a very wide range of preexisting conditions. This was 
particularly important as it made it difficult for many people to change jobs, because 
their health insurance was linked to their employment, and in the case of a preexist-
ing condition they would have major difficulties or cost increases if they took on a 
new job. Consequently, one of the most central elements of the ACA is the ban on the 
preexisting conditions exclusion.  
Obamacare sought to be a strongly redistributive legislation, which addressed 
some of the problems that had arisen from the previous health care system, and some 
of the main health issues faced by the American population. Although the enactment 
of Obamacare was a major victory for the Democratic Party and marked an im-
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portant change in American social politics, it is imperfect and unsatisfactory in many 
respects. The legislation has been criticized right from the beginning. Many claimed 
that it did not work or would cause major problems and difficulties in the economy, 
and Republicans immediately vowed to repeal it. Moreover, because of its complexi-
ty, the law is vulnerable to attacks, and some key provisions have already been struck 
down, leaving holes in the universality of coverage. In addition, the effect of the legis-
lation on alleviating racial inequalities, one of Obama’s goals, is not entirely satisfac-
tory either.  
The Role of Race in the Reform 
The reflection for this research started with one sentence in The Audacity of 
Hope, the book detailing Obama’s political philosophy, published in 2006 while he 
was still a senator from Illinois. In the chapter entitled ‘Race’ Obama wrote: “An em-
phasis on universal, as opposed to race-specific, programs isn’t just good policy; it’s 
also good politics.”1 What were the reasons, the ideas, the reflections, which had in-
fluenced this statement? Why discard a race-specific approach when the outspoken 
intent voiced in the chapter is to alleviate racial inequalities? Further reading and 
analysis showed that Obama was convinced of both the limited effectiveness of race-
specific programs, especially in the form of affirmative action, and of the political 
impossibility of enacting more race-specific programs. Obama appeared convinced 
that new social policies in the realms of education and health care, for example, could 
have a more beneficial impact on the African-American population than any affirma-
tive action program, as blacks face particular difficulties in both areas. The “good pol-
itics” part of the statement, referring to a more strategic thinking, was based on 
Obama’s assessment that the white population was largely unwilling to accept race-
specific measures, meaning that any race-specific policy proposal would most proba-
bly be defeated.  
The political result of this assessment was Obamacare, a universal health care 
legislation, which had a strong redistributive focus and which sought to address some 
specific issues faced by the black population, such as high uninsured rates, greater 
exposure to personal bankruptcy and subsequent loss of middle class status caused 
by unexpected health care costs, or the greater prevalence of certain public health 
issues such as diabetes or obesity, among others. Furthermore, existing health poli-
cies were an impediment to social mobility for the poor and the working poor. A new 
job could result in the loss of Medicaid coverage without providing health insurance 
or sufficient income to pay for it out of pocket. 
Health care was certainly not Obama’s first choice, as illustrated by the fact that 
health care reform was not initially a central issue in his presidential campaign. 
However, the political context and pressing problems of the times called for health 
care legislation. Additionally, health care is not the most obvious domain in which, or 
through which, to fight for racial equality. Jobs and education appear as more 
straightforward approaches. Obama’s initial education reform, a topic for which he 
shows more passion, died in Congress, and even if unemployment is strongly linked 
to the tides of the economy, many measures can be taken, especially regarding racial 
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inequalities. Nonetheless, health care insurance, and particularly the lack of it, play a 
significant role in social mobility and the maintenance of one’s social status. Moreo-
ver, the American health care system stands out among other Western countries be-
cause of its huge costs and comparatively low outcomes, both in terms of coverage 
and access to care. The problems of cost and difficult access to care, not surprisingly, 
can also be observed to play out along racial lines. If a primarily economic focus—as 
opposed to a focus on rights or political power—is taken to tackle the issue of racial 
equality, then health care becomes a valid and interesting issue to try to improve 
black social mobility and to strengthen the more fragile grasp black families have on 
their middle class status. 
However, in pursuing this goal, the Obama administration faced tremendous 
political constraints. Recent decades in American history have not been favorable to 
social policies in general, and certainly not to race-specific measures particularly 
aimed at improving the conditions of blacks. This nexus can be seen in the sharp po-
larization of the two parties over issues of social policies and government interven-
tion, and is exemplified by the sharp Republican attacks against Obamacare. The 
particular history of the United States and the racial makeup of US society have cre-
ated a distinctive context for social policies that are heavily marked by the question of 
race—which plays out as a divisive force. This is particularly remarkable in the case 
of policies aimed at reducing racial economic inequalities.  
These premises led to the following question: how did Barack Obama circum-
navigate the racial question in the health care reform? The answer is simple and 
complex at the same time. Obama chose a race pragmatic approach that consisted in 
enacting a neutral social policy, which was heavily redistributive and which focused 
on several economic and health issues, which particularly affected African-
Americans. In other words, instead of identifying the black population through its 
race, it was targeted through its socio-economic characteristics. This approach also 
included focusing on a policy that is also pertinent for the white middle and working 
class in order to gather a sufficient majority to support the reform. Health care, being 
a major problem for the white middle class, appeared to be a favorable field, despite 
the long and difficult history of health legislation in the US. This strategy built on a 
certain understanding of the history of social policies in the US and the polarization 
of the two parties over social policies. Obama carefully took into account the racial 
divisiveness of such policies, the white backlash against race-specific measures and 
against means-tested programs, as well as the backlash against social policies in gen-
eral. To overcome this, he crafted a distinctive discourse based on racial transcend-
ence, a sense of class unity cemented through economic populism, and a forceful ar-
gument legitimizing government intervention in order to unite public opinion 
behind the reform project. 
Theoretical Approach 
 In order to assess the role of race in the reform, it was decided to analyze 
Obama’s reform strategy in terms of its political and ideological foundations, its ap-
plication, and its outcomes. 
The choice to conduct the analysis through the prism of the white and the black 
population was made for several reasons. First, African-Americans are one of the 
populations facing the greatest economic and social difficulties in the US. Moreover, 
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historically, the black-white divide is the deepest one in US society and politics, with 
specific problems, issues, and attitudes resulting from the past history of slavery and 
segregation. The concomitant arrival of the first white colonizers and black servants 
turned into slaves, moreover, provides a clear background for the intersection of ra-
cial and economic oppression that still structures US society today, and continues to 
impact political power relations.  
The main analysis is grounded in the comparison between the socioeconomic 
situation and needs of the black and the white populations, with the white population 
serving as a reference point, due to their numerical strength and dominance in Amer-
ican political decisions. Political scientist Robert Goodin’s definition of politics sheds 
light on this relationship. He defines politics as “the constrained use of social power,” 
power that according to him takes many forms and is constrained in many different 
ways.2 As social power is largely defined by economic status, it led to the close exami-
nation of the economic differences between the two groups, in order to determine 
their respective needs in terms of social policy programs. Economist Patrick Valtriani 
insists on the fact that social policies, despite containing the term “social,” do not be-
long to the field of sociology, but to economics. According to political scientist Marie-
Thérèse Lambert, their aim is to alleviate inequalities resulting from an economy 
focused on profit, which is necessary in a democratic society to regulate this society.3 
To get a picture of the political stakes of both groups in the new health care legisla-
tion it was thus necessary to determine the extent of inequalities between the two 
groups at the moment of the development of the health care reform to see to what 
extent their interests were opposed or might converge. This also implied an examina-
tion of the extent to which Obamacare addressed universal health care problems and 
to what extent it focused on specific issues of heightened interest to the black popula-
tion. 
This purely materialistic approach, however, is far too limited, because policy 
results are only determined to a certain degree by objective needs, just as political 
opinions or choices are only partially determined by rational considerations based on 
objective material needs. Political scientist Colin Hay insists on the limited scope of 
approaches used by materialists or constructivists. While both approaches recognize 
the importance of ideas in shaping politics, they either limit them as being deter-
mined by material factors, such as interests determined by context, or on the contrary 
attribute ideas to a sort of voluntarist idealism, in which political outcomes are direct-
ly attributable to the desires, motives, and thoughts of the actors involved. Hay insists 
on an approach that combines both material and ideational factors. He insists that  
[p]olitical outcomes are, in short, neither a simple reflection of actors’ intentions and un-
derstandings nor of the contexts which give rise to such intentions and understandings. 
Rather, they are a product of the impact of the strategies actors devise as a means to real-
ize their intentions upon a context which favors certain strategies over others and does 
so irrespective of the intentions of the actors themselves.4 
To analyze Obama’s health care reform from a racial perspective means looking, 
on the one hand, for the factors that influenced Obama’s ideas and informed his 
choice of political strategy, such as his awareness of racial and economic inequality in 
the US and the hostile attitude of the population towards social policies and race-
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specific measures. On the other hand, it also means looking for the factors and events 
that shaped the reform independently of Obama’s wishes and ideas—such as certain 
institutional constraints—such as the makeup and fragility of the Democratic majori-
ty in the 111th Congress, the threat of a filibuster, or the conservative lawsuits against 
the ACA. 
To understand Obama’s strategy, it is important to have a precise view of the 
historical context that determined his choices. Sociologist, political scientist, and his-
torian Charles Tilly foregrounds the importance of the historical context in political 
analysis because political processes occur within history, and the moment when they 
occur influences how they occur by determining them through the cultural materials, 
such as beliefs, dominating the period.5 Obama’s choice of a race pragmatic approach 
was informed by the racial history of the US, which has stratified US society along 
overlapping racial and class lines and which has also given a distinctive shape to the 
American welfare state. In the history of the American welfare state, the factors of 
race and class have played out in different ways, depending on which one gained 
more salience within a given period. Race has been a divisive element in society, 
which was overcome at certain moments by a stronger class alliance that allowed the 
welfare state to expand, such as during the New Deal and the Great Society, but 
which in recent years has had a problematic resurgence, as in the case of the Reagan 
and Bush presidencies, or more recently in the election of Donald Trump. 
For the present analysis, another reason why history matters is of interest. Tilly 
evokes a “path dependency” that predominates in political processes, which is creat-
ed by the events that occur at one moment of history and which constrain and influ-
ence the range of events that are possible later.6 Political scientists Robert Goodin, 
Martin Rein, and Michael Moran insist that this path dependency is particularly 
strong in the case of public policies, although this needs not be viewed in exclusively 
negative terms, but also in the sense that it is a form of experimentation through 
which we get new ideas about how to address some problems and about how to pur-
sue certain goals. Path dependency is not qualitatively loaded, it only means that pre-
vious events and the existing public policy domain influence the options available for 
further policy development.7 Thus, the historical context impacts the political choices 
that are made later and influences the political strategy that will be considered for a 
new policy.  
The abovementioned quote from Obama underscores the fact that the race-
pragmatic approach is also, and maybe primarily, a question of political strategy. The 
choice of a political strategy is based on past political experience of what worked and 
what did not, both as a matter of real effectiveness and political feasibility, and of 
how the population reacted to policy proposals or events. Thus, the development of 
the welfare state, of what already exists, is a determining factor in political choices, 
but so is the public’s reaction to and interaction with the welfare state, meaning poli-
cies and programs put in place by government to alleviate economic and social ine-
qualities. Thus, beyond the purely material aspect of what kind of programs exist and 
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when they were put in place, the perception of this welfare state by the public strong-
ly influences the political choices made for new programs or reforms. 
Political scientist Theodore Lowi particularly insists on the strong ideational 
dimension of redistributive policies, i.e. social policies. According to him “the nature 
of a redistributive issue is not determined by the outcome of a battle over how redis-
tributive a policy is going to be. Expectations about what it can be, what it threatens 
to be, are determinative.”8 It is in the range of those expectations and fears that histo-
ry matters, because these will be influenced by past experience, in conjunction with 
considerations of present material needs. Obama’s choice of a race-neutral policy was 
determined by the past experience of the white backlash against policies aimed main-
ly or exclusively at minorities—such as means-tested programs or affirmative ac-
tion—and the expectation of a new backlash should the new policy proposal be per-
ceived as mainly benefiting minorities.  
Given the centrality of ideas and perceptions as determining factors, the deci-
sion was made for this research to treat the historical context in two different ways. 
The welfare state had to be considered first as a set of measures enacted by the vari-
ous governments since the early 20th century, before moving to an ideational ap-
proach of how this welfare state and its different programs are perceived, and how 
this perception is used in politics. This approach distinguishes between the ‘welfare 
state,’ which is the objective fact of government programs aimed at alleviating eco-
nomic inequalities, and the concept of ‘welfare,’ which developed later in reaction to 
perceived unfairness in the welfare state, and which is a pejorative term implying 
undeserved benefits mainly for racial minorities. Such events or processes are para-
mount, because, as Tilly points out, “once a process (e.g. a revolution) has occurred 
and acquired a name, both the name and one or more representations of the process 
become available as signals, models, threats, and/or aspirations for later actors.”9 
Such ideas and representations have a particularly strong influence in the case 
of redistributional policies because these concern the society as a whole, and people 
cannot escape them, as people are categorized according to their being, to what they 
are in terms of income or age, etc., in order to benefit or not from a social program.10 
Moreover, what social policies do is basically the essence of the most commonly cited 
definition of ‘politics’ as the “who gets what, when, and how” formulated by Harold 
Lasswell in 1950.11 Which social group or category benefits from what type of pro-
gram, when can it be enacted, how will it be enacted and how will the benefits be de-
livered? However, Lasswell’s definition leaves out the crucial factor of “from whom,” 
which raises the issue of taxation, which is necessary to finance a program. The fact 
that for Lasswell the question of “from whom” was not yet at the forefront in his time 
might be due to the fact that the fiscalization of American politics occurred only in 
the 1970s and 1980s. The fiscalization of American politics, as explained by political 
scientist Kenneth Shepsle, means the predominance of financial and budgetary is-
sues epitomized by the central question of the deficit.12 Any new program today nec-
essarily triggers the question of the deficit and taxation, as the benefits must be paid 
for. 
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 Thus it is essential to determine who, or which social groups, should be the 
main focus in health care reform, based on material and political needs. These 
groups are racial minorities based on economic needs, and the white working and 
middle class, based both on economic and political needs. The timing of the reform 
was also significant, when considering the defeated Clinton attempt. Although health 
care insurance has been a longtime problem for minorities, it only became a major 
problem for the white working and middle class in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Goodin, Rein, and Moran point to the fact that policy is made in response to prob-
lems, which are not, however, predetermined or fixed. The public’s policy agenda 
changes according to the “personal troubles” that drift in and out of what is consid-
ered a “social problem,” which in turn is determined by the consideration of “whose 
problem it is,” depending on whether a progressive or conservative approach is tak-
en.13 In other words, to continue with Lasswell’s definition, the ‘when,’ was a conflu-
ence of several factors, which included health insurance becoming a sufficiently seri-
ous “personal trouble” to be considered as a social problem for it to appear on the 
policy agenda, as well as a context in which it would be considered to be a govern-
ment problem. Another condition was to have at the same time a progressive admin-
istration, which would consider health care to be indeed government’s responsibility, 
and not just a matter of personal responsibility. With the dramatically increasing 
health care cost of the early 2000s and the changing economic situation after the 2008 
crisis, health care became a pressing issue again. The economic crisis and ensuing 
Great Recession made it an even more central problem for the white population, alt-
hough to a lesser degree than for minorities. However, it became urgent enough to 
propel health care to the forefront of the 2008 presidential campaign and to provide 
enough momentum to see the reform through.  
The ‘how’ of the implementation of health care reform relates to two aspects. 
The first is the practical dimension of what type of program, or what type of health 
system, should be created. This, however, is strongly influenced by the dominant ide-
as and beliefs, in short, by the political ideology, of the nation. Ideas regarding the 
role and scope of government, and by extension ideas regarding the issue of personal 
responsibility as opposed to governmental responsibility, are determining for this 
and inform whether a full government approach—such as a single payer system—
will, or can, be chosen, or whether a market-based system should be favored. Addi-
tionally, the particular history of the United States in which the federal government 
played a major role for racial equality led to very different ideas dividing the two 
main racial groups regarding the role of government, with blacks favoring a more 
active and predominant role for the federal government than whites. The ‘how’ also 
refers to the issue of political strategy and process, both of which shape final legisla-
tion. The strategy is constrained by the interpretation of the beliefs of the population 
and the opposing party, based on historical assessment; the process constrains and 
limits the shape and scope of the final Act. During Obama’s first term, the power of 
the Democratic Party to act was heavily constrained by its fragile majority and legis-
lative hurdles; the scope of the reform was limited by the strong partisan opposition 
of the Republican Party. Both contributed to the shaping of a reform that was far 
more centrist and moderate than many Democrats, liberals, and activists would have 
liked. 
Lastly, the question of ‘from whom’ raises the looming specter of taxation. Taxa-
tion is a central issue in redistributive policies because it is half of the redistribution 
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equation. Redistributing, as opposed to simply distributing, implies taking resources 
(in the form of money raised through taxes) from one part of the population to give 
them to another part of the population in the form of social benefits such as health 
insurance. This implies making the choice of who is going to be taxed and who will 
get the bulk of the benefits. Both decisions are informed by material questions of who 
has enough resources that can be taxed, and who needs the benefits. However, be-
yond that, the issue of taxation raises the political question of whether people will 
accept being taxed and for whose benefit. These parameters are determined by the 
views people have about their own situation, about the beneficiaries, about those 
people or entities constrained by the new policy, about the scope of government, and 
about the legitimacy of the issue in the first place. These views, moreover, are only 
shaped to a limited extent by objectively material facts, as the last two points are par-
ticularly determined by ideology. Political scientist Diana C. Mutz foregrounds the 
fact that, within the general public, decision-making is biased, new input is ignored 
when it deviates from the ideological goal, which is based on the emotion attached to 
the cue or issue.14 It is thus necessary to examine the perceptions of who is taxed on 
the behalf of whom, and what the perceptions of these groups are. These perceptions 
have been strongly shaped along racial lines throughout American history. It is fur-
thermore necessary to examine attitudes about government and their foundation, as 
well as attitudes about social policy issues, especially health care. As Tilly pointed 
out, past historical events determine these attitudes, can be partly informed and ex-
plained by historical context, and can be measured through opinion polls. 
The political behavior of the public, and by extension, public opinion, which in-
forms the political behavior, are very tricky issues implying a range of debates. Politi-
cal scientists Russell Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann highlight the fact that in 
the information-rich environment of Western societies, citizens appear to often use 
information shortcuts, cues, emotions, and a heuristic trial-and-error approach to 
reach political choices.15 Thus it appears all the more interesting and relevant to ana-
lyze how history has shaped and influenced these emotions, what has already been 
tried, what kind of intellectual shortcuts are made based on past experience, and es-
pecially how past events can be transformed into cues that influence voter choices. 
Another theoretical question had to be addressed before starting the research. 
When looking at the division of power in the American governmental system, it may 
seem incongruous to focus on the president for a policy analysis. However, Theodore 
Lowi points out that redistributive policies are the only policy arena in which the 
president plays not only a role, but a crucial one, as he demonstrates that social poli-
cies are likely to fail without presidential intervention.16 The president not only has 
the agenda-setting function formalized through the State of the Union Address, but is 
also needed for social policy enactment because the president, contrary to Congress, 
can speak in one distinctive voice, known since Theodore Roosevelt as the bully pul-
pit. This is particularly necessary for social policies, because of the huge impact they 
have on society and the strong role public opinion plays in this context.  
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In this respect Goodin insists on the fact that the people in power cannot simply 
dictate something, they have to persuade.17 This persuasion operates at two interre-
lated levels: public opinion needs to be worked on and the legislators in Congress 
need to be convinced and marshaled. Favorable public opinion will influence Con-
gress’s willingness to shape a bill in a specific manner and will influence the con-
gresspeople’s likeliness not only to back or cosponsor a bill, but also to ultimately 
vote for it. Lowi foregrounds that this partisanship is particularly exacerbated over 
social policies because of their strong ideological dimension.18 Thus ideology plays a 
major role because it determines both the public’s and the parties’ attitude toward 
social policy, and because public opinion has a significant influence on Congress. 
Thus the president has to use the bully pulpit to push for reform and to model 
the perceptions of social policies and of the specific reform he wants to push, which is 
achieved through discourse. This discourse is built based on the beliefs of the public, 
on the policy goal that the president wants to achieve, and is contrasted with the 
rhetoric of opponents. Since public policy originates within a context, the different 
actors involved in the process, policy makers, implementers, and the public, have 
previous views, “notions,” which influence their choices and evaluations and affect 
what is deemed relevant, important, or desirable. These notions are themselves influ-
enced by information, by material assets, institutions, and normative judgments. 
They function as “enablers and constraints for public policy.”19 Thus the cultural and 
historical context determines the kind of symbols—or doxa, as termed by rhetorician 
Ruth Amossy20—that are used to shape the notions of both the public and politicians. 
It also determines how political capital is used to further the political agenda, and 
how the life histories of political elites are used to shape these notions. As a conse-
quence, the presidential rhetoric that develops regarding a specific reform project 
should carefully craft a discourse that takes these enablers and constraints into ac-
count and should shape and rework them. Thus it is necessary to carefully examine 
in this work the political discourse that has developed around social policy, including 
issues of taxation and beneficiary groups, ideas of government and personal respon-
sibility, as well as issues of race and class, in order to determine the ideational con-
straints that Obama faced. On the other hand, Obama could build upon cultural and 
ideational enablers, including his personal history and identity, which needed to be 
analyzed, based on their use in discourse—something Amossy terms persona and 
ethos.21  
Finally, it appeared as too limited to focus only on the political strategy and dis-
course used in the enactment of policy. The policy, the law itself, needs to be 
analyzed to determine to what extent it addresses the problems that have been identi-
fied as needing to be addressed, to what extent the outcome corresponds to the intent 
of the framers, and to what extent the features of the law reflect the constraints and 
the opposition against the policy. Furthermore, there is the question of whether the 
outcomes or expected outcomes correspond to the ones aimed for, or to what extent 
the outcomes are adverse effects. It is necessary to examine the law to determine 
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whether it reflects the initially proclaimed will and to what extent the will of the op-
position has influenced it. Further, it must be examined how this impacted the popu-
lation, or the different groups. 
Moreover, given the influence of courts in contemporary politics, the role of the 
Supreme Court in the political battle over Obamacare had to be analyzed. This ap-
plies to lawsuits against affirmative action as well, as a key element of the historical 
context that determined Obama’s strategy. 
Methodology 
The present work analyzes Obama’s political strategy of creating race-neutral 
but issue-focused redistributive policy in terms of its foundation, application, and 
outcome, based on the main example of health care legislation. First the concepts of 
race and class will be discussed, then a historical overview of social policies and their 
racialization in American politics will be presented, the specific discourse crafted for 
the political purpose will be analyzed, and finally the political outcome of Obamacare 
will be evaluated. 
It was decided to analyze only the black and the white populations because of 
the particular history of the political and socioeconomic interaction between these 
two groups. For comparative purposes, economic trends within the Hispanic—and in 
some rare cases the Asian population will be evoked to highlight the specific situation 
of the black population or to underline convergences of interests. However, it was not 
considered possible to conduct a systematic study of the three main racial groups of 
the US because the Hispanic situation would have added the complexifying element 
of immigration to the political debate, which deserves a study of its own. 
To evaluate the foundation of Obama’s approach, meaning taking a class focus 
instead of a race focus, the two key concepts of race and class will be examined, as 
well as the historical context that led Obama to formulate this approach.  
The concepts of race and class will be studied from a sociological and ideational 
perspective, and Obama’s definition of these concepts will be analyzed in an articula-
tion with the ideational background. The structural intersection22 of race and class 
will be analyzed to see if a permutation of the categories is possible to a certain de-
gree. The conceptual definitions of race and class are based on scholarly works going 
back to the early 20th century, when the economic dimension of race started being 
discussed, for example by W.E.B. Du Bois. As for the socioeconomic overview, it is 
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both based on scholarly works that analyze class in America, as well as on data and 
statistics gathered by various government agencies.23 
To further evaluate the permutability of race and class, their structural dimen-
sion will be examined, as well as factors of social mobility. Research on the im-
portance of health care for social mobility and economic stability will be closely re-
viewed to ascertain the salience of health care legislation for the populations 
concerned. Although class is an undeniable factor in social mobility, the race factor 
has nonetheless a very important impact on inequalities, for various reasons ranging 
from the present effects of past discrimination to current discrimination and systemic 
inequalities. Thus, current opinions, political and academic, about race-specific poli-
cies will be examined to show the main arguments in favor of a race-neutral ap-
proach, which could help justify Obama’s choice. The main arguments that surfaced 
centered on the question of political feasibility, a concern that Obama strongly 
shares. 
The second step in exploring the foundation of Obama’s strategy will be to de-
termine the historical context that led him to the conclusion that race-specific poli-
cies are a political impossibility. It is thus necessary to discuss the American welfare 
state, especially regarding its development and its opponents, as well as the specific 
history of attempts at enacting health care legislation, to have a clear view of the situ-
ation Obama faced for his reform project. Given the subject, it is necessary to careful-
ly analyze the racial dimension of social policies. However, there is neither an aca-
demic nor a political consensus about the actual racial dimension of social policies, 
just as there is no consensus about the fact discrimination occurred or still might oc-
cur. Similarly, there is no consensus about whether racial appeals are still made in 
politics. It was thus decided to distinguish between a factual and consensual overview 
of the history of social policies, and theories regarding the racialization of social poli-
cies. The separation of the two highlights attitudes and ideas, in short, a racialized 
perception of social policies informing voters’ choices. This is based on prior research 
on those questions, as well as current polls (conducted by Gallup, PEW, or the Joint 
Center of Political and Economic Studies, as well as some newspapers known for 
their polling, as for example The New York Times or The Washington Post). 
Current statistics will be used to determine whether or not there is a statistical 
basis for the perception by part of the white population that social programs benefit 
only or mainly racial minorities. Medicaid, rather than Medicare, appears as the most 
relevant program for this part of the analysis. Indeed, it is a health care program, and 
contrary to Medicare is a means-tested program. Most of all, Medicare is one of the 
most popular programs in the US, and it does not suffer from the negative perception 
of social policies, whereas Medicaid does. 
 Furthermore, beyond the general backlash against welfare, the specific case of 
affirmative action will be scrutinized. Although affirmative action is not a social pro-
gram per se, as it redistributes opportunity rather than means, it nonetheless epito-
mizes and has crystallized the backlash against race-specific policies and has greatly 
fuelled the rejection of measures perceived as racial preferential treatment. Obama’s 
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views and interpretations regarding the white backlash against race-specific and so-
cial policies will be analyzed, as well as the racial backlash against Obama, to evalu-
ate the relevance of the notion of race both for Obama’s political thought and for the 
Obama presidency. This will help establishing the historical and ideational back-
ground that informed Obama’s choice of political strategy. 
The study of Obama’s strategy will further be completed by an analysis of the 
ongoing partisan divide over social policies during the Obama presidency, especially 
in relation to the enactment of health care reform. The interpretations and the analy-
sis presented here were checked against, verified, and corroborated by interviews 
conducted with Democratic Congressmen and health legislation staffers of Demo-
cratic Congressmen involved in the health care legislation process. 
After identifying the main ideational issues, as well as some issues of representa-
tion and perception, regarding social policies and race-specific policy efforts, the 
analysis will focus on how these issues, representations, perceptions, and even stereo-
types were used in political discourse to attack social policies, and especially to create 
a class division along racial lines. It was deemed necessary to have a precise view of 
the opposition’s discourse, in particular because the racially divisive discourse estab-
lished by President Ronald Reagan proved extremely long lasting and strongly 
marked these perceptions. This is needed to show how precisely Obama reacted to 
this discourse, and how carefully he crafted a counter-discourse aiming at establish-
ing a class-based racial unity in order to find a majority in favor of social policy re-
form. In addition, Obama’s racial identity is discussed. First because during the 2008 
presidential campaign it was a major issue in the United States, and second, because 
the discourse analysis method devised by rhetorician Ruth Amossy24 emphasizes the 
importance of the public identity (persona) of the orator, as well as his discursive 
identity (ethos). This appeared all the more relevant since Obama very outspokenly 
used his identity in his speeches, as well as his personal and family history.  
Obama’s strategy will further be assessed by analyzing how this strategy fit into 
black political thought and how it sought to address racial inequalities. The assess-
ment that the race-based focus of the Democratic Party was a political liability is pri-
marily a white point of view. The examination of black political thought appeared 
essential to situate Obama as a black politician. This is particularly useful to analyze 
Obama’s strategy to find solutions to tackle racial inequalities, which is not necessari-
ly the focus of mainstream white political thought. 
Finally, the application and political outcome of Obama’s strategy will be ana-
lyzed in the form of Obamacare. Thus both Acts, the ACA and the HCER—which 
amends the ACA—will be analyzed in terms of how they reflected Obama’s political 
thought. The focus will especially be on measures that were likely to structurally im-
pact the black population, as can be seen in the statistical description of the black 
population as compared to the white population.  
Further analysis will be centered on the question of whether certain provisions 
dealing with specific health issues are of specific interest to the black population 
based on their socio-economic situation. Although the main focus is on the question 
whether or not the legislation corresponded to the political strategy Obama had cho-
sen, some early statistics and reports on the effects of Obamacare will be exposed. In 
this respect an analysis of the lawsuit National Federation of Independent Business v. 
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Sebelius in 201225 will be conducted, because it seriously harmed Obamacare by ren-
dering its Medicaid extension optional. This was considered particularly relevant as 
the Medicaid issue encompasses two major elements in relation to race: Medicaid is a 
health care intersection of race and class, but it is also a nexus of the question of fed-
eral versus state power. This question of the interplay between federal and state level 
plays a major role in the question of the scope of government in general and in social 
policy in particular. This analysis will focus on the Supreme Court decision and on 
the racial impact of the decision, to highlight the impact of adverse conditions on the 
outcome of a policy. 
Fieldwork 
In order to buttress the theoretical findings of the research, interviews with con-
gresspeople involved in the elaboration of the health care reform were conducted.26 
The interviews were not meant to function as a basis for the research, but rather as a 
means to corroborate the analysis and the findings. This is due to the fact that the 
number of people involved in the drafting of the reform was too limited for a quanti-
tative research. In the House of Representatives, three committees were involved: 
Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means. In the Senate, 
the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, as well as the Senate Finance 
Committee, worked on the health reform. Except for the bipartisan Gang of Six in the 
Senate, which included three Republicans, only Democrats in these congressional 
committees participated in the reform bill. Senators were not considered for the in-
terviews because of their limited availability. Only representatives were targeted be-
cause of their greater availability. It was not considered problematic that the final Act 
is based on the Senate bill, as the questions of the interviews focused on the process, 
the guiding principles, and the interaction between the legislative and the executive 
branch. This narrowed the pool to 91 representatives and their health staffers, which 
represents too small a sample to serve as an analytical basis, especially as it was obvi-
ous that only a small share of these representatives would accept to be interviewed.  
Thus, the research is a qualitative one, meaning a small number of extensive in-
terviews, which lasted, depending on the availability of the interviewees, between 30 
minutes and an hour. The interviews were semi-directive, guided by a few broad and 
some very specific questions. All questions were very open-ended as to elicit addi-
tional information and to prompt free thought. To be able to elaborate the interview 
questionnaire in the most relevant way, it was decided to conduct the interviews rela-
tively late into the research process, during the third year. This time period was cho-
sen to make sure that the theoretical foundation for the interviews was solid, but to 
allow for enough flexibility should major new insights occur. 
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Although more representatives and staffers had initially agreed to be inter-
viewed, I finally managed to interview nine persons in total, five former representa-
tives and four staffers working for different representatives. Some of the interviews 
were conducted by phone or Skype, others were conducted on site in Washington, 
either in the offices of the congressional buildings or at the workplaces of the former 
representatives.  
The following persons were interviewed: 
Robert E. Andrews represented New Jersey’s 1st district from 1989 to 2014. He de-
scribed himself as a moderate Democrat and sat on the Education and Labor Com-
mittee. He was chairman of the subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and 
Pensions and strongly involved in the legislative process. His district was majority 
white with about 17% of blacks and was rather solidly Democratic.  
Bruce Braley, representative for Iowa’s 1st congressional district from 2007 to 
2015. He was on the Committee on Energy and Commerce. His district was over 90% 
white. His district is now represented by a Republican. Braley described himself as a 
progressive populist. In 2009, he founded the Congressional Populist Caucus, whose 
focus seems to be mainly on middle class issues. 
Bart Gordon, representative for Tennessee’s 6th congressional district from 1985 
to 2011. He was on the Committee on Energy and Commerce. His district was majority 
white and rather conservative. Gordon was one of the conservative Blue Dogs, but 
described himself as personally rather more liberal than his district.  
Earl Pomeroy represented North Dakota’s at large district from 1993 to 2011. He 
is one of the conservative Blue Dogs and was on the Ways and Means Committee and 
its subcommittees on health as well as Social Security. His district was majority white. 
He was part of the bipartisan Rural Health Care Coalition. He had worked, prior to 
his time in Congress, as insurance commissioner, an elected state executive position, 
in North Dakota from 1985 to 1992, regulating the health insurance industry. Both 
Pomeroy and Gordon ended their political careers over the health care vote. 
John F. Tierney, representative for Massachusetts’s 6th district from 1997 to 2015. 
He was on the Committee on Education and Labor. His district was majority white 
with low levels of poverty. His district was rather solidly Democratic and he describes 
himself as very progressive.  
Thomas Dorney is a staffer for Congressman John Lewis who has represented 
Georgia’s 5th district since 1987. Lewis is on the Ways and Means Committee. His dis-
trict is majority black with some poverty issues and solidly Democratic. Lewis is a 
member of the Congressional Progressive Caucus and the Congressional Black Cau-
cus. 
Yardly Pollas is the health advisor for Congressman Bobby Rush who has repre-
sented Illinois’ 1st district since 1993. Rep. Rush is on the Committee on Education and 
Labor. His district is majority black and very Democratic. Rush is a member of the 
Congressional Black Caucus and of the Congressional Diabetes Caucus.  
Megan Sussman is a senior legislative advisor for Congresswoman Doris Matsui 
who represented California’s 5th district from 2005 to 2013, and was elected in the 6th 
district in 2013. It is a strongly Democratic majority-minority district. The 5th district 
was slightly majority white with a strong Asian population and very Democratic. Rep. 
Matsui is on the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus and co-chair of the 
Congressional Caucus on Women’s Issues. She is on the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce. 
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In addition, Dan Riffle, health advisor to Congressman John Conyers, accepted 
to be interviewed. Conyers has represented Michigan’s 13th district since 1965. The 
district is majority black with rather high levels of low and moderate incomes. Co-
nyers is the Dean of the House, the longest-serving member in the House. He is not a 
member of any of the Committees with jurisdiction over health care, but this inter-
view was included because Conyers is a longtime champion of single payer and has 
re-introduced a single-payer bill in 2017. He is a member of the Congressional Black 
Caucus and the Congressional Progressive Caucus, among others.  
And finally, a last interview was conducted with New York Times journalist Da-
vid Herszenhorn. Together with journalist Robert Pear he covered the Obama health 
care reform for the NY Times. Pear focused more on the technical health care aspects, 
Herszenhorn dealt more with the political process. 
Despite the sample being small, it nonetheless reflects political diversity, as it 
comprises members of all the House committees involved in the ACA. Moreover, the 
representatives occupied varying positions on these committees. It also represents an 
important ideological diversity encompassing the whole spectrum of Democratic 
ideologies from very progressive through moderate to conservative. The districts the 
interviewees represented are very diverse as well, ranging from almost all-white dis-
tricts to majority-minority districts, including one district with an important Asian 
and Hispanic population. In addition, the districts also present geographical diversity, 
as all main regions of the US are covered. Thus the sample provides a good overview 
of the different political interests and situations in very different regions of the US. 
Sources 
The analysis of Obama’s discourse and opinion, meaning the rhetorical con-
struct of his Weltbild and political ideology, is based on a set of texts encompassing 
some of Obama’s writings, political speeches, and interviews with journalists. 
Two books Obama had written prior to his presidential bid were selected, 
Dreams from my Father: A Story of Race and Inheritance, and The Audacity of Hope: 
Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream.27 The first, his autobiography, was includ-
ed because it extensively discusses Obama’s search for identity, which is relevant for 
the discussion of his persona and even his ethos. This autobiography extensively dis-
cusses Obama’s family, and to some extent his professional background, which sheds 
light on his sensitivity in questioning racial and class issues. It also informs his par-
ticular interest in the specificity of the economic situation of the black population. 
Dreams from my Father, written by Obama after he had been elected first black presi-
dent of the Harvard Law Review and first published in 1995, has the advantage of 
providing insights into Obama’s racial and class thinking without the constraining 
filter of electoral politics. The second book is particularly interesting and was exten-
sively used to discuss Obama’s political ideology. As was explained by David Plouffe, 
Obama’s campaign manager in 2008, the book tour organized after the publication of 
The Audacity of Hope in 2006 gradually transformed into the foundation of the presi-
dential nomination campaign. Plouffe insists on the fact that the campaign program 
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was strongly based on the content of the book.28 Beyond that, the book has the addi-
tional interest of discussing issues in more detail than any speech could do it, as well 
as being more radical in its formulation and the positions defended, because it was 
written from the perspective of a senator, not a president, or presidential candidate, 
and thus was slightly less politically constrained. 
The speeches selected for the study start with Obama’s keynote address at the 
2004 Democratic National Convention, which attracted a lot of attention and was a 
major success. They continue with speeches made during the first presidential cam-
paign, and end with the year 2010, because Obamacare was passed in March 2010. 
Later speeches were considered less relevant, although in many respects it would 
have been interesting to explore if his discourse on the various issues changed after-
wards. The time range is wide because the intention was to analyze the overall rhe-
torical and ideological construct that Obama had built around social policies. Major 
presidential speeches, such as the 2009 Inaugural Address, the 2009 Address to a 
Joint Session of Congress, and the 2010 State of the Union Address, were included 
because of their wide scope of themes, and especially because of the heightened pub-
lic attention they garnered. Other presidential speeches over the 2009-2010 period 
were included based on their content. The focus was on speeches that addressed is-
sues of race, the economy, social policy, class issues, and health care specifically. 
Three interviews were also used. Two of which were conducted after the selected 
time period, but they focused on his presidential terms. Because of this, the content 
was used to put certain events in perspective, rather than to establish his political 
ideology. 
In addition to these main primary sources, several works are the cornerstones 
for the theoretical and historical analysis developed in this dissertation. 
The reflection on the intersection of race and class is partly based on works from 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, such as analyses by sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois in 
The Souls of Black Folk or The Conservation of Races,29 because they are seminal works 
on the structuring effect of race. The 1944 work of economist and sociologist Gunnar 
Myrdal in An American Dilemma: the Negro Problem and Modern Democracy is similarly 
important because it stresses the fact that “the Negro problem is primarily a white 
man’s problem,” and that the subordinate position of blacks primarily reflects white 
economic interests.30 The continuity of this structuring effect has been studied by 
sociologist and race theorist Howard Winant, who posits that the situation has not 
significantly changed between the pre- and post-Civil Rights era.31 The analysis of 
this structuring effect, and more precisely of the social, economic, and political 
mechanisms that contribute to reinforcing and maintaining it, was greatly based on 
historian and political scientist Ira Katznelson’s 2005 book When Affirmative Action 
Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America and on 
sociologist Joe R. Feagin’s 2012 book White Party, White Government: Race, Class, and 
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US Politics.32 Katznelson analyzes how social policies contributed to creating an addi-
tional greater advantage for whites on top of the negative structural barriers blacks 
faced, thus contributing to widening the gap between the two populations. Feagin 
has a more political perspective in demonstrating the systemic racism that skews re-
source allocation towards white interests. The more recent assessment of racial eco-
nomic inequalities was mainly based on the works of sociologists Melvin L. Oliver 
and Thomas M. Shapiro in their 1995 book	  Black Wealth/ White Wealth: A New Perspec-
tive on Racial Inequality and sociologist Dalton Conley in his 2010 book Being Black, 
Living in the Red: Race, Wealth, and Social Policy in America.33 The two books assess the 
impact of past discrimination on racial economic inequalities, and Conley particular-
ly insists on the role social policies can play in addressing such inequalities. Oliver 
and Shapiro detail the greater fragility of the black middle class. The description of 
the economic situation of blacks during the health reform period was completed by 
recent government reports and statistical data.  
Sociologist William Julius Wilson’s classic The Declining Significance of Race: 
Blacks and the Changing American Institutions, first published in 1978, provides the first 
major analysis of the limitations of affirmative action and of the need to take class 
differences within the black population into account.34 The work of sociologist Karyn 
R. Lacy in her 2007 book Blue-Chip Blacks: Race, Class, and Status in the New Black Mid-
dle Class provided the basis for analyzing class differences within the black popula-
tion.35 Attitudes regarding race issues in recent decades are mostly informed by soci-
ologist Lawrence Bobo’s various studies. 
The issue of racial differences in attitudes and conceptions of social mobility 
and inequality was strongly informed by political scientist Jennifer Hochschild’s 1995 
book, Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation.36 The dis-
cussion of class issues draws mostly from political scientist Larry Bartels’ 2008 book, 
Unequal Democracy: The New Political Economy of the New Gilded Age,37 which strongly 
highlights the link between politics and growing class inequalities. The 2014 book by 
sociologists Earl Wysong, Robert Perrucci, and David Wright, entitled New Class Soci-
ety: Goodbye American Dream?,38 offers a historical analysis of the changes in the 
American class structure and strongly emphasizes the growing class inequalities in 
the US.  
Regarding the problem that race represents in terms of political strategy, two 
works proved particularly important. The first is political scientists and journalists 
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Thomas and Mary Edsall’s book, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes 
on American Politics (1991), which best explains the racial division of the class-based 
New Deal Coalition, and strongly focuses on the type of discourse Reagan devised to 
exploit this division. Moreover, Edsall and Edsall provide proposals for Democratic 
counter-strategies based on their analysis of Reagan’s electoral victories and his dis-
course emphasizing values. This includes a stronger focus on the white middle 
class.39 As for the importance of the divisiveness of race on the left, it is also greatly 
tackled by political scientists Paul Sniderman and Edward Carmines’ 1997 book, 
Reaching Beyond Race.40 Only an analysis by political scientist and sociologist Frances 
Fox Piven provided an additional dimension to the Edsalls’ thesis by integrating the 
issue of globalization.41 
On the African-American side, Cornel West’s perspective in Race Matters (1993)42 
is decidedly more racial than the Edsalls’ perspective, but he reaches a similar con-
clusion by way of a different path: the political stalemate between liberals and con-
servatives and their congealed discourse has had nefarious effects on the black popu-
lation. West proposes a different strategy to further black interests, the idea of an 
interest-based interracial class alliance that would integrate some conservative ideas 
such as a greater emphasis on constructive values. The more recent trends and argu-
ments showing this perspective can be found in different books by historian and pro-
fessor of public affairs Manning Marable, such as his 2009 Beyond Black and White: 
From Civil Rights to Barack Obama.43  
The theoretical reflection on policy types is based on political scientist Theo-
dore Lowi’s 2009 book, Arenas of Power, which categorizes legislations into constitu-
tional, regulatory, distributional, and redistributional policies. This categorization 
depends on the area of application of the policy and the degree of intervention of dif-
ferent political actors in the legislative process, including the executive. This typology 
includes the ideological potential of different types of policies. Lowi asserts the influ-
ence of the president on social policies and highlights the ideological polarizing po-
tential of social policies.44 Furthermore, for the more specifically racial dimension, 
political scientist Robert Lieberman’s 2007 book, Shaping Race Policy: the United States 
in Comparative Perspective, proved a useful foundation. Lieberman’s analysis and ty-
pology categorizes policies not based on their racial intent, but on their racial out-
come.45  
The analysis of the historical context from a racial perspective (and especially 
the racialization of social policies) was based to a great extent on the above-cited 
works of Feagin and Katznelson, but also on the detailed work of political scientist 
and sociologist Theda Skocpol in her 1995 book, Social Policy in the United States: Fu-
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ture Possibilities in Historical Perspective,46 which highlights the constraints that the his-
tory of social policies represents for the development of new programs. Other works 
that contributed strongly to this part were the 1999 work, Why Americans Hate Welfare: 
Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy, by political scientist Martin Gilens 
and The Welfare State Nobody Knows: Debunking Myths About US Social Policy (2007) by 
political scientist Christopher Howard.47 Gilens minutely analyzes the negative per-
ception of social policies, and welfare in particular, in racial terms, and speaks of a 
racialization of social policies when they are perceived to mainly benefit minorities. 
These trends were verified for the period under study either through later studies 
replicating some of Gilens’ analyses, such as the study conducted by political scientist 
Bass van Doorn,48 or through recent polls on the issues and cue words identified by 
Gilens. Howard particularly insisted on the gap between the perception and the reali-
ty of various programs. The issues that Howard identified were verified for the period 
under study based on the data provided, among others, by the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services. 
Two books served as a major basis for the discursive analysis in terms of con-
tent, in addition to the previously mentioned theoretical work L’argumentation dans le 
discours by Ruth Amossy. The analysis of coded racial discourse is greatly based on 
The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality (2001) by 
political scientist Tali Mendelberg.49 The racial discourse of health policies is best 
decoded by political scientist Gerard W. Boychuck in his comparative study, National 
Health Insurance in the United States and Canada: Race, Territory, and the Roots of Differ-
ence, published in 2008.50 The comparative perspective precisely highlights the im-
pact of race on the development of American health policies. Adjacent issues of pub-
lic opinion impact analysis, especially regarding health care, were to a great extent 
based on the 2000 book Politicians Don’t Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of 
Democratic Responsiveness, by political scientists Lawrence Jacobs and Robert 
Shapiro.51 This was particularly relevant because they conducted a case study of the 
Clinton health reform defeat, which served to identify certain issues that could be 
critical for the Obama reform. 
Regarding salient issues in the health care reform process and the understand-
ing of the health care legislation, three books were particularly helpful. The specific 
relationship of the executive branch with health care reform efforts and the role pres-
idents have played in health care legislation since the 1910s was analyzed by political 
scientist James Morone and health care policy expert David Blumenthal in their 2009 
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book, The Heart of Power: Health and Politics in the Oval Office.52 Sociologist Paul Starr 
provided an overview of specific problems in American health care reform in his 2011 
book, Remedy and Reaction: the Peculiar Struggle over American Health Care Reform.53 An 
overview of the Obama reform was provided by Jacobs and Skocpol in their early 
analysis Health Care Reform and American Politics: What Everyone Needs to Know (2012).54 
These books constitute the core references used in this research. In addition, 
each part of the dissertation tries to provide an overview of different and evolving 
perspectives on the varying subjects involved in the analysis. 
Outline 
To analyze, on the example of health care reform, the foundation, application, 
and outcome of Obama’s strategy, which consists in using a race-neutral but issue-
focused approach (race pragmatism), to circumvent the racial problem in social poli-
cy questions, several steps will be taken. 
The first part deals with the concepts of race and class, their uses (academic, so-
ciological, political), and the difference between the perception and the socio-
economic reality of these notions. Obama’s position and conception of these notions 
are analyzed. Specific attention is paid to the structural intersection of race and class 
and to the issues where black and white interests, based on material reality, might 
converge or diverge. In this respect, the influence of health care on social mobility 
and stability of class status is explained. Finally, the part closes on the analysis of the 
current debate over colorblindness, which underlines the decisive factor of political 
feasibility in choosing the race-neutral but class-based approach. 
The second part focuses on the development of the welfare state and provides 
an overview of the previous health care reform efforts. This presentation is followed 
by a more interpretative analysis of social policies based on theories by both black 
and white scholars positing race as an influential factor in the shaping of the welfare 
state. This section focuses primarily on the impact of the 1970s white backlash against 
social policies, and the ongoing effects of this backlash, analyzing Obama’s opinion 
and thoughts on the issue, as well as the racial backlash against Obama. This part 
establishes a historical context in which a class division operates along racial lines 
over issues of social policy, thus serving as a background to Obama’s choice of a neu-
tral reform strongly focused on the middle class. It also introduces the continuing 
strong partisan polarization over social policies. Through an overview of the Obama 
reform process, specific attention is paid to the constraints of partisanship and the 
makeup of the Democratic majority, which influenced and determined the leeway 
that existed for reformers. 
The third part focuses on discourse. It explores the functioning of coded racial 
discourse and its relation to stereotypes. This analysis is completed by an overview of 
the impact of the media on politics and political discourse, followed by a discussion 
of how congresspeople perceived the role of the media in relation to the ACA. Several 
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racial code terms, which were selected through the exploration of the specific history 
of health care, are then explained in historical perspective. Their relevance is shown 
through examples of how either Obama or the health care reform were criticized. 
Particular attention is paid to the responsibility discourse, from Reagan to Obama, 
because this issue subsumes and encapsulates all the sub-issues that appear in the 
social policy debate, especially when viewed from a racial perspective. Moreover, this 
section reveals Obama’s centrist approach, which integrates certain conservative el-
ements, to rework them with a progressive aim. This is in accordance with a long tra-
dition of black thought, such as Du Bois’ for example. Finally, Obama’s rhetorical 
construct is examined in detail. Themes were selected based on their relevance re-
garding the historical context, the coded racial discourse, and their usefulness in ar-
guing for a class-based interracial unity in favor of social policy and health care re-
form. Thus themes like unity, racial transcendence, class populism, an issue-focused 
approach, but also the American Dream and government intervention, are discussed. 
The fourth and last part specifically explores pragmatic race theory and to what 
extent Obama appears to adhere to the theory, followed by a discussion of reactions 
to Obama’s approach. After this, the two health care Acts are analyzed to uncover the 
aspects of the universal class-based approach that have a beneficial structural impact 
on the black population, followed by an analysis of the provisions that specifically 
focus on issues that are particularly problematic for the black population. Prelimi-
nary results of the implementation of Obamacare are examined, as well as the fragili-
ty of the reform. The main focus here is the 2012 Sebelius lawsuit and the impact of the 
decision on the black population. In relation to the fragility of the reform, the issue of 
single payer and its new political potential is analyzed.  
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1.1. Race  
There is an ongoing debate about the salience of race in the USA, which 
has intensified in the wake of President Obama’s election. This historic election 
has been heralded by many as the coming of post-racial America, but there are 
just as many who see race as all-defining in American society.1 The con-
cept/term of “race” is a very difficult one and its meaning has changed over 
time, hence the importance of clearly defining it and describing the context of 
its use. 
It is very difficult to distinguish between race, racism, and prejudice. It is 
also hard to provide an overview of the changing use of race as a category, the 
changing use of racism, i.e. how racism is expressed, or how it is defined accord-
ing to periods. This is especially complicated because it is a very sensitive issue, 
one in which people are emotionally implicated, either because they see race as 
a life-defining issue, or because they want to conform to political correctness.2 
The issue is so sensitive because right from the first establishment of racial cat-
egories based on physiognomic differences, these racial categories have been 
used in a negative and harmful way (racism) to justify the oppression of the na-
tive people of Africa and the Americas. Depending on the context of country 
and issue, people become wary of the use of race, precisely because of this diffi-
cult history. For example, the US allows for a racial census, allows racial statis-
tics, and today sees this data as a means to fight discrimination. France, on the 
other hand, views any form of racial data, whatever use may be made of it, as 
inherently racist, since racial statistics could imply that there is a difference be-
tween people according to race. But what kind of difference would that be? 
Does it necessarily mean that some are biologically inferior to others, as biolog-
ically racist theories of white supremacy and Aryan Nazi ideology imply? Is it a 
cultural difference, as conservatives argue today in the US? Does difference 
necessarily imply a superiority-inferiority relationship? And in these circum-
stances, how to explain the economic and social structural differences that ap-
pear along racial lines? More importantly: what causes what? Does race cause 
structural differences or do structural differences cause race?  
1.1.1. Use as a Category 
Elizabeth Anderson proposes a minimal conception of race, where she dis-
tills the main aspects of racial differences that are central to a biological concep-
tion of race: “1: real or imagined bodily differences, 2: real or imagined common 
ancestors, 3: real or imaginary common geographical origins.” These minimal 
criteria used for racial differentiation allowed for a very fine-tuned conception 
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of race in the 19th century and the early 20th century because they mingled with 
what today would be considered ethnic distinctions.3 
Race, in its biological conception has mainly been used to argue for genet-
ic racial inferiority, and it was only in the early 20th century that the environ-
ment and cultural differences started to be used to explain and justify racial 
differences.4 W.E.B. Du Bois expressed this link in one of his early essays: 
The American Negro has always felt an intense personal interest in discussions as 
to the origins and destinies of races: primarily because back of most discussions of 
race with which he is familiar, have lurked certain assumptions as to his natural 
abilities, as to his political, intellectual and moral status, which he felt were 
wrong.5  
Du Bois also showed that this biological conception of race was primarily a 
white conception of race. 
Despite this approach having been abandoned for a long time, Charles 
Murray, a political scientist, and Richard J. Herrnstein, a psychologist, tried to 
bring back genetic racial inferiority in their book The Bell Curve: Intelligence and 
Class Structure in American Life first published in 1994. The book rapidly became 
a best seller. Sociologist Stephen Steinberg explains that although this genetic 
racism had been discredited by the social sciences, its resurgence was possible 
because of what he calls the “permanent ‘underclass.’”6 Despite its popular suc-
cess, the book had no lasting impact on the social sciences. 
However, the rejection of biological racism is mainly an academic devel-
opment. The popular success of books like The Bell Curve points to the fact that 
there might be lingering beliefs in biological racial differences within the gen-
eral population. Ta-Nehisi Coates defends this idea: “Americans believe in the 
reality of “race” as a defined, indubitable feature of the natural world.”7 Sociol-
ogist Robert Miles shares this observation and points out the paradox of the 
abandonment of the biological concept of race as it was defined in the 19th cen-
tury by the scientific world, but its ongoing use in a “common sense” way. He 
points out that people continue to believe in a rather “biological conception of 
race”.8 This schism in the understanding of what race is, emphasizes the need to 
explain race as a social construct. 
It is very difficult to accept the idea of race as a social construct precisely 
because the features included in the idea of race, such as skin color, hair, facial 
features, and to a certain extent the shape of the body, are so visible and thus 
inevitably have a huge impact on our lives. Howard Zinn highlights this diffi-
culty in the essay The Southern Mystique first published in 1963: 
It seems to be the hardest thing in the world to convince ourselves that once we’ve 
noted skin color, facial features and hair texture, we have exhausted the subjects 
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of race—that everything beyond that is in our heads; put there by others and kept 
there by ourselves, and all the brutal material consequences of centuries, from 
lynching to patronizing friendship, were spun from an original thread of false-
hood.”9 
Because of this visibility, race is a concept that cannot be discarded. Although 
the objective basis of race as a biologically significant category that can be used 
to justify a racial hierarchy and claim white supremacy is widely rejected, the 
social reality of the concept persists. Sociologist and race theorist Howard 
Winant insists on the fact that the questioning of the future of the race concept 
is only possible because it is now considered a social construct.10 For example, 
researchers, such as political scientist Jennifer Hochschild, have speculated 
over the possible disappearance of the use of race categories in the US by 2050, 
as announced in an issue of Migration News, a scholarly journal about immigra-
tion.11 The increasing acceptance of multiculturalism and diversity seems to 
justify these speculations, as well as the broadening of the Census question-
naire since 2000, allowing for mixed racial categories and self-statement of ra-
cial category. Winant also points to the increasing use of “ethnicity” instead of 
race; race referring only to major distinctions according to skin color.12 Manning 
Marable sees this social construct primarily as a relationship: 
’Race’ is first and foremost an unequal relationship between social aggregates, 
characterized by dominant and subordinate forms of social interaction, and rein-
forced by the intricate patterns of public discourse, power, ownership and privi-
lege within the economic, social and political institutions of society.13 
In this sense, race in its form as social construct must be understood as a force 
that structures society, that has an economic impact on people’s lives, and that 
has a political dimension. Sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, among others, has 
argued for the need of a deeper understanding of this structuring force, even if 
it is a social construct.14  
Already in 1944, in his seminal work The American Dilemma, Gunnar 
Myrdal pointed out the ideological use that was being made of biological rac-
ism to explain the oppression of part of the population. 15 Later, in 1980, Colette 
Guillaumin, a sociologist at the CNRS (Centre National de Recherche Scientifique), 
demonstrated the inherently ideological dimension of race as a tool to explain 
existing social relations: 
Hence, any analytical use of the idea of ‘race’ disguises the fact that it is an idea 
created by human beings in certain historical and material conditions, and used 
to represent and structure the world in certain ways, under certain historical con-
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ditions and for certain political interests. The idea of ‘race’ is therefore essentially 
ideological.16 
Sociologist Joe R. Feagin argues in his 2012 book White Party, White Government: 
Race, Class, and US Politics that race has been used as a means of subordination 
since the origins of the United States.17 It is in this use to justify subordination in 
social hierarchy that race becomes racism. Political scientist Rickey Hill shares 
this view on the ideological use of racism in US society:  
Conceptually, race specifies a system of ideas and values, of advantages and dis-
advantages. Racism is the ideology that rationalizes racial domination and white 
supremacy. Moreover, racism gives a framework to the superstructural, substruc-
tural, and infrastructural processes and institutions that practice racial exclusion, 
circumscription, and proscription. In broad terms, racism in the United States op-
erationalizes a racial contract of whiteness. Whiteness is about privilege and the 
normality and visibility of white people as the dominant group and class in Amer-
ican society. Historically, whiteness has privileged white people over and against 
non-white people as the “Other.” Moreover, whiteness socially categorizes white 
people into a dominant power relationship with non-white groups. This concep-
tualization accounts for the differentiation in the resources, power, authority, and 
influence among white people writ large.18 
The essential aspects of this ideological construct are that it is a white vs. non-
white construct and that the ultimate goal is to justify an unequal distribution 
of resources. 
1.1.2. Race, Racism, Prejudice 
It is precisely within this harmful use of race to justify subordination that 
the definition of racism can be ascertained. Albert Memmi points out that rac-
ism revolves around difference and in the negative use made of those physical 
differences. The differences themselves, initially, do not necessarily contain a 
judgment of value: 
Therein lies the real depravity of racism. This can all be summed up in three 
points. Differences can exist or not exist. Differences are not in themselves good 
or bad. One is not a racist or anti-racist in pointing out or in denying differences, 
but one is racist in using them against someone to one’s own advantage.19 
This use of racial differences to ‘one’s own advantage’ differentiates the notions 
of race and racism. It is in this use that racism becomes a tool of oppression: 
Racism is both the ideology and the active manifestation of domination. Each 
time one explores a relation of oppression, one discovers within it a racism, like a 
ghost or a shadow, as its inevitable extension. An aspect of all forms of domi-
nance, it is a laborious and self-concerned form of bad faith. If I dominate you, it is 
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because you are an inferior being; the responsibility is yours, and the differences 
that exist between us prove it.20 
There is no consensus on the use of the appropriate terms to discuss the 
issue of race. The system of oppression based on race that Feagin, Zinn, and 
Memmi call racism, is called racialism by historian and philosopher Tzvetan 
Todorov, which he sees as different from racism. He defines racism as the “ha-
tred or contempt for individuals who have well-defined physical differences 
from your own.”21 This is closer to the notion of prejudice that will be discussed 
later. Todorov defines racialism as follows: It relies on 5 postulates: 1. races exist 
and have relevant differences. This is often linked to an opposition to the mix-
ing of races. 2. there is an interdependence of physical and moral character, 
meaning that physical differences imply cultural differences. 3. the behavior of 
the individual largely depends on the racio-cultural (or ethnic) group to which 
they belong. 4. One’s own race is asserted as being superior, which includes 
morality and beauty. 5. it is used to justify subordination (and even the elimina-
tion of so-called “inferior” races).22 This rather brutal aspect of racialism or rac-
ism is echoed by Coates, who defines racism as “the need to ascribe bone-deep 
features to people and then humiliate, reduce, and destroy them”.23 Todorov’s 
definition of racialism contains the same major important feature of the defini-
tion of racism as made by Feagin and Zinn: the use of race in a negative way to 
justify subordination. The terms racism and racialism largely mean the same 
thing, but for the sake of simplicity the term of racism will be kept because it is 
more widely used. 
Todorov’s definition, however, introduces some important factors, such as 
the link between physical and cultural differences, superior/inferior values, and 
group behavior superseding individual behavior. Todorov’s first postulate, the 
belief in races as biological reality is discarded by academia, but continues to 
exist as a popular belief, albeit not a very conscious belief. Ti-Nehisi Coates is 
convinced that in the United States there is still a more biological conception of 
race which allows racism or a racially structured society seem natural and nor-
mal, more precisely to use it to justify this subordination: 
In this way, racism is rendered as the innocent daughter of Mother Nature, and 
one is left to deplore the Middle Passage or the Trail of Tears the way one de-
plores an earthquake, a tornado, or any other phenomenon that can be cast as be-
yond the handiwork of men.24 
The fact of believing in a “natural” racial order is central to the justification 
of inaction, of non-intervention. In this sense, Coates also sees racism as preced-
ing the notion of race: the need to justify oppression leads to the creation of 
racial categories whose differences could be exploited in the negative use justi-
fying the said oppression: 
But race is the child of racism, not the father. And the process of naming “the 
people” has never been a matter of genealogy and physiognomy so much as one 
of hierarchy. Difference in hue and hair is old. But the belief in the preeminence 
                                                        
20	  Memmi	  131.	  
21	  Tzvetan	  Todorov,	  “Race	  and	  Racism,”	   in	  Theories	  of	  Race	  and	  Racism:	  A	  Reader,	  ed.	  Les	  Back	  
and	  John	  Solomos,	  2nd	  ed.	  (London,	  UK:	  Routledge,	  2009),	  68.	  
22	  Todorov	  68–69.	  
23	  Coates,	  Between	  the	  World	  and	  Me,	  7.	  
24	  Coates,	  Between	  the	  World	  and	  Me,	  7.	  	  
44 Stephan Social Policies and Racial Questions 
of hue and hair, the notion that these factors can correctly organize a society and 
that they signify deeper attributes, which are indelible—this is the new idea at the 
heart of these new people who have been brought up hopelessly, tragically, de-
ceitfully, to believe that they are white.25 
Elizabeth Anderson also points out this deep-seated, almost biological, 
dimension of race that continues to persist. According to her, this is the condi-
tion for race to “work” as a stigmatizing tool, it has to associate specific charac-
ter traits and talents with different races to allow for the differentiation and the 
creation of a feeling of superiority for one group based on the perceived nega-
tivity of the characteristics of other groups. These characteristics need to be 
seen as “intrinsic” to a group: this excludes the notion of free choice, situational 
explanations, or discrimination.26 Murphree and Royster insist on the fact that 
the justifications for group patterns developed to maintain hierarchy make this 
hierarchy seem logical, natural, and deserved by virtue and merit.27 
Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo demonstrate that in the 1880s and 1890s the 
South developed a new form of biological racism based on Social Darwinism to 
justify segregation. Inherent biological differences to justify segregation were 
used for example in the famous Plessy v. Ferguson case.28 It illustrates the need to 
find a natural explanation for social oppression, which, in reality, has been or-
chestrated by humans. However, World War II and the fight against Hitler, Na-
zism, and biological racism as stated by Nazi-ideology to justify the elimination 
of entire populations, started to erode the foundations of biological racism in 
the US.29 
But this by no means meant a disappearance of the belief or racial hatred, 
especially not in the South of the USA. In his 1963 essay The Southern Mystique 
Zinn describes what he perceives to be the uniqueness of Southern racial ani-
mus: 
 The mystery of the white Southerner comes from a trait that he is presumed to 
possess in quantity and quality sharply distinct from everyone else. That trait is 
race prejudice. 
Other white people, it is acknowledged, are color-biased. There is considered to 
be, however, something special about the quality of the white Southerner’s preju-
dice. The Yankee is rather businesslike in his matter-of-fact exclusion of the Ne-
gro from certain spheres of ordinary living. The British imperialist was haughty 
and sure of himself. But the violence, the passion, the murderous quality of the 
white Southerner’s feeling against the […] Negro has become a canon of American 
thought deep in our consciousness and our literature (and of European literature; 
see Sartre’s La Putain respectueuse). And what is more significant, while the out-
ward signs of this prejudice are clear enough, at its core, at the why of this crazy 
feeling, is a mystery. 30 
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Although Zinn points out the uniqueness of the Southern racial feeling (unique 
in its violence), he qualifies this statement a few pages later when he says that 
“the South is but a distorted mirror image of the North.”31 It is important not to 
overlook that the race issue might be more visible and violent in the South, but 
not confined to it. In his 1964 speech The Ballot or the Bullet Malcolm X states this 
similarity more bluntly: “If you black, you were born in jail, in the North as well 
as the South. Stop talking about the South. Long as you south of the Canadian 
border, you’re south.“32 The violence of Southern racism seems to contain an 
internal contradiction. On the one hand, Zinn’s description of the Southern 
racial violence is very familiar and is exemplified by the use of whippings and 
lynchings. On the other hand, Southern racism was also very often expressed in 
the form of paternalism, which Murphree and Royster identify as a form of rac-
ism and of subjugation. In this type of racism, the affection for the subordinate 
individual is a wanted feature, and part of the elements that reinforce the group 
hierarchy. But when this hierarchy is threatened, the feeling of affection turns 
into open hostility. 33 Paternalism, and theories to justify slavery were largely 
based on ideas of biological inferiority and the idea that blacks were like chil-
dren, unable to take care of themselves, hence the need for white people put-
ting them to work and telling them what to do. This form of racism is echoed by 
the British imperial variation of colonial racism expressed in the idea of a 
“white man’s burden” who has to bring civilization to primitive people, which 
was first popularized in a poem in 1899 by Rudyard Kipling. 
In 1944, Myrdal pointed to lingering paternalism inherited from slavery 
times, when he identified very racist and very radical attitudes in people, who 
would nevertheless defend “their” blacks.34 This paternalistic form of racism 
can account, even today, for seemingly contradictory attitudes in people who 
would be very kind to their own black (nowadays more likely Hispanic) house-
hold employee, but who defend political orientations that are detrimental to 
minorities in general. 
With the Civil Rights Movement, racism has undergone tremendous 
change, especially regarding the expression of racial beliefs with the introduc-
tion of political correctness in racial matters.35 Robert Lieberman points out this 
change in the American conception of racism: 
More sophisticated versions of the racism thesis suggest that even though out-
and-out racist expression is frowned upon, racial stereotypes remain a powerful 
framing device that can shape political behavior and policy debates, often in ways 
that remain hidden behind a norm of color-blind equality.36 
But the changes also concern, and more importantly so, perceptions of race and 
racism since the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Like Ronald Reagan,37 many whites be-
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lieve that discrimination along racial lines disappeared overnight in the mid-
1960s and that most whites have become colorblind.38 According to Bonilla-
Silva, this commonsense view about race and racism became more and more 
widespread during the 1970s and is easily shared, since racism has become more 
subtle.39 
Bobo compares this change to biological racism as denounced by Du Bois: 
where biological racism stated a natural, biological, innate physical and mental 
inferiority, the modern “laissez-faire racism” emphasizes negative black behav-
ior (more violence-prone, lazier, more sexually irresponsible, less educated). 
This conception is often muted, but it tacitly accepts negative black stereotypes, 
which are seen as cultural and based on volitional difference.40 It must be high-
lighted, however, that many of these characteristics, that are now seen as cul-
tural differences, very strongly echo earlier racial images based on biological 
differences. The nearly animalistic inferiority previously attributed to blacks by 
the biological racists, finds an echo in the predisposition to violence, sexually 
promiscuous behavior, and perception of supposed irresponsibility in sexual 
relations (exemplified today by teenage pregnancies and single mothers, and 
the persisting image of the black man as a sexual predator, inherited from slav-
ery times). “Natural laziness” is rephrased as “lack of work ethic”, and “natural 
lower intelligence” is converted into “lack of education due to cultural differ-
ences”. Despite the underlying similarities in the perception, Bobo and Charles 
consider these changes as “substantial”.41 This echo allows for a smooth transi-
tion from the old biological to the modern laissez-faire racism. The most im-
portant aspect of this, however, is the fact that this cultural explanation is still 
used to justify the social hierarchy which puts blacks at the bottom, and is still 
used to blame them for it: their biological inferiority transformed into cultural 
deficiencies and lack of willpower. Moreover, it could be argued that the per-
ception of a lack of willpower strongly resembles a biological conception of 
race, associating a physical with a behavioral trait. 
Wornie L. Reed cautions against the confusion between racism and preju-
dice, although they reinforce each other. Nowadays the focus is mainly on indi-
vidual or small group racism with a strong emphasis on intentional racism. But 
very often, racism is quite unintentional, for example when a person assumes 
that a black man in a suit in front of a restaurant is the parking valet. In The Au-
dacity of Hope, Barack Obama’s book on his political philosophy, he recounts 
having experienced that type of racial profiling: 
[…] I can recite the usual litany of petty slights that during my forty-five years 
have been directed my way: security guards tailing me as I shop in department 
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stores, white couples who toss me their car keys as I stand outside a restaurant 
waiting for the valet, police cars pulling me over for no apparent reason.42 
 According to Reed, the major difference lies between attitude and treatment. 
Racial prejudice is thus defined as a negative attitude towards people belonging 
to other racial groups, whereas racism would be the negative treatment of peo-
ple belonging to other racial groups. Racism is often viewed as the behavioral 
manifestation of racial prejudice.43 Bobo defines race prejudice as “the ideas, 
beliefs, feelings, and consequent patterns of behavior of whites toward 
blacks.”44 
Both of these definitions, however, are too narrow. Going back to Du Bois, 
it appears that open contempt and hostility play a central role in prejudice, 
alongside a belief in the superiority of white culture and values. 
Men call the shadow prejudice, and learnedly explain it as the natural defence of 
culture against barbarism, learning against ignorance, purity against crime, the 
“higher” against the “lower” races. To which the Negro cries Amen! and swears 
that to so much of this strange prejudice as is founded on just homage to civiliza-
tion, culture, righteousness, and progress, he humbly bows and meekly does obei-
sance. But before that nameless prejudice that leaps beyond all this he stands 
helpless, dismayed, and well-nigh speechless; before that personal disrespect and 
mockery, the ridicule and systematic humiliation, the distortion of fact and wan-
ton license of fancy, the cynical ignoring of the better and the boisterous welcom-
ing of the worse, the all-pervading desire to inculcate disdain for everything black, 
from Toussaint to the devil, […].45  
Du Bois shows the intricate link between the belief in white superiority, 
disrespect of blacks, the denial of reality, and the willingness to assume the 
worse of two possibilities, and the overall association of blackness with nega-
tivity. Most of those themes have not disappeared in the definitions of racism 
seen above, although some occur at a rather sub-conscious level. The major 
difference is the mentioning of open hostility and racial violence contained in 
“[the] personal disrespect and mockery, the ridicule and systematic humilia-
tion.“ Du Bois’s definition of prejudice still intermingles a separate notion of 
prejudice with what has been defined as racism above, meaning the use of race 
in a negative and harmful sense to justify social, economic, and political subor-
dination. At the time of the publishing of Du Bois’ text, 1903, a distinction be-
tween the two was indeed not necessary, since open prejudice was condoned 
and a full part of the system of racial oppression and social structuring. Du Bois 
saw prejudice as a tool for shaping the social hierarchy according to racial 
lines.46 According to Cox, the function of race prejudice was precisely that: “a 
social attitude propagated … by an exploiting class for the purpose of stigmatiz-
ing some group as inferior so that the exploitation of either the group itself or 
its resources or both may be justified.”47 
Political scientists Ted Brader and Nicholas Valentino use a watered-down 
definition of prejudice, in the sense that it seems to be understood as the notion 
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of a negatively biased attitude, leaving out the element of open hostility and 
even violence. According to them, prejudice is “built on the belief that blacks 
violate cherished values of hard work and self-reliance and do not deserve the 
resources they demand.”48 Robert Lieberman seems to share this definition of 
prejudice as a negatively biased attitude, since he opposes it to “out-and-out 
racist expression”.49 It seems that these definitions of prejudice are quite close 
to the definition of simple cultural racism, in its sense of viewing black cultural 
attributes as inferior to white culture and associating black culture with failure 
and a lack of virtue and values. 
To avoid confusion between some very different aspects, I chose to in-
clude in the definition of prejudice the idea of a negatively biased attitude to-
wards blacks, but at a conscious level, which can include the open expression of 
racist remarks and racist insults. There are several reasons for this inclusion. 
First, the basic definition of the Oxford English Dictionary mentions this ele-
ment of hostility. 50 Violence and hostility also have a central place in Du Bois’s 
definition. Moreover, there is a need to distinguish between laissez-faire racism 
that is not defined by open expressions of hostility, rather quite the contrary, 
and un-rationalized racial contempt, which, moreover, is often due to a lack of 
racial interaction. The term “prejudice”, meaning a pre-conceived and un-
founded notion, highlights this aspect. Prejudice also needs to be distinguished 
from a simple negatively biased attitude. Racial bias is a very complex matter 
and very often plays at an unconscious level, as illustrated by the classic as-
sumption about the parking valet. This racial bias is not necessarily linked with 
conscious beliefs in racism and can even occur in people with racially friendly 
attitudes. Du Bois already noted this and insisted on the fact that the negative 
attitude was not necessarily “intended to annoy.”51 They are so widespread be-
cause they are produced and fostered by a wide range of racial images and ste-
reotypes spread by the media and popular culture.52 But this distinction is also 
necessary because most people do not notice this influence of negative images 
and associate racism with racist comments. This is reflected in the belief 
(among whites) that racism is an individual act and that discrimination has 
generally ceased in the United States.53 A 2010 study by the PEW research cen-
ter showed that there are huge differences in the perception of discrimination 
according to race. In 2009, 43% of blacks said that they perceived “a lot” of dis-
crimination against blacks, whereas only 10% of whites shared this opinion. 
This trend has been declining since 2001, when 48% of blacks and 15% of whites 
saw “a lot” of discrimination against blacks. PEW point out that, based on a 
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Princeton Survey between 2000 and 2005, this has been a steady decrease.54 
This shows that the decline was not only due to the election of Obama. 
Here is a situation that easily leads to confusions and makes it harder to 
talk about racial issues. According to Bonilla-Silva, there are different concep-
tions of racism according to color: whites tend to see prejudice, where blacks 
tend to see institutionalized or systemic racism.55 Whites tend to have a defini-
tion of racism that is closer to the above-given definition of prejudice that tends 
to play at an individual level and often finds expression in voiced hostility. This 
white view of racism “as overt racial divisions and oppression” leads many to 
think that “black victimology” has lost its salience, that complaints about dis-
crimination and inequality are now unfounded. Thomas et al. also noted differ-
ences in the conception of racism between blacks and whites. Blacks are still 
very aware of the role of past and contemporary racism in the creation of ine-
qualities, whereas whites tend to downplay this.56 This indicates that blacks 
tend to have a laissez-faire and structural conception of racism, whereas whites 
tend to view racism in the sense of prejudice. 
Elizabeth Anderson offers an additional dimension to Bobo’s analysis of 
laissez-faire racism, which she calls cultural racism. She explains that (white) 
conservatives have adopted the “oppositional culture” hypothesis to explain 
differences in achievement and outcome. The common example that is given is 
to explain black-white differences in educational attainment. The conservative 
frame is that black youths lack academic motivation, or oppose it, supposedly 
because success in school is equated with “acting white”. Anderson admits that 
there might be an underlying reality to this frame and shows that, to a certain 
extent, this has been fuelled by white behavior and discourse, which associates 
school success with whiteness and failure with blackness.57 Unfortunately, there 
are no statistics or other data that would make it possible to confirm or to deny 
this cultural explanation. However, the important point here is that this expla-
nation is used to discard discrimination and structural inequality, instead of 
envisaging both acting in tandem. 
Bonilla-Silva shares Bobo’s interpretation of a change in the type of racism 
but he uses the term “colorblind racism” to refer to what replaced Jim Crow and 
the idea that “blacks are subhuman.” Bonilla-Silva’s concept integrates Bobo’s 
laissez-faire racism, which he calls cultural racism. His concept of colorblind 
racism is based on four “frames”: abstract liberalism, naturalization, cultural 
racism, and the minimization of racism.58 Abstract liberalism, according to 
Bonilla-Silva, is the use of ideas associated with liberalism in an abstract man-
ner to explain racial matters, which is the case for example when an abstract, 
out of context conception of equal opportunity is used to oppose affirmative 
action. Naturalization is the explanation of racial phenomena as natural occur-
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rences, which is often used, for example, when housing segregation is explained 
as grouping by natural affinity. Cultural racism is the explanation of inequali-
ties through behavioral arguments. Bonilla-Silva gives the example of explain-
ing Mexican underachievement by the fact that they do not put much emphasis 
on education, or welfare restrictions by accusing blacks of having too many ba-
bies. And finally, minimization consists in suggesting that discrimination no 
longer plays a central part in minority life opportunities and thus ignoring the 
effects of past and present discrimination. The use of equal opportunity and 
meritocracy rhetoric plays a central role in this colorblind racism, suggesting 
that the only thing minorities have to do is to meet the (white) standards. He 
lists other names for the concept, such as Bobo’s laissez-faire racism, or compet-
itive racism. The denial of the salience of race, the scorning of people who talk 
about race, and the increasing insistence on the fact that “We are all Ameri-
cans” together with a denial of inequalities, are central features of colorblind 
racism, according to Bonilla-Silva.59 
These changes in types of racism correspond to a change in the attitudes 
of whites toward blacks. Murphree and Royster point out that some of these 
changes are quite superficial and do not concern aspects of deep racial inequali-
ties. 
White attitudes toward blacks have undergone a series of strategic modifications 
(some quite superficial) that are principally designed to evade accusations (and 
feelings) of racism while still allowing the dominant group to benefit from struc-
tural legacies and contemporary practices that perpetuate racial inequality.60 
This creates an apparent paradox by putting the emphasis on the fact that 
racism is not politically correct while still allowing for the underlying structures 
to reproduce the old racial hierarchy to exist. For Murphree and Royster this 
attitude is central to “laissez-faire racism” because it allows society to reject the 
responsibility of inequality on those who suffer from those inequalities.61 
Schuman et al. also insist on the fact that people’s inner conviction is often sig-
nificantly different from both their attitudes and behavior, which are regulated 
by societal norms.62 This impact of political correctness, not necessarily reach-
ing to the deepest entrenched beliefs, leads to a lose-lose situation for many 
minorities in the way they are viewed by parts of mainstream society. Accord-
ing to Anderson, there are “[…] attribution biases central to racial stigmatiza-
tion: blaming blacks’ disadvantages on internal vices, and blacks’ advantages on 
(undeserved) external help.”63 People seem to believe that, because of the ab-
sence of overt prejudice, discrimination has largely disappeared while being 
exposed to the muted form of laissez-faire racism with its negative behavioral 
stereotypes that still maintain an image of racial inferiority not significantly 
different from old classical biological racism. 
Four terms thus emerge for one concept, although sometimes with minor 
variations: laissez-faire racism, cultural racism, colorblind racism, and competi-
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tive racism. To avoid confusions with later discussions about colorblindness 
and to avoid giving the term too negative a connotation, I will use the term 
“laissez-faire racism”. The dimension of political ideology it includes also moti-
vates this choice. Indeed, the French “laissez-faire” (literally: let do) meaning 
“let it run its natural course” or “let it happen” can also be translated as “do 
nothing”. This is a nice reminder of an essential aspect of this form of racism 
that suits the conservative behavioralist/cultural explanation for racial inequali-
ties, which is the conservative principle of governmental non-intervention. The 
attribution of the responsibility for inequality to minorities serves to strengthen 
the idea of governmental non-intervention. 
Laissez-faire racism is mainly expressed in political discourse and finds 
concrete application in the dismantling of the welfare state and in the attacks 
on affirmative action. There is, however, another form of racism, which is very 
real, but does not find expression in discourse. This is systemic or structural 
racism.64 Robert Lieberman, a political scientist at Johns Hopkins University, 
describes structural racism as a“[…] racial inequality [that] can be “built into” 
the very structure of American politics, and […] citizens need not have racist 
intentions for a society systematically to subjugate racial minorities.” He insists 
on the fact this does not need to be intentional, it is the structure of the institu-
tions or the framing of the policy that can shape outcomes along racial lines.65 
Structural racism is less acknowledged because it is more difficult to spot and 
conflicts with the common-sense conception of racism, especially concerning 
unintentional outcomes. 
1.1.3. Obama’s Conception of Race 
Although Barack Obama is not a race scholar, an overview of his beliefs 
and conceptions about race is necessary in order to understand his politics. 
Obama has thought and written about race in three main works: Dreams from 
My Father, The Audacity of Hope, and his famous speech A More Perfect Union. 
Only The Audacity of Hope is not centered on race, dealing instead with Obama’s 
whole political philosophy, but an entire chapter is specifically devoted to the 
question of race. Each of the three works deals with a different aspect of race. 
Dreams from my Father already shows through its subtitle A Story of Race and 
Inheritance that race has played a central role in Obama’s life. In his autobiog-
raphy, written when he was at Yale Law School,66 Obama narrated his search 
for identity.  
He describes and analyzes the difficulties of a young man of mixed ances-
try, whose father was a Kenyan exchange student, whose mother was a young 
middle-class woman from Kansas, who was raised by his white family, and 
mostly by his grandparents, to grow up in an American society that had no 
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place for him. In search for his own identity, Obama was confronted by the ri-
gidity of the American race system, not allowing for a biracial identity.67 The 
fact that Obama grew up in a white family without a black male role model in a 
society that identified him as a black male gave him a singular perspective on 
American race relations and pushed him to analyze and search for black identi-
ty: “Away from my mother, away from my grandparents, I was engaged in a 
fitful interior struggle. I was trying to raise myself to be a black man in America, 
and beyond the given of my appearance, no one around me seemed to know 
exactly what that meant.”68 Obama read authors like James Baldwin, Ralph El-
lison, Langston Hughes, Richard Wright, and W.E.B. Du Bois to find out about 
black identity and possibilities for his own identity, but found no satisfying an-
swer,69 in the sense that their experience was different, stemming from a life in 
the black community on the continent, whereas Obama was brought up in a 
white family in multicultural Hawaii and in Indonesia.70 
This search, along with his work as a community organizer in the South 
Side of Chicago, profoundly shaped Obama’s views about race and race rela-
tions. Obama grew up with a deep-seated awareness of race as a social construct 
that was ascribed to him. Clearly, his conception is extremely far from any bio-
logical one of race: “My identity might begin with the fact of my race, but it 
didn’t, couldn’t, end there.”71 The social construct might be ascribed to him, but 
he clearly rejects race as an all-defining element of his person. In Dreams from 
my Father, Obama just as openly criticizes any cultural difference as an explana-
tory factor: 
[…] the explanations that whites had always offered for black poverty: that we 
continued to suffer from, if not of genetic inferiority, then cultural weakness. It 
was a message that ignored causality or fault, a message outside history, without a 
script or plot that might insist on progression.72 
Obama seems to have noted the closeness of the idea of “genetic inferiority” 
with cultural racism, making the likeness apparent through the use of the syn-
onym ‘weakness’ for the cultural explanation, and insisting that it creates the 
same static situation and the same negation of the effects of discrimination. 
His upbringing also gave him a better understanding of both, black and 
white, points of views about race relations. In his autobiography he insists on 
his living in both worlds:  
As it was, I learned to slip back and forth between my black and white worlds, un-
derstanding that each possessed its own language and customs and structures of 
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meaning, convinced that with a bit of translation on my part the two worlds 
would eventually cohere.73 
This upbringing and belonging to both worlds shows in his willingness to be a 
“translator” or “bridge” between the two racial worlds that was most admirably 
shown in his speech A More Perfect Union. In this speech Obama showed that he 
has a deep understanding of the racial grievances of both communities. At the 
beginning of his speech, Obama acknowledges that Reverend Wright’s harsh 
words about America “were not only wrong but divisive” and qualifies Wright’s 
sermon as a “use [of] incendiary language to express views that have the poten-
tial not only to widen the racial divide, but views that denigrate both the great-
ness and the goodness of our nation, and that rightly offend white and black 
alike.” This preliminary condemnation of Wright’s words serves mainly as a 
mollifier for the audience, before moving on to a long description of current 
racial inequalities. He roots the origins of these inequalities in history, insisting 
on past discrimination, as a concession to the white part of the audience, but for 
each point, be it work, education, or housing, he insists on the present state of 
inequality and the still all-pervading effects of past discrimination, thus defend-
ing the black point of view. To contextualize Reverend Wright’s words for the 
white audience, Obama makes a short description of the perception of reality 
for the black Civil Rights generation: 
This is the reality in which Reverend Wright and other African-Americans of his 
generation grew up. They came of age in the late '50s and early '60s, a time when 
segregation was still the law of the land and opportunity was systematically con-
stricted. What's remarkable is not how many failed in the face of discrimination, 
but how many men and women overcame the odds; how many were able to make 
a way out of no way, for those like me who would come after them. 
For all those who scratched and clawed their way to get a piece of the American 
Dream, there were many who didn't make it—those who were ultimately defeat-
ed, in one way or another, by discrimination. That legacy of defeat was passed on 
to future generations—those young men and, increasingly, young women who we 
see standing on street corners or languishing in our prisons, without hope or pro-
spects for the future. Even for those blacks who did make it, questions of race and 
racism continue to define their worldview in fundamental ways. For the men and 
women of Reverend Wright's generation, the memories of humiliation and doubt 
and fear have not gone away; nor has the anger and the bitterness of those years.74 
To show his understanding of white prejudice, he gives the example of his own 
grandmother who raised him: 
I can no more disown him [Reverend Wright] than I can disown my white grand-
mother—a woman who helped raise me, a woman who sacrificed again and again 
for me, a woman who loves me as much as she loves anything in this world, but a 
woman who once confessed her fear of black men who passed her by on the 
street, and who on more than one occasion has uttered racial or ethnic stereotypes 
that made me cringe.75 
Through this dual presentation, Obama wanted both parts of the audience, 
black and white, to understand that each community’s point of view is heavily 
influenced by its racial past, in the hope of fostering a better understanding for 
each other’s reactions. In The Audacity of Hope Obama explaines exactly where 
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he draws the line between acknowledging ongoing prejudice, lauding progress, 
and admitting the real impact of ongoing prejudice and negative stereotypes. 
Although he readily admits widespread prejudice and the impact of negative 
black stereotypes on whites’ behavior, he insists on the gradual overcoming of 
those prejudices, albeit in individual experiences: 
I maintain, however, that in today’s America such prejudices are far more loosely 
held than they once were—and hence are subject to refutation. A black teenage 
boy walking down the street may elicit fear in a white couple, but if he turns out to 
be their son’s friend from school he may be invited for dinner. A black man may 
have trouble catching a cab late at night, but if he is a capable software engineer 
Microsoft will have no qualms about hiring him.76 
Even if Obama highlights the progress made regarding deep-seated racism at a 
social level, he does not downplay the effects of negative stereotypes and ongo-
ing prejudice on the psyche of minorities, thus acknowledging an ongoing im-
pact of prejudice: 
It’s the added weight that many minorities, especially African-Americans, so often 
describe in their daily round—the feeling that as individuals we must prove our-
selves anew each day, that we will rarely get the benefit of the doubt and will have 
little margin for error. Making a way through such a world requires the black 
child to fight off the additional hesitation that she may feel when she stands on 
the threshold of a mostly white classroom on the first day of school; it requires the 
Latina woman to fight off self-doubt as she prepares for a job interview at a mostly 
white company.77 
Obama sees race as an ongoing burden that impacts life in society. Despite 
race being a social construct, or maybe precisely because of its unjustified na-
ture, Obama sees it as having substance in real social life, still representing a 
barrier that has to be overcome. 
It would be, however, a deep misunderstanding to think that for Obama 
race only has a psychological impact. In the speech A More Perfect Union he ex-
plains exactly how he sees the impact of past discrimination on inequalities 
today. In The Audacity of Hope he exposes the current economic gap between the 
communities, denounces present discrimination that has a severe economic 
impact, and denounces the Bush administration’s lack of enforcement of Civil 
Rights.78 Thus, Obama does not discard the real impact of current prejudice and 
discrimination and sees race in its structural dimension.  
Despite this strong structural understanding of race, Obama includes, to a 
certain degree, a cultural dimension. At first sight it could seem that he buys 
into the negative black stereotypes favored by cultural racism to explain blacks’ 
lower socio-economic status. Indeed, he denounces some aspects of black 
“pathological” behavior79, but does not present it as inherently black: “Many of 
the social or cultural factors that negatively affect black people, for example, 
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simply mirror in exaggerated form problems that afflict America as a whole 
[…]” Furthermore, he certainly uses these factors (too much television, bad eat-
ing and drug and tobacco habits, lack of education, and increasing number of 
single mom’s) to explain blacks’ lower socio-economic status. The difference is 
that he does not view these factors as being inherently black cultural traits as 
cultural racism does, but as factors that make social upward mobility more dif-
ficult, which thus must be overcome.80 His view about the negative impact of 
black pathological behavior markedly differs as well because he insists heavily 
on the fact that discrimination plays a major role in maintaining these patho-
logical behaviors: 
A lack of economic opportunity among black men, and the shame and frustration 
that came from not being able to provide for one's family contributed to the ero-
sion of black families—a problem that welfare policies for many years may have 
worsened. And the lack of basic services in so many urban black neighbor-
hoods—parks for kids to play in, police walking the beat, regular garbage pickup, 
building code enforcement—all helped create a cycle of violence, blight and ne-
glect that continues to haunt us.81 
To sum up, Obama sees race as a social construct with a real impact and a struc-
tural effect, coupled with a cultural dimension that is partly fostered by ongoing 
discrimination. 
1.1.4. A Post-Racial America? 
Such differences in conceptions of racism, seen on the one hand as open 
hostility and discrimination (such visible barriers as “colored only” signs) and 
on the other hand as a wide range of practices that lead to an unequal society 
structured along racial lines, explain the debate about whether or not the elec-
tion of Barack Obama as president of the United States marks the beginning of 
post-racial America. Opinions range from “yes” through “maybe” to “no” and a 
closer analysis shows that this is heavily informed by one’s definition of racism. 
Bobo identifies different possible meanings for “post-racialism.” Accord-
ing to him, in its feeblest form, it could “signal a hopeful trajectory for events 
and social trends,” or that “black victimology” does not apply anymore, or point 
to the change in identity choices that suggest that the black-white divide is not 
relevant anymore and that interraciality or multiraciality is growing in im-
portance.82 Michael P. Jeffries, a sociologist and political science professor at 
Harvard, thinks that “Postracialism is a direct descendant of colorblindness.” In 
this view, colorblindness would be aspirational, a way out of a racial society and 
post-racialism would be the achievement of this race-innocent society. Jeffries 
insists on the fact that if speaking about racism was already difficult during the 
phase of colorblind aspiration and was seen	  as rejecting colorblindness’ “right-
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eous path”, it would become excruciatingly difficult with claims of a post-racial 
era.83 
Marable identifies a post-racial trend in black politics. Here post-racial 
means that the new generation of black politicians have a more pragmatic ap-
proach, meaning that the political agenda is no longer based solely on racial 
issues and do not advocate race-conscious, affirmative-action type policies as 
remedy to inequalities.84 Jeffries and political scientist Theodore J. Davis Jr. 
share this interpretation of “post-racial” in the context of black politics.85 Ac-
cording to Jeffries, this results from the abolishing of former formal barriers 
that resulted in “expanded career options” for black politicians to address a 
wider audience.86 Some more recent examples of such postracial black politi-
cians include Cory Brooker, the young mayor of Newark, N.J., Deval Patrick 
who was elected governor of Massachusetts in 2006,87 and Michael Nutter, who 
was elected mayor of Philadelphia in 2008. 
Historian Peniel E. Joseph shares this interpretation of post-racialism as 
used in the context of the Obama election: 
For most Americans, Obama’s ascension to the pinnacle of political power vindi-
cates King’s vision of a color-blind democracy. The image of the nation’s first Af-
rican-American president-elect instantly reverberated around the world as a tri-
umphant testament to historic struggles for racial justice. However, Obama’s 
election also called into question the civil rights-era understanding of domestic 
race relations and the continued viability of the politics of racial solidarity. Con-
servative pundits put the matter more crudely, arguing that Obama’s election 
would end the politics of “racial grievances” practiced by “professional agitators” 
such as Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton.88 
Joseph’s assessment of the situation highlights three major elements: Seeing 
Obama’s election as King’s dream come true suggests indeed the view that the 
race-innocent society has been achieved. The view that Obama’s election sig-
nals the death of the old, civil rights-type of black politics reflects Marable’s 
definition of post-racialism in black politics, and the pithy summary of the 
comments of conservative pundits reflects the interpretation that post-racialism 
means that discrimination claims have lost their salience. Marable shares this 
interpretation of “post-racial” understood as the end of racial political claims in 
the context of Obama’s election: “To many, the impressive margin of Obama’s 
popular-vote victory suggested the possibility that the United States had en-
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tered at long last an age of postracial politics, in which leadership and major 
public policy debates would not be distorted by factors of race and ethnicity.”89 
Visions of America entering such an era of post-racialism are obviously 
founded in a superficial understanding of racism that leans toward prejudice. It 
is understandable that the election of a black man to the symbolic heavyweight 
position of President of the United States is interpreted as a symbol of overcom-
ing discrimination. This interpretation is, by the way, shared by many African-
Americans, as shows the anonymous poem that became popular shortly after 
Obama’s election:  
Rosa sat, 
so Martin could walk, 
so Barack could run, 
so that our children can fly.90 
This rhyme, however, contains a sharp difference with a whiter interpreta-
tion of post-racialism: Obama is not seen as the fulfillment of the Civil Rights 
Movement’s aspirations, here he is the penultimate station in achieving these 
hopes: Obama is only “run[ning]“, the children will “fly“. It is clear that blacks 
see his election as overcoming a barrier of discrimination, but it was by no 
means the last hurdle. This opinion is shared by Obama himself: “I never 
bought into the notion that by electing me, somehow we were entering into a 
post-racial period.”91  
Already in The Audacity of Hope Obama directly refuted the idea that his 
words, and in particular his speech given at the 2004 Democratic National Con-
vention, could be honestly interpreted as celebrating a post-racial America:  
Still, when I hear commentators interpreting my speech [2004 DNC] to mean that 
we have arrived at a “postracial politics” or that we already live in a color-blind 
society, I have to offer a word of caution. To say that we are one people is not to 
suggest that race no longer matters—that the fight for inequality has been won, or 
that the problems that minorities face in this country today are largely self-
inflicted. We know the statistics: On almost every single socioeconomic indicator, 
from infant mortality to life expectancy to employment to home ownership, black 
and Latino Americans in particular continue to lag far behind their white coun-
terparts. […] To suggest that our racial attitudes play no part in these disparities is 
to turn a blind eye to both our history and our experience—and to relieve our-
selves of the responsibility to make things rights.92 
Not only did Obama remind the nation about existing inequalities, which are 
real and statistically proven, but he also stressed the wrong use that is regularly 
made of the notion of post-racialism: an excuse not to take action and address 
racial inequalities. 
Many speeches made by Obama openly expressed his insistence that ra-
cial inequalities persist. For example his speech at the NAACP Centennial Con-
vention in 2009 addresses the race situation and rejects the idea that a post-
racial America has been achieved with his election. Joseph greets this speech as 
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the “navigation of a racial tightrope”. 93 Another example would be his 2012 In-
augural Address where he highlights the persistence of racial inequalities, 
among other inequalities. The speech that maybe best expressed Obama’s 
complex view about race-relations in the US is A More Perfect Union given in 
2008. In this speech Obama explained his point of view as follows: 
The profound mistake of Reverend Wright's sermons is not that he spoke about 
racism in our society. It's that he spoke as if our society was static; as if no progress 
had been made; as if this country—a country that has made it possible for one of 
his own members to run for the highest office in the land and build a coalition of 
white and black, Latino and Asian, rich and poor, young and old—is still irrevo-
cably bound to a tragic past. But what we know—what we have seen—is that 
America can change. That is the true genius of this nation. What we have already 
achieved gives us hope—the audacity to hope—for what we can and must achieve 
tomorrow.94 
Obama strongly insisted on the complexity of not denying the racial progress 
that has been made, here exemplified by his own candidacy for the presidency, 
while at the same time highlighting all that still remains to be done to achieve a 
more equal society. Moreover, Obama was careful to insist on the fact that ine-
quality is present, and the nation must address this: 
In the white community, the path to a more perfect union means acknowledging 
that what ails the African-American community does not just exist in the minds of 
black people; that the legacy of discrimination—and current incidents of discrim-
ination, while less overt than in the past—are real and must be addressed, not just 
with words, but with deeds, by investing in our schools and our communities; by 
enforcing our civil rights laws and ensuring fairness in our criminal justice sys-
tem; by providing this generation with ladders of opportunity that were unavaila-
ble for previous generations.95 
However, Obama’s call for addressing inequalities was made in a transcending 
and post-racial fashion. He advocated investments in more social policies for 
everyone to create common prosperity. 
Persisting racial inequalities and an interpretation of racism as the une-
qual structuring of society along racial lines is the argument that some use, like 
Obama, to reject the idea that a post-racial era has begun in the US Political 
scientist at the University of Chicago Michael C. Dawson refutes the idea of 
having reached a post-racial America on the grounds of the persisting racial 
gaps in all areas. However, he acknowledges that Obama’s election has trig-
gered black optimism about the “prospects for achieving racial justice in the 
United States.”96 Anti-racism activist Tim Wise has a very harsh view of what 
Obama’s election might bring. He fears:  
[…] that Obama’s election, far from serving as evidence that racism had been de-
feated, might signal a mere shape-shifting of racism, from Racism 1.0 to Racism 
2.0, an insidious upgrade that allows millions of whites to cling to racist stereo-
types about people of color generally, while nonetheless carving out exceptions 
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for those who, like Obama, make us comfortable by seeming so “different” from 
what we view as a much less desirable norm.97 
Wise’s interpretation of possible consequences suggests indeed the idea that 
colorblind and cultural racism will grow even stronger and that Obama’s ex-
ample will serve to highlight the supposed lack of willpower to overcome defi-
cient values in the struggling masses. 
1.1.5. Race as an Analytical Tool 
These different conceptions of racism also inform part of the problem 
when envisaging race as an analytical category. Levi Martin and Yeung high-
light in their research the different, and sometimes problematic, uses made of 
race as analytical category. This use has steadily increased in scholarship over 
the 20th century and is very varied. The use ranges from very specific analyses, 
through just mentioning race, to pointing out that it will be a whites-only study. 
They point out that the category is commonly used by social scientific and med-
ical research, as well as in public health research. 98  
With medical research, this use can be seen as problematic since it allows 
for the easy shortcut that race has a biological foundation and is not entirely a 
social construct. However, the use of race in medical and public health research 
can be justified on two grounds that also show that there is no foundation to the 
conception of race as a biological category, creating a link of causality between 
physical and mental or character attributes. In the medical domain, race can be 
used because of some existing biological differences in predisposition of diseas-
es or type of manifestation of an illness. Blacks, for example, present a higher 
and stronger form of hypertension, making the use of different medication rel-
evant.99 Some forms of blood-disorder, like Sickle cell anemia occur only in 
blacks. These different predispositions by no means imply any notion of biolog-
ical inferiority/superiority. 
In the case of public health, it is the factor of intersectionality that makes 
racial categories relevant. Intersectionality completes the view of racism as a 
means of structuring society along racial lines, and shows how race and class 
intersect. Depending on social class, lifestyles tend to change and have an im-
pact on public health issues. However, it is easier to establish statistical data 
along racial categories rather than along income lines. In the example of diabe-
tes it is easy to see how race and class intersect: diabetes is a possible side effect 
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of too rich a diet and often occurs among the lower classes of society.100 Hispan-
ics and blacks are disproportionately concentrated on those lower rungs of the 
social ladder, which incidentally coincides with the higher proportion of diabe-
tes in these populations. In 2011, 5.5% of whites were diagnosed with diabetes 
compared to 9.5% of blacks.101 The difference is quite significant and the racial 
statistics can help improve preventive education and providing treatment. 
In 1999, sociologist Mara Loveman argued for abandoning race as an ana-
lytical category. She does not reject the idea of race having a structural impact 
on society, it is rather a matter of terminology. She prefers the term ethnicity. In 
her opinion “[t]his would increase analytical leverage for the study of race as a 
category of practice.”102 Loveman makes a valuable point, since this change 
would reflect the evolution in terminology and integration/assimilation of 
white ethnics that during the 19th century were still considered as different rac-
es. It could be hoped that by changing the terminology a similar change could 
occur for blacks. However, the change in terminology for Hispanics shows that 
this is not necessarily the case. Hirschman et al. argue that since the establish-
ment in 1970 of Hispanic as a distinct ethnicity applying to people whose race is 
either black or white, the concept has not really gotten hold. The popular un-
derstanding still treats Hispanic as a racial category, and even the use made by 
administrations is closer to race than ethnicity, despite the fact that the “eth-
noracial pentagon”, as historian David Hollinger called it, of white, black, 
Asian, Native American/Pacific Islander, and Hispanic ethnicity was officially 
adopted by the Office of Management and Budget in 1977.103 Moreover, John 
Sibley Butler sees one fundamental political implication in the difference be-
tween race and ethnicity: “minority group status was and is associated with re-
sources or special consideration in the public square. It must be separated from 
the ethnic group category, which means that one is proud of one’s heritage and 
traditions.”104 This distinction is paramount for the analysis of social policies 
and issues of redistribution.105 Based on this experience with the Hispanic eth-
nicity, the use made in government data, and its implication for social policies, I 
chose to maintain the category of race. Moreover, this use also incorporates the 
lingering biological conception of race as explained above. 
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The increasing use of race, which is also due to the fact that the regression 
model of analysis made it easier to incorporate race, does not mean that the 
inclusion of race in the analysis is necessarily relevant or will be analyzed in a 
relevant way.106 This means that an inclusion of race in an analysis does not 
necessarily mean that the study will analyze how the race factor shapes the dif-
ferences between the categories, or how it can account for discrepancies. Alt-
hough the use of racial statistics and analyses is rather widespread, there is a 
debate about the impact of race on the analysis. Once again, the differences in 
conceptions of racism and prejudice shed light on the debate. 
Both Brader and Valentino on the one hand, and Lieberman on the other 
hand, describe the ongoing debate among academics about the impact of “prej-
udice” on white policy preferences, while agreeing on the diminishing of open-
ly racist comments.107 
Others argue that prejudice is a diminished force in shaping policy preferences. 
Instead, they argue, opposition to racial redistribution springs primarily from a 
preference for small government and values such as egalitarianism and non-
racialized individualism.108 
This is very close to Lieberman’s summary: 
Others suggest that racial prejudice per se is less important than other kinds of be-
liefs in shaping white Americans’ opinions about policies such as affirmative ac-
tion and others that are designed expressly to benefit minorities.109 
Both definitions highlight the fact that there are major differences in the con-
ception of racism. If the relevance of using race as an analytical category is 
based on the impact of prejudice (understood as an individual hostility toward 
other races), then the questioning is understandable. However, if the under-
standing of race as an analytical category is based on structural racism, then the 
analytical category must be maintained.  
Bonilla-Silva sees three major trends on how race is viewed as an analyti-
cal category. All three trends agree on race as a social construct. The first trend 
discards race as an analytical category because of it being a social construct and 
thus considers it “not a fundamental category of analysis and praxis”. The ma-
jor stream tends to a superficial use of race and restricts it to describe differ-
ences in achievement in crime stats or in SAT test, among others. In Bonilla-
Silva’s opinion such a use reinforces racial categories and a racist interpretation 
of racial inequality. He puts himself in the third stream of using race as an ana-
lytical category that views race indeed as a social construct but also as a social 
reality: meaning that the category produces real effects on the actors.110 
Sociologist Michael Banton notes the importance of locating “race” within 
its context: 
[…] the validity of “race” as a concept depends upon its value as an aid in explana-
tion. From this standpoint, the main issue is the use of the word “race,” both in ra-
tional argument and in more popular connections, for people use beliefs about 
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race, nationality, ethnicity and class as resources when they cultivate beliefs about 
group identities.111 
Miles shares this conception about the use of race as an analytical category. He 
sees the salience of race not when the focus is on what race explains about soci-
ety, but “rather on the questions of who, why and with what effect social signifi-
cance is attached to racial attributes that are constructed in particular political 
and socio-economic contexts.”112 Miles’s recommendation about an analytical 
use of race is very narrowly built on structural and cultural racism, as it chooses 
to see race as a tool in shaping social and economic hierarchies.  
Bobo sees the relevance of race in three aspects: identity, use of race as a 
category, and economic inequality. Bobo points to the majority (98%) of people 
who chose one race in the Census and to the low intermarriage rate to argue 
that the identity categories are solid. Moreover, he points to the strong econom-
ic divide along racial lines that shows a deeper poverty for blacks, with higher 
poverty rates, more dire social and family conditions, school inequalities, and 
sharp discrepancies in incarceration rates, to justify the use of race as analytical 
tool. 113 Dawson shares this argument about the deep economic inequalities 
along racial lines keeping blacks at the bottom of American society as justifica-
tion for using race as an analytical tool.114 
Sociologist William Julius Wilson, in his seminal work The Declining Sig-
nificance of Race, insists on the fact that today race has its significance in the out-
come, not in the cause of inequalities. It is very meaningful in the stratification 
of society.115 This structural dimension was what was hinted at in the title of his 
book first published in 1978 and that was widely misunderstood and misinter-
preted as race having no significance at all anymore, and thus as a denial of dis-
crimination. But quite on the contrary, Wilson wanted to show that race had 
declining significance as remedy to inequality, meaning that deep economic 
inequalities cannot only be addressed with more civil rights. 
1.1.6. Race in Politics 
Miles’ definition of the use of race as an analytical category mentions the 
political dimension of race that is also hinted at in the definition of cultural rac-
ism. In both cases the point is that racism serves as a tool in shaping society 
along racial lines, to create inequality that can be justified on racial grounds 
and that can be seen at a structural level in the intersection of categories of race 
and class. Feagin argues against a purely structural approach of race and rac-
ism, which he underlines with the use of the term “systemic racism”. He sees 
more political use for race analysis.116 Harold Lasswell’s definition of politics as 
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the question of who gets what, when and how,117 links structural or systemic 
racism and cultural racism with politics. Feagin shows this relation as follows: 
The actual authoritative allocation of society’s important material resources, as 
well as of less tangible items such as power and prestige, has been dramatically 
inegalitarian, massively skewed toward the elite’s group interests, and aggressive-
ly legitimated by a dominant white political, racial, and class framing of the socie-
ty.118 
Feagin insists on the use of race in elite propaganda and framing to achieve an 
unequal society. What Feagin calls framing is close to the definition of cultural 
racism and new racism given earlier. For him a white frame is “a positive view 
of whites, their interests, folkways, and self-conceptions”,119 which is the other 
side of the negative conception of black culture denounced in the definition of 
cultural racism. 
Political scientist Robert Lieberman also stresses the central place of race 
in the domain of politics and agrees that it deploys its full significance there. 
Race—particularly the color line dividing white from black (or white from every-
thing else)—has always been central to American political life. It has instigated 
our most harrowing political challenges, from sectional strife to Civil War, and in-
spired our proudest achievements, from emancipation to the civil rights revolu-
tion. Despite those achievements, however, racial division and inequality remain 
disturbingly present and disruptive forces in American political life—even more 
so today, in many ways, than in the bad old days of slavery and Jim Crow. Where-
as once the color line was apparent for all to see, etched without irony or embar-
rassment on the nation’s lawbooks, on its maps, and in its customs and social 
codes, now it has shifted beneath the surface of American politics. Although few 
will openly acknowledge the color line, its effects are everywhere, in decaying in-
ner cities, overcrowded prisons, and substandard public schools.120 
Lieberman clearly establishes the link between a camouflaged presence of race 
in politics and its visibility in the structural effects it has in American society. In 
1995, Cornel West made a similar observation: 
Yet the fundamental litmus test for American democracy—its economy, govern-
ment, criminal justice system, education, mass media, and culture—remains: how 
broad and intense are the arbitrary powers used and deployed against black peo-
ple. In this sense, the problem of the twenty-first century remains the problem of 
the color line.121 
This view of the significance of race in politics is widely shared. Krugman 
insists on the fact that there is a gap between the perception of the race factor 
and its reality: “The reality is that things haven’t changed nearly as much as 
people think. Racial tension, especially in the South, has never gone away, and 
has never stopped being important. And race remains one of the defining fac-
tors in American politics.”122 Political scientists and journalists Thomas and 
Mary Edsall demonstrate how the Reagan rhetoric successfully aimed at a ra-
cial division of the working class to allow him to fulfill his conservative agen-
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da.123 This phenomenon of the Reagan-Democrats and the massive opposition 
of working- and middle-class whites to social policies is further explained by 
political scientist Martin Gilens. He explains the paradoxical attitude of Ameri-
cans about social policies through the framing of welfare as a black program.124 
Wilson, in the afterword of the 2012 edition of his Declining Significance of Race, 
supported this analysis of the exploitation of racial tensions at a sociopolitical 
level.125 
Finally, Marable insists on the necessity to see the political dimension of 
race: 
 Our political vision must go beyond the confrontations and narrow boundaries of 
what black and white has meant, and, for many Americans, still continues to 
mean: racial-identity politics essentially serve to reinforce conservative solutions 
to poverty, employment and social problems.126 
Marable clearly insists that discussion of race as a category on its own without 
connection with other issues has a very limited relevance and only distracts 
from the real problem, which is the use of race at a political level to reinforce 
social and economic inequalities and maintain a racially structured society that 
contributes to increasing inequalities for the entire population. 
1.1.7. Affirmative Action 
In politics, race is not used solely in a harmful way. Affirmative action is the 
program that was devised in the 1960s to try to tackle racial inequalities. Alt-
hough there are strongly divided opinions about affirmative action, and despite 
the program being under attack, I will briefly outline the general legal frame of 
the program to show how color consciousness is expressed in policy.127  
The first part of affirmative action is Executive Order 10925 signed by Ken-
nedy in 1961. It established non-discrimination and urged employers to adopt a 
more active non-discriminatory hiring procedure: “The contractor will take 
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees 
are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or 
national origin.” This being an executive order, it applied only to government 
contractors, meaning companies receiving federal funds or working for the fed-
eral government. This was further completed by Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act, which extended the non-discrimination clause of EO 10925. However, the 
legislation is adamant about the fact that it does not represent preferential 
treatment or a quota system:  
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employ-
er, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management commit-
tee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or 
to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such in-
dividual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the 
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total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin employed by any employer […]128 
Title VII also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Its mis-
sion is to fight discrimination, but also to investigate the “cause of and means of 
eliminating discrimination and such recommendations for further legislation as 
may appear desirable.”129 As for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, it established 
anti-discrimination practices in education (§2000d): “No person in the United 
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” The Code 
of Federal Regulations (34 CFR 100.3) further develops affirmative action for 
education:  
(6)(i) In administering a program regarding which the recipient has previously 
discriminated against persons on the ground of race, color, or national origin, the 
recipient must take affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimina-
tion.  
(ii) Even in the absence of such prior discrimination, a recipient in administering a 
program may take affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions, which 
resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular race, color, or national 
origin. 
Thus, an institution can be compelled to implement affirmative action if dis-
crimination has been proved, but can also do so voluntarily.  
In 1969 affirmative action was further expanded by the Nixon administra-
tion through the so-called Philadelphia Plan, a program first devised by the 
Johnson administration but never implemented. The Nixon administration 
tried to focus their equal opportunity efforts on the construction industry, a 
sector that was booming and that had high wages. Positions, however, were 
mainly occupied by whites. The first attempts of “voluntary minority-hiring 
agreements between unions and contractors” proved not to be efficient enough. 
The administration consequently resolved to apply the Philadelphia plan to 
“set a range of percentages of minority hirings with which contractors would be 
required to make a "good faith" effort to comply.“130 These percentages were 
rapidly called quotas. However, as soon as 1972, Nixon prohibited quotas. As the 
Bakke case showed,131 some universities made misinterpretations in their ways of 
applying affirmative action and effectively created set-asides, but these were 
ruled unconstitutional. 
The Civil Rights Act has progressively been expanded. Other population 
categories have been added to the non-discrimination clause. Title IX of the 
Educational Amendments of 1972 added gender; section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 included people with disabilities. Further inclusions came 
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through the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, Title II of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990, and finally through the Boy Scouts of America Equal Ac-
cess Act (part of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001). 
However, institutions with a clear religious affiliation are exempt from 
compliance with affirmative action programs and are allowed to focus their 
hiring according to the religious affiliation of the applicant.132 
1.2. Class: Limitations of Race as the Sole Dimen-
sion of Analysis  
As early as 1944, in his groundbreaking work, An American Dilemma: The 
Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, Gunnar Myrdal discarded the use of the 
term ‘race’ because of its (at that time) solely biological connotation. He pointed 
out the need to find another category to explain blacks’ separate position from 
the rest of society after Emancipation in 1863. He rejected the term ‘class’ be-
cause that would imply the idea of social mobility, which he thought impossible 
in 1944 because of de facto and de jure segregation, although he noted class strati-
fications within each population group (white and black). Myrdal also rejected 
‘minority group’ and ‘minority status’ because he considered them to be confus-
ing with the temporary status of new white immigrants. He finally settled his 
choice on the term ‘caste’ in its meaning of a “large and systematic type of social 
differentiation”.133 Myrdal’s caste concept is obviously outdated now, especially 
since the 1964 Civil Rights Act allowed for greater social mobility and greater 
participation in political life. However, in light of the deep inequalities along 
racial lines shown above, Myrdal’s insistence on caste because of its implied 
lack of mobility does not seem all that irrelevant.  
Political scientists Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, 
in their 2006 work Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches, 
discard the race factor as an analytical category for the period starting in the 
1980s and prefer a focus on class.134 However, it must be pointed out, that their 
analysis of the relevance of race relied solely on occurrences of racism and ra-
cial tension, leaving out systemic or structural racism, coded race talk in politi-
cal discourse, and underlying racialization of social policies.135 Although I think 
that this part of their analysis can be considered as having a questionable 
methodological approach, their work highlights an important trend: an increas-
ing focus on class analysis in the United States. Feagin, in his 2012 work White 
Party, White Government: Race, Class, and US Politics, points out that class dis-
crimination has been present in the US political system since its inception, 
along with racism and sexism. Despite the gradual and early enfranchisement 
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of the white American population Feagin notes a strong political domination of 
the financial elites and denounces classism, meaning discrimination along class 
lines.136 Wilson, in The Declining Significance of Race, argued that the salience of 
class was superseding the salience of race because of the decrease of openly 
racist institutions. His reasoning was that the Civil Rights Act changed the form 
of oppression and the social structure: moving away from organized racial op-
pression to a class structure. He painstakingly pointed out that the new social 
structure has no racial origin at the institutional level, but has a racial outcome, 
in the sense that the economic outcome shows distinctive racial lines. Accord-
ing to Wilson the US has moved since the 1970s from racial oppression to class 
subordination.137 
1.2.1. Sociological Approaches and the Definition of Class  
In An American Dilemma, Myrdal noted Americans’ rejection of class dif-
ferentiation and their fierce belief in equality. Most Americans then, and now, 
believed that they were middle class. According to Myrdal this was due to a 
certain incompatibility of the class concept and the American Dream. He noted 
that Americans rejected class differentiation even in the face of evidence of 
wealth and income differences. Hence Myrdal defined class in a somewhat 
loose fashion. He mentioned class feeling, as the feeling of individuals that they 
belong together in a corporate unity and share a sense of interested solidarity. 
According to him, this was rather underdeveloped in the lower classes. He ex-
panded the notion of class as people getting into social contact with one anoth-
er especially for leisure time, determining social orientation of the children.138 
Wilson offers a more precise definition of class, that he derives from the Max 
Weber definition: “the concept [class] means any group of people who have 
more or less similar goods, services, or skills to offer for income in a given eco-
nomic order and who therefore receive similar financial remuneration in the 
marketplace. One’s economic class position determines in major measures 
one’s life chances, including the chance for external living conditions and per-
sonal life experience.”139  
Sociologist Dennis Gilbert offers a more circumvoluted description of the 
notion of class, hinging on the use of the term “families” instead of class: “[…] 
groups of families, more or less equal in rank and differentiated from other 
families above or below them with regard to characteristics such as occupation, 
income, wealth, and prestige.” He uses the term “[…] family in the broadest 
sense possible to include households consisting of one person and larger do-
mestic units “headed” by single females, single males, or couples (both hetero-
sexual and homosexual).” In his use, the class position is defined according to 
the highest income in the family. He justifies the focus on income on the 
grounds that “[p]eople in similar positions have similar incomes and a tendency 
to mix with one another, to grow similar in their thinking and lifestyles.” This 
                                                        
136	  Feagin	  38.	  
137	  Wilson,	  The	  Declining	  Significance	  of	  Race,	  x,	  1–2.	  
138	  Myrdal,	  An	  American	  Dilemma,	  2:670–71,	  673.	  
139	  Wilson,	  The	  Declining	  Significance	  of	  Race,	  ix.	  
68 Stephan Social Policies and Racial Questions 
class stratification also has an effect on the worldview, which is often, but not 
necessarily, ‘inherited’ by the children.140 
Sociologist Dalton Conley takes 3 factors into account to determine socio-
economic status: education, income, and occupation. But he insists on the im-
portance of assets and wealth in intergenerational inequality.141 Through this he 
points out the limitation of class mobility and thus a class system that is more 
rigid than most Americans want to believe.  
Political scientist Larry M. Bartels insists on the lack of class awareness 
in the US that still holds more than 70 years after Myrdal already highlighting 
this: “Most Americans have only a vague sense of the contours of the nations’ 
income distribution—especially for parts of the income distribution that extend 
beyond their personal experience.”142 Americans still fiercely believe that they 
are a middle-class nation, although a heightened awareness about economic 
issues starts to creep into the American public mind: according to Hedrick 
Smith 2/3 of Americans see economics as the most divisive issue, more than 
race, age, or ethnic grouping.143 
This creates two problems: a difficulty to talk about class and class issues, 
and a recent and short academic history on the topic, leading to conceptual 
complications. Only since the beginning of the 1980s have scholars started to 
openly and strongly refute the longstanding idea of classlessness (since 
Tocqueville) or the “inherited ideology of classlessness” defended by Ossowski 
in 1957 (1963).144 More serious work has been done since, but sociologist Rick 
Fantasia pointed out still some lingering academic questioning of the very ex-
istence of social classes in the US as late as 1994.145 This relatively late turn to-
ward class analysis coupled with a rather low public attention on social class, 
and major changes in the economy, especially since the 1970s, leads to problems 
when conceptualizing class in the US Gilbert discusses the problem that there 
are many different class structure models, some better than others (some are 
utterly worthless according to him) but in his opinion so far there is no “true” 
model. He proposes the Gilbert-Kahl model: 
Capitalist class: live on assets, like lucrative businesses, commercial real es-
tate, securities such as stocks and bonds. The main income source is derived 
from assets even when they have jobs, often in top executive managerial posi-
tions. They represent about 1% of the population in 2010 with incomes around 
$2 million. 
Upper-middle class: Composed of university educated professionals and 
managers (lawyers, doctors, etc.), rely mainly on income: alternative name: 
working rich. They constitute about 14% of the population with incomes around 
$150,000. 
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Middle class: Low-level managers, insurance agents, teachers, nurses, 
plumbers and electricians. Represent about 30% of the population with in-
comes around $70,000. 
Working class: Unskilled office workers and retail workers. There is no dis-
tinction between blue- and white collar: the distinction is based on the level of 
skill or knowledge, as well as the independence and authority associated with 
the job. Represent about 30% of the population in 2010, with incomes around 
$40,000. 
Working poor: Very low-skill, low-wage, insecure jobs, without medical 
benefits, characterized by financial instability. Represent about 13% of the pop-
ulation with incomes around $25,000. 
‘Underclass’: May have some job income, but mainly rely on government 
programs, this includes Social Security, public assistance, and veteran benefits. 
This represents about 12% of the population with incomes around $15,000. In-
cludes income from criminal activities.146  
In the Gilbert-Kahl model the boundaries between the classes are not very 
sharp, but a few salient separations exist: the capitalist classes are set apart by 
their source of income, the upper middle class is somehow apart because of the 
“valuable credentials and the rewards that flow to them” and the ‘underclass’ is 
set off by their loose connection to work and mainstream society.147 
This focus on income as opposed to occupation to determine class status is 
also advocated by McCarthy et al. They insist on the fact that income is more 
relevant since many public policies are defined by income.148 Oliver and 
Shapiro go even further and demonstrate that even income is too rough a crite-
rion, and show how assets give a more precise image of inequalities, especially 
along racial lines.149 Conley shares this view and considers assets a major factor 
in intergenerational inequality.150 
Sociologists Earl Wysong, Robert Perrucci, and David Wright offer anoth-
er model to describe the American class structure, and particularly insist on the 
evolution that has taken place since World War II. 
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Schema 1 Class Structure US 1930-1945151 
According to Wysong et al., the US class structure in the period from 1930 
to 1945 still corresponded to the old classic pyramid structure. The welfare state 
created through the New Deal allowed for a major change in the American 
class structure, creating a strong middle class, and changing the shape of the 
class structure, resembling more a diamond. This “middle-class society” was 
mostly created through wage increase, pensions, health insurance, paid vaca-
tions, and the GI Bill that offered a better education to many people.152 
 
 
Schema 2 Diamond Class Structure 1945-1970153 
Wysong et al. no longer consider the Marxist production model154 or the 
Weberian functionalist model as useful because of their over-focusing on occu-
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  relationship	   to	   the	  means	  of	  production	  develop	  a	  
conscious	  sense	  of	  belonging	  to	  the	  same	  class,	  i.e.	  a	  class	  consciousness	  of	  having	  shared	  inter-­‐
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  (e.g.	  money)	  
30%	  
60%	  have	  less	  of	  something	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pation as key factor in class determination. Marx’s focus on control of the 
means of production and Weber’s focus on the prestige derived from occupa-
tional status as determinants of the socioeconomic position no longer fit the 
evolution of western economies.155 In this rejection they echo Gilbert’s model 
that does not distinguish between blue- and white-collar occupations anymore.  
Wysong et al. propose a new model, the Double-Diamond Class Struc-
ture. The focus is, among others, on organizations, meaning structures that con-
trol the distribution of resources, because according to them “large organiza-
tions are centrally involved in legitimating the distributional processes as well 
as the class inequalities that arise from them.” Four factors are used to deter-
mine the class: investment, consumption, skill, and social capital. They give the 
example of the lawyer. A corporate lawyer with a high salary would be consid-
ered to be in the upper segment of the credentialed class segment. But a small 
town lawyer who handles divorce cases could be considered working class (in 
the Double-Diamond model). The model is designed to reflect the increasingly 
polarized class structure in the US, increasingly divided into haves and have 
nots. 156 
In the Double-Diamond Model, the Super Class segment is composed of 
owners, employers and senior executives, with incomes derived from assets, 
from $1 million to $1 billion. They represent 1-2% of the population. Below, but 
still in the upper diamond, is the Credentialed Class segment composed of 
Managers (CEOs and mid- and upper-level managers of medium-sized corpora-
tions. Incomes range from $100,000 to $1 million. They represent 9-11% of the 
population), and Professionals (they have credentialed skills through college 
and professional degrees. They have social capital and organizational ties to 
further their interests. Incomes range from $200,000 to $900,000. They repre-
sent 12-14% of the population). In the lower diamond is first the Comfort Class 
segment composed of nurses, teachers, civil servants, small business, and 
skilled and/or unionized workers. They possess little investment capital and 
incomes range from $40,000 to $80,000. They represent 14-16% of the popula-
tion. The Contingent Class segment is composed of Wage Earners and Self-
employed persons. The first work for wages in clerical and sales jobs or person-
al services, in transportation jobs, as clerks, and as machine operators. Incomes 
are below $40,000. They represent 44-46% of the population. The Self-
employed usually have no employees but a high potential of failure, and in-
clude family workers. They represent 3-4% of the population. The Excluded 
Class segment is constituted of people who are in and out of the workforce and 
occupy unskilled, temporary, and low-wage jobs. They represent 10-15% of the 
population.157 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
 
The	  Weberian	  model	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   social	   stratification	   as	   resulting	   from	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   interconnection	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Schema 3 Double-Diamond Class Structure 1970-present158 
The Double-Diamond Structure also serves to indicate the growing ine-
quality between the haves and have-nots (in terms of investment capital) and 
the lack of mobility between the two. Interestingly, in this model, the middle 
class (now called Comfort Class) are to be included in the New Working Class. 
This segment would roughly correspond to Smith’s definition of the middle 
class based on incomes from $30,000 to $100,000,159 which then corresponds to 
Gilbert’s middle class with incomes around $70,000, or Oliver and Shapiro’s 
middle class definition with incomes ranging from $45,000 to $95,000. Below 
this segment they distinguish between moderate-income levels ranging from 
$22,000 to $25,000 and define as poverty-level households those earning less 
than $21,999 (rounded through the conversion from 1988 to inflation-adjusted 
2010 dollars).160  
It must be highlighted that both Oliver and Shapiro, and Gilbert have a 
broader definition of poverty than the American government. The Federal Pov-
erty Level (FPL) was $11,139 in 2010 for a single-individual household for people 
under age 65 as defined by the US Census Bureau. It was $6,155 in 1988 (this 
makes $11,517 in 2010 dollars).  
A last possibility to define socioeconomic classes must be added: the one 
provided by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA). The 
ACA defines income categories that are entitled to different types of help for 
acquiring health insurance. The lowest incomes up to 133% of FPL are to be 
covered by Medicaid, whereas incomes between 133% FPL and 400% FPL are to 
receive subsidies in the form of tax credits to make health insurance affordable. 
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Incomes above that threshold are not entitled to help, and higher incomes are 
to pay more taxes with a redistributional perspective.161 This means that in-
comes up to $14,800 (single person household) qualify for Medicaid and in-
comes between $14,800 and $44,500 qualify for subsidies. With the Federal 
Poverty Level, it was already apparent that the government had a rather low 
definition of poverty. The ACA provides for a slightly wider consideration of 
economic hardship. The category qualifying for subsidies would correspond to 
the previous definitions of working poor and lower middle class. 
The concentration of money and wealth at the top level is noted by all, 
with only the name of the top 1% changing: Capitalist Class for Gilbert, top 1% 
for Smith, and Superclass for Wysong, and all set them apart from the following 
5% and are far from the upper middle class. Increasing inequalities will be 
treated in the next section. Gilbert and Wysong also insist on the presence of an 
‘underclass’ or excluded class and roughly agree on the proportions: 12% for 
Gilbert, 10-15% for Wysong. This ‘underclass’ was thoroughly discussed by Wil-
son in The Declining Significance of Race. The rapid increase of this ‘underclass’ 
since the 1970s (partly due to the changes in the economy), their falling further 
and further behind mainstream society, the near exclusive reliance on govern-
ment aid for a significant part of them, led Wilson to conclude that class had 
become more relevant than race in trying to alleviate the problems. He also 
noted that the Civil Rights Act had little impact on their condition, partly be-
cause of their isolation in the inner city ghettos.162 Oliver and Shapiro point out 
the “lack of desirable human capital” in these populations, that prevents them 
from competing on the mainstream job market.163  
Historian Jacqueline Jones comments on this deepening poverty with the 
following words: “By the 1990s America’s internal colonial economy had grown 
to the point that observers linked conditions in the South Bronx, and in the hills 
and hollows of Appalachia, to those in the Third World.”164 Political scientist 
Jennifer Hochschild noted the same trend, with, however, a racial difference: 
the white ‘underclass’ is decreasing; the black ‘underclass’ is increasing (in ab-
solute numbers), and poverty is becoming deeper and more entrenched. But 
Hochschild rejects the term ‘underclass,’ because of its extremely pejorative con-
notation. She prefers the term estranged poor.165 However, the term ‘underclass’ 
is widely used, and I will continue to use it. This choice is also motivated by the 
fact that in my opinion the term reflects the low public consideration for those 
populations, thus allowing for a constant reminder of the social barrier this 
population faces and their loose connection to the rest of society and the body 
politic. Political scientist David Goldberg analyzes the views on the ‘underclass’ 
as follows: 
 Thus, the notion was relinked to the 19th century conceptions of the ‘undeserving 
poor’, the ‘rabble’, and the ‘lumpenproletariat’. Accordingly, ‘the ‘underclass’’ has 
come to signify not just the unemployed but the permanently unemployed and 
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unemployable. It has come to include, particularly in the popular but also in the 
academic and political imaginations, those poor considered unmotivated to 
work—especially, women on welfare, vicious street criminals, drug pushers and 
addicts, hustlers and urban gangs, winos and the mentally deranged homeless. If 
these conditions are permanent, then they are necessary, and necessarily un-
changeable, and so it would seem there is no responsibility for doing anything 
about them save improving the criminal justice response.166 
This shows not only the loose connection of the ‘underclass’ to mainstream so-
ciety because of their own supposed deficiencies, but also an abandoning of the 
‘underclass’ by mainstream society. 
Wysong et al.’s Double-Diamond model is the most relevant for my analy-
sis. In my opinion, it is best suited for graphically representing the upward re-
distribution that has been operating since the 1970s alongside the dismantling 
of the welfare state.167 It also exemplifies the lack of upmost mobility, graphical-
ly represented by the constrained neck between the two diamonds, which is 
experienced by African-Americans.168 Moreover, this model fits the trend of a 
more and more precarious middle-class status, here included in the New Work-
ing Class. This new precariousness of the middle class is exemplified in the case 
of this analysis by their difficulty to meet health care expenses and affording 
health care insurance, especially since the 1990s. Sociologist and political scien-
tist Paul Starr sees the recession of 1991 and the 90% increase in insurances fees 
between 1987 and 1993 (incomes increased only by 28% during the same period) 
as the moment when health care definitely became an urgent problem for the 
middle class. 169 And lastly, the Double-Diamond structure is the most relevant 
in light of Barack Obama’s new class populist rhetoric revolving around uniting 
the lower middle and middle classes against some undefined “elites” de-
nounced through their power derived from money.170 
This haziness of the definition of the middle class is reflected in the 2010 
Report of the White House Task Force on the Middle Class chaired by Vice-
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168	   There	   is	   a	   great	   awareness	   about	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   in	   the	  African-­‐American	   community.	   An	   extract	   from	  
Chris	   Rock’s	   2008	   stand-­‐up	   comedy	  Never	   Scared	   illustrates	   this,	   explaining	   the	   difference	   be-­‐
tween	  white	  and	  black	  money:	  “There	  are	  no	  wealthy	  black	  or	  brown	  people	  in	  America.	  We	  got	  
some	   rich	   ones.	  We	   got	   no	   f***	  wealth.	   Shaq	   [Shaquille	  O’Neill,	   basketball	   player]	   is	   rich.	   The	  
white	  man	  that	  signs	  his	  check	  is	  wealthy.	  ‘Here	  you	  go	  Shaq,	  go	  and	  buy	  yourself	  a	  bouncing	  car,	  
bling	  bling.’	  I’m	  not	  talking	  about	  rich,	  I’m	  talking	  about	  wealth,	  ok?	  I	  talk	  about	  the	  white	  family	  
that	  owns	  all	   the	   fucking	  Similac	   [infant	   formula].	   I’m	  talking	  about	   the	  white	   family	   that	  owns	  
the	  color	  blue.	  […]	  I	  ain’t	  talking	  about	  Oprah,	  I’m	  talking	  about	  Bill	  Gates,	  ok?	  If	  Bill	  Gates	  woke	  
up	  tomorrow	  with	  Oprah’s	  money,	  he’d	  jump	  out	  of	  the	  fucking	  window.	  He’d	  slit	  his	  throat	  on	  
the	  way	  down.	  […]	  I’m	  not	  talking	  about	  rich,	  I’m	  talking	  about	  wealth,	  because	  wealth	  would	  set	  
us	   fucking	   free.”	   Chris	   Rock	   insists	   on	   the	   social	   and	   political	   power	   derived	   from	  wealth.	   His	  
sarcastic	  comment	  about	  the	  bouncing	  car	  has	  two	  objects:	  convey	  contempt	  for	  whites’	   treat-­‐
ment	  of	  blacks,	  here	  in	  a	  certain	  form	  of	  paternalism,	  and	  also	  denounce	  blacks	  hyperconsumer-­‐
ism,	  that	  had	  already	  been	  noted	  by	  Frazier	  in	  his	  1957	  Black	  Bourgeoisie.	  Frazier’s	  analysis	  was	  
that	   this	  hyperconsumerism	  and	  display	  of	  purchasing	  power	  aimed	  at	  hiding	   the	   lack	  of	  black	  
assets.	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President Joe Biden. For example, the report announced changes in 2011 that 
would help the middle class, such as the Child-Care Tax Credit, to help families 
to balance their work obligations and care for the children. The Report an-
nounced that the credit would be doubled for families with incomes up to 
$85,000 and increased for families with incomes up to $115,000.171 This shows 
that in terms of income brackets, the White House adopted a rather broad defi-
nition of the middle class. 
The Report gives a more precise definition of what they understand by 
‘middle class’ based on a detailed report made by the Department of Commerce 
on the request of the White House. First, the middle class, in this report, is more 
defined by aspirations than income, which echoes the foggy income definitions 
of the various economists and sociologists cited above. Middle-class aspirations, 
according to the Report, are: “home ownership, a car, college education for 
their children, health and retirement security and occasional family vaca-
tions.”172 The Report nonetheless gives a more precise income-category defini-
tion with the lowest income set at $51,000 for a married-couple family with two 
children to $123,000 for the same household as the highest income bracket. 
Lastly the report identifies three key elements that are problematic for the real-
ization of those middle class aspirations: health care, college, and housing, be-
cause of the dramatic price increases of those items over the past 20 years in a 
context of a lower income increase, especially during the 2000s. The Report, of 
course, points particularly to the sharp increase of health care insurance costs, 
which had increased by 155% since 1990.173 
1.2.2. We’re All Middle Class 
Some 70 years after the publishing of The American Dilemma, Wysong et al. 
make the same assessment as Myrdal in 1944: most Americans believe they are 
middle class, but nowadays Americans are conscious that the middle class is in 
trouble.174 One of the major problems is that there is no consensual definition of 
the “middle class”. It has been shown above that different foci exist in trying to 
define class status: some focus on income, others consider wealth to be a pri-
mordial factor, some take benefits (health and pension) into account, others 
take job security into evaluation, as well as the prestige and the autonomy of the 
job, or the social and political power wielded by different classes. Wysong et al. 
propose an additional dimension that is more based on a structural considera-
tion: Are the conditions present in society and in the economy for a middle 
class to exist, for people to move into it and to move upwardly out of it? Thus 
they add the criteria of opportunity and class mobility, in addition to a combi-
nation of income and resources.175 As their Double-Diamond model shows, they 
believe that the middle class has disappeared, or is at least seriously jeopard-
ized. Their assessment is very pessimistic: Regarding income, inequality is the 
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trend, income increases are below inflation and at only half of the productivity 
increase, more family members have to work and for longer hours. Regarding 
resources, the picture is just as bleak: they notice a reduction in years spent on 
the job, and less long-term jobs providing security. Health benefits have de-
creased, costs have increased and the coverage has diminished, the same apply-
ing to pensions. The overall financial stability has been jeopardized and is far 
from guaranteed. As far as opportunity is concerned, they observe a lack of 
availability of entry-level middle-class jobs and do not see a college education 
as a guarantee for a better income anymore. They consider this as a definite 
decrease in upward mobility.176 Sociologist and political scientist Leslie McCall 
makes a similar observation. According to her, this increasing income inequali-
ty has a dramatic impact on citizens: poor and middle income families manage 
to cope so far through the work of women and by accumulating debt, but this is 
only a limited tactic.177 Her observation clearly shows that the middle class sta-
tus has eroded. Smith shares a similarly pessimistic view about the middle class. 
According to him, the changes that occurred in the economy in the 1990s lead-
ing to more and more part time and temporary jobs are not compatible with the 
maintenance of a strong middle class. For him, the Great Recession presents yet 
another blow to the middle class: according to him, only people with incomes 
over $75,000 are still holding on, those with incomes under $50,000 are losing 
ground. To evaluate the situation of the middle class, Smith uses the Misery 
Index developed by Edward Hyman based on four items: income taxes, Social 
Security taxes, medical costs, and interest cost. The overall situation has dra-
matically worsened.178 
Gilbert still notes a high level of occupational inheritance and the positive 
impact of higher social class on the chances of success of the children. He ob-
serves similar trends for wealth mobility.179 The high occupational inheritance 
is not necessarily contradictory with Wysong et al.’s assessment: their claim is 
that at similar occupational levels the conditions for resources and opportunity 
have worsened. According to Bartels and McCall, US social mobility lags be-
hind several other western countries, for example Finland, Canada, Norway, or 
Sweden. Intergenerational studies show that mobility is declining, caused by 
factors such as family structure, race and ethnicity, parental education and in-
come, and region. The effect of parental income had declined between 1940 and 
1980, but increased between 1980 and 1990.180 This increasing class rigidity, 
which has also been pointed out for the ‘underclass,’ is part of a larger trend of 
class inequalities. 
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1.2.3. Obama’s Conception of Class 
Obama’s discussion of class is less detailed than his discussion of race, 
which is perfectly in line with the general attitude in the US about race and 
class. 
Obama uses the rhetoric of class populism, especially to counter the long-
established race populism used by conservatives. However, this class populism 
is somewhat hazy and mostly opposes undefined “elites” to the rest of the popu-
lation. 
That we are in the midst of crisis is now well understood. […] Our economy is bad-
ly weakened, a consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the part of some, but 
also our collective failure to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new 
age. Homes have been lost, jobs shed, businesses shuttered. Our health care is too 
costly, our schools fail too many […].181 
This extract from Obama’s first Inaugural Address is a good example of this ra-
ther vague evocation of class issues. The elites are referred to through the 
“greed and irresponsibility on the part of some”, which could also include the 
Republican Party since the financial crisis of 2008 and ensuing Great Recession 
is due to deregulations first started by president Ronald Reagan and pursued by 
the following Republican presidents. The population is also referred to in a very 
indirect manner through their concerns: jobs, homes, businesses (which must 
be interpreted as small businesses and concerns over jobs), health care, and 
education. References to elites are sometimes clearer, but often quite narrow. 
When attacking tax breaks for the rich, Obama focuses on “the wealthiest 2% of 
Americans”.  
In The Audacity of Hope, in the chapter “Opportunity,” outlining Obama’s 
views on increasing inequality and possible solutions, he also sketched his 
views on class relations. The class struggle that is described roughly opposes 
the wealthiest 5% of the population who benefitted from the Bush administra-
tion’s tax cuts to the rest of the American population, referred to either as “or-
dinary Americans,” “American families,” or “American workers.”182 The popula-
tion becomes more clearly defined when he promises absolutely no tax raises 
for families with incomes up to $250,000 a year. Moreover, in the 2009 SOTU 
he reminds the audience that the Recovery Act even “provides a tax cut—that’s 
right, a tax cut—for 95% of working families.”183 The elites are further defined 
by denouncing big money interest: 
So we can't just sit back and do nothing while families are struggling. Because 
even before this recession hit, we had an economy that was working pretty well 
for the wealthiest Americans -- working pretty well for Wall Street bankers and 
big corporations -- but it wasn't working so well for everybody else.184 
The elite, in addition to the wealthiest 2% of Americans, includes Wall Street 
bankers and big corporations, as well as undefined “special interests” and 
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health insurance companies.185 Although the elites are defined, the population 
remains somewhat elusive: “families” and “everybody else”. Obama only direct-
ly mentions the middle class. This is perfectly adapted, given that most Ameri-
cans believe they are middle class and given the widespread opposition to wel-
fare: “I'll be a president who ends the tax breaks for companies that ship our 
jobs overseas and put a middle-class tax cut into the pockets of working Ameri-
cans who deserve it.”186  
Obama’s class populism differs notably from the conservative racial popu-
lism: instead of pitting middle class taxpayers against undeserving poor, he cre-
ates an opposition with elites, here embodied in the companies harming the 
national economy through outsourcing. Obama’s focus on the middle class is 
very strong: 
And that means providing a hand-up for middle-class families —- so that if they 
work hard and meet their responsibilities, they can afford to raise their children, 
and send them to college, see a doctor when they get sick, retire with dignity and 
respect. (Applause.)187 
This focus on the middle class also becomes apparent through the social policy 
issues he focuses on. He speaks mainly about issues that are major concerns for 
the middle class, such as health care and good education. Especially regarding 
health care, Obama takes great pain to point out that it has become primarily a 
middle class problem, which perfectly corresponds to the conclusions drawn 
through the Misery Index or the Economic Insecurity Index: 
Now, when I was talking about this at that health care summit, some of you saw it 
-- I sat there for about seven hours; I know you guys watched the whole thing. 
(Laughter.) But some of these folks said, well, we just -- that’s a nice idea but we 
just can’t afford to do that. Look, I want everybody to understand -- the wealthiest 
among us can already buy the best insurance there is. The least well among us, 
the poorest among us, they get their health care through Medicaid. So it’s the 
middle class, it’s working people that are getting squeezed, and that’s who we 
have to help, and we can afford to do it. (Applause.)188 
In this passage Obama depicts a class system that corresponds to the rough vi-
sion most Americans share: the big and undefined bulk of the “middle class”, 
slightly more defined as the “working people” are set apart from “the wealthy” 
and “the poor”. This echoes Wysong et al.’s class model, in which the wealthy 
elite is set apart and out of reach in its smaller diamond, and that points the 
poor out as the excluded class. 
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1.3. Increasing Inequality 
Bartels shares this perspective on a changing class structure fuelled by in-
creasing income inequalities. According to him, after World War II there was a 
rather egalitarian income growth for all income categories. Since 1974 the 
growth has been much slower and “a good deal less evenly distributed”. Bartels 
bases his assessment on the comparison of the cumulative income growth189 
between the period 1947-74 and the period 1974-2005. 
 
 
In percent. 
Diagram 1 Cumulative Income Growth by Income Percentile for 1947-2005190 
The distribution very strikingly shows that from a rather even income dis-
tribution, favoring the middle segment of the income percentiles, the income 
distribution has moved to a sharply slanted income growth distribution, heavily 
tilted in favor of the highest percentiles. Although growth has diminished for 
all income percentiles, the slow-down is much more marked for the lowest in-
come percentiles. Bartels insists on the significant income gains for the “ultra-
rich” as compared to the merely affluent after 1985, and refers to the study by 
Thomas Picketty on the gains of the hyper-rich top 0.1% that made fivefold 
gains between 1981 and 2005. Their enrichment was constant from World War 
II onwards, but experienced a rapid escalation since 1980.191 
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In percent. For the income quintiles. 
Diagram 2 Change in share of Aggregate Income for Households: 1980-1992192 
 
 
In percent. Change in average household income by income group, 2000-2008. 
Diagram 3 Household Income Down from 2000 to 2008193 
The US Census Bureau has also noted a change in income distribution 
with a constant loss of income shares for the lower income quintiles. For the 
period from 1967 to 1980, the opposite was the case, with a 7.5% gain of shares 
for the lowest quintile and a loss of 9.7% for the top 5% of incomes.194 Smith 
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concurs in defining the period from the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s as the era of 
middle class prosperity, and also agrees on defining the period starting in 1974 
as the New Gilded Age.195 In terms of income distribution, the following picture 
emerged in 2010: 
 
 
Diagram 4 Shares of Aggregate Income 2010196 
In the highest quintile, 21.3% of the income was reaped by the top 5%. 
Economist Alan Krueger has described the wealth chasm between the stagnat-
ing middle class and the elites as “mind-boggling”. According to his analysis, 
during the growth spurt from 2002 to 2007 the top 1% of the nation reaped 2/3 of 
the total economic gains. In 2010, the first year of the recovery, the top 1% cap-
tured 93% of the gains.197  
Gilbert shares this assessment of shrinking inequalities between the 1950s 
and the 1960s, with a sharp increase in inequalities in the late 1970s and a par-
ticularly steep rise since the 1980s. Alongside a concentration of income and 
wealth at the top 1%, he notes an increase of full-time year-round male working 
poverty and that there has been no progress against poverty since the early 
1970s, while the proportion of families with incomes above $100,000 is growing 
steadily. Gilbert highlights some important changes: Since the 1970s, with the 
post-industrial society, it has become nearly impossible for a high school grad-
uate to support a family, or themselves, for that matter. He points to a growing 
inequality between all categories, but especially steep inequalities between high 
school and college education. According to him, “in an era of growing inequali-
ty, the less educated, the less skilled, and the less experienced have been the 
biggest relative losers.”198 Gilbert echoes the observations that Wilson and Oli-
ver and Shapiro have made regarding the black ‘underclass.’ 
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From this observation of economic inequality along class lines, two points 
emerge. First, the conclusion that the concentration of wealth is counterproduc-
tive for the economy199 and that the trickle-down/supply-side economic model 
obviously does not trickle down, but only works upwards. Second, according to 
Bartels, this inequality is accepted because of the promise of mobility that lies at 
the heart of the American Dream that is strongly coupled to the idea of equality 
of opportunity.200 Hochschild insists on the nearly unanimous endorsement of 
the American Dream in the US and the fierce belief in equality of opportunity 
as opposed to equality of outcome.201 McCall concurs in this opinion, but her 
analysis focuses on the American public favoring opportunity over redistribu-
tion, and more specifically the lacking association between redistribution and 
the expansion of opportunity as well as economic growth.202 
 A set of explanations is offered to clarify the dynamic features influencing 
and shaping this class system. Wysong et al. focus on mechanisms that allow the 
mobilization of the resources of the wealthy “to facilitate via corporate and gov-
ernmental policies the upward redistribution of income and wealth to the most 
affluent classes”, that in turn serves to maintain a caste-like class system. Ac-
cording to them, “the perpetuation and legitimation of our unequal class system 
[is achieved] by several conventional social institutions, including federal and 
state governments, large corporations, the corporate media, and the culture 
industry.”203 Gilbert’s explanations are less hinged on class warfare. He evokes 
economic restructuring, globalization and especially the outsourcing of un-
skilled manufacturing labor, technological changes and automation taking a 
heavy toll on unskilled and low-educated workers. He also points to weakened 
wage-setting institutions through the decline of the unions and the erosion of 
the minimum wage through inflation (the federal law did not provide for ad-
justment). Lastly he points to the deregulation of the American economy as an-
other possible explanation.204  
It is most likely that multiple causes are coming together. However, Gil-
bert largely agrees with Bartels on the effects of government policies tilted to-
wards the rich as being a primordial factor of increasing inequalities. Gilbert’s 
analysis of the effect of tax policies shows that the income inequality trends 
since the 1970s are further exacerbated by the tax code: the top tax rate on per-
sonal income has decreased from 77% to 28%. Corporate and inheritance taxes, 
especially for the wealthy, were reduced, whereas payroll taxes were increased, 
hitting working people hardest. The only counterbalancing measure was the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC, enacted in 1975). Although overall tax rates 
have decreased for everybody, the drop was most generous for the rich, particu-
larly for the top 1%.205 
                                                        
199	  Smith,	  Who	  Stole	  the	  American	  Dream?,	  xvi.	  
200	  Bartels,	  Unequal	  Democracy,	  15.	  
201	  Hochschild,	  Facing	  Up	  to	  the	  American	  Dream,	  55.	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  Amer-­‐
ican	  Dream	  and	  Obama’s	  use	  of	  it,	  see	  3.2.1	  “The	  Dream	  Smells	  Like	  Peppermint	  but	  Tastes	  Like	  
Strawberry	  Shortcake:”	  the	  Conservative	  Responsibility	  Discourse	  and	  3.4.6.	  “In	  No	  Other	  Coun-­‐
try	  on	  Earth	  Is	  My	  Story	  Even	  Possible:”	  the	  American	  Dream.	  
202	  McCall	  9.	  
203	  Wysong	  et	  al.	  2.	  
204	  Gilbert	  64,	  82.	  
205	  Gilbert	  95.	  
1 – Race and Class: Concepts and Reality 83 
 
McCarty et al. offer an explanation that closely resembles the previous 
ones. Their central thesis, however, is that immigration is a major factor of in-
creasing income inequalities, through the influx of cheap labor. It must be not-
ed that their view about the middle class is less pessimistic; they mainly note 
income stagnation for low wages, thus lending more credibility to the immi-
grant hypothesis.206 According to them, economic inequalities lead to political 
polarization. The wealthy have captured the Republican Party to enact policies 
to reduce redistribution, as was the case with the major tax breaks in favor of 
the rich under Ronald Reagan, G. H. W. Bush, and G. W. Bush. They also point 
to Republicans’ obstructionist tactics when in the minority to prevent changes 
from the status quo. “In other words, polarization in the context of American 
political institutions now means that the political process cannot be used to 
redress inequality that may arise from nonpolitical changes in technology, life-
style, and compensation practices.”207 McCarty et al. published this conclusion 
in 2006. This highly divided and polarized political context will be discussed in 
detail in Part 2, especially to demonstrate how conservatives have managed to 
create a division along racial lines in order to prevent an alliance based on 
common class interests. However, since 2006, Barack Obama has proved that 
even in a highly polarized context it is possible to create redistributional legisla-
tion. Nonetheless, the 2006 conclusion, partly informed by president Bill Clin-
ton’s failure to achieve progressive redistributional reform, helps highlight the 
difficulty of the task and shows the place, although not openly admitted, of class 
in American politics. 
1.3.1. Race Akin to Class 
Talking about race remains very delicate because of the social and politi-
cal implications of the issue. The following part will show, based on data from 
the US government, how race impacts a social and economic reality. By doing 
this, I do not intend to deny that tremendous racial progress has been made. I 
would be wrong to imply that the Civil Rights have had little effect. But it would 
be equally wrong to downplay the persisting economic and social gaps along 
racial lines. My focus here is only on social and economic inequalities, I there-
fore chose not to engage in discussing persisting political inequalities in this 
part. 
In 1993, Cornel West stressed the racial progress that has been made since 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964:  
Racial progress is undeniable in America. Never before we have had such a color-
ful menagerie of professionals in business, education, politics, sports, and the la-
bor movement. Glass ceilings have been pierced—not smashed—by extraordi-
nary persons of color. Overt forms of discrimination have been attacked and 
forced to become more covert.208 
West is very clear that progress has been made, but he is equally lucid that 
many inequalities remain and that the progress is a limited one. He insists on 
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the fact that the glass ceiling has not been completely removed and that dis-
crimination takes a more “covert” form. Especially considering individual suc-
cesses, it is necessary to examine broad social and economic trends to be able to 
reveal the ongoing impact of the race factor. Winant assesses racial progress as 
having been too limited and hence discards the idea of a post-racial America 
because of the many lingering effects and reproduction of structures and condi-
tions. He points out the gap between current racial rhetoric and the actual “ra-
cial experience and social organization”.209 
Bobo argues that ongoing, and even unconscious, prejudice works to rein-
force and maintain racial inequalities through its impact on hiring practices 
and residential segregation and thus constitutes “the modern reproduction of 
systematic racial inequality”.210 Anderson shares this assessment and denounc-
es the impact of the still very high residential segregation: “It unjustly deprives 
blacks of access to jobs, public goods, consumer goods and services, and finan-
cial, social, cultural, and human capital.”211 Bonilla-Silva’s diagnosis of black 
racial reality is equally unforgiving. He points out the still very high residential 
segregation, the blatantly unequal education, a social life that is still character-
ized by persistent discrimination, unequal treatment, and even exclusion. 
Blacks remain the group with the least intermarriage. Bonilla-Silva considers 
that there has not been a major structural [emphasis added] change since Jim 
Crow.212 
It is beyond the scope of this work to make a thorough investigation of the 
causes of these inequalities. I merely wish to point out that all those causes are 
interrelated, creating a “lack of desirable human capital” as sociologist Melvin 
L. Oliver and political scientist Thomas M. Shapiro213 call it, and maintaining 
blacks at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy. 
African-Americans only represent 12% of the total population, but are con-
centrated at the receiving end of all major social and economic inequalities. 
Between 2009 and 2013, 27.1% of the black population had experienced poverty 
status over the past twelve months, compared to only 10.6% of the white popu-
lation over the same period. 
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Diagram 5 Population by Race, 2010214 
 
Diagram 6 Poverty Status by Race, 2009-2013215 
 
A similar picture of structural inequality emerges when looking at poverty in 
detail. Black poverty is deeper and direr than for other populations. Within all 
levels of poverty, blacks experience higher rates of poverty, especially at the 
lowest level, the under 50% of Federal Poverty Level. The Federal Poverty Level 
(FPL) for a single person under age 65 was $11,344 (annual revenue).216 The black 
poverty rate at this level is more than double than for the total population, and 
nearly three times higher than for whites. 
 
 
Diagram 7 Level of Poverty by Race, 2009-2013217 
The same picture appears when looking at the income of all social categories. 
Blacks have consistently lower incomes than the rest of the population. The 
black population concentration exceeds the white population and the total 
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population for incomes under $49,999. This trend is reversed for incomes over 
$50,000, thus giving a macro-perspective of the socio-economic stratification 
along racial lines. This picture is developed further through the median and 
mean income.218 The median income for black households (with $35,195) was far 
below that of whites (with $54,999) or of the total population (with $51,914). The 
mean income was $47,945 for blacks, $74,765 for whites, and $70,883 for the total 
population.  
 
 
Diagram 8 Income and Benefits by Race, 2010 219 
Income must be further broken down, because major differences exist in the 
composition of the income. Several government benefits are included in in-
come calculations.  
 
 
Diagram 9 Income Composition by Race in Percent 2010220 
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When looking at income details, it appears that black incomes depend heavily 
on government help that is associated with welfare. White incomes rely more 
heavily on “earned” supplements such as Social Security or retirement funds. 
But not only the proportions vary, the amounts do too. The mean incomes of 
the different categories are consistently lower for blacks than for whites. 
 
 
Diagram 10 Mean Additional Incomes by Race221 
Although already reflecting stark inequalities, income inequalities only 
show part of the picture. Oliver and Shapiro point out that measuring income 
does not show the effect of past discrimination. They prefer to look instead at 
wealth in order to establish a more reliable account of entrenched inequalities. 
The measure of wealth takes into account income, net worth, and net financial 
assets.222 Oliver and Shapiro argue that:  
The disadvantaged status of contemporary African-Americans cannot be divorced 
from the historical processes that undergird racial inequality. The past has a liv-
ing effect on the present. We argue that the best indicator of this sedimentation of 
racial inequality is wealth. Wealth is one indicator of material disparity that cap-
tures the historical legacy of low wages, personal and organizational discrimina-
tion, and institutionalized racism. The low levels of wealth accumulation evi-
denced by current generations of black Americans best represent the position of 
blacks in the stratificational order of American society.223 
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Indeed, assets are usually accumulated over generations and are strongly 
influenced by family wealth. The authors point, among others, to the role of 
inheritance in social status. For example, if a family wishes to buy their first 
home, financial aid from their parents can help to make a first down payment 
and help secure a better loan. The same intergenerational money flux is at play 
for higher education. Financial help from parents and grandparents help to 
reduce (or avoid altogether) exiting college with very high student loans to pay 
back. This in turn helps to start a faster accumulation of assets.224  
When looking at the median net worth of households, a deep inequality 
emerges. The net worth of a household equals the assets minus the debts. Me-
dian means that the same number of households are situated above and below 
this value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 11 Median Net Worth of Households 2005 and 2009225 
 
The extent of inequality becomes quite striking. Moreover, the tremendous 
differences in losses during the economic crisis of 2008 show that discriminato-
ry practices must have been at play. Reed points out practices of predatory 
lending targeted at minorities.226 This seems to be confirmed by the fact that 
during the subprime crisis Hispanics and blacks lost respectively 66% and 53% 
of their net worth, compared with only 16% for whites. According to PEW, 
wealth ratios have hit a new record: the difference in median net worth was a 
ratio of 19 between whites and blacks, and 15 between whites and Hispanics in 
2009, the highest since 1984, when those ratios were 12 and 8 respectively.227 
Oliver and Shapiro conducted a study based on the 1987 SIPP (Survey of 
Income and Program Participation) data and showed the deep impact of asset 
inequality in surviving in case of income loss. Only 25.3% of all white house-
holds had no or a negative net financial asset, compared with 60.9% of all black 
households. This means that those households have no financial cushion to fall 
back on in case of job loss, but face a high probability of being engulfed by 
debts. 38.1% of white households had net financial assets for survival at poverty 
level for less than three months, compared with 78.9% of black households. For 
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six months, it was 43.2% for whites compared with 83.1% for blacks. This means 
that 56.8% of white households compared with 16.9% of black households could 
survive for more than 6 months at poverty level in case of income loss. Blacks 
also face greater risk to lose their middle-class status: only 27% of black middle-
class households had enough savings to maintain their present standard of liv-
ing, compared with 65% of white households. 55% had enough savings to main-
tain their standard of living for at least three months.228 I do not have the means 
to conduct the same analysis based on 2010 figures, but in their new edition of 
2006, Oliver and Shapiro saw the initial trends confirmed. The fact that the as-
set ratio between whites and blacks increased from a ratio of 10 in 1988 to a ratio 
of 19 in 2009229 only indicates that the inequalities uncovered by Oliver and 
Shapiro also have increased. 
These inequalities mirror inequalities at the housing level. The contrast is 
very stark. Not only is the percentage of owned houses lower for minorities; the 
percentage of rented lodgings is actually higher than the percentage of owned 
property, as the following diagram shows. 
 
  
Diagram 12 Occupation of Housing Units by Race, in Percent, 2010230 
In addition, marked differences exist between blacks and whites regarding 
type of work. Blacks rely more heavily on government employment and man-
age less often to start their own business. Although the percentage is very small 
for the overall workforce, only half as many blacks are unpaid family workers, 
showing that blacks are less able to forego an additional income. This is reflect-
ed by findings in the study conducted by Oliver and Shapiro suggesting that 
blacks rely more heavily on two full-time incomes to reach middle-class sta-
tus.231 
 
                                                        
228	  Oliver	  and	  Shapiro	  89,	  99.	  
229	  Taylor	  et	  al.	  3.	  
230	   “American	   Community	   Survey”	   (Census	   Bureau/FactFinder,	   2011),	  
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_11_1YR
_S2502&prodType=table.	  
231	  Oliver	  and	  Shapiro	  98.	  
64.6	   69.8	  
43.4	   46.3	  35.4	   30.2	  
56.6	   53.7	  
Total	  Population	   White	   Black	   Hispanic	  
Owner-­‐occupied	  Units	   Renter-­‐occupied	  Units	  
90 Stephan Social Policies and Racial Questions 
 
Diagram 13 Class of Workers by Race in Percent, 2010232 
Differences also occur at the occupational level, particularly at the highest 
level. In the category of “Management, business, science, and arts occupations” 
there is a difference of 9.5% between blacks and whites. These 9.5% of blacks 
who did not manage to secure a job in this category are found in excess com-
pared to whites in the service category. 
 
 
Diagram 14 Occupational Categories by Race in Percent, 2010233 
The lower participation in the workforce is, among other factors, influ-
enced by the notoriously high incarceration rate of African-Americans. The 
rate for black males was 3.25 times higher than that of the total population, and 
6.7 times higher than the incarceration rates for white males in 2010. 
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Diagram 15 Incarceration Rates by Race and Sex 2010234 
In other words, although blacks represent only 12% of the population, in 2014 
they represented 37.4% of the prison population, as compared to 59.2% of whites 
in the prison population (for 64% of the total population).235 Legal researcher 
Michelle Alexander explains that this resulted from Reagan’s and Clinton’s 
tough legislation on drugs that massively increased the prison population. She 
also noted sharp racial inequalities. According to her, at the beginning of the 21st 
century, in many states, up to 90% of people incarcerated for drug offenses 
were black or Hispanic. These high incarceration rates have problematic politi-
cal and economic consequences, as people can lose their right to vote, but also 
become ineligible for TANF and food stamps, be no longer eligible for public 
housing, federal education assistance, and encounter problems when searching 
employment.236 
Future job prospects are further complicated through differences in edu-
cational attainment, which are partly due to the socio-economic situation of the 
parents. 
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Diagram 16 Educational Attainment by Race 2010237 
Blacks outpace whites only at the lowest educational levels and lag behind es-
pecially at levels of completed and longer university educations. The health 
situation of blacks will be exposed in detail later.238 
Despite race being a social construct, it has direct and real consequences 
on people’s lives. The ‘race’ construct has been, and still is, used as a means of 
social subordination, thus giving the notion of ‘race’ a very substantial and size-
able reality, that manifests itself in the very structure and hierarchy of society. 
This subordinating use and the ensuing hierarchical social structure makes race 
alone an insufficient analytical tool. The structuring effect of race means that 
class has to be taken into account as well. 
1.3.2. The Truth is in the Barbershop: Community vs. Popu-
lation 
The increasing importance of class in the black population has widely 
been noted. However, it appears that the black community is often very reluc-
tant to talk about the social and economic reality and tries to maintain an ap-
pearance towards mainstream society as a monolithic block. One must distin-
guish, however, between social and economic differentiation within the 
community and a more solid political ideological block based on racial solidari-
ty. Based on previously undertaken research and some political events and in-
cidents, I will try to show this conflicting dynamic and try to explain the termi-
nology that should apply to the different situations. 
When E. Franklin Frazier first published his sociological study of the black 
middle class under the title Bourgeoisie noire in France in 1955, a controversy and 
debate started within the black community. For the first time, the black middle 
class were seeing themselves from the “outside”. Different reasons fuelled the 
discontent: Frazier was accused of revealing “intimate” things to whites, expos-
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ing the community’s private life. Frazier openly discussed the lack of assets of 
the black middle class and thus destroyed the myth circulating at that time 
about their purchasing power through which they had tried to gain some eco-
nomic leverage. Moreover, Frazier pointed out the self-delusion of the black 
middle class in the 1950s. If the foreign reactions were positive toward the book 
and welcomed the self-analysis and self-criticism of the black community, the 
reactions in the US were more negative. White Americans reacted with anger 
and heavily criticized the validity of the methodology and the analysis. In the 
preface to the 1970 American edition, Frazier explained that he thought that this 
reaction stemmed from the fact that his analysis belied the social and economic 
progress of the black population, i.e. that it showed the lasting effects of slavery 
and segregation. Moreover, Frazier insisted on the psychological effects of slav-
ery and showed the ongoing outsider position of blacks in US society since 
Emancipation. In Frazier’s opinion, the truth about the economic and social 
reality of the black population was a liability for US foreign relations for the 
African stage of the Cold War conflict. The black working class greeted the 
book because they had the impression that the book attacked “upper class” 
blacks. After a while the outrage started to fade and the book became seen as a 
good contribution, as something making the black situation and difficulties 
more widely understood within the rest of society.239 
William Julius Wilson’s 1978 book, The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks 
and Changing American Institutions, was met with similar anger. It must be admit-
ted that the title is quite provocative, but it seems that at some point critics al-
most deliberately misunderstood Wilson. His pointing out that class and select-
ed economic issues had become more salient than race in addressing the 
problems of the black population was heavily criticized by the black intelligent-
sia.240 According to Andrew Diamond, many black academics belonged to the 
first generation of African-American studies that were still in continuity with 
the civil rights struggle and viewed their studies through the prism of race. 
Moreover, critics read in Wilson’s book the same “culture of poverty” blaming 
as they saw in the Moynihan Report.241 This interpretation, however, does not 
hold after a close reading of the book. Wilson’s main argument is that because 
of undeniable class differentiation within the black community, racial policies 
that focus mainly on civil rights or rights of access (such as affirmative action) 
are ill adapted to the current needs of the black population. The core idea is to 
argue for more and more specific redistributional policies, in short, to be more 
efficient and truly helpful. 
Much of the criticism of the Moynihan report was spurred by a partial 
reading of the publication, and preceding leaks. The report (original title: The 
Negro Family: The Case for National Action) was published in 1965 at the request 
of President Johnson to have a working base for social programs. In a 2009 re-
evaluation of the Moynihan report, Wilson showed how many of the controver-
sial statements had been taken out of context. Wilson insists that Moynihan’s 
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concerns, particularly about black male joblessness, today find a strong echo 
among social scientists and even civil rights leaders.242  
There is undeniably a certain reluctance to talk about issues concerning 
the black population that either conflict with political and social interests or 
seemingly make the population appear in a negative light and show that there 
are great differences within the black population. This, however, is difficult to 
avoid given the low socioeconomic status of a significant part of the black popu-
lation. Moreover, the black population tends to present itself as an ideological 
block based on racial solidarity: the idea of the community.  
Political scientist Melissa Harris-Lacewell conducted a study of the expres-
sion of black political and social thought. Her analysis shows that deep opin-
ions, and especially opinions that are conflicting with the black doxa243, are not 
easily expressed, and certainly not in a mainstream context. Harris-Lacewell 
terms these spaces for expression of black political thought and production of 
ideology the counterpublic. This counterpublic space can be anywhere, the 
church, the barbershop, or the kitchen table. According to her this counterpub-
lic was created through racial separation and is based on Du Bois’s description 
of black life occurring behind a veil. She insists, for example, on black conserva-
tives denouncing their being silenced by the traditional leadership when saying 
that race is not the number one issue anymore. According to her “[t]hey are 
frustrated that their ideas will be silenced by a hegemonic black leadership that 
is not committed to offering ideological choices to African-Americans.”244 How-
ever, elections and governmental appointments have shown that mainstream 
politics give a space of expression to black conservatives. But this can lead, ac-
cording to Manning Marable, to confusions between race and political ideolo-
gy, as happened with the support for Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas. 
Marable insists on Thomas’s anti-black political ideology (he is against welfare, 
against abortion, against affirmative action, and shows hostility toward black 
women). And thus his assessment of black middle class support for Thomas is 
very negative:  
Seldom has the black middle class so confused its actual material interests with 
the symbolic satisfaction of seeing one of their own appointed to high judicial of-
fice. The Thomas case is one of the rare instances in which the majority of the Af-
rican-American community has supported the wrong person for the wrong posi-
tion for the wrong reasons.245 
Cornel West made a similar assessment of the Clarence Thomas case. In 
his opinion the community failed to denounce Thomas’s mediocrity at the 
moment of his appointment to the Supreme Court and chose instead to close 
ranks on a fellow black, as was the case for Louis Farrakhan, who supported 
him for the sake of racial solidarity.246  
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Political scientist Alanna Hackshaw describes this ideological community 
as follows: 
A common history and shared collective memory of racial exclusion define the 
narrative of political incorporation of US-born African-Americans [the term Afri-
can-American denotes individuals who identify their origins within the United 
States] and inform perceptions of this group's racial common fate [Common fate, 
also known as linked fate, is the belief that one's individual life chances are direct-
ly shaped by the fate of one's racial group in the larger society].247 
Jennifer Hochschild also points out a strong group solidarity among blacks, 
including at an economic level.248 However, Harris-Lacewell’s analysis of coun-
terpublic discourse shows that within the black population there is a different 
perception of this solidarity. Some segments of the black working class perceive 
a lack of racial solidarity along class lines. Some of them think that the middle 
class should subordinate their economic interests to the racial interests.249 This 
difficult interaction of race and class within the black population is further 
highlighted by the difficulties people face when trying to define their social 
identity. Sociologist Karyn Lacy explains in her analysis of the black middle 
class that for the respondents of her study the salience of their class or race 
identity depended on the situation and that they often had difficulties distin-
guishing precisely between race and class discrimination.250  
This serves to illustrate an important point: although the black popula-
tion is clearly not a monolithic block with one socioeconomic situation and one 
single ideology, the expression of this reality is far from unproblematic. To try 
to makes this difference visible, I will use the term “black population” when 
referring to matters of socioeconomic differences, and use the term “communi-
ty” when referring to the ideological entity that tries to appear as a united block 
toward mainstream society. 
1.3.3. Black Social Classes 
The class structure within the black population mirrors the structure of 
American society at large, with the slight difference that the black population is 
concentrated at the bottom of the class system. Oliver and Shapiro have shown 
that the black middle class status is a poorer one than the white middle class 
status. This is a reflection of both a historical and a structural reality: the whole 
black population having been excluded from the mainstream society and the 
highest occupations, this has led to the concentration of the black population at 
the lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder, but also to a perception of upward 
mobility with a potentially lighter baggage than their white counterparts. Lacy 
describes this phenomenon:  
[…] historically, many occupations that are actually working-class positions were 
considered middle-class by the black community. Porters and postal clerks, for 
example, were widely perceived as veritable middle-class occupations. […] These 
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blacks are actually what LeMasters terms “blue collar aristocrats” rather than 
members of the middle class.251 
Already in 1955 Frazier pointed out the particularity of the black middle class 
and deliberately conducted a non-comparative study, choosing to highlight the 
peculiarities of the black middle class.252 
 
 
In percent.  
Diagram 17 Income Distribution Black Population, 2010253 
When looking at the incomes of the black population in 2010, it becomes appar-
ent that there are indeed major class differences. It must be noted, however, 
that half of the black population would not qualify, or only barely so, as middle 
class: Smith’s definition of the middle class starts at incomes of $30,000, and the 
lowest and the second quintile representing 50% of the black population, are 
below $35,000. 
 
 
Diagram 18 Income Quintiles Black Population 
2010254 
 
Diagram 19 Income Quintiles White Population 
2010255 
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It has been shown above that it is very difficult in the US to define the 
middle class. Lacy points out the fact that this is even more difficult for the 
black population.256 Oliver and Shapiro demonstrated that the black middle 
class was very distinct from the white middle class, not only due to differences 
in income, but also because of major differences in assets. Lacy makes a similar 
observation, but based more on their life experiences:  
“[…] despite appreciable differences in their income, occupation, and educational 
attainment, members of the black lower-middle class share a common daily expe-
rience that does not differ significantly from the experience of being a member of 
the black working class or the black [22] poor. At the same time, many existing 
studies report that the middle-class blacks and whites do not experience their 
middle-class status in the same way.” 
Lacy also confirms Oliver and Shapiro’s assessment of the fragility of the black 
middle class, especially the lower middle class. According to her analysis, in 
2000, 65% of the black middle class belonged to that category (with incomes 
between $30,0000 and $49,000). The rest of the black middle class closely re-
sembles their white counterpart and is mainly composed of professionals (47% 
of the white middle class).257 Just like Wilson, sociologist Elijah Anderson sees 
the black middle class as a product of affirmative action and equal opportunity 
programs, “supported by society’s egalitarian ethos of tolerance for diversity 
and racial incorporation” and characterized by a “growth of human capital”. 
Although he puts emphasis on the fact that the children mostly have a very di-
verse circle of friends, he also notes that the parents still face occasional hard-
ship, have trouble fitting in at times, and still encounter racism.258 This echoes 
Lacy’s observations of middle class blacks having more trouble to make their 
class status known externally and facing everyday discrimination when not ad-
vertising their class status clearly enough. Lacy explains that the black middle 
class identity is created through two means: by marking class differences within 
the black population and by emphasizing areas of consensus with the white 
middle class.259 A 2010 PEW poll showed that blacks see a growing values gap 
between the black poor and the black middle class, with 61% of blacks seeing an 
increasing difference (so do 54% of whites and 45% of Hispanics). Moreover, 
they also perceive a growing values convergence with the white population 
(54% of blacks, 72% of whites, and 60% of Hispanics).260 This shows that the 
economic class differentiation based on income differences is accompanied by a 
social differentiation within the black population and an increasing assimila-
tion into the white mainstream for the black middle class. 
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In The Audacity of Hope Obama offers a description of his understanding 
of black class relations that mingles a perception of racial solidarity with a 
strong class differentiation within the population, especially regarding values. 
He also points out the difficulty of making society see your values and your 
class first, and only then your color: 
The truth is that such rising frustration with conditions in the inner city was hard-
ly restricted to whites. In most black neighborhoods, law-abiding, hardworking 
residents have been demanding more aggressive police protection for years, since 
they are far more likely to be victims of crime. In private—around kitchen tables, 
in barbershops, and after church—black folks can often be heard bemoaning the 
eroding work ethic, inadequate parenting, and declining sexual mores with a fer-
vor that would make the Heritage Foundation proud. 
In that sense, black attitudes regarding the sources of chronic poverty are far 
more conservative than black politics would care to admit. What you won’t hear, 
though, are blacks using such terms as “predator” in describing a young gang 
member, or “‘underclass’” in describing a mother on welfare—language that di-
vides the world between those who are worthy of our concern and those who are 
not. For black Americans, such separation from the poor is never an option, and 
not just because the color of our skin—and the conclusions that the larger society 
draws from our color—makes all of us only as free, only as respected, as the least 
of us.261 
Obama’s understanding of black class relations matches largely the conclusions 
drawn by academic research. He also insisted on the negative impact of the 
‘underclass,’’ which fuels negative stereotypes, on blacks of other social classes. 
William Julius Wilson argues that the Civil Rights Act increased the class 
gap in the black population. He points out that the 1964 Civil Rights Act reflect-
ed more the needs of the black middle class, who were instrumental in the pro-
tests and the Civil Rights Movement, and who were under the illusion that it 
would serve the whole community. His interpretation of the 1960s ghetto riots is 
that they showed the dissatisfaction of the lower class blacks about the lack of 
economic opportunities and the problem of de facto segregation: both problems 
that were not addressed by civil rights legislation. Wilson’s conclusion is that 
now class issues have become more relevant for the African-American popula-
tion than race.262 Political scientist Michael C. Dawson observed two parallel 
trends regarding black economic status: a persistent and sometimes growing 
gap between black and white, but also a class polarization within the black 
population.263 This is confirmed by Gilbert’s observation of an increased resi-
dential segregation according to class within the black population. He notes a 
greater income segregation among blacks than among whites, which increased 
by 50% between 1970 and 1990, with a slight drop in the 1990s.264 
In a 2009 interview with April D. Ryan on the black radio AURN, Obama 
described his perception of the black class structure: 
You know, I think this continues to be the best of times and the worst of times. I 
mean, I think it’s the best of times in the sense that never has there been more op-
portunity for African-Americans who have received a good education and are in a 
position then to walk through the doors that are opened. And, obviously, you and 
me sitting here in the Oval Office is a testament to that.  
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I think it’s the worst of times in the sense that unemployment and the lack of op-
portunity, particularly in some cities, has never been worse. I mean, you look at a 
city like Detroit where you used to have an enormous African-American middle 
class built on the auto industry—that city is in hard, hard times right now.265  
Obama’s description echoes the analysis made by sociologists and economists: 
for those who have the necessary skills to enter mainstream society, life is full of 
opportunity; the others are left behind and struggling because of their “lack of 
desirable human capital” as sociologists Melvin L. Oliver and Thomas M. 
Shapiro term it, which is particularly characteristic of the black lower classes.266 
Only 3.3% of the black population are in the upper classes, only 1.3% of 
which make it to incomes of more than $200,000. This is especially striking 
compared with the 9.4% in the highest quintile for the white population, half of 
which are in the highest income category. This would correspond to Wysong’s 
Credentialed Class, mainly composed of managers and CEO’s of at least medi-
um sized enterprises. This small upper class reflects the lower business partici-
pation of African-Americans. Black businesses account only for 9.4 percent of 
the number of all firms in the US, which is lower than their population propor-
tion of 12%. It must also be noted that although their business share is higher 
than the Asian share, their turnover is lower than the Asian turnover.  
 
 
In percent of firms.  
Race defined by race of 51% of the sharehold-
ers. 
Diagram 20 Businesses by Race of Owner 
2012267 
 In percent. The total value for 2012 was 
$33,536,848,821,000. 
Diagram 21 Sales, Receipts, or Value of Shipments of 
Firms With or Without Paid Employees268 
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Moreover, most African-American businesses do not have paid employees: only 
4.2% of all black businesses have such employees compared with 8.6% of His-
panic businesses, with 21.7% of white businesses or even 25.2% of Asian busi-
nesses.269 Following this trend, black businesses also represent the smallest pay-
roll share. 
 
 
In percent. The total payroll was $5,236,446,058,000 in 2012. 
Diagram 22 Shares of Payroll by Race of Firm Owner 2012270 
However, they not only have the smallest payroll share, their payroll ratio is 
also the weakest: this ratio was 0.84 for white businesses, but only 0.62 for black 
businesses (Asian ratio 0.67, public 1.16). This is consistent with the generally 
lower incomes of African-Americans. 
The disproportionate concentration of the black population on the lower 
rungs of the economic ladder becomes very obvious on the pie chart (Income 
quintiles diagram 9 and 10). Whereas the white population is rather evenly dis-
tributed over 3 big income segments (low, middle, and upper class, with admit-
tedly big inequalities in real income distribution), the black population, howev-
er, is very clearly concentrated at the bottom: 49.7% of the black population are 
in the lowest two quintiles (compared with 31.5% of the white population), 
meaning they have incomes under $35,000 and do not qualify as middle class, 
or just barely so (12.6% have incomes between $25,000 and $34,999, so for the 
sake of simplicity let us assume that roughly half of them would be in the over 
$30,000 category and would qualify for the lower middle class). Hence a major 
part of the black population must be considered working poor, although within 
this quintile, sharp distinctions must be made. Only part of it corresponds to the 
working poor, which is distinct from the ‘underclass.’ Wilson’s observations of a 
growing ‘underclass’ since the 1970s are linked with changes in the economy 
and the white flight to the suburbs, coupled with a growing teenage population 
in the inner city neighborhoods (ghetto). The inner city does not suffer from 
race competition, but from a lack of jobs, especially for unskilled labor, which 
in turn leads to increasing reliance on welfare and increasing crime rates. Wil-
son noted the high proportion of low wage jobs that were paid below living 
standards, thus not solving the welfare dependency.271 Sociologist Linda Dar-
ling-Hammond points out the relationship between low education achieve-
ments, especially for high school dropouts, and high unemployment. According 
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to her, these are directly related to the growing ‘underclass.’272 This echoes Oli-
ver and Shapiro’s assessment of the “lack of desirable human capital” that char-
acterizes the ‘underclass.’ Jones describes the emergence of the ‘underclass’ as 
follows:  
By the 1980s or so middle-class white Americans had identified a supposedly 
postmodern phenomenon, a Northern urban black “‘underclass’” located with an 
otherwise “classless” (or exclusively “middle class”) society. “Underclass” was but 
one more term used to label and objectify people believed to be morally dissolute 
and criminally inclined […].273 
Economists Isabel Sawhill and Erol Ricketts chiefly characterize members of 
the ‘underclass’ by what they define as their dysfunctional behavior and thus 
differentiate them from the working poor.274 Jones’s description of the ‘under-
class’ phenomenon highlights two facts: the fact that the ‘underclass’ is seen as 
being outside the society and the fact that the ‘underclass’ is strongly associated 
with negative values. Hence, the working poor’s desire to differentiate them-
selves from the ‘underclass.’ This differentiation cannot always be made 
through physical distance, i.e. living in a different neighborhood, hence this 
difference is expressed through values, such as responsibility and a strong work 
commitment, to set them apart from the ‘underclass.’ Elijah Anderson insists on 
this problem, explaining that the black working class suffers from the troubles 
associated with the ‘underclass’ and thus puts great importance on decency, 
work ethics, and church attendance, for example.275 Harris-Lacewell has noted 
that slightly better off blacks tended to blame the ‘underclass’ for their patho-
logical behavior276 and impute that part of the not getting ahead to a lack of tak-
ing responsibility for oneself. In 2010, 53% of blacks thought that lack of respon-
sibility was a greater cause for “not getting ahead” than discrimination (53% for 
responsibility and 30% for discrimination).277 The important point here is that 
the ‘underclass’ is indeed characterized by its persistent and concentrated pov-
erty.278 Hochschild points out that this high rate of passing on of low economic 
status is principally linked to the deleterious conditions in the ghettos.279 
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1.4. “To Be a Poor Man is Hard, but to Be a Poor 
Race in a Land of Dollars is the Very Bottom of 
Hardships:”280 the Intersection of Race and 
Class  
1.4.1. Structural Dimension 
There is a harsh debate about the class approach among academics and 
activists. Gilbert, for example, highlights the general lack of focus on the class 
factor in political analysis.281 More importantly, many think that a class ap-
proach obliterates the specificity of race and racism.282 Academics point toward 
considerable inequalities between whites and blacks within the same class, as 
sociologist David Theo Goldberg explains through examples such as inequali-
ties in employment opportunity. According to his point of view 
[…] the notion of the ‘underclass’ explicitly erases the exclusionary experience of 
racism from social science analysis while silently enthroning the demeaning im-
pact of race-based insinuations and considerations. It distinguishes the especially 
impoverished from the ordinary poor while aggregating together those whose 
conditions of experience in various ways—in terms of race, gender, and class—
may be quite different.283 
Although Goldberg particularly insisted on the notion of ‘underclass,’’ explicit-
ly attacking Wilson’s conclusions, the same observations must be made about 
all other classes. Oliver and Shapiro conducted a detailed demonstration of the 
greater fragility and generally lower middle class status of blacks and Lacy 
showed that race and racism remain everyday experiences for blacks. There is 
indeed a color line within the class system. This economic color line also be-
came quite visible after the Great Recession. Even without insisting on predato-
ry lending targeted at blacks and Hispanics, the tremendous losses of these 
groups (53% and 66% respectively), show the greater structural vulnerability of 
minorities, and thus clearly establish economic outlooks shaped by race. Eliza-
beth Anderson, in her book The Imperative of Integration (2010), makes a plea for 
race policies such as affirmative action and a greater development of such an 
approach based on a moral philosophical analysis of the question. Her explana-
tions are basically the same as those used in the 1960s to initially justify affirma-
tive action, with the difference that her demonstration shows that the reasoning 
is still valid in 2010, since the structural inequality has not changed and is still 
due to past and present discrimination.  
The key point that emerges from the debate over race versus class is that it 
is impossible to dissociate the two. As has become apparent with the respective 
presentations of the race and the class issues there are structural analogies be-
tween them. The same growing class inequalities observed in overall American 
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society apply to the black population, since the removal of formal and official 
barriers of legal discrimination. However, the fact that racism, institutional and 
otherwise, has created a social order based on domination over non-white peo-
ple, (and this also at an economic level), means that structurally, the black pop-
ulation is concentrated at the lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder, making 
race an issue that keeps its salience, whereas the increasing class differentiation 
makes it impossible not to take class into account. 
This intersection between race and class has long been noted. Du Bois 
started very early to discuss the double-burden of race and economic subordi-
nation: 
For the first time he [the African-American] sought to analyze the burden he bore 
upon his back, that dead-weight of social degradation partially masked behind a 
half-named Negro problem. He felt his poverty; without a cent, without a home, 
without land, tools, or savings, he had entered into competition with rich, landed, 
skilled neighbors. To be a poor man is hard, but to be a poor race in a land of dol-
lars is the very bottom of hardships.284  
In 1939, in his work Race Relations and the Race Problem: a Definition and an Analy-
sis co-authored with Edgar T. Thompson, sociologist and co-founder of the Chi-
cago school of Sociology Robert E. Park, made a similar observation of a social 
order established along fixed racial lines corresponding to social classes,285 thus 
showing the intersection of race and class. Myrdal’s caste concept to describe 
the racial order in the USA highlights this historically structural dimension: 
“When we say that Negroes form a lower caste in America, we mean that they 
are subject to certain disabilities solely because they are “Negroes” in the rigid 
American definition and not because they are poor and ill-educated.”286 This 
formal and fixed oppression described by Myrdal, in which race trumped class 
for the assignment of social positions, was transformed by the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act. According to Conley, this was the moment when the type of oppression 
changed and became primarily economic and thus a class issue. He goes so far 
as to say that nowadays race often functions as “a stand-in for that dirty word of 
American society: class.”287 Manza and Brooks show that class and race are the 
strongest structural factors (as compared to religion and gender) in shaping a 
person’s outlooks.288 Feagin makes a detailed demonstration of the racialized 
class history of the United States, showing how throughout American history 
racial divisions have functioned to weaken and prevent class alliances, especial-
ly during the 19th and early 20th century. Moreover, Feagin argues that the 
maintenance of blacks at the bottom of society functioned to quench white 
working class unrest: with blacks beneath them, they could “feel better” about 
their own situation and “often inadequate economic conditions.”289  
The concentration of minorities at the lowest rungs of the social ladder al-
lows for a certain swapping between the categories of race and class. During her 
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research on black working women, Jacqueline Jones noted that there was a ma-
jor convergence of values and experiences, regardless of race, among poor peo-
ple, leading her to further investigations of the subject of poverty for both 
blacks and whites, and ultimately to the conclusion that “[p]overty abides no 
line drawn by color or culture.” However, Jones also noted that there was an 
intrinsic link between race and class since the middle class and public policy 
makers insist on defining social problems in racial terms, for example, the ‘un-
derclass’ is identified as black. She admits that blacks face a heightened vulner-
ability, but she also shows that poverty is more concentrated among rural 
whites from the South than among urban blacks in the North. These, however, 
are the absolute numbers, blacks are disproportionately hit by poverty, which 
explains in part the heightened attention to that group and the general identifi-
cation of poverty with black faces.290 Sociologist Oliver C. Cox gave a historical 
explanation in 1948 of race as a convenient element to justify exploitation and 
declared that “[…] racial antagonism is essentially political-class conflict.”291 
Wilson reached the same conclusion in 1978: according to him, both race and 
class are needed to give a satisfactory explanation of the conditions of the black 
population.292 Dawson shares a similar interpretation of a link between race 
and class:  
a third dimension of the racial order [the other two dimensions are: white-
nonwhite, then foreigner-insider] is one’s racialized economic status. Individuals 
and groups that are not economically successful are considered deficient. In this 
racial context, economic failure is seen at least in part due to the pathologies of 
the struggling group and, in the minds of too many American citizens, also as a re-
sult of innate racial inferiority.293  
However, it must be noted that Dawson’s interpretation of the race-class link 
differs slightly, inasmuch as his vision does not highlight the systemic oppres-
sion that created a social order with intermingled race and class lines, but ra-
ther highlights how negative racial images function to justify the socioeconomic 
order that resulted from systematic racial oppression. Conley also sees race and 
class as intrinsically linked: “In contemporary America, race and property are 
intimately linked and form the nexus for the persistence of black-white inequal-
ity.”294  
Among black politicians and activists, the economic dimension of the race 
issue has long been emphasized. During the 1963 March on Washington, John 
Lewis, then chairman of SNCC, initially wanted to protest the civil rights bill 
and criticized it for its lack of focus on economic issues. He pointed out that 
“[w]e need a bill that will provide for the homeless and starving people of this 
nation.”295 A little later, Martin Luther King Jr. picked up the same idea and 
turned to economic issues in his final years, for example with the Poor People’s 
March on Washington. He summarized the problem very bluntly: “What good 
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is it to be allowed to eat in a restaurant if you can’t afford a hamburger?”296 The 
Moynihan report, requested in 1965, showed that there was a governmental 
awareness about racial inequalities. Moreover, President Johnson’s wish to ad-
dress these inequalities with social policies highlighted the economic dimen-
sions of the race issue, and thus shows that it is also a class issue. The economic 
dimension of the race issue became more obvious during that period because 
the civil rights legislation ending segregation in the southern states had little or 
no impact on the de facto segregation in the North and the dire economic condi-
tions there. Many scholars, like political scientist David O. Sears, agree in say-
ing that the riots in Watts in the summer of 1965 were an expression of the deep 
dissatisfaction with the political situation in the North.297 Schuman et al. see the 
riots in Watts as a turning point when it became apparent for the population 
that their condition would not be improved by civil rights legislation alone. Ac-
cording to them, Watts constituted a turn for the agenda.298 This strong eco-
nomic agenda is also apparent, for example, in the Ten Point Black Panther 
Party Platform of 1966. Although showing a very strong black nationalist orien-
tation, the platform has a very strong economic dimension and is heavily influ-
enced by Marxist thought. Marxist influence is apparent in the thought of some 
black scholars, such as Cox, again showing the relevance of class in racial ques-
tions. 
The intertwining of race and class can be found at a legislative level as 
well. Affirmative action, although presented as a race policy and often cited as 
the emblematic multicultural policy, reflects the overlapping problematic of 
race and class: although branded a race policy and not targeting underlying 
economic problems, the program seeks to achieve social upward mobility, and 
through this it shows the intimate link between race and class. Moreover, polit-
ical scientist Robert C. Lieberman demonstrated the impact of social policy on 
racial inequality. By examining the structural impact of social policy on differ-
ent racial populations, Lieberman shows that minorities have been excluded 
from many an opportunity for upward social mobility. 299 The most interesting 
aspect of this demonstration is that this exclusion did not work openly, as it was 
the case under Jim Crow laws for example, and was not restricted to the South. 
Lieberman shows that Social Security, at its beginning and until 1950, worked as 
a racially exclusive program, because it excluded farmworkers and domestic 
servants.300 Historian Michael B. Katz estimates that this excluded up to 2/3 of 
the black population from Social Security benefits.301 A similar picture emerges 
with Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), now TANF (Tempo-
rary Assistance to Needy Families enacted in 1996). Initially a program to help 
white widows care for their children, the program was rapidly discredited and 
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came under attack when black mothers started to swell the AFDC rolls in the 
1950s and 1960s. AFDC benefits peaked in the 1970s and have since then steadily 
declined, whilst at the same time the number of black enrollees has in-
creased.302 Political scientist Francis Fukuyama chronicles this negative repre-
sentation of social programs identified as black programs.303 Hedrick Smith has 
noted that the filibuster tactics that were used in the 1950s and 1960s on civil 
rights issues are applied more and more to economic issues today, for example 
in the form of a “Phantom Filibuster”, meaning that in the case where a 60 vote 
majority is not present the threat of a filibuster is enough and the bill is deemed 
dead.304 This shows that the issue of social stratification has moved from a pure-
ly racial outlook to a more economically based form. This demonstration of 
black exclusion from social policy benefits shows two features: the first is that 
race and class are inextricably intermingled, since a part of the population was 
excluded from the benefits of policies that helped the white middle class to 
emerge. The second feature is, as Lieberman concludes, if indeed the race prob-
lem is also a class problem, the same political solutions can be applied to both 
and must not necessarily take the form of race policies. 
This strong class dimension, however, does not mean that the race issue 
can be discarded from social policy. Sociologist and race theorist Howard 
Winant highlights the persisting structural impact of race: 
At the social structural level, the macro-social level, we must recognize again, a 
century after Du Bois, that we still live in an unfolding racial history, in which ra-
cial dynamics are linked to the struggle for democracy, for a socially just distribu-
tion of resources, and for the overcoming, if not of capitalism itself, at least of the 
wretched, cruel, and despotic excesses of capitalism. Racism is a variety of despot-
ism. When we contemplate race and racism as global or national structures, we 
are immediately struck by the extent to which they still stratify national societies 
and the social world as a whole. Yet we cannot operate effectively, we cannot 
think effectively, if we deny the significance of the racial transformations of recent 
decades.305 
The race factor has indeed an ongoing economic significance that makes 
the minority economic situation a more fragile one. The Great Recession fol-
lowing the 2008 crisis had a stronger impact on minorities, be it because of the 
greater structural weakness due to the effects of past discrimination or through 
the effects of present discrimination in the form of loan refusals, predatory 
lending, or ongoing housing segregation and its negative impact on minority 
real estate value, or employment practices that result in blacks being the last 
hired and the first to be fired, thus creating a distinct racial economic hardship. 
Dawson noted a similar trend for the recession in 1981-2 that hit African-
Americans particularly severely, while the recovery in the mid-1980s did not 
include this population.306 Although the general hardship of the decade from 
2000 to 2010 has been put forward, as well as the general decline of the middle 
class in the US, once again the recession has been particularly hard on minori-
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ties.307 The income losses experienced by the population between 2000 and 
2008 hit everybody, but racial minorities experienced the greatest losses. 
 
 
In percent. Change in real median household income. 
Diagram 23 Change in Household Incomes by Race, 2000-2008308 
 
Although the economic dimension of race issues is undeniable, so is the racial 
dimension of economic issues. Only by dealing with both at the same time can a 
satisfactory solution be arrived at.  
1.4.2. “In the Race to the Top it Helps to Start there:”309 
Built-in Inequality, Class, Education, and Meritocracy 
The reason why neither race nor class can be discarded as analytical para-
digms is that US race relations are constructed around built-in inequality. By 
this I mean that US society was constructed so as to give whites an economic, 
social, and cultural superiority and advantage, things that were achieved 
through the subordination of the non-white populations. Winant points out 
that the US is constructed as an Anglo-white male society, where non-whites 
are perceived as a threat. 310 Critical race theorist and professor of law Kimberlé 
Crenshaw insists that this system “subordinated the life chances of blacks to 
those of whites on almost every level”, with more “symbolic” subordination like 
segregated facilities that were often tightly linked to material subordination 
(lower wages for the same work, housing segregation, impact of poorer living 
conditions and health care on shortened life span). The symbolic subordination 
of denied access translated in most cases into economic subordination through 
lower quality facilities, restricted job access, and restricted union participa-
tion.311  
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However this subordination, which created a disadvantage for people of 
color is only one side of the medal. Political scientist Ira Katznelson, in his work 
When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in 
Twentieth-Century America, demonstrates how throughout American history 
social policies were intentionally shaped for an unequal outcome along racial 
lines, thus contributing to the unfair advantage for whites. 312 Those two pro-
ceedings coupled together, unfair exclusion of one group topped by an unfair 
additional advantage for the other group ended up creating a wide gap between 
the two populations. Both together can be designated as institutional racism 
(according to Feagin’s definition of racism as the use of race to justify subordi-
nation) but here government institutions exert it. Institutional racism strongly 
echoes Lieberman’s structural racism, but carries a more intentional dimension 
than the latter. Reed insists on the nefarious effects of this form of racism:  
Institutional racism is more important because its effects are widespread. While 
individual-level racism affects a modest number of individuals, a racist institu-
tional policy can systematically disadvantage many members of a racial group, 
and the consequences can have effects over many years. 313 
These long-term effects of institutional racism explain some of the inequalities 
that have been exposed above. This institutionalized racism held the black 
population back exactly at the same time as when the white population moved 
massively toward middle class status fuelled by a welfare state that largely ex-
cluded minorities. But institutional racism is just one aspect of this inequality. 
Bonilla-Silva shows a second side to this racial structure: a racialized social sys-
tem (i.e. white supremacy) based on systemic privileges awarded to whites. Ac-
cording to him this is present in all European or European-affected societies 
and has a global effect. He defines it as follows: “[…] a society’s racial structure 
is the totality of the social relations and practices that reinforce white privilege.” 
Most importantly, this racial structure is not overcome yet, because people 
want to maintain their privileges, even unconsciously. This leads the dominant 
group to develop rationalizations to explain the subordinate status of others. 314 
The concept of meritocracy is one of these rationalizations. In my understand-
ing, Meritocracy is strongly linked to the concept of cultural racism and behav-
ioralist explanations for racial inequalities and thus, in a larger extent, to the 
discourse of personal responsibility, as well as to the tricky question about the 
different interpretations of equal opportunity.315 The concept of meritocracy is 
also strongly linked to the American Dream, the success any American can 
reach through hard work and which is deserved because of personal striving. 
Hochschild explains the role of the American Dream in accounting for racial 
inequality:  
By submerging structural reasons for failure—racial or gender discrimination, the 
unequal division of economic and social capital, the simple lack of jobs—under 
individual explanations for failure, the dream contributes to ensuring that some 
cannot succeed. But that very submerging makes it appear that the reasons for 
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failure really are individual, and thus subject to conquest by any one individual, or 
even all individuals.316 
Crenshaw concurs in this interpretation and denounces “the myth of equal op-
portunity” that justifies class inequalities. In her opinion “[r]acism, combined 
with equal opportunity mythology, provides rationalization for racial oppres-
sion, making it difficult for whites to see the black situation as illegitimate or 
unnecessary.” This is based on whites’ erroneous belief in a “fair and impartial” 
market that allows viewing economic competition as ruled by merit.317 The core 
idea of meritocracy is that your socioeconomic status reflects your merit, the 
hard work one puts in to reach this status. This, of course, works only if the so-
ciety and the economy are defined by equal opportunity. By positing equal op-
portunity as existing simply through antidiscrimination law and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and not acknowledging the unfairness of the system, the fail-
ure of an important segment of the population results in a racist belief in racial 
cultural inferiority because they are at the bottom of the economy. Acknowl-
edging the unfairness of the system, however, is difficult because it challenges 
the norms and values of the concept of success of the dominant segment of the 
population, meaning that success is not the result of one’s own virtue, but of, 
amongst other things, an unfair advantage. 
Part of this unfair advantage revolves around education. Education is one 
of the factors that have a high impact on socioeconomic status with a strong 
correlation between educational attainment and income. 
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In 2014 dollars. For full time wage and salary workers. Median income all workers: $839. 
Diagram 24 Median Weekly Earnings by Educational Attainment, 2014318 
  
In percent. All workers 5%. 
Diagram 25 Unemployment Rate by Educational Attainment, 2014319 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ data show the strong correlation between edu-
cational attainment and income, but also the impact of education on unem-
ployment and thus ultimately the relation between education and upward so-
cial mobility. To the extent that income is strongly linked to educational 
attainment, it can be said that educational attainment has an impact on social 
class status. However, there is also an interrelation the other way round. Gilbert 
shows that there is a strong impact of social class on educational attainment, 
creating an interrelation.320 It becomes a self-perpetuating cycle. 
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Other includes non-measurable variables and unknown factors, such as sheer luck. 
Schema 4 Intercorrelation Class-Education321 
Gilbert realized this schematic representation based on the analysis of data of 
college access according to the income of the parents. The obvious trend shows 
that low-ability students (based on SAT scores) from low-income backgrounds 
have nearly no access to college (13%), whereas high-ability students from high-
income backgrounds have a very high college access rate (83%). It is in the mid-
dle of the ability curve that the correlation is more telling: among the students 
with just below —average results, 57% of high-income students go to college, 
compared with 33% of low-income students. Broadly speaking, in 2000, 75% of 
the children aged 18-24 from the top 25% of income background went to college, 
compared with 35% of the children from the lowest 25%.  
Class also has an impact on the quality of education. The lower social 
classes tend to go to 2-year community colleges with little transfer to 4-year col-
lege and have a high dropout rate. Gilbert points to tuition fees and the link 
between social class and selective admission.322 Reed explains this selective link, 
which also creates inequality along racial lines because of housing segregation. 
Several factors interact: economics and housing influence where a child goes to 
school. Depending on the poverty of the neighborhood there may be insuffi-
cient or a lack of advancement placing courses, which in turn jeopardize college 
admission and thus educational outcomes.323 Education researcher and activist 
Jonathan Kozol has conducted a detailed study of inner-city schools. His find-
ings highlight the resegregation of schools and point out the lower funding 
based largely on property taxes that continuously disadvantage low-income 
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neighborhoods.324 Moreover, he denounces the low expectations of these 
schools, offering classes such as sewing. This not only negatively influences the 
chances of the students getting admitted in college and finding good job later, 
but also creates high levels of frustration and despondency among the stu-
dents.325 Wysong et al. also point out this crucial interaction of social back-
ground, education, and future job opportunities. Today, only the elite universi-
ties offer opportunities at the high paying jobs in the big corporations, but even 
at lower job levels social capital is paramount: the network of family, friends, 
and acquaintances provides emotional and financial support and job opportu-
nities.326  
The social network simulations by economists Antoni Calvò-Armengol 
and Matthew O. Jackson show that the job prospects of the networks members 
have an influence on other persons of the network in obtaining a job or get a 
better one. Unfortunately this also works the other way round, a person in a 
social network with high unemployment tends to have fewer job opportuni-
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  with	  the	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  regarding	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  low-­‐income	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  high-­‐income	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   districts	   spending	   33%	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  the	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  states:	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Rhode	   Island,	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  Dakota,	   Texas,	  West	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  Wyoming.	  Nevada	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   the	   greatest	   ine-­‐
qualities	   as	   the	   spent	   30%	   less	   per	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   in	   the	  highest	  minority	   districts	   than	   in	   the	   lowest	  
minority	  districts.	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ties.327 Conley agrees that differences in educational attainment can be ex-
plained by class differences and class related factors. According to him, the first 
predictor of college completion is the occupational status of the parents, the 
second factor being the assets to finance higher education.328 This correlation, 
however, is often denied. Jones points out that: 
The “culture of poverty” thesis serves a larger political purpose, for it encourages 
some people to believe that the poor positively revel in their own misery, that they 
shun stable marriages and steady employment almost as a matter of principle.329 
What Jones terms here culture of poverty is linked to the cultural racism ex-
plained above, which also emphasizes a lack of commitment to education. She 
insists that this cultural explanation completely ignores the “jobs-housing-
education nexus” as explained above, that creates a structural poverty circle. 
However, cultural explanations for, or rationalizations of structural inequality 
are not the only ones. In The Bell Curve (1994), psychologist Richard J. Herrn-
stein and political scientist Charles Murray, the author of the infamous Losing 
Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980, argue that social classes reflect natural 
cognitive abilities.330 By insisting on natural cognitive abilities, or IQ, Murray 
and Herrnstein dare in 1994 to offer a biological explanation for inequalities 
along class lines, that are all the easier to accept since they overlap with old rac-
ist assumptions of racial biological inferiority, made possible through the struc-
tural concentration of racial minorities at the bottom of society. 
Murray and Herrnstein’s argument is a good example of a focus only on 
equality of opportunity in a world devoid of discrimination and effects of past 
discrimination. McCall argues that this focus on equality of opportunity is typi-
cal, especially when dealing with minority and gender issues. However, in her 
opinion, the inequality of outcomes functions as evidence of inequality of op-
portunity.331 Wysong et al. share a similar interpretation of the issue of equal 
opportunity and meritocracy. They debunk meritocracy as “policies [that] actu-
ally function as class-, gender-, and racially biased gatekeeping mechanisms.” 
Moreover, they insist that there is a strong bias toward the norms of the privi-
leged class that have to be adopted in order to succeed.332  Thus, the myth of 
meritocracy is strongly shaped by classicism. At university level, meritocracy 
can almost be considered as affirmative action for affluent (white) students. 
Universities admit a certain percentage of students with low SAT scores, but 
who have special skills, such as athletic or musical abilities and other impres-
sive extracurricular experiences.333  Critical race theorist Richard Delgado ar-
gues that whites benefit from a whole system of advantages, from the social 
network enabling them to get better summer jobs, and therefore having better 
extracurricular experiences, to better financial resources, enabling them to de-
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velop those special skills.334 Thus, positing equal opportunity as existing and 
attributing social class status to merit serves to reinforce the social hierarchy 
along race and class lines that overlap because of historical structural subordi-
nation. 
1.4.3. Why Health Care Reform? 
When analyzing racial and economic inequalities and how to address 
them, health care is not the first item that springs to mind. However, there are 
several reasons—historical, political, economic, and racial—to consider health 
care. First and foremost, because the ACA has been, since the 1960s, the first 
major progressive social policy reform to be enacted, although the progressive 
extent of the reform can be discussed. In addition to that, health care stands out 
because it was marked by one century of unsuccessful attempts at enacting 
comprehensive legislation. Since 1966, when the Canadian Medical Care Act 
was passed that introduced universal health coverage, the US had stood out 
(and in some respects still does) as the only western country with a very sparse, 
uneven, and rather inefficient health care and insurance system (comparing the 
health care expenditures with the amount of care received by the population). 
A 2012 report shows that in 2009 the US spent 48% more on health care than the 
next closest OECD country (Switzerland), and 90% more than most other west-
ern countries. The health care GDP share of the US exceeds the GDP share of 
other industrialized countries by at least 5%. However, the health care received 
by Americans is not substantially better than in the other countries.335  
Beyond these historical considerations, there are also political reasons to 
analyze health care in the context of racial inequalities. Several academics ad-
vocate interracial coalition building on shared (economic) interests to create a 
majority to defend more social policies. Among these academics is, for example, 
Manning Marable, who put forward this strategy in Beyond Black and White: 
From Civil Rights to Barack Obama.336 He argued this particularly in the light of 
the deteriorating economic situation and the heightened inequalities resulting 
from neoliberal politics: “The radical changes within the domestic economy 
require that black leadership reaches out to other oppressed sectors of society, 
creating a common program for economic and social justice.”337 A similar ar-
gument was made by Cornel West in Race Matters, in which he argued for a 
multicultural alliance and a principled coalition in order to defend meaningful 
redistributive measures.338 In the context of creating an interracial coalition to 
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defend more redistributive policies in order to tackle economic and racial ine-
qualities, health care makes sense. 
Health care represents a significant part of the American economy that 
had expanded from 5.6% of the GDP in 1965 to 17.3% of the GDP in 2009 (17.4% 
in 2010, 17.8% in 2015).339  Moreover, health care is among the social issues that 
Americans support rather strongly.340 Moreover, health care plays a distinctive 
role in economic upward mobility. Historian Michael B. Katz insists on the pri-
mordial place of health insurance for economic stability and the early link that 
has been established between health and poverty.341 Political scientists Yeheskel 
Hasenfeld and legal scholar Joel Handler aver that health issues are often a rea-
son for the return into poverty of people above the poverty line. Moreover, they 
highlight the fact that so far the biggest share of the welfare state has gone to 
the non-poor through Social Security and Medicare.342 But this assessment 
should not cloud the fact that the middle class has become more fragile since 
the 1970s and this partly because of health care costs. This means that a focus on 
health care can ally the interests of the poor, the working poor/working class, 
and the middle class. The political need to target the middle class will later be 
explained in detail.343 
As shown above, the assessment of the fragility of the middle class is 
based by some on the Misery Index, which takes health care costs into account 
(but also income taxes, Social Security taxes, and interest cost). These items 
took 24% of a family budget in 1960, but by 1990 it was 42%. Political scientist 
Jacob Hacker developed the Economic Insecurity Index, a tool to assess the 
harshest financial blows, comprising 25% or more income losses, superheavy 
medical expenses, or exhaustion of family financial reserves. According to his 
calculations, in 1985 roughly 10% of families experienced this, compared with 
20% in 2010, thus showing the increasing vulnerability of families confronted 
with hardship. This is confirmed by the increasing number of personal bank-
ruptcies that are filed, which Smith distinguishes as a middle class phenome-
non, since it allows protecting basic assets such as the home and retirement 
funds.344  
A 2011 study showed that health problems and their related expenses con-
tribute to personal bankruptcy filings, more so than other adverse events such 
as divorce or unemployment. Medical problems and medical expenses that ex-
ceed 5% of the annual income increased the probability of filing for personal 
bankruptcy by 9.2%. Households with medical conditions were twice as likely to 
file for bankruptcy (33.3%) as households without medical condition (15.2%), 
thus making medical problems one of the major reasons for personal bankrupt-
cy. It must be noted, however, that consumption patterns, i.e. spending too 
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much, are the main causes for personal bankruptcy. The strongest indicator is 
an excessive mortgage (53.4% probability increase) and credit card debts (35.6%). 
This is in stark contrast to the situation in the 1980s, when medical debts 
trumped consumption as number one reason for filing a personal bankrupt-
cy.345 
These personal bankruptcies have increased sevenfold between 1984 and 
2005. Based on Smith’s analysis, this is partly due to the shifting of health care 
costs. Since 1980, when about 70% of full time employees in companies with 
more than 100 employees enjoyed fully paid health care, the costs have increas-
ingly been shifted onto the employees, or have been dropped altogether. By 
2005, only 18% enjoyed full health benefits, 37% got partial help, and 45% had 
no employer support whatsoever.346 This decreasing employer health support is 
directly linked to the increasing fragility of the middle class, especially with the 
simultaneous increase in health care costs. Paul Starr points out that the health 
care situation has reached an extremely problematic state: between 2000 and 
2006 health premiums for families rose by 87%, while the cumulative inflation 
rose only by 18% and the average cumulative wage growth was only 20%. How-
ever, Starr highlights that the wage growth applied only to top earners, while 
real median household incomes have declined by 3% since 2000.347 Due to the 
increase of health insurance costs, the percentage of uninsured has increased. 
This trend affected the working and middle class in particular. 
 
 
Diagram 26 People without Health Insurance by Income in Percent, 1993 and 2009348 
Both people with and without insurance face problems due to medical 
costs; the greater difficulties are, unsurprisingly, with the uninsured popula-
tion. A 2011 Kaiser Family Foundation health tracking poll found that over the 
past twelve months 19% of the insured had problems with medical bills. This 
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was the case of 56% of the uninsured. Thus a significant proportion of the popu-
lation opted not to use health care services.349  
Major health inequalities exist along class and racial lines, and especially 
among the lower middle class. Contrary to an initial intuition, the overall health 
conditions are not strongly divided by social class although overall poorer 
health conditions are slightly more concentrated among the lower classes, and 
thus, because of the structural overlapping of race and class, among minorities. 
 
 
Diagram 27 Health Conditions by Race and Income, in Percent, 2010350 
Despite this tendency of a better overall health situation among the more 
affluent classes, not surprisingly, the utilization of medical services shows the 
opposite trend: the higher incomes use more medical services than the lower 
incomes.  
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Diagram 28 Medical Services Utilization by Race, in Percent, 2010351 
 
Diagram 29 Medical Services Utilization by Income, in Percent, 2010352 
The absence of health insurance is strongly linked to income: in 2010, 
29.6% of people in families with incomes below 200%FPL had no health insur-
ance at all and 33.6% relied on Medicaid. Among families with incomes over 
200% FPL, 10.2% had no insurance and only 5.3% relied on Medicaid.353  
Moreover, there has been a decrease of employer-based health insurance 
coverage, both for the coverage by one’s own employer or in the coverage avail-
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able for dependents. In 2010, 56.5% of the total population was covered by em-
ployer-based health care (34.8% covered by their own employer, 21.7% covered 
as dependents) compared with 64.4% in 1997 (39.9% own employer, 24.4% as 
dependents).354 This decline in employer-based health coverage illustrates the 
increased fragility of the middle class and the working class, as employment 
becomes less of a guarantee for the access to health insurance. 
Thus, a strong focus on health care makes sense economically for the wid-
er population. 
Other academics, like political scientist Ira Katznelson, put forward similar 
ideas of creating an interracial alliance to defend social policies, but more out-
spokenly urge to specifically target racial inequalities. In his 2005 book When 
Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-
Century America, Katznelson, although a defender of affirmative action, pleaded 
for the kind of issue-focused measures that helped whites reach middle-class 
status, i.e. extensive social policies for the expansion of opportunity, such as 
subsidized mortgages, education grants and job training, small business loans, 
help with job searching and placement, a higher Earned Income Tax Credit, 
child care, and guaranteed basic health insurance.355 Certainly, health insur-
ance is just one element among others, but unfortunately, it is lately the only 
major social policy reform that has been enacted. Similarly, William Julius Wil-
son, in his 1978 book The Declining Significance of Race, argued that racial oppres-
sion is mainly an economic oppression that affects all races: 
The situation of marginality and redundancy created by the modern industrial 
society deleteriously affects all the poor, regardless of race. ‘underclass’ whites, 
Hispano-Americans, and Native Americans all are victims, to a greater or lesser 
degree, of class subordination under advanced capitalism.356 
Moreover, according to his analysis, the more recent trends showed that 
blacks’ social and economic mobility was more strongly affected by economic 
class factors than by race factors. Hence he called for class based programs to 
tackle “the pervasive and destructive features of class subordination” that 
would help to improve opportunity for all economically oppressed populations 
and blacks in particular. 357 Wilson called for a broad multicultural political alli-
ance to help strengthen the factors and institutions that help equalizing class 
inequalities, such as education, the welfare state, or unions.358 
Although there is a general need for a better health insurance situation 
overall, there is also a specific racial dimension. Beyond the impact of medical 
costs on the probability of filing for personal bankruptcy, health conditions also 
have an impact on chances of social mobility, such as education. Economist 
Heather Rose lists “poor health” among the reasons why students fail to gradu-
ate, although these reasons encompass “loss of motivation, dissatisfaction with 
campus life, changing career interests, family problems, [and] financial difficul-
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ties […],” and she particularly points at the difference of quality of previous aca-
demic preparation to explain the racial achievement gap. 359 
The abovementioned trends are compounded for the minority popula-
tions because of the intersection of race and class. Lacking health insurance has 
a distinctive racial dimension. Despite the smaller population count, the abso-
lute number of uninsured blacks (8.1 million or 20.8%) and Hispanics (15.3 mil-
lion or 31.6%) slightly exceeds the absolute numbers of uninsured whites: 23.4 
million uninsured minorities compared with 23.1 million uninsured whites 
(11.7%).360 
However, racial differences also exist regarding health conditions. First 
of all, blacks have a noticeably higher overall mortality rate. 
 
  
Diagram 30 Death Rates for All Causes by Race, 2008-10361 
A distinct racial reality also emerges regarding pathologies. Blacks and 
whites neither die because of the same reasons nor at the same rates. It appears 
that regarding mortality, blacks have very distinct causes of death. Their overall 
death rate is the highest, by far, in the US. The overall death rate for blacks in 
2007 was 919.2 per hundred thousand, compared with a rate of 763,1 for whites, 
the next highest rate, meaning their rate is 1.2 times higher. For most causes of 
death blacks present higher death rates, except for chronic lower respiratory 
diseases, chronic liver disease and cirrhosis, unintentional injuries, motor vehi-
cle-related injuries, poisoning and suicide. The difference in death rates be-
cause of influenza and pneumonia is so small that it is not noteworthy. For oth-
er causes, however, very high differences exist and create a distinct black health 
picture. Diseases of the heart and cerebrovascular diseases take a heavy toll on 
the black population, as do diabetes and HIV. Although not a health problem 
per se, it must be noted that blacks have by far the highest homicide rate. Com-
pared with whites, black rates for diseases of the heart were 1.3 times higher, 1.5 
for cerebrovascular diseases, 1.2 for malignant neoplasm, 2.2 for diabetes, 11.5 for 
HIV, and 7.5 for homicide. It appears that diabetes and HIV in particular dis-
proportionately cause death in the African-American population. 
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Diagram 31 Leading Causes of Death by Race, 2010362 
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Other stark health inequalities exist between the black and white popula-
tions, such as for number of people who have diabetes or HIV/AIDS. Both are 
life-threatening conditions at short term and the treatments are very costly. 
Other major differences appear, for example regarding teen pregnancy rates. In 
all those areas, blacks have markedly higher rates, which informs about the dire 
conditions of part of the black population.  
1.5. Has Color-Consciousness Become Utopian? 
Given these statistically proven racial differences, it would appear logical 
to address these problems with race-specific solutions. However, this is precise-
ly the nexus of the problem. It would be possible to consider that AIDS is a ma-
jor problem that needs to be addressed as such, or it could be considered that 
there are specific problems in the black population regarding AIDS, and that 
the black population needs help. This idea gains salience when considering that 
many problems, among them also problems specifically linked to health issues–
such as the lack of health insurance–are systemic and are the result of systemic 
oppression. 
Despite the fact that given the existing racial inequalities a race-specific 
solution might appear as a logical choice, there might not be necessarily the 
political will to do this. The decision of what to do regarding these inequalities 
is a political decision that is only partly made according to the real objective 
needs. A political decision is far more complex than that and depends also on 
the political context, on the interaction between the parties, and on public opin-
ion. These elements in turn, are influenced by the country’s specific political 
history and its political doxa.363  
In this context, race is a particularly sensitive issue that still has a major 
political role to play today. This occurs, for example, through racial priming, 
which is nowadays, as a consequence of the Civil Rights Movement and politi-
cal correctness, more operated through a coded discourse, but which has none-
theless a real impact. As an appeal is made to negative racial resentment, these 
feelings are brought back, and by being primed regularly and being voiced con-
stantly, these ideas become the norm again. Political scientist Tali Mendelberg 
explains that showing to people that their racial reaction is outside the norm 
has the ability to alter their point of view. Conversely, although racial priming 
works best on people with previous resentments, it also impacts people with 
low levels of racial resentment, especially when they are told that they are in 
the norm, that this thinking is the mainstream. When this is the case, people 
tend to opt for the more conservative opinion or solution because this new dis-
course becomes the norm.364 
Political sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva explains that certain conserva-
tive ideas have even “infiltrated” mainstream black political thought: although 
blacks view discrimination as central, tend to support affirmative action more 
strongly, are lucid about whites’ advantageous position in society and about 
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double-talk about race, they also tend to think that school and residential seg-
regation are natural and have partly accepted and integrated the ideas of a cul-
ture of poverty as well as the free market rationale. According to Bonilla-Silva, 
this explains why there is not a stronger and more massive demand for racial 
policies: “This ideological infiltration of the frames of colorblindness into 
blacks’ political consciousness hinders the development of an all-out opposi-
tional ideology or “utopia” to fight the contemporary white supremacy.”365 The 
race code is also used in presidential discourse, uttered by a figure of authority 
that reinforces the dimension of ‘acceptability.’ Moreover, the coded dimen-
sion, and sometimes multiple strata of meaning and deeply embedded aspect of 
the race code make it easier for people to discard the racial dimension of this 
discourse and thus to negate guilt about racial bias. The most vivid example is 
the contrast between Reagan’s discourse heavily inlaid with racial code and his 
adamant rejection of accusations of racism. Clinton’s dealing with the conserva-
tive atmosphere around social policy and Obama’s attempts to rework and 
change this discourse show the general more conservative atmosphere that has 
developed since the 1970s.  
Before outlining the political history of social policies and before analyz-
ing the political discourse that accompanied the evolution of social policies, the 
different opinions and problems regarding race-specific or race-neutral (i.e. 
color conscious or colorblind) policies will be detailed. In this context it is justi-
fied to ask whether attempts at race-specific solutions to social and economic 
inequalities are utopian or not.  
1.5.1.  “It Really Was Not Seriously Considered for a Minute, 
Ever:”366 A Political Near-Consensus 
Given the situation exposed so far, of persisting and yet denied discrimina-
tion and cultural racism, it is indeed necessary to ask if there is still a possibility 
for race-specific policies or if it is just a utopia of absolute fairness. The answer 
appears to be quite simple: it depends on who you ask. In the current political 
context the answer is mainly: no. Obama shared this opinion at the time the 
reform was devised. His position was partly grounded on the limits of efficiency 
he saw in measures like affirmative action, which will be detailed in Part 2, on 
the greater efficiency he perceived in targeted economic measures, and most of 
all on the political context. Because of this, Obama favored the race pragmatic 
approach that favors helping minorities by targeting specific issues that cause 
problems for minority populations. The details of the ideas behind the race 
pragmatic approach will be detailed in Part 4 because they rest on the historical 
development of social policies and of the political discourse that accompanies 
social policies and government intervention. The reasons for this political strat-
egy will be explained in Part 2 dealing with the racialized attack to break up the 
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support for redistributive policies, and Part 3 dealing with the heavily coded 
discourse that plays on deeply buried racial resentment. 
At the political level, people, especially politicians, are quite adamant 
about the impossibility of the race specific approach, but some voices dissent. 
The attack on affirmative action, and the backing of these attacks by the Su-
preme Court, has demonstrated that the political climate is decidedly against 
race-specific measures. A 2007 Supreme Court decision—Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District—reversed a previous court decision 
upholding Seattle’s busing and integration program declaring the measures 
unconstitutional because Seattle had no prior history of de jure segregation and 
hence was not subject to an integration program.367 This makes challenges to de 
facto segregation more difficult. This decision has also been evoked in the case 
of the ruling over the Michigan affirmative action ban (Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality 
by any means Necessary (Bamn), et al.). The Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ment of the previous ruling that rejected the ban of affirmative action in Michi-
gan in 2012 on the grounds that the affirmative action ban does not represent a 
specific injury to minorities:  
And the principal flaw in the Sixth Circuit’s decision remains: Here there was no 
infliction of a specific injury of the kind at issue in Mulkey and Hunter and in the 
history of the Seattle schools, and there is no precedent for extending these cases 
to restrict the right of Michigan voters to determine that race-based preferences 
granted by state entities should be ended.368 
Moreover, in the Opinion of Schuette v. Bamn, the Supreme Court decided that 
it is impossible to determine the political interests of a minority group and even 
declared that this would be racist: 
To the extent Seattle is read to require the Court to determine and declare which 
political policies serve the “interest” of a group defined in racial terms, that ra-
tionale was unnecessary to the decision in Seattle; it has no support in precedent; 
and it raises serious equal protection concerns. In cautioning against “impermis-
sible racial stereotypes,” this Court has rejected the assumption that all individu-
als of the same race think alike, see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630 
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/509/630), but that proposition 
would be a necessary beginning point were the Seattle formulation to control. And 
if it were deemed necessary to probe how some races define their own interest in 
political matters, still another beginning point would be to define individuals ac-
cording to race. Such a venture would be undertaken with no clear legal stand-
ards or accepted sources to guide judicial decision. It would also result in, or im-
pose a high risk of, inquiries and categories dependent upon demeaning 
stereotypes, classifications of questionable constitutionality on their own terms.369  
The Supreme Court clearly said, echoing in this many conservative interpreta-
tions of minority demands for rights, that acceding to these rights would foster 
racial division. The Supreme Court decided that the principal question at hand 
in this case was not the protection of minority rights, but of states’ rights:  
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[…] there is no precedent for extending these cases to restrict the right of Michi-
gan voters to determine that race-based preferences granted by state entities 
should be ended. The Sixth Circuit’s judgment also calls into question other 
States’ long-settled rulings on policies similar to Michigan’s.370 
Moreover, the Supreme Court pointed out that not overturning the 2012 rejec-
tion of the Michigan affirmative action ban might have endangered the main-
taining of affirmative action bans in other states.  
Letting the states decide whether they want to protect their minority 
population or not, or make them benefit from social programs, is part of a long 
tradition and surfaced also in the Sebelius lawsuit against the ACA: the Supreme 
Court decided that the states had the right to refuse to expand Medicaid and 
thus to deprive the poor, and among them many minorities, of federal money 
and access to health care.371 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor disagreed with the majority opinion in Schuette. 
In her Dissent, in which she was joined by Justice Ginsburg, she mentioned that 
universities had other special admission programs that considered the particu-
lar cases of alumni students, athletes, geographic considerations, or area of 
study, and pointed out that only the consideration of race was excluded. She 
argued that an intervention by the Supreme Court was justified through the 
long history of state discrimination contrary to federal law, and particularly 
insisted on the examples of voting discrimination. She furthermore pointed out 
that the Schuette decision was contrary to the precedents in more recent years, 
where state amendments and city decisions have been overturned because the-
se initiatives harmed minority interests. Interestingly, Sotomayor insisted on 
the costs of those state initiatives through petitions (advertisement and collect-
ing signatures). In this context she drew attention to the financial inequalities 
hampering minority interests in this particular political process. Sotomayor 
particularly criticized Justice Scalia’s focus on states’ rights and his “near-
limitless notion of state sovereignty.” Sotomayor also disagreed on the Opin-
ion’s interpretation that the ban of affirmative action did not harm minorities 
and demonstrated through the enrollment statistics of several universities in 
states that have already banned affirmative action that minority enrollment 
dropped after the ban and was still significantly lower than the proportion of 
minorities in the corresponding state. Finally, she utterly disagreed with the 
idea that race is not significant anymore:  
 Race matters. Race matters in part because of the long history of racial minorities’ 
being denied access to the political process. [...] Race also matters because of per-
sistent racial inequality in society—inequality that cannot be ignored and that has 
produced stark socioeconomic disparities. [...] And race matters for reasons that 
really are only skin deep, that cannot be discussed any other way, and that cannot 
be wished away. Race matters to a young man’s view of society when he spends 
his teenage years watching others tense up as he passes, no matter the neighbor-
hood where he grew up. Race matters to a young woman’s sense of self when she 
states her hometown, and then is pressed, “No, where are you really from?”, re-
gardless of how many generations her family has been in the country. Race mat-
ters to a young person addressed by a stranger in a foreign language, which he 
does not understand because only English was spoken at home. Race matters be-
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cause of the slights, the snickers, the silent judgments that reinforce that most 
crippling of thoughts: “I do not belong here.”372 
Sotomayor lists all the commonly defended reasons why race should be taken 
into account: past discrimination, current socio-economic inequalities due to 
past and present discrimination, and ongoing discrimination and prejudice. 
Hence, she defends the maintaining of a race-specific or color-conscious ap-
proach: 
In my colleagues’ view, examining the racial impact of legislation only perpetu-
ates racial discrimination. This refusal to accept the stark reality that race matters 
is regrettable. The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak open-
ly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Constitution with eyes 
open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination.373  
Although Obama nominated Sotomayor to the Supreme Court in 2009, he 
disagreed on the race-specific approach, at least as far as his own office is con-
cerned, not having the same leeway a Supreme Court Justice. On several occa-
sions Obama had voiced his opposition to race-specific policies, in his partial 
rejection of affirmative action,374 in his support for a universal, issue-specific 
approach focused on economic aspects, and also more specifically because his 
position as President compels him to a universal stance.375 Obama has been re-
peatedly criticized for not doing more for minorities, in particular blacks. Those 
criticisms come from all levels, the Congressional Black Caucus, activists, 
scholars, and intellectuals.  
The situation is quite different for a Congressman. A Congressman is sup-
posed to represent a specific constituency and their specific needs. This posi-
tion is understood and accepted, as explained by former North Dakota Repre-
sentative Earl Pomeroy when he was asked about demands for more race-
specific measures. Pomeroy, who had voted for the ACA, reflected afterwards: 
Any legislator is going to advocate for the people who sent them there. We were 
able to obtain, in the Affordable Care Act, enhanced funding for our hospitals and 
doctors through Medicare. […] We added what’s called the Frontier Amendment, 
which increases reimbursement for health care in North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Montana, and Wyoming. Now, that was an indication of us working for a constit-
uent need, trying to get the best deal out of the bill. If I represent a black part of 
Philadelphia, I’m going to try and do the same thing. Call it affirmative action, call 
it whatever you want, I’m going to try and take this big bill and deliver extra bene-
fit if I can get it for my people. It’s my job. And so I don’t view it as anything more 
than just legislators doing their work.376 
But just as understanding as Pomeroy was, he was equally firm on the political 
impossibility of actually acceding to race-specific demands because in the given 
political context this would jeopardize the bill and represent a major liability: 
Of course [it represents a liability]. I don’t remember this ever being seriously dis-
cussed. I mean, of course, I don’t want to go back to North Dakota, 95% white 
population, saying, we have special provisions where if you’re an ethnic, if you’re 
a racial minority, you get to step to the front of the line. I mean, it wasn’t going to 
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pass. I don’t blame for advocating for it, but I don’t … it really was not seriously 
considered for a minute, ever. 
Racial “favors” have not been seriously considered. However, as Pomeroy 
pointed out, other specific needs were addressed, as shown by the Frontier 
Amendment. On the other hand, the better financing of Medicaid that Senator 
Ben Nelson from Nebraska initially obtained was harshly criticized by members 
of both parties and rapidly repealed,377 showing that it is more difficult to de-
fend Medicaid issues than Medicare issues, just as it is easier to defend special 
favors for white constituencies than for black ones.378 
Former Massachusetts Representative John Tierney voiced a similar 
opinion to Pomeroy’s regarding efforts made for minorities. He said that “we 
tried as much as we could” but that more obvious steps had not been possi-
ble.379 
Former New Jersey Representative Robert E. Andrews added:  
Ah, I don’t think it’s a policy liability, I think that race is a political challenge. You 
know, there are some people who were willing to vote for the bill, who, if it were 
being seen as doing more for minorities, would be less likely to agree to vote for 
the bill. Sadly, but truthfully. So you have to really get above that, do the very best 
you can with the political circumstances you have.380 
Andrews clearly highlights that this would even have represented a risk on the 
liberal side and points also to the political context that makes people wary of 
supporting this kind of measures. And yet, they all agreed that targeted 
measures were needed. 
1.5.2. An Academic Debate: Colorblind vs. Color Con-
scious 
At the academic level, however, the question is still open, because there 
are grounds for color-conscious policy. Two broad opinion trends confront 
each other: those who argue that racial inequality is primarily a matter of eco-
nomic inequality, hence it is rather a class matter than a race matter and should 
be addressed by class-based solutions. They often reinforce their argument by 
pointing to questions of political feasibility.381 The other opinion trend argues, 
broadly speaking, that even though there is an undeniable class dimension to 
the issue, the specificity of the hardship faced by minorities, the inequalities 
between white and black within a same class, and the ongoing discrimination 
call for a race-based solution.  
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Of course, where there are different possibilities, a debate necessarily 
emerges as to which is the best course of action. The debate is most intense at 
the academic level because of the greater liberty of taking into account such 
factors as what would be the ideal solution in matters of actual needs and fair-
ness, instead of nagging aspects of political feasibility. To be clear, as Mendel-
berg pointed out, the public doxa endorses the principle of racial equality in the 
public doxa, and the doxa on biological racism or segregation no longer exists. 
However, there is a huge debate over the implementation of racial equality.382 
Some advocate the color-conscious approach, which means to take race into 
account and openly stating so in the policy by including race in the language of 
the text. Others think that a colorblind approach would be better, which means 
to eliminate the language of race from the text and to give everyone the same 
opportunity. 
Color-consciousness is mainly argued and defended due to the specific 
situation created through racial discrimination. It rejects the colorblind ap-
proach because it omits the specificity of race. Political philosopher Elizabeth 
Anderson makes a strong defense of color-conscious or race-specific policies. 
She advocates integration as a goal for a society characterized by inequalities 
and defends the achievement of this goal through race-specific policies. Her 
positions on that are virtually identical to the liberal position in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Anderson very clearly distinguishes inte-
gration from assimilation. In her view, integration means that society does not 
ignore race. For Anderson, integration means the abolition of segregation (to-
day there is still de facto segregation in many schools and in housing) and ine-
qualities linked to this, but to keep racial identities. In her opinion, this allows 
for race-conscious policies and race solidarity, or racial clustering. Assimilation, 
however, requires the adoption of the standards of the dominant group. Ander-
son completely rejects colorblindness and argues that the long history of dis-
crimination and unfair disadvantage justifies seemingly unfair measures to re-
dress the inequalities. 383  
Similarly activist Tim Wise argues that structural inequality along racial 
lines makes race-specific policies a necessity. He warns that colorblindness 
would reinforce cultural racism or could even lead to a return of attributing 
inequalities to biological inferiority. Furthermore he makes the case for a reviv-
al of race consciousness and awareness about racism, characteristic of the 1960s, 
as a countermovement to the current right-wing politics. Wise thinks that 
colorblind politics help the right-wing agenda of rolling back race conscious-
ness.384 
The defense of color-conscious policies is also driven by fields like Critical 
Race Theory (CRT) that are absolutely race-conscious and urge the recognition 
of the “urgency of America’s racial problem and an uncompromising search for 
real solutions rather than comforting stop-gaps.”385 CRT condemns colorblind-
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ness because it views racism as endemic and as a normative aspect of the US 
society. Judy L. Isaksen defines CRT as follows:  
CRT scholars work to expose the ways in which the law is an interested, ideologi-
cally driven force that sustains asymmetric power relations. This movement is 
praxis based with the specific intent of challenging systemic institutional forces, 
changing policies and practices, and dismantling racism.386 
Deep-seated and institutional inequality is also pointed out by sociologist 
Wornie L. Reed, highlighting the fact that this inequality does not necessarily 
have to be intentional, and thus can be colorblind, but must be addressed: 
Social institutions are the social arrangements through which collective action 
takes place to maintain and perpetuate the society and its culture. They include 
the family, education, business and labor, health care, housing, religion, welfare, 
law enforcement, and politics. These institutions operate on the basis of estab-
lished formal and informal rules, that is, policies, practices, and procedures, 
which in American institutions, established by the dominant culture, may uninten-
tionally or intentionally be racially discriminatory.387 
Political scientist Robert Lieberman defends a similar idea, that colorblind 
policies do not necessarily produce colorblind outcomes, just as color-conscious 
policies do not necessarily produce inequality and discrimination.388 Anderson 
joins this and criticizes the fact that colorblind policies can have racist out-
comes, even without a racist intent: “If racist consequences result from an insti-
tution’s laws, customs, or practices, that institution is racist whether or not the 
individuals maintaining those practices have racist intentions.” It is also on the-
se grounds that she vehemently criticizes colorblindness:  
 It does nothing to dismantle entrenched patterns of racial segregation, undermine 
unconscious racial stigmatization and discrimination, challenge informal practic-
es of racial avoidance such as white flight, end coded racial appeals in politics, 
avoid negligence of disadvantaged racial groups in public policy, or prevent race-
neutral policies with differential racial impact from being based on racially stig-
matizing ideas.389  
Critical Race scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw also denounces the dangers of 
colorblindness. According to her it creates the belief that racism no longer plays 
a role in inequalities and creates an increasing belief that class disparities along 
racial lines are the result of individual or group merit, which is reinforced by 
the myth of equality of opportunity. Moreover, according to her, this also favors 
backlash sentiments.390Sociologist Howard Winant shares the opinion that 
colorblindness obliterates the current effects of historical discrimination, and 
even worse, that the use of colorblindness today reinforces inequalities.391 
  However, in recent years, the Supreme Court has not shared the view 
considering outcome as equally important as intent, as shows the 2001 case of 
Alexander v. Sandoval in which the Supreme Court decided that there is no pri-
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vate right of action to enforce the clause of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act ad-
mitting a disparate impact as sufficient proof for discrimination even without 
discriminatory intent. The 2007 Involved Parents v. Seattle decision, although 
applying to school segregation, also defended the same idea: de jure segregation, 
not de facto segregation is the issue.392 It is the intent that matters, not the im-
pact.  
1.5.3. Equal Opportunity 
Views on colorblindness vs. color-consciousness are also closely linked to 
the difference in conceptions of equal opportunity. Conservatives generally 
only focus on the idea of equal rights, ignoring the notions of opportunity and 
means. Someone may not have the financial means to enroll at an Ivy League 
University, but as long as they have the right to do so, equal opportunity is re-
spected. Liberals, on the other hand, tend to view equal opportunity in the light 
of a more equal outcome, which implies a leveling of means to improve the 
benefits of opportunity. Thus equality of opportunity is intimately linked to 
questions of redistribution, be it opportunity in the sense of social access or 
economic means, and it is especially closely linked to questions of redistribu-
tion of wealth, in other words, social policy. 
The belief in existing equal opportunity is strongly informed by the belief 
that discrimination has ended and that the current marketplace is fair. It pre-
cludes the idea that economic inequalities are structurally embedded and 
transmitted between generations. From this perspective, poverty is inherited 
just as much as is wealth.  
Crenshaw points out that especially among whites there is an erroneous 
belief in a “fair and impartial” market and thus a belief in a meritocratic econ-
omy. According to her, “[r]acism, combined with equal opportunity mythology, 
provides rationalization for racial oppression, making it difficult for whites to 
see the black situation as illegitimate or unnecessary.” Crenshaw speaks of “the 
myth of equal opportunity” and clearly states that it serves to justify class ine-
qualities.393 Political scientist Martin Gilens stresses the fact that the strong be-
lief in equality of opportunity, augmented by the strong adherence to ideas of 
personal responsibility, reinforces the stereotype of the lazy black who remains 
poor despite the wide range of opportunities available.394 These beliefs in a fair 
and impartial market, the existence of equal opportunity, and the strong em-
phasis on individual responsibility are further reinforced by neoliberal eco-
nomic ideology that describes the free market in these terms, and which posits 
that success only depends on people’s willingness to work hard.395 
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Political scientist Larry M. Bartels expressed the same idea: the idea of ex-
isting equality of opportunity combined with social mobility lying at the heart 
of the American Dream result in inequalities being accepted among the popula-
tion.396 Equal opportunity and the American Dream are closely linked and 
complete each other. In its plainest definition, the American Dream promises 
that everyone who works hard can succeed in the US. In this sense, the Ameri-
can Dream builds on the idea that equality of opportunity exists. But instead of 
just claiming that reward is proportionate to the effort made, it actually promis-
es that everyone who works hard will succeed.  
Political scientist Jennifer Hochschild made a detailed analysis of blacks’ 
and whites’ attitudes and beliefs regarding the American Dream. First she de-
constructs the myth of the American Dream regarding its limitations and flaws. 
The first obvious limitation is that not everyone can achieve success. Historical-
ly, up to the 1960s, about two thirds of the US population were barred from ac-
cessing to the American Dream. Women, Native Americans, Asians, blacks, and 
even the poor, could not pursue success. Despite only a minority of one third of 
the population, meaning white men, having access to the American Dream, 
Hochschild asserts that “Americans are close to unanimous in endorsing the 
idea of the American dream. Virtually all agree that all citizens should have 
political equality and that everyone in America warrants equal educational op-
portunities and equal opportunities in general.” This belief is very evenly 
spread among blacks and whites, rich and poor, Republicans and Democrats. 
She points out that blacks, even more than whites, have belief in these Ameri-
can values and heritage. However, she also insists on the fact that people tend to 
be more in favor of equal opportunity than of equal outcomes and greatly value 
self-sufficiency and “trying to get ahead.” Hochschild points to an interesting 
paradox. Despite whites having more real certainty about all the elements of 
the American Dream they are less optimistic about their own future than blacks 
are.397  
When it comes to black beliefs about the American Dream, the paradox is 
reversed. Blacks tend to believe less in the different tenets of the American 
Dream, especially regarding the reality of true equality of opportunity, and yet 
they are more optimistic about their future prospects than whites are about 
theirs. Moreover, whites tend to see all the conditions filled for blacks to access 
the American Dream: because of the absence of discrimination blacks have the 
possibility to succeed, they just have to take personal responsibility for their 
situation and thus can control their own fate. Because of these perceptions of 
blacks having full access to the American Dream and their own white future 
being less bright, whites tend not to believe blacks when they complain about 
glass ceilings or ongoing discrimination and biases. Hochschild reports that 
between one-tenth and one-third of whites think that compared to whites, 
“blacks have more opportunities, are less vulnerable to economic upheaval, 
receive better health care, are treated better in the courts and the media, and 
are more likely to obtain good jobs and be admitted to good colleges.”398  
These perceptions are certainly informed by a feeling of disproportionate 
attention to blacks because of political correctness, affirmative action programs, 
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and a representation of social programs being aimed disproportionately at the 
black population.  
A 2009 PEW study on beliefs about black progress confirmed the percep-
tion trends identified by Hochschild in 1995. The study showed that whites have 
a rather optimistic view about the situation of blacks. 49% of whites believed 
that blacks were better off in 2009 than five years earlier, 53% believed that the 
standard of living gap between white and black was narrower now than five 
years earlier, and even climbed to 65% who believed that it was narrower than 
10 years earlier. This perception is quite distorted. In fact, in 2008, the black 
household income was 61.8% of that of white household incomes, which repre-
sents only an increase of 0.6% since 1979 (it peaked shortly in 2000 when it 
reached 64.8%). Moreover, whites are very optimistic about black futures: 56% 
think that blacks will be even better off in the future. It must be added that 
blacks share this distorted vision, albeit at a slightly lower level.399 This percep-
tion of the black economic situation, also described by Jennifer Hochschild in 
1995, is very far from reality. In reality the wealth gap between blacks and 
whites based on net worth (taking homeownership, income, debts, etc. into ac-
count) tripled between 1984 and 2009, increasing from $85,000 to $236,500. 
Whereas black median net worth only increased very little and very slowly over 
the period, white median net worth increased sharply.400 Despite blacks faring 
worse than whites in almost all economic areas, according to Hochschild many 
whites think that blacks have more opportunities. However, when whites try to 
apply the American Dream to their own situation, in which they do not experi-
ence any visible barriers but nonetheless do not manage to reach the Dream, 
they face a quandary. Hochschild explains: 
Something is wrong with the American dream, and the problem is associated with 
blacks in some way. But identifying what is wrong and how blacks are implicated 
in it is a difficult and thankless task for which they receive almost no institutional 
support. It is far easier to cling to the dream, insist that it really works, and find 
someone to blame for the lacunae.401 
Instead of turning to a close analysis of structural unfairness of the system, 
many whites prefer not to question the tenets of the Dream, to continue to be-
lieve in the reality of the Dream, but instead to use race as a vector for blame. 
There are two main vectors for this blame. The first, as alluded to by 
Hochschild, consists in claims of reverse discrimination. The second, identified 
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by political scientists Camille Z. Charles and Lawrence Bobo consists in blam-
ing failure of the Dream on blacks’ lack of personal responsibility.402 
At the level of political discourse, equality of opportunity finds a distinct 
expression as equality of means. As mentioned earlier, after gaining civil rights 
in 1964, black activists turned more seriously to claims of economic equality, in 
other words, to equality of means, which would allow equal chances of success.  
In mainstream political discourse, a similar change occurred in the 1960s. 
President Lyndon B. Johnson had commissioned The Negro Family: The Case for 
Nation Action, better known as the Moynihan Report, in 1964, (it was published 
in 1965).403 This report strongly focused on equality of opportunity and especial-
ly on life chances for blacks. The findings of the report were alarming and 
strongly urged the government to focus on economic issues. Johnson took these 
recommendations seriously, expressed as action through the Great Society and 
the War on Poverty, but also in his discourse. In a 1965 speech given at Howard 
University, one of the famous HBCU’s, Johnson clearly discussed the difference 
between a false equality of opportunity that did not take into account centuries 
of barred opportunity, and opportunity of means: 
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate 
him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, "you are free to com-
pete with all the others," and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.  
Thus it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must 
have the ability to walk through those gates. 
This is the next and the more profound stage of the battle for civil rights. We seek 
not just freedom but opportunity. We seek not just legal equity but human ability, 
not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a re-
sult. 404 
Johnson clearly denounced unequal situations and the more difficult condi-
tions blacks faced. This focus on poverty was not new in the Democratic Party. 
The Populist period of the Party had witnessed a strong denunciation of ine-
quality, but with a clear enemy: economic elites, in the form of trusts and other 
concentrations of power.405  
Edsall and Edsall pointed out that the conservative conception of equal 
opportunity, as adopted by the Republican Party, allowed them to dominate the 
“values marketplace.” Edsall and Edsall explain conservative equal opportunity 
as based on the idea that the allocation of scarce resources functions best 
through market mechanisms. Moreover, they establish a strong link between 
merit and status, as well as reward and effort.406 By positing that the system is 
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fair and that ample reward follows righteous effort, cohesion can be created 
between groups that everything opposes. The vision of being rich one day leads 
people to support measures favoring the rich in anticipation of the day when 
one would be rich. This conception of equal opportunity also conveniently al-
lows blaming the poor for their poverty since in a fair system that rewards effort 
and everyone gets according to their merit, poverty must be self-inflicted.  
Reagan understood the changes that had taken place within the elec-
torate. In his 1981 Inaugural Address he presented equal opportunity the way 
most Americans want to understand it, as based on a fair economic system 
without barriers of any kind, especially for minorities: 
Well, this administration's objective will be a healthy, vigorous, growing economy 
that provides equal opportunities for all Americans, with no barriers born of big-
otry or discrimination. Putting America back to work means putting all Ameri-
cans back to work. Ending inflation means freeing all Americans from the terror 
of runaway living costs. All must share in the productive work of this "new begin-
ning," and all must share in the bounty of a revived economy. With the idealism 
and fair play which are the core of our system and our strength, we can have a 
strong and prosperous America, at peace with itself and the world.407 
Reagan’s view of American equal opportunity and fair system insists on the fact 
that the rewards will be distributed fairly, according to the effort made. Here it 
becomes apparent how neoliberal ideology gave an economic credibility to a 
discourse that rejected equality of means by insisting on the neoliberal presen-
tation of the market as being fair and devoid of discrimination. Reagan oblique-
ly attacks government programs, social policy, as being a barrier to opportunity. 
In the same Inaugural Address, Reagan said: 
Now, so there will be no misunderstanding, it's not my intention to do away with 
government. It is rather to make it work—work with us, not over us; to stand by 
our side, not ride on our back. Government can and must provide opportunity, 
not smother it; foster productivity, not stifle it. 
During his presidency, Reagan managed to present government intervention as 
the anti-thesis of opportunity by building on neoliberal ideas, which he success-
fully combined with racial conservatism to create a brilliant rhetoric that al-
lowed him to win over the white working class. Thus Reagan successfully 
solved the American Dream quandary that Hochschild identified: it is not the 
American Dream that is not working, equal opportunity is a reality, but whites 
are held back by the government catering to the special demands of minorities. 
In his 1986 State of the Union Address, Reagan explains this vision of govern-
ment as only having to safeguard equal opportunity that is present in the free 
economy, in opposition to the Democratic vision of government that aims at 
more equality of means through redistributive measures: 
Tonight let us speak of our responsibility to redefine government's role: not to 
control, not to demand or command, not to contain us, but to help in times of 
need and, above all, to create a ladder of opportunity to full employment so that 
all Americans can climb toward economic power and justice on their own. 
But we cannot win the race to the future shackled to a system that can't even pass 
a federal budget. We cannot win that race held back by horse-and-buggy pro-
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grams that waste tax dollars and squander human potential. We cannot win that 
race if we're swamped in a sea of red ink.408 
President G. H. W. Bush’s conception of equal opportunity of did not differ 
from Reagan’s.  
As for President Clinton, he saw opportunity as something that govern-
ment had to provide through a thriving economy. In his New Democratic 
statement of principles, The New Orleans Declaration of 1990, Bill Clinton 
more clearly showed his rather conservative stance on equal opportunity:  
We believe the promise of America is equal opportunity, not equal outcomes. 
We believe the Democratic Party’s fundamental mission is to expand opportunity, 
not government. 
We believe in the politics of inclusion. Our party has historically been the means 
by which aspiring Americans from every background have achieved equal rights 
and full citizenship.409 
Clinton very clearly focuses on equal opportunity, rejecting the previous Dem-
ocratic focus on more equal outcomes. This is consistent with Clinton’s centrist 
approach. 
Not surprisingly, during the presidency of George W. Bush, the interpreta-
tion of equal opportunity is conservative. The Republican Party Platform of 
2004 defines it as equal rights and opportunity, no leveling of life chances.  
Every day, we strive to fulfill Lincoln’s vision: a country united and free, in which 
all people are guaranteed equal rights and the opportunity to pursue their 
dreams. [...] 
Ensuring Equal Opportunities 
Our nation is a land of opportunity for all, and our communities must represent 
the ideal of equality and justice for every citizen. The Republican Party favors ag-
gressive, proactive measures to ensure that no individual is discriminated against 
on the basis of race, national origin, gender, or other characteristics covered by 
our civil rights laws. We also favor recruitment and outreach policies that cast the 
widest possible net so that the best qualified individuals are encouraged to apply 
for jobs, contracts, and university admissions. We believe in the principle of af-
firmative access—taking steps to ensure that disadvantaged individuals of all col-
ors and ethnic backgrounds have the opportunity to compete economically and 
that no child is left behind educationally. We support a reasonable approach to 
Title IX that seeks to expand opportunities for women without adversely affecting 
men’s athletics. We praise President Bush for his strong record on civil rights en-
forcement, and for becoming the first President ever to ban racial profiling by the 
federal government. Finally, because we are opposed to discrimination, we reject 
preferences, quotas, and set-asides based on skin color, ethnicity, or gender, 
which perpetuate divisions and can lead people to question the accomplishments 
of successful minorities and women.410 
                                                        
408	  Ronald	  Reagan,	  “Address	  Before	  a	  Joint	  Session	  of	  the	  Congress	  Reporting	  on	  the	  State	  of	  the	  
Union,”	  (April	  2,	  1986).	  
409	  William	  J.	  Clinton,	   “The	  Manifesto	  of	  The	  Third	  Way	  Democrats	   -­‐	  The	  New	  Orleans	  Declara-­‐
tion”	   (Conference	   of	   the	   Democratic	   Leadership	   Council,	   Louisiana,	   March	   22,	   1990),	  
https://abiasedperspective.wordpress.com/2015/04/07/repost-­‐the-­‐manifesto-­‐of-­‐the-­‐third-­‐way-­‐
democrats-­‐the-­‐new-­‐orleans-­‐declaration/.	  
410	   The	   Republican	   Party,	   “Republican	   Party	   Platform	   of	   2004”	   (American	   Presidency	   Project,	  
August	  30,	  2004),	  1,	  75,	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25850.	  
136 Stephan Social Policies and Racial Questions 
It is interesting to notice that the platform’s section on equal opportunity ex-
plicitly addresses feelings of reverse discrimination, mentioned in the section 
addressing opportunities for women, where it explicitly says: “without affecting 
men’s athletics.” Moreover, affirmative action is openly rejected, once again 
with already proven Reagan-style: the rejection is based on the interest of the 
recipient and seems to stem from a good intention. Political sociologist Eduardo 
Bonilla-Silva calls this tactic “abstract liberalism.” It is the co-optation of con-
cepts of the liberal language, such as equal opportunity or individualism, but 
used as a means to justify inequality. The example Bonilla-Silva quotes is the 
same as here in the 2004 Republican Party Platform: equal opportunity is used 
to oppose affirmative action.411 
The significant change came with Barack Obama. Obama is also very 
strong on equal opportunity, but gives a decidedly “new tone” compared to the 
last few decades. In The Audacity of Hope, Obama devoted a whole chapter to 
opportunity. This chapter gives the general outline of his conception of equal 
opportunity, which is clearly on the side of more equal means. 
First of all, he differs from conservatives in his view of the fairness of the 
free market. In his conception, the market is not fair, quite on the contrary, he 
calls the current system a “winner-take-all economy” where the benefits are not 
evenly shared.412 In this, his vision is radically opposed to the neoliberal vision 
of the free market and to Reagan’s vision that lastingly influenced political dis-
course until Obama. Moreover, Obama draws on the rhetoric of the populist 
period of the Democratic Party, denounces bullying and greedy big business, 
and attacks economic elites and trusts. 413 In that he addresses the problems that 
Gerring identified about the Universalist period of the Democrats:414 the ab-
sence of a victimizer that hampers equal access to opportunity and reward. Big 
business is not the only enemy in Obama’s economic vision, he also denounces 
globalization as a threat and barrier to the American Dream, and by this he 
conveniently creates a big and mighty outside enemy that is easy to blame. 
Obama’s economic opportunity triptych is completed by a last nice rhetorical 
balancing act: while at the same time denouncing an insufficient social policy 
safety net to ensure opportunity, he also blames crazy social policy regulations 
that are not efficient enough in providing opportunity.415 In doing this, he inte-
grates part of the conservative discourse regarding certain social programs and 
tries to break the image of the Democratic Party as not questioning the efficien-
cy of certain programs. The vision of a certain inefficiency of social programs 
stems from the increase in urban poverty in the late 1960s and 1970s. In the rest 
of the chapter, Obama explains various measures of government intervention, 
to ensure equality of opportunity and to level inequalities created by the free 
market system. He recasts Roosevelt’s New Deal, and argues for similar 
measures by drawing an analogy between the economic upheavals created by 
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globalization and the disruptions of the Great Depression416 (The Audacity of 
Hope was written and published before the 2008 crisis and the Great Recession). 
In a 2009 speech, Obama gives a lengthy description of his conception of 
equal opportunity created through government leveling inequalities. He does 
so through the story of his own and Michelle’s families: 
You see, Michelle and I are where we are today because even though our families 
didn’t have much, they worked tirelessly—without complaint—so that we might 
have a better life. […] Yes, our families believed in the American values of self-
reliance and individual responsibility, and they instilled those values in their 
children. But they also believed in a country that rewards responsibility; a country 
that rewards hard work; a country built on the promise of opportunity and up-
ward mobility.  
They believed in an America that gave my grandfather the chance to go to college 
because of the GI Bill; an America that gave my grandparents the chance to buy a 
home because of the Federal Housing Authority; an America that gave their chil-
dren and grandchildren the chance to fulfill our dreams thanks to college loans 
and college scholarships.417 
His long account of both their hardworking families, one white, the other black, 
shows that in his conception, true equality of opportunity to reach the Ameri-
can Dream does not exist naturally, the economy is not fair. The will to seize 
opportunity is there, but this opportunity has to be brought within reach by 
government through social policies.418 
1.5.4. A Question of Hierarchy 
The racial nexus of equal opportunity is quite obvious. Historically, the 
populations that have been barred from equal opportunity are minorities, espe-
cially racial minorities. Among these, the most obviously and most institution-
ally oppressed minority are blacks. Thus the question of whether equal oppor-
tunity means only equal rights to compete, or whether it also means that 
government should ensure equal outcomes, is highly racial and implies more 
redistribution in favor of blacks. As Bonilla-Silva pointed out, equal opportuni-
ty can also be used to argue against race-conscious policies, but not only so, as 
Reagan’s discourse shows that in the framework of the broader neoliberal eco-
nomic ideology, equal opportunity is used to argue against social policies and 
government intervention in general. As Edsall and Edsall demonstrated, race 
was used by Reagan as a wedge to split the economic-interest based New Deal 
Coalition that stood in the way of the neoliberal agenda. Through this racial 
wedge, a numerical multicultural majority demanding more government inter-
vention, more social justice, more equal opportunity and more equal outcomes, 
has been reduced to what is presented as a racial minority claiming undue spe-
cial privileges in the form of race-specific policies. 
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As has been demonstrated above, there are statistically proven reasons to 
fully justify a race-specific leveling of these inequalities. It has also been shown 
that this approach, while justified, is considered as politically unfeasible, even 
by people who acknowledge this inequality and the need to do something 
against it. Even Obama, who claimed equality of opportunity to mean also 
equality of outcomes, and who views the role of government as creating the 
equality of means to seize opportunity, considers race-specific policies as a po-
litical no go.  
Why then, are race-specific policies considered as unfeasible, almost as 
utopian, by people who clearly see the need for them? The answer lies in the 
political hierarchy and the status of those demanding such measures. Sociolo-
gist Karl Mannheim defined political utopia not as something that is unattaina-
ble—Thomas More’s original utopia meaning “place that does not exist”—but 
as being a question of status of the group/party/individuals formulating the 
idea: if it is the or a dominant group, then the idea or belief or demand will be 
considered as feasible, if it emanates from a subordinate group, then the idea 
will be labeled as utopian.419 And indeed, in the sense that this group is not in a 
position of power to implement the ideas, they can be considered as unfeasible.  
Through the 1970s backlash and the Reagan rhetoric racial claims have in-
deed become utopian on several grounds: race has been used to destroy the 
New Deal Coalition that had successfully fought for social justice. The backlash 
has once again politically isolated minorities with a minority agenda, contrary 
to a short span in the 1960s that was open for racial claims of compensation 
based on recent white guilt. And lastly, it has become utopian because Reagan 
managed to transform race into a red flag that even as innuendos and code 
manages to antagonize people and led (and leads) them to oppose their own 
economic interests.  
The political polarization of the two main parties has worked to the ad-
vantage of the Republicans. Clinton’s health care legislation failure and subse-
quent conservative AFDC/TANF reform is just one example of that. But the 
Republicans’ obstructive attitude also took its toll on the ACA: by trying to find 
a common ground with Republicans to try to create a bipartisan solution, 
Obama’s health care reform has become far less progressive than many would 
have liked. Moreover, the Clinton failure and the two lawsuits against the ACA 
are just two examples of how Republicans relentlessly attack any possible 
weakness of a bill or even legislation. This in turn makes Democrats wary to 
attempt anything that could be easily exploited by Republicans to their ad-
vantage.  
Republican discourse presents Democratic proposals as too extreme, as 
not trying to find a common ground, and thus posits a conservative atmosphere 
as the norm. In 2010, Kentucky Senator Mitch McConnell said that they were 
willing to envisage bipartisanship under certain conditions, namely if Obama 
did a “Clintonian backflip,”420 meaning if Obama turned conservative. Nobody 
seems to be shocked that the opposition demands that the party in power sur-
renders to their opinion and at the same time refuses to meet them halfway. 
This decidedly conservative atmosphere was created through Reagan’s dis-
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course that put minority discourse back to its subaltern political status. Later 
Republican presidents picked up Reagan’s discourse, and even Clinton just 
gave in to this discourse, making welfare-bashing a campaign slogan. The po-
tency of the Reagan discourse was partly due to problems within the Democrat-
ic Party. Contrary to the Republicans, Democrats are less ideologically unified. 
Some Democrats have rather conservative positions regarding race.421 The same 
discourse that impacts the white working and middle class also impacts politi-
cians, in part because of the apprehension of the reaction of their electorate. 
Democrats themselves do not strongly enough support an oppositional position 
to the Republicans. 
In addition to this unfavorable political context for minorities, it must not 
be forgotten that blacks not only are a political and social minority, but in the 
US they are also a numerical minority. Blacks represent only 13% of the popula-
tion. Politically, this numerical minority is further weakened by the conse-
quences of their low socio-economic status. The poorer people are and the less 
educated, the less they tend to vote.422 This low voter mobilization in turn 
makes that blacks are politically underrepresented or “mis-represented” 
through “symbolical” nominations, 423 such as Supreme Court Judge Clarence 
Thomas, former Secretary of State Colin Powell, or Secretary of State Con-
doleezza Rice, who neither represent black majority opinion nor interests that a 
majority of black people consider important. 
When considering the feasibility of race-conscious policies, it must not be 
forgotten that black opinion regarding race-specific policies has evolved as well. 
Fewer blacks tend to favor affirmative action, especially if race is presented as 
the only admission criterion.424 Moreover, more and more blacks think that 
there are more differences than similarities between blacks from different so-
cial classes, which indicate a decreasing relevance of race considered as single 
factor.425 
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These perceptions contrast with social and economic statistics. It is true 
that there is an increasing black middle class that is very distinct from the black 
poor and particularly far away from the problems of the ghettos.426 And yet it is 
also true when looking at the overall socio-economic structure that the black 
population is among the poorest in the US, that the black middle class is much 
more fragile than the white middle class, that black mortality rates are higher, 
that black education rates are among the lowest, that the black population dis-
proportionately relies on social programs, that black unemployment rates are 
among the highest, and that the black population was the biggest victim of the 
2008 financial crisis. These differences are partly due to discrimination, as for 
example the refusal of bank loans, discriminating practices of predatory loans, 
more rejections of job applications, stigmatization, and negative representation 
in the media. 
It appears that since the 1970s, the ideological current advocating racial 
policies is in a subordinate position at several levels, especially regarding politi-
cal representation and the political climate. Although social and economic real-
ities plead in favor of race-specific policies, the political situation favors more 
pragmatic solutions. It is undeniable that the political situation is a major factor 
that must be taken into account. However, demands that could be judged to be 
more utopian, such as race-specific policies can find significance and a role in 
the theoretical framework devised by philosopher Ernst Bloch with his Princi-
ple of Hope (Das Prinzip Hoffnung).427 In this sense the ultimate goal of race-
specific policies, meaning the suppression or alleviation of all racial inequalities 
remains a central orientation point of an ideal that should be reached, albeit by 
other means. 
1.6. Conclusion 
Both race and class have the function of organizing social hierarchy. 
Through racism, race has become a means of social and economic subordina-
tion that created deep structural inequalities along racial lines in US society 
that appear in the fields of the economy, education, social networks, housing, 
and health. Although open institutional discrimination is banned, discrimina-
tory practices persist and the effects of past discrimination continue to shape 
the lives of minorities. Through this structuring function of subordination, race 
and class have become overlapping categories. Yet, the deeply racist character-
istic of American social subordination means that race cannot be discarded. 
Indeed, at similar socioeconomic status, the situation of minorities is systemati-
cally worse, especially when assets are taken into account. Moreover, cultural 
norms expressed through classism and racism doubly hit poor minorities and 
even make the black middle class experience a different one. The continuous 
concentration of the same (racial) populations at the lowest rungs of the social 
ladder has created a vicious cycle of reproducing the same social hierarchy, 
disguising structural disadvantage of lacking access to quality education and 
valuable social networks behind mythical notions of equal opportunity and 
meritocracy. Through institutional and structural racism in social policy minor-
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ities have largely been barred from the beneficial effects of the welfare state 
that helped the white middle class to emerge after World War II. The most sali-
ent aspect is that this social and economic hierarchization revolves around the 
distribution of resources, be it good jobs, health benefits, quality education, or 
income shares. In this part, only the outcome of this competition around distri-
bution of resources has been presented. The next part will show how social pol-
icies, the means by which redistribution is achieved at a political level, have 
skewed along racial lines, leading ultimately to this unequal society shaped 
along racial and class lines. More importantly, the historical development of 
social policies and party attitudes regarding social policies will explain the roots 
of the political non-feasibility of race-conscious policies. 
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The historical perspective on the racialization of social policies makes it possible 
to see the reasons why Americans continue to oppose social policies and why they 
often even vote against their economic interests. It also makes it possible to explain 
why meaningful social policy reform is a major challenge for American politicians, 
especially when there is a will to address racial inequalities. This was the case for 
Obama, who not only wanted to establish a universal health care system, but also 
intended to specifically help the black population. This chapter will retrace the his-
torical and political evolution of social policies that make it difficult to achieve mean-
ingful reform while addressing racial inequalities, which Obama tried to do through 
his health care legislation. He faced strong opposition from the Republican Party and 
from the public. A historical survey of social policies will show how these have con-
tributed to structural inequalities along race and class lines, how racial competition 
for economic resources in the form of social policies has prevented an interracial 
class alliance, and how the two major American political parties became strongly po-
larized over the issue of social policies. It appeared preferable to treat the purely his-
torical development of social policies separately from the different theories and in-
terpretations regarding the reasons for such a problematic development and later 
attacks. Therefore the racialization of social policies will be treated separately from 
the general overview of the welfare state. 
Political scientist Theda Skocpol insists on the need for a historical perspective. 
In addition, she argues in her book Social Policies in the United States: Future Possibilities 
in Historical Perspective (1995) that not only must the historical perspective be adopted 
to understand the development of the policies themselves, but that the evolution of 
American politics must also be taken into account. The difference of political atti-
tudes between the Democratic and the Republican Party concerning social policies is 
often explained in ideological terms opposing ideals of strong government interven-
tion to ideals of a market-based approach. Other explanations focus on differences in 
moral preferences that oppose ideas of economic aid to preferences for “reform of 
behavior.” Skocpol argues that these explanations oversimplify the issue and that the 
historical and political evolution of social policies needs to be taken into account, as 
these show the gradual racialization of such policies, which was made possible be-
cause structural racial inequality was built into them right from their inception. The 
existence of structural racial inequalities in social policies is demonstrated by politi-
cal scientist Ira Katznelson in his 2005 book When Affirmative Action Was White: An 
Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth Century America.1 This view is shared by 
political scientist Joe R. Feagin in his work White Party, White Government: Race, Class, 
and US Politics (2012). Feagin insists more on how, in the American context, the racial-
ization of social policies has prevented the development of a strong political class 
alliance.2 Thomas and Mary Edsall explain how these elements have been exploited 
in the Republican electoral strategy since the 1970s, and by Ronald Reagan in particu-
lar.3  
By electing Reagan in 1980, the white working and middle class turned away from 
redistributive measures during a period that witnessed major economic difficulties. 
Based on the evidence of the Great Depression—a period of economic crisis that re-
sulted in the creation of the American welfare state—it could have been expected on 
the contrary that Americans would favor more redistributive measures in the late 
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1970s. These two historical examples show that it is difficult to affirm that the 2008 
crisis and the ensuing Great Recession necessarily represented a favorable context for 
the creation of more redistributive policies, both at the political and the public opin-
ion level.  
At the political level, Obama explained in a 2016 interview that he assumed that 
because of the 2008 crisis Republicans would be more cooperative and that they 
would work on a bipartisan basis to tackle the crisis. He explained that he understood 
his mistake when House Minority Leader John Boehner publicly declared Republi-
cans would not support the stimulus bill, even before Democrats had presented their 
first draft of the bill.4 There were only rare occasions of bipartisan collaboration dur-
ing the Obama presidency. As far as the health care reform is concerned, the Repub-
lican opposition is striking. For the drafting of the health care reform bill, there was 
only a small and superficial collaboration in the Senate. The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2008 (ACA) was passed without a single Republican yea. More-
over, the Republicans challenged the constitutionality and some provisions of the 
ACA in two major lawsuits.5 Congressional Republicans have repeatedly promised 
that they would dismantle the ACA. The Republican presidential candidates of 2012 
(Mitt Romney) and 2016 (Donald Trump) both promised in their campaigns that they 
would revoke the ACA.6 From a political point of view, the economic crisis did not 
translate into more favorable conditions for redistributive policies as far as the col-
laboration of the GOP was concerned. 
The health care reform was protested against by the public, especially by the Tea 
Party. In August 2009, six month before the final vote on the reform bill, only a 37% 
minority of public opinion supported health care reform, 39% opposed the reform, 
and the remaining 24% had no opinion.7  
Greater inequality and greater economic needs do not automatically translate in-
to greater demands for redistributive measures. Political scientist Larry M. Bartels 
expressed his puzzlement over the lack of political demand for redistribution. He 
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noted the discrepancy between the theoretical assumption that greater inequality 
should result in political demands for higher taxation and more redistributional poli-
cies from people with moderate incomes, and the reality that is quite different. De-
spite the high inequality rates in the country, the tax cuts for the wealthy made by 
President George W. Bush (and his Republican predecessors) did not trigger a strong 
opposition.8 According to sociologist and political scientist Leslie McCall, concerns 
about income inequality do not necessarily mean that people support more taxes on 
the rich or redistributive policies. According to her studies, people tend to favor 
spreading opportunity through education or similar measures enhancing self-
reliance.9 And yet, President Barack Obama’s big education reform has stalled in 
Congress since 2008 and his health care reform came at a very high price for Demo-
crats.10 The racialization of social policies based on intergroup competition and the 
ensuing negative discourse around social policies will provide part of the analytical 
framework to explain why Americans opposed an opportunity-enhancing reform 
that cut the health care deficit and provided coverage for millions of uninsured. 
2.1. A Brief History of Social Policies 
Before starting to outline a brief history of the development of social policies, it 
must first be understood what kind of policies they are. Social policies play a major 
role in politics, because they regulate part of the redistribution of wealth, meaning 
the allocation of resources within society. The allocation of resources is the core ele-
ment of politics, as shown by the famous and oft cited definition of politics: “Who 
gets what, when, and how,” after political scientist Harold Dwight Lasswell’s epony-
mous 1950 book. This already points to two core elements of politics: the administra-
tion of a circumscribed human group and the matter of resources, that is, how com-
mon resources are created and defined and how they are shared. Moreover, the 
“Who” is quite important, and there are many ways of defining the “who” that “gets”, 
just as there are many ways in deciding where to get the resources that will be pooled. 
Social policies do just that: establish the criteria of which persons will get which 
amount of resources under which conditions. This redistribution process also estab-
lishes from whom the resources are taken. Hence the very nature of social policies 
creates inter-group competition. Moreover, they have a deep and heavy impact on 
the whole country and the country’s economy.  
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2.1.1. Different Types of Policies  
In his 2009 book Arenas of Power, political scientist Theodore J. Lowi distin-
guishes four main types of policies: constituent, distributive, regulatory, and redis-
tributive policies. These different types of policies are not only distinguished because 
they affect different parts, levels, or spheres of the nation, society, or the economy, 
but also because they are influenced by different parts of the government, or by an 
association of different parts of the government. Moreover, Lowi finds the various 
types of policies to be so different that he describes them as “distinct subsystems” that 
entail different types of politics.11 
Constituent policies are policies that are concerned with “state building” and 
create a structure in which government action can take place. 12 The most obvious 
example of this type of policy is the Constitution.  
Distributive policies mainly concern public land and resources, such as river 
and harbor programs, labor, business, traditional tariffs, and agricultural “clientele” 
services. They can be broken down into small units, with virtually no connection be-
tween each other, and which do not obey any general rule. Lowi posits “patronage” as 
a synonym for “distributive.” Distributive policies are made up of “highly individual-
ized decisions that only by accumulation can be called policies.”13 The most individu-
alized of these decisions and most specific allocations are also called “pork-barrel” 
policies and are mostly included within wider bills. Distributive policies are exclu-
sively handled by Congress where lobbies and committees play the major roles.14 The 
narrower pork-barrel distributive policies are mainly made at the request of a single 
member of Congress for their specific district, mostly in return for their vote in favor 
of the wider bill in which the pork is included. This exchange of votes in support of 
one another’s bills is called “log rolling.” 
Regulatory policies also have an individual and specific impact, but they are 
stated in general and neutral terms. The impact is “clearly one of directly raising costs 
and/or reducing or expanding the alternatives of private individuals.”15 These policies 
establish rules of conduct that are enforced, if necessary, by fines or other forms of 
penalties and that create rules of behavior to organize the living/working/functioning 
together in a nation. Although the impact is highly individualized, the policies cannot 
be disaggregated to a single unit, individual or enterprise. The law does not apply to a 
single unit, as is the case with distributive policies. But there can be a perceived 
common impact along sectors of the economy. Regulatory policies are cumulative 
along those sector lines, therefore regulatory policies can be broken down to the sec-
tor level.16 Moreover, the units can adapt to regulatory policies by adjusting their be-
havior to the rule that has been established. These are the texts that are often referred 
to as “the law” that must not be broken. Regulatory legislation is handled exclusively 
in Congress, mostly in committees and on the floor.17 
Most redistributive policies are commonly called social policies. However, a sig-
nificant part of redistribution is also achieved through tax policies and tax breaks or 
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subsidies. They also deal with the relations between individuals, but the categories 
are broader, almost resembling social classes, described by Lowi as follows: “They 
are, crudely speaking, haves and have-nots, bigness and smallness, bourgeoisie and 
proletariat. The aim involved is not use of property, but property itself, not equal 
treatment but equal possession, not behavior but being.”18 Thus clearly, redistributive 
policies, as the name suggests, concern social policies such as welfare programs that 
deal with the redistribution of resources among the population. Redistributive poli-
cies create categories and this classification is involuntary. Through redistributive 
policies, people are automatically grouped, and cannot by their own choice get into a 
group defined by the policy. Redistributive policies can be seen as manipulation of 
the system, of the macropolicy, or of the environment of conduct. Moreover, redis-
tributive policies are very closely associated with social movements and social clas-
ses.19 This stems from the fact that such policies seek to create new structures, to ma-
nipulate existing structures in order to change the value of property or money, or to 
categorize people according to some universalized attribute, such as level of income, 
or age, or status of occupation. As a result of this type of restructuring of the popula-
tion, these policies can be called categoric.20 To phrase it with Lasswell’s words, redis-
tributive policies determine “who” (which category) “gets what” (the amount of bene-
fits or subsidies). In the case of the ACA, an example category would be people with 
an income up to 133% Federal Poverty Level (FPL) who can benefit from the Medicaid 
extension. Another income category would be the people with incomes between 
100% and 400% FPL who qualify for tax credits to pay for their health care insurance 
premiums and reductions in cost-sharing.21 
Whereas the other types of policies are out of reach of the president, or are poli-
cies for which the president can at best have a supplicative role (as for regulatory pol-
icies), by contrast, Lowi found that in the case of redistributive policies, the executive 
plays a major role. In a general manner, it can be said that redistributive policies re-
sult from strong executive activity, otherwise they are likely to fail. Such policies im-
ply a direct communication between the executive and the legislative: the “acting out 
of the intent of the framers” as Lowi calls it. Moreover, for both the House and the 
Senate, there is greater floor activity and greater floor creativity—meaning that alter-
ations to the bill are made—than for the other types of policies.22 In the context of 
health care reform this means that the type of policy provided for conditions that 
allowed for a greater outplaying of intra-party conflicts and also provided for more 
opportunities for the opposition to voice their disagreement. The Democratic majori-
ty had conflicting opinions about the content of the reform project and the Republi-
can minority was strongly opposed to it. The media’s focus on these conflicts contrib-
uted to negatively influencing public opinion about the reform project.23 
Lowi also noted that, although for all four types of policies “coalitions form 
around shared interests, the coalitions will shift as the interests change or as conflicts 
of interest emerge.”24 This, however, is less the case for redistributive policies, as the 
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issues align along class lines, which tends to stabilize these interests. Lowi highlights 
the fact that “these interests are sufficiently stable and clear and consistent to provide 
the foundations for ideologies.” Indeed, a careful analysis of a set of case studies re-
veals that for redistributive policies the relationship among the legislative actors is 
driven by ideology, whereas it is driven by logrolling for distributive policies, and by 
bargaining for regulatory policies.25 Redistributive policies, or social policies, imply 
oppositional interests revolving around taxation and reallocation of resources along 
sufficiently stable lines to create lasting ideological oppositions, and ultimately, po-
larization.  
The polarization of the two parties over social policies has increased over the 
past decades, starting with the demise of the Keynesian consensus in the 1970s and 
the adoption of neoliberal ideas by the Republican Party. The strong ideological po-
larization between the two parties and the Republican political strategies introduced 
by Newt Gingrich in the 1990s have created a context in which bipartisanship for re-
distributive policies is virtually impossible. Quite on the contrary: Republican opposi-
tion is strong and unrelenting. This is exemplified by the Clinton health care reform 
failure in 1994 or Boehner’s public rejection of the stimulus bill in 2009 before having 
discussed the bill with the Democrats. Issues of bipartisan collaboration for Obama’s 
health care reform will be discussed later in detail.26 
The implication of the type of policy on the type of politics, following Lowi’s def-
initions and analysis, is that in the case of the ACA Obama had a triple role to play. 
The first point was that Obama had to take on his role as government leader to en-
courage and push Congress to enact the reform project. The second role, more dif-
fuse and less directly traceable, is linked to “the acting out of the intent of the framer”, 
meaning the influence on the content of the bill regarding the features and provisions 
of the future law. And finally, the last role, although less directly addressed by Lowi, 
but which is hinted at in the mentioning of the strong impact of redistributive laws on 
the population, is that the president’s role includes working the public and maintain-
ing a discursive context favorable for reform. 
However, Lowi’s classification does not take race into account. On the surface, 
policies can be distinguished as color-conscious and colorblind, or race-specific and 
race-neutral. In other words, a policy can explicitly target specific racial populations 
or apply universally to the whole population. Yet, when it comes to race, another ma-
jor distinction must be made regarding the outcome of a given policy. This outcome 
can be negative (racist or prejudiced). Or it can be positive or enhancing, meaning 
that the policy has a beneficial effect on the targeted racial population. Political scien-
tist Robert C. Lieberman, in his 2007 book Shaping Race Policy: the United States in 
Comparative Perspective, insists on this aspect. According to him a distinction must be 
made between discriminatory intent and discriminatory outcome. A race-neutral 
policy can have a discriminatory outcome. Moreover, in his 1998 book Shifting the 
Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State, Lieberman shows how this discrimina-
tory effect can result from the manner in which a program is financed and adminis-
tered.  
It is generally understood that the first type of race policy, the one most com-
monly associated with racial policy, is the race-specific policy with a negative out-
come. Slavery laws and segregationist laws immediately come to mind. These laws 
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somewhat blur Lowi’s categories, since they use the category factor of race to estab-
lish regulations.  
The second type of race policy is the race-specific policy with a positive out-
come. The prime example is affirmative action. It is somehow difficult to categorize 
affirmative action according to Lowi’s terms, since once again, it targets being instead 
of behavior. Moreover affirmative action regulates access rather than redistributing 
resources. Nonetheless, affirmative action is commonly studied alongside more clas-
sical social policies. Affirmative action is redistributive in the sense that it redistrib-
utes opportunity in social policy areas such as work and education. Moreover, it es-
tablishes categories as redistributive policies do; in this case, race, gender, religion, 
and age. 
As for race-neutral policies, it is more difficult to evaluate their differential out-
come. A policy can be race-neutral on the surface, meaning the legislative text does 
not contain language openly excluding a specific race or races, or does not openly 
impose a certain discriminatory conduct on a specific race or races, and yet the policy 
can have a negative or discriminatory outcome. 
One of the ways to create a neutral policy that has a negative racial impact is to 
target the racial population through another category that is predominant in that 
population, such as economic categories. For example Social Security, as it was de-
vised in 1935, excluded a majority of African-Americans because it excluded domestic 
servants and farmworkers. These categories were only integrated in 1950. Although 
many now view Social Security as a neutral program, some have criticized an imbal-
ance, since African-Americans have a notably shorter life span and thus benefit less 
from Social Security.27 
The way a program is administered also allows for unequal outcomes along ra-
cial lines. Lieberman opposes two extremes of administration. On the one hand, there 
are procedurally egalitarian programs with clear rules and carefully selected criteria 
that treat all the individuals equally. In these cases, it is rather simple to determine 
whether there is discrimination or not. On the other hand, there are discretionary 
programs. In these cases, 
clear benefit criteria are not written into the statute or if power is not clearly vested in a 
central authority, policies will grant wide discretion to subordinate administrators and 
governments. Discretionary policies need not be slanted on their face in order to dis-
criminate against particular social groups; the very fact of discretion allows for the possi-
bility that individuals in identical situations will not be treated identically.28 
This is often the case with state-administered programs, where states are free to set 
their eligibility criteria. For example, with the case of Medicaid prior to 2010, it was 
mostly states with important black populations and high poverty rates that had the 
lowest Medicaid eligibility levels. Howard showed that this was the case for most 
southern states, even when controlling for economic and political variables. Southern 
states used the discretionary aspects of Aid for Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) in the same way, often declaring black applicants as unfit mothers and as 
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such ineligible for benefits.29 Regarding AFDC, Lieberman noted that in the 1970s, 
when the proportion of minority applicants increased, the real value of the benefits 
started to decrease.30  
Lieberman demonstrates that the structure of financing can also have a discrim-
inating effect. Some policies are contributory, meaning that the policy revenue (al-
most) exclusively comes from future or potential beneficiaries. Thus the programs 
“entail at least the illusion of a self-contained system,” without appearing to rely on 
other sources of revenues. Other programs do not require a previous contribution 
and very explicitly rely on general revenue, meaning taxes, to finance the benefits. 
This not only leads to easily defined constituencies in the case of contributory pro-
grams on the one hand, and fragmented constituencies that are politically separated 
from the general population on the other hand, but also to distinct statuses in the 
“political mind as ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving,’ ‘honorable’ or ‘dishonorable.’”31 A 
state-administered program with a fragmented and imprecise constituency that is 
morally judged as undeserving and dishonorable is vulnerable and prone to discrim-
ination. 
The last possibility is a race-neutral policy with a positive outcome. In this case, 
there is no specific racial designation, but the beneficiaries are impacted through 
specific socio-economic aspects or through specific issues that disproportionately 
affect these populations in order to alleviate these problems. As it will be demon-
strated later in detail, this is the case with the Affordable Care Act. Officially, the 
ACA is a universal and race neutral policy. However, the ACA manages to impact 
racial minorities, and blacks in particular, by focusing on certain socio-economic as-
pects or specific issues that disproportionately affect minority populations in order to 
alleviate these problems. The ACA, for example, disproportionately helps the lower 
black middle class by concentrating the subsidies for the purchase of health insur-
ance on income categories between 100% and 400% Federal Poverty Level.32 Based on 
the statistics of family incomes in 2010 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Cen-
sus Bureau, these subsidies concerned 13.6% more families in the black population 
than in the white population.33Another example would be the strong focus on issues 
like HIV/AIDS or diabetes, both extremely costly and life threatening, and of major 
proportions in the black population. 
2.1.2. Building the Welfare State 
It is usually highlighted that the American welfare state developed quite late in 
the US compared with other Western nations. This, however, must be slightly quali-
fied. The New Deal was by no means the beginning of the American welfare state. 
Skocpol points to the development of veteran pensions after the Civil War to show 
that some type of welfare programs already existed, as well as some assistance for 
widows and orphans, and the already existing primary and secondary school system. 
                                                        
29	  Howard	  178–9.	  
30	  Lieberman,	  Shaping	  Race	  Policy,	  2–3.	  
31	  Lieberman,	  Shaping	  Race	  Policy,	  16.	  
32	  ACA	  Sec.	  1401.	  
33	  US	  Census	  Bureau,	   “Family	   Income.”	   The	   figures	   are	   slightly	   rounded	  because	   the	   income	  brackets	  
used	  by	  the	  Census	  do	  not	  exactly	  correspond	  to	  the	  income	  categories	  defined	  by	  the	  Federal	  Poverty	  
Level	  that	  are	  applied	  for	  the	  attribution	  of	  the	  subsidies.	  
2 — The Racialization of Social Policies 153 
 
The veteran pensions in particular are often overlooked, because they are part of the 
military budget. Moreover, in the North, more people (native-born white men) were 
covered by the pensions than there were actual veterans, making it effectively work 
as a broader social policy. However, this mostly led to the association of the pensions 
with political corruption.34  
During the late 19th century discontent over poverty started to grow. The major 
change was that poverty was not only blamed on personal failure anymore, but on 
“an unjust political and economic organization.”35 The idea that government had a 
role to play in regulating this organization in favor of the workers and ensure their 
welfare started to make headway, especially with the publication in 1909 of Herbert 
Croly’s The Promise of American Life.36 In 1911, Illinois was the first state to enact Moth-
ers’ Pensions, soon followed by the other states. Mothers’ Pensions enjoyed a broad 
consensus. However, the allocation was narrowed down to children with unemploy-
able or deceased fathers, and was made “contingent upon their mothers’ acceptance 
of [white] middle-class behavioral norms.”37 The first report on the various state pro-
grams issued by the Department of Labor in 1914 described the various state Mothers’ 
Pension programs as “a type of legislation whose purpose is admittedly uniform, 
namely, to secure for young children home life and the personal care of a good moth-
er. No one quarrels with this purpose.”38 Sociologist and political scientist Joe Soss 
and political scientists Richard Fording and Sanford Schram argue that Mothers’ 
Pensions were largely denied to black and Hispanic women, sometimes by simply not 
establishing the programs in areas with large minority populations. The Pension pro-
grams focus on middle-class norms also led to the use of the program as an assimila-
tion tool for European immigrants.39 It consequently already becomes apparent that 
social policies were viewed as programs that should be addressed to the white popu-
lation.  
The Progressive Era was marked with a spirit that sought to improve working 
conditions, public health, and housing, and the major policy breakthrough came in 
1935 with the Social Security Act. Although the term “Social Security” is understood 
nowadays as referring to the retirement pensions, the act also established unem-
ployment benefits and relief for the poor, and it must be considered as the foundation 
of today’s welfare state.40  
Four aspects are of particular interest in the New Deal. The momentum for the 
New Deal was created by the Great Depression. One interesting part of the Great De-
pression is that it gave a white face to poverty, especially through the famous photo-
graphs by Dorothy Lange. Moreover, it reinforced the perception that poverty is not 
exclusively a problem caused by personal failure but a result of economic forces, thus 
rendering government intervention acceptable.  
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Second, the way the New Deal was designed meant that it functioned as “af-
firmative action for whites”, as Ira Katznelson argues.41 Minorities were largely ex-
cluded since agricultural and domestic workers were not covered, thus leaving about 
2/3 of the black population not covered by Social Security.42 Besides, the New Deal, as 
designed initially, on top of discriminating against minorities by barring them from 
the program, also gave an unfair advantage to the white population by allowing them 
to benefit from programs that had a major impact on economic well-being, especially 
regarding poverty in old age. Katznelson asserts that the political power of Southern 
Democrats was still a determining factor in Congress, allowing them to heavily influ-
ence the contours of social policy in a manner as to preserve the Southern Way of 
Life.43 In his 2013 book Fear Itself, Katznelson argues that “crucially, the South permit-
ted American liberal democracy the space within which to proceed, but it restricted 
American policymaking to what I call a ‘southern cage,’ from which there was no es-
cape.” Moreover, Katznelson insists on the fact that the influence and role of segrega-
tionist politics on the shaping of the New Deal is the most overlooked theme in the 
histories of the New Deal.44 
It must be said, however, that this is also refuted. On behalf of the Social Securi-
ty Administration, Larry DeWitt argues that this exclusion “was due to considera-
tions of administrative feasibility involving tax-collection procedures”,45 and had 
nothing whatsoever to do with an intention to discriminate or to accommodate 
Southern politics. Despite the exclusion and the fact that most blacks knew that they 
were getting less than whites, when they got something at all, the New Deal relief 
program kept many black families from starving, which assured President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt’s popularity among the black population. This was also due in part 
to Eleanor Roosevelt’s commitment and activism on behalf of minorities.46  
Third, FDR had initially also aimed to pass legislation on health insurance but 
“political realities”, namely opposition, prevented it.47 Lastly, the Social Security Act 
transformed Mothers’ Pensions into Aid to Dependent Children. The interesting 
point is that it failed to create a federally administered program. The New Deal estab-
lished a two-tier system. The programs aimed at the families of white male workers, 
such as pensions, would be federally administered. Relief for the poor and ADC, 
which benefited minorities and women more, would be administered at the state lev-
el with discretion for the states on how to allocate the resources.48 Skocpol argues 
that this was a conscious effort to dissociate Social Security from relief for the poor.49 
The 1934 National Housing Act created the Federal Housing Administration 
whose purpose is to help Americans access homeownership. However, it has been 
demonstrated that the FHA discriminated against minorities by refusing mortgages 
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and redlining black neighborhoods; practices that continue to shape American city-
scapes today.50 Similar discrimination was at work when implementing the Service-
men’s Readjustment Act of 1944, better known as the GI Bill. The package to help 
veterans back after service included low-cost mortgages, low-interest loans to help 
start a company, unemployment benefits, and paying for tuition fees, especially for 
college and university, and even providing for a monthly living allowance for the du-
ration of their studies. This act helped many working-class veterans move into the 
middle class.51 Despite the GI Bill being a program that did not in any way explicitly 
exclude blacks, a race trump had been built-in at the request of Southern congress-
men: it was a state-administered program, allowing Southern states to exclude blacks, 
especially from home mortgages. Katznelson concludes that “the performance of the 
GI Bill mocked the promise of fair treatment.” Moreover, Katznelson insists on the 
increasing gap created by the exclusions of blacks from a program that provides a 
greater advantage for whites.52 This means that at a period when blacks were held 
back by segregation and discrimination, which already gave an advantage to whites, 
the latter got additional federal help to get ahead and reach a middle class status from 
which blacks were thus doubly excluded. 
President Harry S. Truman sought to address many of the shortcomings of the 
Roosevelt presidency. FDR had not even dared to propose anti-lynching legislation 
for fear that the Southern Democrats would jeopardize other legislation.53 Truman, 
on the other hand, openly sought to enforce a civil rights agenda and desegregated 
the army in 1948 through Executive Order 9981. However, most of Truman’s Fair 
Deal, including the major project of health care insurance, was defeated by the con-
servative coalition in Congress, which allied Republicans with conservative Southern 
Democrats, united in their goal to limit the scope of government. In the case of the 
Southern Democrats, the scope of government was perceived as a threat to segrega-
tion, especially since Truman had openly linked his agenda on social policy with his 
agenda for civil rights and desegregation.54 In 1950, at last, the Social Security Act was 
modified as to include domestic servants and agricultural workers and thus gave ac-
cess to many minorities. 
President John F. Kennedy’s ambitious domestic policy program, which notably 
comprised civil rights and health care, failed because of the opposition of Southern 
Democrats. Kennedy rapidly turned away from domestic policies and focused on 
other issues. It is a gross underestimation to think that president Lyndon B. Johnson 
simply enacted Kennedy’s domestic agenda. What Johnson did went far beyond that 
and he managed to address many of the shortcomings of the New Deal.55 Johnson 
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was a deeply convinced class populist and committed to racial justice. It was his polit-
ical savviness and his personal dedication to the issue, which also showed in the way 
he relentlessly worked on members of Congress to convince them to vote for the bills, 
which allowed him to pass the Civil Rights Act and the wide array of programs of the 
Great Society. The Great Society created many means-tested programs aimed at the 
poor. These programs in particular aimed at reducing the growing economic gap be-
tween whites and minorities. Between 1947 and 1964, white poverty rates had dropped 
by 27%, whereas minority poverty rates had dropped by only 3%.56 Johnson was well 
aware of these issues of economic inequality, notably through the Moynihan report 
(whose official title was: The Negro Family: A Case for National Action, published in 
1965) he had commissioned. The first page of the report clearly stated that enacting 
Civil Rights was just a beginning, but an insufficient one, that would not address 
deep-seated economic inequality:  
In this new period the expectations of the Negro Americans will go beyond civil rights. 
Being Americans, they will now expect that in the near future equal opportunities for 
them as a group will produce roughly equal results, as compared with other groups. This 
is not going to happen. Nor will it happen for generations to come unless a new and spe-
cial effort is made.57 
The “new and special effort” to target poverty was the War on Poverty within 
Johnson’s Great Society. Among the developments of the Great Society was the ex-
pansion of AFDC (in 1962 it had been renamed Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren in order to encourage marriage). Now AFDC recipients were also entitled to 
receive Medicaid, Food Stamps, day care, and work-related incentive payments. 
However, the expansion of AFDC did not come without a fight. As it increasingly 
included blacks, it became increasingly tied to the Work Incentive Program (1967).58 
But the War on Poverty was also in part fought through the 1964 Economic Oppor-
tunity Act, which created programs like VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America), 
Head Start, or the Job Corps, providing job and training opportunities.  
Another major achievement of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations was 
the creation of affirmative action. Affirmative action does not redistribute resources, 
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but rather opportunity. Despite affirmative action not being a redistributive policy in 
the primary sense of reallocating resources, it nonetheless has its place among social 
policies because it aims at facilitating upward social mobility.59 
Despite being elected on his conservative law and order rhetoric, president 
Richard Nixon further expanded social policies and he also sought to introduce 
health care legislation. Interestingly enough, despite his conservative background, 
Nixon has quite an impressive record on social policies. Regarding his record on 
health legislation, he enacted several smaller policies addressing specific health is-
sues or populations. A major achievement was the 1970 OSHA (Occupational Safety 
and Health Act), which introduced new measures for industrial workers. The same 
year the Nixon administration enacted the Family Planning and Population Research 
Act that provides family planning assistance and access to contraceptives for low-
income and uninsured people. 60 In 1971, the Nixon administration enacted the Emer-
gency Employment Act that allocated $1 billion for the temporary creation of about 
170,000 public sector jobs aimed at high unemployment areas. The main target popu-
lations were veterans and minorities. The same year, national eligibility standards for 
food stamps were established. These measures appear more in continuity with the 
policies established by Johnson and do not yet show a sharp ideological opposition 
between Democrats and Republicans regarding social policies. 
Quite on the contrary, the 1972 Local Fiscal Assistance Act established a general 
revenue sharing. The expressed aim was “to help our sorely pressed State and local 
governments to meet their heavy financial problems and to keep them fiscally 
sound”61 regarding their implementation of social policies and providing of public 
services. The same attitude of expanding social policies that was in the continuity of 
the Johnson administration could be seen with the indexation Social Security bene-
fits to rise with inflation and the creation of Supplementary Security Income (SSI). 
This continuity was also apparent in the Family Assistance Plan that Nixon proposed 
in 1969, but which was never enacted. It proposed to reform AFDC by increasing the 
federal involvement in the program and by guaranteeing a minimum income to poor 
families with children.62The Rehabilitation Act was passed in 1973, and addressed the 
needs of people with disabilities. And finally, ERISA (Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act) was enacted in 1974 to protect pensions and to require a responsible 
management of pension funds. The same year, Congress increased the minimum 
wage. Nixon’s conservatism showed in the greater de-centralization of social policies 
that gave ever more autonomy to the states and relied more on the use of private 
markets than on government. This stance becomes apparent in the 1973 CETA (Com-
prehensive Employment and Training Act) that replaced existing programs, but also 
shifted administration to a more local level.  
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The most notable achievement of the Ford administration was the creation of 
the Earned Income Tax Credit in 1975, which was aimed at poor wage earners. As for 
the social policy dimension of the Carter presidency, it was rather small. Among the 
notable elements feature the separation of the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) into two distinct administrations: the Department of Education and 
the Department of Health and Human Services. The year 1980 saw the enactment of 
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act as well as the Mental Health Systems 
Act.63  
2.1.3. The Welfare State and its Critics 
Up to that point, the American welfare state had been expanding, at a more or 
less rapid pace. With the election of Ronald Reagan, things changed. The passage of 
the 1981 Omnibus Reconciliation Act (OBRA) was the first great attack on the Ameri-
can welfare state. Political scientist Bruce Jansson summarizes its effect as follows:  
OBRA made deep cuts in social programs and eliminated 57 social programs by folding 
them into seven block grants: social services; community services; alcohol, drug abuse, and 
mental health services; maternal and child health services; community development ser-
vices; primary health services; and preventive health services. By creating block grants and 
allocating limited funds to each of them, Reagan was able to cut social spending for those 
programs within the block grants.64 
The same year, the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) was enacted, which 
sharply reduced personal and corporate taxes, thus decreasing the available budget 
that could potentially be devoted to social policies. However, the following year, due 
to the recession and fears over budget deficits, this strategy had to be slightly revised 
with the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). The law raised 
corporate taxes, especially by targeting loopholes, but it still provided for cuts in so-
cial programs. Reagan’s conservative orientation was also apparent in the passage of 
the 1982 Job Training Partnership Act that replaced Nixon’s CETA, which had been 
based more on public jobs. The funds had been slashed and the new program pro-
vided neither training nor daycare. It only placed unemployed people in new jobs, 
thus making the program useless for many women and low-income people who had 
insufficient job qualifications.65 In 1983, with the support of a bipartisan commission, 
Reagan weakened Social Security by amending it to increase the retirement age, 
some benefits were reduced, and the pensions of high-income retirees were subjected 
to taxes. 66  
The development of social policies has been particularly constrained by the en-
actment of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985. Despite the act not pertaining to social policy per se, it is relevant 
here because it greatly influenced spending on social programs and placed con-
straints on the budgeting of new policies. The Supreme Court declared the act un-
constitutional, because it did not respect the separation of powers, but it was passed 
again in 1987 with modifications regarding its enforcement. Gramm-Rudman-
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Hollings II maintained the sequester (across-the-board spending cuts if the deficit 
control targets were not met) for an equal share of domestic and military programs. 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings II allowed for extended presidential discretion regarding 
exemptions of cuts for the military.67 This was not applied to cuts in social programs. 
Thus the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act left social policies vulnerable to spending 
restraints. Political scientist Kenneth A. Shepsle speaks of the “fiscalization of Ameri-
can politics,”68 which means that concerns over the deficit, which were shared by 
both parties, came to the forefront. These concerns, in turn, have been used to argue 
for cuts in social policies. The argument of the deficit should be primarily seen as a 
tool that can be used in the debate about the role of government, social policies, and 
taxation. As a general tendency, Republicans used the deficit rather as a constraining 
factor against Democratic projects to expand social policies. Democrats, on the other 
hand, have even used the deficit to argue in favor of social policy reform, as it was the 
case for Obama and the health care reform.69 
The amount of general revenues, and thus the funds available for social policies, 
were further decreased by the 1986 Tax Reform. It is a somewhat mixed legislation. 
The aim of the reform, according to the Joint Committee on Taxation, was to create a 
simpler, less intrusive, and fairer tax system, especially regarding tax shelters and 
discrepancies between the taxation rates for high and low incomes, higher incomes 
being taxed at lower rates. Moreover, the act aimed at removing 6 million low-income 
taxpayers from the rolls and at providing a “significant reduction in the tax burden of 
other working low-income individuals.”70 This allowed for a somewhat fairer distri-
bution of the tax burden, but it did not increase the overall revenue.  
Despite Reagan considering poverty and need as being a primarily private and 
personal matter, the Democratic Congress pushed him in 1987 to sign the Homeless 
Assistance Act that provided emergency shelter, transitional as well as some perma-
nent housing, job training, primary health care, and education to the homeless.71 
However, the more conservative atmosphere that dominated during the Reagan years 
became apparent in the 1988 Family Support Act. Political scientists Irene Lurie and 
Mary Sangar saw this act as a change in the relationship between people dependent 
on welfare and the state because the act so heavily insisted on requirements of self-
sufficiency.72 This, however, was not a solely Republican achievement. Political scien-
tist Erica B. Baum, who was hired in 1986 by Senator Moynihan to work on the Fami-
ly Support Act, explains that this legislation was designed with the unsatisfying re-
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sults of previous programs in mind, which were criticized because poverty persisted. 
The greater focus on social policy achieving independence and self-reliance was a 
bipartisan goal. Congress managed to defeat the extremely harsh “workfare” pro-
posals that Reagan had made and that would have required welfare recipients to 
work in exchange for their benefits.73 Despite Reagan’s scalding rhetoric attacking big 
government and welfare, it is interesting to see how much of the welfare state sur-
vived, notably because Congress opposed some of the most severe measures. 
The election of George H. W. Bush in 1988 did not change the attitude regarding 
social policy. His famous promise made during his acceptance speech at the Republi-
can National Convention was: “Read my lips: no new taxes.” Bush continued high 
military spending, thus adding to the deficit. The deficit in turn was used by Republi-
cans to argue against increased spending for social programs. Existing social pro-
grams were maintained, but there was no additional funding. However, Democrats 
managed to make some gains because they controlled both houses of Congress. Dur-
ing the discussion of the budget in 1990, Bush even had to break his nomination 
pledge and accept some new taxes74 through the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act. Be-
sides raising taxes, this Act also created the PAYGO system (Pay As You GO), which 
stipulates that any increase in spending cannot be financed through borrowing, but 
must be financed through either tax increases or spending reductions elsewhere.75  
The year 1990 also saw the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) and the Child Care and Development Block Grant program that provided 
child care subsidies for low-income families. ADA protects people with disabilities 
against discrimination, it functions basically as an extension of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, but the act also requires employers to provide adapted accommodation and it 
requires that public spaces be accessible to people with disabilities. The 1991 Civil 
Rights Act modified the 1964 Civil Rights Act: in cases of discrimination lawsuits, trial 
by jury came to replace trial by court. Moreover, the equitable compensation of Title 
VII (such as back pay, reinstatement) was replaced by the possibility to sue for com-
pensatory and punitive damages for emotional distress, even if it was for limited 
amounts.76 
Only the first year of the Clinton administration yielded positive outcomes re-
garding social policy, the subsequent period being rather the fulfillment of a Repub-
lican agenda by a Democratic President. This was due to the fact that President Wil-
liam J. Clinton tried to combine conservative and liberal ideas in his New Democratic 
approach by walking a thin line between cutting the deficit while making positive 
social reform at the same time. This plan, however, backfired. To realize this New 
Democratic plan Clinton started his presidency by announcing a tax increase and 
spending cuts. He also set immediately to the task of devising health care reform.77  
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Among the two major achievements of his first year in terms of social policy are 
the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 which provided scarce, but unprecedented, 
leave. Employees in companies with 50 employees or more having worked one year 
full time for their employer would now be entitled to 12 weeks of unpaid leave with 
the guarantee of getting their job back while keeping the benefits of their group 
health insurance coverage. The leave applied for maternity, illness, and taking care of 
a sick relative. Special provisions were devised for military caregivers if one of their 
next of kin was seriously injured during service, in which case the leave would be 
extended to 26 weeks.  
Clinton’s more liberal stance showed in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1993. This budget was very different from the choices made in 1981, as it increased 
taxes for the rich and corporations and it extended the Earned Income Tax Credits 
for incomes under $30,000. Despite his campaign promises, Clinton did not include 
tax cuts for the middle class, fearing that this would increase the deficit. Moreover, 
his investments plans for education, technology, and infrastructure, included in the 
bill, were hollowed out by Congress. Moreover, it renewed the PAYGO rules of the 
1990 Budget Act.78 The last truly progressive legislation under the Clinton administra-
tion was the 1994 Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE), which granted pro-
tection to people seeking or providing abortions.  
Despite the fact that crime legislation is not primarily a social policy, it has its 
place here, because of the social and economic impact of a prison sentence on the life 
of an individual. Prior convictions make it more difficult to find a job, when serving a 
sentence an individual cannot provide for their family, and a felony offense is ac-
companied by a loss of certain citizen rights, such as the right to vote. The 1994 Vio-
lent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (or Crime Bill) combined a rather con-
servative tough stance on crime with some more progressive notions. It significantly 
increased police forces and augmented the budget for prisons, but it also provided 
significant funds for prevention programs. It issued bans on some types of assault 
weapons, but also extended the death penalty and led to heavier and longer sentenc-
es, notably for juveniles and especially for gang-related crimes. It also enacted stricter 
regulations for sex offenders, such as the obligation to register. It also created the 
now infamous “Three Strikes” rule, i.e. mandatory life imprisonment without possi-
bility of parole for any third conviction of serious felonies or drug trafficking crimes.79 
The provisions relating to gang crimes and drugs had a particularly great impact on 
the incarceration rates of minorities.80 
Republicans gained the control of both houses of Congress after the 1994 mid-
term elections and enacted the very conservative Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1995. 
The act sought to terminate the entitlement status of AFDC, Medicaid, and Food 
Stamps, all programs that benefited the poor and a large share of minorities. Clinton 
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vetoed the bill and stood up against Congress in his defense of Medicare and Medi-
caid spending and his opposition to other cuts requested by the Republican majority 
in the House of Representatives. The disagreement over the cuts in domestic pro-
grams between Clinton and Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich led to a government 
shutdown, which Clinton eventually won thanks to his continuous defense of Medi-
care. 
However, during the 1996 presidential campaign, Republicans managed to pres-
sure Clinton into signing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Act 
(PRWOA), a deeply conservative welfare reform. It notably terminated AFDC and 
turned it into TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families). Benefits would now 
be limited to 5 years over a lifetime, with strong work incentives. States would be free 
to replace cash assistance with in-kind benefits and to restrict help to teen parents. 
Moreover, great discretion was given to local administrations in deciding whom to 
cut off the welfare rolls.81 
The election of George W. Bush in 2000 reversed the approach on tax, but only 
partially modified the trend in social policy. 2001 witnessed a $1.3 trillion tax cut for 
the affluent, thus crippling the budget and reducing the pool of available funds for 
domestic programs. The same year, the Bush administration enacted the education 
reform No Child Left Behind, which introduced much criticized standardized testing. 
The criticism also targeted other central features of the reform, among them under-
funding, the low implementation of the standards, the heavy and constraining ac-
countability provisions, and the low follow up on requests for students’ transfers. 
Moreover, the reform failed regarding its major goal: the closing of the achievement 
gap for different racial and income groups.82 
2.2. Health Care Reform in Perspective—a Recurrent 
Failure 
Obama’s health care reform, which was enacted in 2010, is composed of two sets 
of legislation: the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care 
and Education Reconciliation Act. Obama’s signature legislation was achieved after 
almost one century of failed attempts to enact comprehensive health care policy in 
the United States. 
Obamacare built on the existing health system, creating a mixed market-based 
system with some government intervention. Universal coverage is based on three 
pillars: an employer mandate that compels businesses to offer health care to their 
employees, an individual mandate that compels every person to carry health insur-
ance, and an extension of Medicaid, the government health insurance program for 
the poor (just as before, Medicare covers people over age 65).  
Obamacare also sought to address the increasingly pressing problem of health 
care costs, for which the ACA established a series of cost-containment measures. The 
ACA particularly focused on the increasing health insurance costs. Thus the Act reg-
ulates health insurance policies and defines the type of benefits that an insurance 
policy must cover. To make insurance more affordable for Americans, the govern-
ment heavily subsidized insurance purchase. For people purchasing their insurance 
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on the marketplace through the health exchanges, the government provides tax cred-
its based on their income level to help meet the insurance costs. The specific prob-
lems faced by the black population are targeted through policy efforts aimed at spe-
cific health issues that predominate in the black population.83 However, the ACA was 
enacted after almost one century of failed attempts at establishing comprehensive 
health care in the US. 
2.2.1.  “I Think the Other One Is What’s Got Sex Appeal:”84 
Attempts at Health Care Reform 
The US is often described as the exception in matters of health care in the 
Western world, because of its lateness in establishing governmental health care and 
the inefficiency of its system. Yet, at the turn of the 20th century, the US was not ini-
tially lagging behind other industrialized countries regarding health insurance. Ger-
many had passed pioneering health legislation in 1883, and both the US and the UK 
were contemplating more social policies in the 1910s. In Washington the idea of na-
tional health insurance made some headway but failed by 1920.85 
The European model clearly inspired the US in envisaging comprehensive so-
cial policies, but all those European states had strong governments to take action in 
those matters. In the United States, however, the Progressive Era of the 1910s must be 
understood in relation to its “19th century patronage democracy”: local systems dis-
bursed social benefits to expand and maintain their constituencies, hence social ben-
efits were associated with corruption, especially through veterans’ pensions. The sys-
tem covered many more people than there were actual veterans: about 1/3 of the 
native-born men in the North received a pension. There was a willingness to rework 
this system into universal coverage for old age and disability but attempts by the Wil-
son administration to expand social policies were hampered by this association of 
social benefits with political corruption.86 
Shortly after the 1912 elections, in which Theodore Roosevelt ran on a platform 
including health insurance, health care legislation was promoted by a group of aca-
demics and the American Association for Labor Legislation. Although their proposal 
was rather conservative and would only have covered workers (domestic and casual 
workers excluded),87 their proposal was strongly opposed by labor unions because of 
their strong distrust of government, but even more because unions provided this type 
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of benefits for their members and feared the competition.88 Insurers opposed the 
proposal as well because they viewed it as a government assault on private enterprise. 
After World War I, opposition to health legislation grew stronger, because it had its 
origins in the much-hated German nation.89 
Although there were advocates of universal health coverage prior to World War 
I, strong opposition developed as well. Because of the medical progress made during 
the 1920s, opposition to compulsory insurance emerged. Opponents such as the 
American Medical Association (AMA) feared that the government would set limits 
and issue regulations that would hamper their opportunity of making greater bene-
fits from health, especially from middle-class patients who were attracted by medical 
progress.90 During the New Deal, President Roosevelt showed great interest in estab-
lishing health insurance but “political realities”, namely opposition, prevented it.91 
This opposition comprised Republicans and Southern Democrats with the support of 
lobbies like the AMA.  
Truman introduced health care reform twice, in 1945 and 1949, and was defeated 
both times. Although the New Deal had been under attack right from the beginning, 
Truman remained openly very supportive of the welfare state principle and the New 
Deal. Just like Roosevelt’s plan, Truman’s attempts to establish national health care 
were attacked as socialism.92 The Truman health program planned for national 
health coverage that would have been run and funded by government.93 But out of 
respect for the value of freedom, the program would have been optional. Political 
scientist Gerard Boychuck argues that the battle about health care reform was deeply 
racialized. Southern states and the white American Medical Association opposed 
national health insurance; the NAACP and the black National Medical Association 
supported it. The opposition was drawn along racial lines, but also along segregation-
ist/integrationist lines. The language of the opposition was interestingly the same 
regarding Civil Rights and health insurance. Denunciations of “socialized medicine” 
and “federalized medicine” pointed out a lack of possibility for the patient in choos-
ing their doctor and vice-versa. This clearly implied the perception of a threat to seg-
regationist practices. It is actually an exaggeration to say that the South opposed 
health insurance, as the states were in favor of it, but only if designed on the model of 
Social Security. Yet, Truman was not willing to do that, nor was he willing to com-
promise on the administration system that would have left the program administra-
tion to the states with discretion to discriminate. The only health-related legislation 
that passed during this period was the 1946 Hall-Burton Act, for the funding of hospi-
tal construction. The Act did not require states to participate and allowed for a sepa-
rate-but-equal provision. Boychuck has argued that “Hill-Burton could be seen as a 
compromise that allowed for federal aid in the provision of health services while 
forestalling incursions into areas deemed to be matters of “states’ rights” that might 
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challenge the racial status quo.” In the same period, the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill 
failed. It would have provided for health insurance prepaid through tax rolls, but it 
would have been managed by federal administration.94 
The next great attempt at achieving major social reform came in the 1960s with 
the election of John F. Kennedy. A new window of opportunity for reform opened, as 
it had for FDR.95 Kennedy faced the choice of moving toward the center and dimin-
ishing possible resistance from conservatives and big business, or of making a bolder 
move on the left. Even more so than FDR had done, Kennedy chose to show himself 
“extremely conciliatory with the economy.” Kennedy chose a more conservative ap-
proach, dropping the reform of the tax code and abandoning plans to increase social 
spending by 1962, and opted for tax cuts to stimulate the economy. The Kennedy ad-
ministration adopted the domestic policy agenda already established by Congres-
sional Democrats, which featured health care for the aged and the poor. But when 
conservatives blocked the proposals, Kennedy, who was “put off by the need to court 
congressional leaders in order to pass domestic legislation,” simply focused his atten-
tion on other issues.96 
Finally it was President Lyndon B. Johnson’s commitment to social issues and 
his ability to use political momentum that allowed him to push for health care legis-
lation. It must be noted that Johnson did more than just enacting Kennedy’s projects: 
he redefined the proposals and pushed for more ambitious legislation.97  
Johnson faced mixed conditions for enacting legislation. The economy was 
booming, hence it was difficult for conservatives to mobilize business opposition; 
quite on the contrary, business was rather supportive of new social policies.98 But 
Unions, Southern Democrats, and Federalism took their toll on the new health care 
system. 
One of the most American features in the battle for social policies is the role 
played by unions. In Europe, unions and working class alliances were among the 
driving forces for the expansion of social policies. In the United States, on the contra-
ry, unions were initially among the forces hampering the expansion of the welfare 
state. The situation was quite complex because unions supported liberal political coa-
litions, but only for propositions that were feasible in the short term and of immedi-
ate interest to organized workers. They often opposed greater expansions of social pol-
icies, because the working class and the unions were greatly weakened by racial 
divisions. Their refusal to integrate minorities prevented them from developing their 
base and also made them more reluctant to support social policies that would have 
benefited all workers, including blacks. Moreover, they felt that their privileges were 
threatened through social policies, and additionally were particularly wary of work-
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training programs that would increase competition.99 In short, racial divisions among 
the American working class prevented them from supporting meaningful universal 
social reform, ultimately leading to very narrowly tailored programs, especially for 
the health care of the poor. 
The New Deal had set the precedent for a “two-track system” through Social Se-
curity and public assistance targeting only the elderly and the very poor.100 This way 
of proceeding left out any universalist approach, and subsequently made it more dif-
ficult to argue for universal programs. It should come as no surprise that the 1965 
health care legislation, envisaged as a temporary step toward universal coverage, 
should have matched the system set by the New Deal: Medicaid for the poor and 
Medicare for the elderly. Although the Medicare proposal received broad public 
support, the Medicaid part of the legislation was designed secretly by Johnson and 
Wilbur Mills, then Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee (the main 
committee with jurisdiction over health issues). The final proposal came as a surprise 
to Congress and Johnson’s role in it has long been downplayed, although, according 
to Mills, Johnson’s involvement was crucial in achieving the legislation.101 During the 
legislative process, only Medicare was promoted, despite the program being opposed 
by the AMA and the insurance industry.102 Nonetheless, Johnson was convinced of 
the greater political potential of Medicare. In a phone conversation with Mills, John-
son said: “I think the other one [Medicare] is what’s got sex appeal.” He then contin-
ued, based on his experience regarding Republicans’ attitude about Social Security: 
“they [the Republicans] won’t always be against the other [Medicare] either if you 
ever give them a taste of it, I tell you this.”103 
But just like FDR and Truman, Johnson had to deal with the South. The 1954 
Brown decision104 and the Civil Rights legislation, however, had changed the situa-
tion. Although Southern states were still wary of federal intrusion, they now feared 
even more being forced to desegregate through Supreme Court orders. With Medi-
care, they would also have to desegregate their hospitals, but at least they would get 
the federal money associated with the Medicare program. During a Senate Finance 
Committee hearing on Medicare, Senator Harry Byrd asked if Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination in programs and activities receiving fed-
eral assistance,105 would apply to Medicare and he got an unequivocal confirmation 
from the White House. This triggered initial resistance from the South. With Medi-
care only applying to the elderly, a deal was found: there would be two different ad-
ministration systems. Following the example laid by the New Deal of a two-tiered 
system, the new health legislation was also designed as a two-tiered program: Medi-
care, the program for the elderly that benefited from political clout and public opin-
ion support, would be a non-discriminatory, federally administered, program fi-
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nanced through payroll taxes. The hastily added and less popular Medicaid program 
for the poor would be administered at the state level and financed through match-
grants (in which federal grants match state expenses).106 This allowed assuaging the 
South: by having discretion over spending for the poor, the states were able to main-
tain their largely black workforce in poverty and hence to keep a malleable workforce 
that would not threaten the region’s social and political hierarchy. 
Johnson managed to create a first public health care system in 1965 by adding 
Title XX in the amendments to the 1935 Social Security Act. Medicare, the health pro-
gram for the elderly, is based on an insurance concept, notably to avoid any associa-
tion with “socialism.” It is partly financed through employer and employee payroll 
taxes. But even though it is not exclusively contributory, people associate Medicare 
with an earned right.107 In fact, only Medicare Part A covering hospital and limited 
nursing home care is funded by payroll taxes. Part B is funded by general revenues 
and beneficiary co-payments and covers physician fees and other services. Part B was 
made optional under pressure from Republicans and the AMA. They also obtained 
the dropping of any cost-control measure, which led to inflating health costs.108 Ac-
cording to political scientist James Morone and health care expert David Blumenthal, 
the issue of segregation shortly jeopardized the implementation of Medicare. Title VI 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act forbids discrimination of any kind for programs that re-
ceive federal assistance. This meant that hospitals receiving Medicare payments 
could not segregate. Towards the end of 1967, all but a dozen hospitals in the South 
had implemented desegregation rather than losing Medicare funds. President John-
son’s plan of using Medicare as a means for achieving social change had worked.109  
Medicaid, on the other hand, which was hastily added as Title XIX to the Social 
Security Act, was constructed as “a conservative, sparse, uneven, and stigmatized 
program.” It is based on a means test and funded “only by dint of national and state 
officials’ annual good will.”110 It has to be highlighted that Medicare is centralized, 
whereas the funding and administration of Medicaid is split between the federal gov-
ernment and the states. In this sense Medicaid happily combined demands of South-
ern Democrats with American federalism: the political system was used to satisfy the 
need of racial conservatives to maintain their black population in poverty by leaving 
to the states the administration and regulation of programs destined to the poor. As a 
result of this joint administration the implementation of Medicaid took much longer. 
By 1969, Arizona and Alaska still had not adopted Medicaid. Moreover, already in 
1967, federal funding had been seriously capped: the federal government set the max-
imum eligibility levels that would receive federal funding. States were free to set 
higher levels, but none did.111 
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Thus health legislation as enacted by the Johnson administration was shaped by 
a very “American” political context that differed greatly from the situations in Eu-
rope. Political traditions and a unique situation of racial division of the working class 
prevented the creation of a comprehensive health care system, leading to Johnson’s 
partial solution that proved quite lasting and resistant to reform. Indeed, the Johnson 
solution was flawed right from its inception and laid the foundations for future prob-
lems and inequalities. 
After Johnson managed to establish an emergency solution for health care, eve-
ry Democratic president (and even some Republicans) has tried to introduce more 
comprehensive health care. The Medicare reforms made by presidents Ronald 
Reagan and George W. Bush will not be discussed here, since they did not try to in-
troduce a reform to establish a comprehensive health insurance system. All the at-
tempts to create comprehensive systems failed for various reasons. 
Interestingly enough, Nixon has quite an impressive record on social policies, 
although he was very conservative. Regarding his record on health legislation, he 
enacted several smaller policies addressing specific health issues or populations. A 
major achievement was the 1970 OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Act) intro-
ducing new measures for industrial workers. But it must not be forgotten that Nixon 
was a conservative. For instance, he started to increase the de-centralization of social 
policies, giving ever more autonomy to the states and relied more on the use of pri-
vate markets than on government.112  
Nixon proposed a plan for comprehensive health care first in 1971, then again in 
1974. His reform plan was very market-oriented, built on the existing system, and 
charged the states with a role of regulatory standard setting instances. 113 Both of Nix-
on’s proposals failed although several health bills were discussed, but no consensus 
could be found. Everyone only supported their own bill, and ultimately they all failed 
for lack of support. Most notably, health care champion Senator Ted Kennedy 
worked against Nixon and was among those who introduced competing health care 
bills. He later admitted the error of not managing to achieve a compromise with Nix-
on.114 
One of Jimmy Carter’s campaign promises, when he ran for president in 1976, 
was to reform the health care system. According to political scientist Bruce Jansson, 
Carter’s health care reform plan failed for several reasons. First, Carter failed to build 
the usual alliances with support groups of the Democratic Party. Moreover, Carter 
showed a lack of motivation and was not interested in domestic politics. At a personal 
level he was not convinced about government intervention in health care issues, and 
favored “volunteerism and Christian noblesse oblige.”115 Although a Democratic pres-
ident, Carter’s ideological orientation was rather conservative. Carter’s plan had a 
dual approach: workers’ insurance financed through payroll taxes and government 
financed health care for non-workers. The same year, Senator Ted Kennedy pro-
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posed an entirely government-centered plan,116 thus moving to a system comparable 
with the European systems.117 However, adding to the problems previously men-
tioned, the double-digit inflation in 1979 made both propositions a no-go.118 
In 1983 Reagan managed to partially reform the health care system. The changes 
in Medicare concerned Part A and established diagnostic-related groups that estab-
lished national levels of reimbursement for specific diseases or treatments with no 
additional payments in case of complications. This means that hospitals and doctors 
have to treat a patient with a certain diagnosis within a certain pre-defined budget. 
Medicaid was also attacked on several fronts: the federal share of funding was re-
duced, state incentives to cut the number of enrollees were issued, and contracts were 
limited to the cheapest hospitals and clinics.119 However, attempts to turn Medicaid 
into block grants were defeated.120 
2.2.2. “It Is a Magic Moment, and We Must Seize It:”121  
The Clinton Health Care Debacle 
President Clinton’s health care reform attempt is essential to understand and in-
form Obamacare because this failure served as an example for Obama as for which 
mistakes to avoid. Moreover, many parallels exist between the two reforms, with one 
major outstanding difference: the Obama reform passed. 
Just as Obama, President Clinton made health care reform a central point of his 
presidential campaign right from the start and focused on ideas of universal coverage 
and cost containment. The latter was paramount, because it was part of his plan to 
spur the economy and tackle the deficit.122 
Many reasons are invoked for the failure of the Clinton reform plan in 1994. 
Some consider that Clinton overestimated his mandate for massive reform since he 
was elected with only 43% of the popular vote, a reality that was clouded by the 68.8% 
of electoral votes. 123 Others, like political scientists Kathleen Hall Jamieson or Law-
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rence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, blame negative advertising, like the infamous Har-
ry-and-Louise ads financed by the powerful HIAA (Health Insurance Association of 
America, AHIP since 2003), the unsettling of public opinion through the medias’ fo-
cus on conflict in Washington, and the priming about the negative aspects of the re-
form for the ultimate failure of the reform plan.124 Political scientists Mark D. Rushef-
sky and Kant Patel evoke different problems, such as the failure to convince critical 
voters in Congress, the nature of class relations in the US, or the power of interest 
groups, but eventually blame the failure on Clinton’s leadership style and on delays 
in introducing the reform in Congress.125 Historian Michael B. Katz does not exactly 
blame Clinton’s leadership style but considers his choice of creating reform through 
a task force to be a major “strategic error” that contributed to the fact that “[d]espite 
the early favorable signs, in less than a year Clinton’s proposal had died a public and 
ignominious death.”126  
Clinton’s choice to have the reform project developed by a task force of 630 peo-
ple under the direction of First Lady Hillary Clinton, assisted by Ira Magaziner, a 
business consultant from Rhode Island and former classmate of Clinton, was unprec-
edented. Political scientist and health policy specialist James Morone and health pol-
icy expert David Blumenthal explain that Clinton wanted to keep the health reform 
development “under his thumb.” Moreover, they point out that newly appointed 
Health and Human Services (HHS) secretary Donna Shalala had little experience in 
health care, her résumé encompassing mainly academia, most recently as chancellor 
of the University of Wisconsin, and thus HHS was easily dismissed in the develop-
ment of the health policy reform. But it was not only this strictly procedural aspect 
that posed a problem. Clinton’s task force developed a very detailed bill, thus very 
narrowly associating the health care reform with the presidential couple. This ap-
proach is the complete opposite of the one chosen by president Lyndon B. Johnson in 
1965 who insisted on Congress drafting the Medicare proposal (and hastily and dis-
creetly added Medicaid). LBJ insisted heavily on keeping his involvement secret and 
giving all the credit to Congressman Wilbur Mills.127 
According to Jacobs and Shapiro, the task force was supposed to deflect conflict-
ing opinions within the Democratic camp. Many contradictory ideas were advocated 
by the Democratic congresspeople: single payer, pure managed competition, and 
pay-or-play.128 The task force was supposed to build a Democratic consensus. Moreo-
ver, Clinton had run on a New Democratic agenda that emphasized the distance with 
the old liberal image of more government and “tax-and-spend” liberalism and had 
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put forward the New Democratic philosophy of incorporating the private sector, eco-
nomic competition and less government. The task force’s role was to give credibility 
to this ideological change and convince the public of the reinvention of government, 
to make the reform look apolitical, an objective choice, and not something designed 
by government. Clinton wanted “a competitive bill, not a regulatory bill.”129  
This strategy, however, backfired. The task force alienated Congress and con-
gressional staff: they felt excluded.130 And indeed, the task force can be seen as an 
overreach of executive power, the creation of legislation being the prerogative of 
Congress. Even today, some representatives, like Earl Pomeroy (D-ND 1993-2011), still 
see it as “Hillary’s reform.”131 The reform was dubbed Hillarycare to highlight the 
strong influence of the First Lady.  
The task force eventually chose the approach of managed competition, which 
Clinton sold as universal coverage to liberals and as cost containment to conserva-
tives.132 However, the ideological division was strong, and many in the Democratic 
camp were dissatisfied with this. Political scientist Paul Starr highlights this. Those 
who preferred an approach based on the Medicare model and even the significant 
minority who preferred single payer found this unacceptable. According to Starr, the 
constant infighting of the Democratic camp “helped mightily to confuse the public, 
slow the momentum of reform, and eventually kill it.“133 Jacobs and Shapiro also de-
fend this opinion. According to them, the press’s focus on political conflict, among 
Democrats and between Democrats and Republicans, combined with priming about 
the negative aspects of the reform and the focus on big government, led the public to 
reject the reform.134 Representative Pomeroy remembers in an interview the difficul-
ties of constituting a Democratic majority to back the Clinton reform:  
I was asked to be a co-sponsor on the Hillary Clinton bill, they were trying to get more 
co-sponsors for Hillary’s bill than single payer bill. As a former insurance commissioner, 
I mean, I was a very loyal young Democrat and I really didn’t know the politics of the 
place yet, but as a former insurance commissioner, I thought that the Hillary bill was not 
going to work, and so I didn’t support it. If I added my name as a co-sponsor, I know that 
I would have been defeated, my entire legislative career never would have happened. 
And there was some number of fairly innocent freshmen Democrats that found them-
selves in that circumstance.135 
These internal ideological conflicts and difficulties to convince representatives of 
their own camp resulted in turning the relatively comfortable Democratic majority of 
258 seats into a fragile one, and even, eventually, contributed to the defeat of the re-
form. Starr puts this reform killing through ideological squabbling into perspective. 
According to him, the immediate urgency of health care reform had faded because of 
the easing of the economic situation: unemployment was down, so people feared less 
about losing their jobs and their health care, and even for businesses health care costs 
were less of a problem because inflation had come more under control.136 Thus pure-
ly ideological issues managed to gain prominence and increased the stakes for Dem-
ocrats. Pomeroy highlights that his refusal to become a co-sponsor was greatly moti-
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vated by fears of a defeat in the next election. Despite the rather comfortable margins 
in the House (258 seats, 218 needed for a simple majority), Democrats did not manage 
to achieve a majority to get the bill through the House, and the Senate, with the up-
coming mid-term elections, let the bill die even before voting on it.137  
Moreover, in the Senate, Democrats only had 57 seats, which certainly guaran-
teed them a simple majority of 51, but the use and abuse of filibuster had long shifted 
the simple majority to 60. Clinton and the Task Force considered using the budget 
reconciliation process to force the health care legislation through, thus bringing 
down the required majority to 51. However, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) who was 
chairman of the powerful Appropriations Committee rejected this and claimed it 
would not be a proper use of the budget reconciliation process and would constitute 
an abuse of the Senate rules. He argued that an important bill such as health care 
should be considered on its own merits. However, there was also the additional prob-
lem that the President did not have a budget bill yet to which to attach the reform 
bill.138 
The threat and pressure of reelection on such a highly sensitive and ideological-
minefield issue as health care reform must not be underestimated. Twenty-eight 
Democratic representatives came from split districts in the South that had voted for 
the Republican candidate in 1992,139 which made it clear that there was a strong con-
servative tendency in their constituencies. However, political orientations in the dis-
trict can be deflected by the personality and the voters’ closeness to the representa-
tive, but the initial orientation can turn against the representative once highly 
ideologically polarized issues, such as health care reform, are at stake.  
The second factor, besides the ideological division among Democrats, which 
contributed to the killing of the reform, was its incredible complexity. Representative 
Pomeroy highlights this aspect, especially regarding the public’s ability to understand 
and support the reform proposal:  
Again, remember, it comes down to this, and it’s Kaiser polling, and it’s also, by the way, 
similar to polling I did back in 1993 and 4 with Hillary Clinton. 70% of the people have 
coverage, 70%140 of those like their coverage, and so you cannot move a system off of 
something that the public likes to something it doesn’t know, or doesn’t understand. The 
business of health care coverage relates to the core sense of security in a family. And so, 
the adults in a family will value and vote on their levels of confidence about the health 
policy being debated. 141  
The complexity of the text even bewildered supporters and left them uncertain.142 
And of course, this political weakness was exploited by the opposition, be it Republi-
cans or health care interests. The bill was 1,342 pages long, an its sheer size was often 
put forward to show how complicated it was as demonstrated by a September 1993 
article published in the Washington Post presenting the bill as “the two-inch-thick 
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draft document.”143 This was because Clinton tried to please everybody and tried to 
build on the existing system. But instead of being hailed for its moderate centrist ap-
proach, the reform was decried as bureaucratic. 
Clinton’s failure was not complete since, in 1996, he signed the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act into law, which amended the 1974 ERISA. It made 
the portability of employer health insurance provided through group plans easier 
and set some limitations on preexisting conditions exclusion, such as a limitation of 
the period for which this exclusion could last. It also prohibited group health plans 
from considering pregnancies as preexisting conditions.144 
The Clinton presidency witnessed some other changes in the health care sys-
tem. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 saw the creation of SCHIP (State Children 
Health Insurance Program) that made health care insurance available to low-income 
children from families with incomes up to 200%FPL, but Republicans still managed 
to obtain cuts in discretionary spending for domestic programs. Moreover, Republi-
cans managed to create a conservative reform in Medicare: Part C now provided the 
same benefits as Part A and B, but through subsidized private insurance plans instead 
of public plans. 145 
It was George W. Bush who managed to further reform Medicare. The 2003 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act moved ever more Med-
icare beneficiaries onto the private insurance market. It also introduced Medicare 
Part D, which covers prescription drugs on a subsidized and voluntary basis.146 How-
ever, these government subsidized private plans were yet another means for private 
companies to get more money out of the government: on average those plans cost 
$1,000 more per person per annum than a classical Medicare coverage plan.147 
2.2.3. The “Cheerleader-in-Chief:” Obama’s Role in the 
Reform 
As Lowi has highlighted it in his policy analysis, redistributive policies need 
strong presidential intervention in order to pass. Hence the role played by Obama in 
pushing the reform through Congress deserves a close look. In many respects Obama 
faced a similar situation to Clinton’s. Overall, public opinion was in favor of health 
care reform, the health care insurance system had become an even more problematic 
and dramatic problem for the middle class. The overall rates of people without health 
care insurance had increased between 1993 and 2009, but the increase was particular-
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ly sharp for the middle class. The rates almost doubled for people with incomes be-
tween $50,000 and $74,999. 148  
The ACA strongly focuses on the lower middle class. This takes two elements 
into account. The first is the risk of opponents playing on intergroup competition 
between the white middle and working class and minorities, as it was the case for the 
Clinton reform to a certain extent. The second element is that, by 2009, health care 
had indeed become a more rapidly increasing problem for people with incomes be-
tween $25,000 and $75,000 than for other income groups. The ACA provides subsi-
dies to purchase health care insurance for people with incomes between 133% and 
400% FPL (in 2010, 400% FPL represented an income of $43,330 for one person). 
About 31.2% of the American population qualifies for these subsidies. 
Another similarity with the Clinton reform plan is that the focus has not 
changed: universal access to health insurance and cost-containment primed. These 
were the major tenets Obama put forward when he exposed his health care plan to a 
2009 Joint Session of Congress on Health Care:  
The plan I'm announcing tonight would meet three basic goals. It will provide more se-
curity and stability to those who have health insurance. It will provide insurance for 
those who don't. And it will slow the growth of health care costs for our families, our 
businesses, and our government.149  
However, Obama was more outspokenly in favor of redistribution and more 
readily claimed government responsibility in providing equality of opportunity than 
Clinton did. 
Another major point of difference for Obama was that the country (and the rest 
of the world) had suffered a huge financial crisis and the Great Recession had started. 
Because of this economic crisis, the Obama administration could expect, contrary to 
the Clinton administration, that congressional Democrats and the population would 
not lose interest in health care reform. 
The Obama administration clearly tried to avoid some of the most obvious mis-
takes of the Clinton reform attempt. Democratic Representative Bruce Braley (1st con-
gressional district of Iowa 2007-2015) said in an interview that the Clinton failure was 
a warning to them: 
Well, I mean I think everybody knew, based on that experience [the Clinton failure] that 
this was going to be a very difficult challenge even with the Democratic president and 
majorities in the House and the Senate; and that we were going to work hard, stay fo-
cused, keep our eye on the big prize and realize that perfection was probably not going to 
be achieved and we needed to work aggressively to push for the things that were im-
portant to us and the American people and try to get the bill done. And I think that was 
something that was clearly part of our efforts throughout the whole process.150 
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Among the most noticeable features was the fact that the Obama administration 
was warned about the tactics of the health care interests that so massively contribut-
ed to turning public opinion against the Clinton reform project. In order to avoid 
their reform project being undermined by a similar strategy such as the hostile Har-
ry-and-Louise advertisement campaign, the Obama administration invited the health 
care interests to the negotiation table. This new strategy made health care veteran 
Senator Kennedy very confident about success, prophesizing after a big health care 
summit with the health care interests at the White House on March 3, 2009 that “this 
time we will not fail.”151  
Political scientists Theda Skocpol and Lawrence Jacobs stress the need to play 
with interest groups as they are better organized and have more political clout and 
especially more financial means than the public most concerned by health reform 
(everyone down from the middle class). The powerful and notoriously and historical-
ly anti-reform AMA was mollified by the prospect of new customers, who were esti-
mated at that moment at about 32 million people. The same applied to the AHA 
(American Hospital Association). PhRMA (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufac-
turers of America) agreed to slightly lower their drug prices and to pay fees for the 
same prospect of new customers and the “filling [of] the doughnut hole”—the gap in 
coverage for prescription drugs—in Medicare through more subsidies. However, to 
seal the deal, they also required that they would be guaranteed no competition from 
generic drug makers and they obtained a ban on the importation of cheaper drugs 
from other countries. These last two points were contrary to campaign promises, yet 
this secured big PhRMA’s cooperation and their throwing in of massive funds for 
pro-reform ads. AHIP (America’s Health Insurance Plans, formerly HIAA) pressured 
for the rejection of the public option152 and obtained four dozen amendments favor-
ing insurance companies and were, of course, also speculating on future gains 
through new customers. The individual mandate—meaning the legal obligation to 
contract a health care insurance—was a guarantee in that sense for AHIP. This part 
of the reform regulations was very welcome and sharply contrasted with insurers’ 
accusations of government takeover of health care. Eventually AHIP betrayed the 
Obama administration because they were upset about the weakening of the penalties 
in case of non-compliance with the individual mandate Republicans had required. 
AHIP feared that because of the lower penalties they would reach only 94% (!) of the 
potential customers. AHIP’s open revolt was, ironically enough, actually against “too 
little government.”153 Although AHIP’s CEO Karen Ignagni initially voiced support 
for the health care reform, AHIP secretly funneled millions to the Chamber of Com-
merce to help them to try to kill the reform.154 
According to Skocpol and Jacobs, Obama was widely criticized on all fronts for 
not taking a clearer position on the precise features of the health care reform. They 
explain that this was done on purpose in order to avoid Clinton’s error with the task 
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force,155 which had proven to be a major liability. Representative Pomeroy, who 
worked on the reform as member of the Ways and Means Committee, in particular 
stressed the wish to avoid making the same mistake: 
Well, it [the Clinton failure] wasn’t on my mind particularly, but it was, I think, on the 
minds in terms of how this was structured. That one was built in the White House, in a 
fairly non-transparent way and brought up to Congress where it had a very low prospect 
of being politically accepted. So this time, they were going to send it to Congress. 
Obama carefully and deliberately went back to the traditional distribution of roles 
and separation of powers. The president set the guidelines and let Congress flesh out 
the reform. But despite clearly attributing the reform process to Congress, some 
Democrats felt that the process was not transparent enough and that, because of time 
pressure (the Clinton reform attempt had been criticized because of the protracted 
process), there had not been sufficient discussion about the content of the reform. 
Representative Pomeroy expressed this opinion: 
But on the other hand, it was still a fairly non-transparent and non-inclusive process. To 
my frustration, as a former insurance commissioner, sitting on the health subcommittee 
of the Ways and Means Committee, I could not have been better prepared or better 
placed from a point of jurisdiction to weigh in on the substance of the bill. I didn’t even 
dent the bill. It was cooked by staff and the chairman… I believe throughout, starting 
with the President and certainly running through congressional leadership, there was a 
deep philosophical commitment to do health reform. There was not a deep understand-
ing of the technical… of the technical challenge of that task. That was basically assigned 
to smart staff, heavily influenced by some smart think tanks. When it came to the mem-
bers actually wrestling with the substance of the bill in meetings, in endless meetings 
that we had about the bill, us Democratic members of the Ways and Means Committee, I 
felt like the role of Chairman Rangel and the role of the other chairmen in the other 
committees with jurisdiction although I wasn’t part of those discussions, were simply to 
protect the staff product at all cost.156 
Pomeroy seemed to resent the fact that this process did not take the prospects of 
reelection sufficiently into account. Moreover, in addition to the process regarding 
the crafting of the bill, Pomeroy also strongly resented the manner in which the bill 
had to be passed after the Democrats lost Senator Kennedy. The fact that Pomeroy 
lost his seat because of his vote on the health care reform certainly contributes to this 
perception. Bart Gordon, Representative for Tennessee’s 6th district from 1985 to 2011, 
who also lost his seat, expressed similar thoughts: 
It [my participation] was more overall. I mean, you have to keep in mind, this was just 
literally a few weeks after the Democrats got the majority, there really hadn’t been many 
hearings on it, so it was more of a top-down driven effort by those folks that had been 
working on it in the years past. […] I think that Henry Waxman and some of his health 
care staff, as well as White House, they were the primary architects early on. […] I think 
that it would have been better if we had had more hearings and had more overall infor-
mation. That being said, if it had occurred, it would also have given time to the opposi-
tion to make out more of a defense and maybe nothing should have gotten done. So 
that’s, you know, that is a question I’m not sure has an answer.157 
Others expressed diverging views when asked about the exchanges between the 
legislative and the executive over the health care bill. Representative Tierney said 
that the White House was “tremendously engaged” in the reform process and that a 
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lot of work was done between the teams of House and the White House.158 Repre-
sentative Braley also described a close collaboration to establish a common frame 
and a common understanding of what the reform ought to be, but he insisted on the 
elaboration taking place in Congress: 
I’m sure that the leadership and the committees worked closely with the White House in 
putting together legislation that was compatible with the White House’s views of what 
needed to be in a comprehensive bill, but a lot of the fine-tuning and the hard hammer-
out compromise among Democrats, I might add, came about through the legislative pro-
cess, which the White House was following very closely and constantly providing feed-
back to those who were moving the legislation, but the process itself was very much 
driven by Congress.159 
Representative Andrews took great pains to highlight the separation of powers 
and make it clear that the reform was made by Congress: 
Yes, I wouldn’t use the word directions. No, of course in our system, the White House, 
the executive branch has its stock in enforcement of the law, and Congress has its stock 
in writing the law, but I would say that it was a shared goal and that President Obama 
and the leadership of the Congress shared the cause of what I just talked about.160 
Of course, these contradictory accounts have their explanations. Pomeroy and 
Gordon were both Blue Dogs—conservative Democrats—and both lost their seats, 
which certainly influenced their opinion of not having had enough influence on the 
act that cost them their reelection. Moreover, Pomeroy, as a health insurance special-
ist, felt entitled to weigh in heavily on the language of the bill. Tierney and Braley lost 
their seats for other reasons and thus did not hold any grudge against the ACA in that 
respect. Andrews, on the other hand, was one of the chairpeople of the subcommittee 
on Health, Labor, Employment, and Pensions, and thus he was one of the main au-
thors of the bill. His Wikipedia page describes him as “one of the primary authors of 
the Affordable Care Act.”161 This pride in his participation in the creation of the ACA 
might explain his strong insistence on the low implication of the executive. 
Regarding public relations, Obama restrained himself to the part of the job be-
longing to the president: using Theodore Roosevelt’s famous bully-pulpit to push 
health care on the agenda, and later to defend the reform project. By doing so he 
overruled even some of his top advisors. White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel 
feared another Clinton-like debacle (he was Clinton’s advisor then) and wanted 
Obama to step back and instead go for a less ambitious health care agenda, such as an 
expansion of CHIP (Children’s Health Insurance Program) and a couple of new rules 
for the private insurance industry. (CHIP was enacted in 1997 under Clinton and is 
considered a consolation prize for his failed health care reform).  
Obama, however, maintained his wish for universal health care. He then acted 
as “cheerleader-in-chief” touring the country and holding town-hall meetings during 
2009 for the public relations campaign of health care reform.162 Skocpol and Jacobs 
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insist on this aspect and consider this as a crucial role in the moments when it 
seemed that the reform momentum would expire, for example in August 2009 when 
Congress’s summer recess led to the explosive anti-reform movement of the Tea Par-
ty.163 Political scientist Theodore Lowi highlights the central place of the role and in-
fluence of the president in redistributive policies, allowing for a greater presidential 
influence in this legislative area.164 The wide and heavy impact of redistributive poli-
cies on the lives of the population make public opinion crucial, and the president is in 
a good position to address and to influence public opinion.  
Obama urged the public to make their opinions heard and to voice their support 
for health care in order to push Congress to get to work on the health care reform: 
The American people, and the US economy, just can't wait that long. So, no matter 
which approach you favor, I believe the United States Congress owes the American peo-
ple a final vote on health care reform. […] I, therefore, ask leaders in both houses of Con-
gress to finish their work and schedule a vote in the next few weeks. From now until 
then, I will do everything in my power to make the case for reform. And I urge every 
American who wants this reform to make their voice heard as well—every family, every 
business, every patient, every doctor, every nurse, every physician’s assistant. Make your 
voice heard.165 
Obama even pleaded with Congress for a finalization of the reform in his 2010 
State of the Union Address: “Here's what I ask Congress, though: Don't walk away 
from reform. Not now. Not when we are so close. Let us find a way to come together 
and finish the job for the American people. (Applause.) Let's get it done. Let's get it 
done.”166 
However, Obama did not only influence public opinion, he also worked Con-
gress.167 In a 2016 interview, Obama recounts his perception of the final efforts on the 
health care reform, just after they had heard that a Republican had been elected in 
Massachusetts to replace health care champion Senator Kennedy, who died in 2009. 
Senator Kennedy’s death resulted in the Democrats losing their filibuster-proof ma-
jority in the Senate, which had resulted in despondency among Democrats:  
The truth is that once we knew that the Massachusetts election might be difficult, and 
that was probably a couple weeks ahead of time, then we started doing some contingen-
cy planning. That was something that I had to learn fairly early on in the process, alt-
hough we had learned it to some degree in the campaign: You have to have a plan B. You 
always have to be very quiet about your plan B, because you don’t want it to sabotage 
your plan A—and sometimes people are looking for an out and want plan B. But we had 
begun to look at what other paths might be possible, and this one presented itself. It still 
required really deft work by Nancy [Pelosi] and Harry [Reid] and our legislative teams, 
but we knew at that point that it was possible, and once we had that path, then it was re-
ally just a matter of working Congress.  
Obama and the leaders in the House and Senate had anticipated the legislative diffi-
culties of the loss of the filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and had found a legis-
lative strategy to circumvent this problem, the Budget Reconciliation Process.168 
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However, a change in legislative strategy required that Congresspeople be convinced 
to adopt the new strategy. Obama insisted on his role in gathering a sufficient Demo-
cratic majority in these decisive weeks after Kennedy’s death: 
It’s interesting, in 2011, when the left had really gotten irritated with me because of the 
budget negotiations, there was always this contrast between Obama and LBJ, who really 
worked Congress. But I tell you, those two weeks, that was full LBJ. I think [White House 
photographer] Pete Souza has a picture series of every meeting and phone call that I was 
making during the course of that, which is actually pretty fun to see. Basically, every day 
for the following two weeks, we were working Democrats, because at that point there 
was no prospect of us getting any Republicans. Although I devoted an enormous amount 
of time with Olympia Snowe, the one person who, to her credit, took a tough vote to get 
ACA out of committee before then deciding that she couldn’t support the broader ef-
fort.169 
Representative Gordon insisted on this role of the president working on Demo-
crats to get a simple majority out of the apparent comfortable majority. Gordon in-
sisted on the fact that despite the apparent majority the necessary votes were not easy 
to obtain, especially because representatives are very sensitive to the opinions of their 
voters. According to Gordon, Obama invested a lot of time and energy to get enough 
votes for the health care bill: 
It was very, very difficult. And the President has personally spent many hours with many 
of us trying to work through our problems, trying to convince us, and so it was… again, 
Democrats had those same majorities, but were not able to pass the climate bill. We’re 
not a parliamentary system, we’re becoming more of a parliamentary system, but partic-
ularly then we were not a parliamentary system and didn’t just look to the head of the 
party. They looked also at their constituents. [So huge work had to be done] to get 
enough, not everybody, but to get enough.170 
Representative Pomeroy spoke more in detail about the interactions with the 
President and how the latter convinced him to make the vote that would end Pome-
roy’s political career: 
But as I look back […]… you know I was basically forced to put my career on the line for 
this, I feel like it was well worthwhile. In a meeting I had at the Oval Office with the Pres-
ident shortly before the vote, I showed him poll numbers that showed that if I voted 
against, my prospects of reelection were about 60-40. If I voted for, my prospects of de-
feat were about 60-40. And I told him ultimately… he made still, even in the face of those 
numbers, he made some good arguments why I should vote for it, on political grounds. 
But there was no political case to be made, really, for voting for it. But it was policy 
grounds and a matter of conscience. So I told him I would vote for it on those… on that 
basis.171  
Pomeroy insisted on the fact that he voted for the bill based on the policy pro-
posal because he was convinced that it would be good for the country, and that he 
voted with the certainty that he would lose if he ran again. This also illustrates the 
influence of public opinion on the representatives, which is enhanced by the short 
terms representatives are serving. In a 2016 interview Obama said that given the diffi-
cult political context this was the kind of argument he made in most cases:  
I would say 80 percent [of the Democrats I convinced were a] moral case, because the 
numbers weren’t with us. Look, Scott Brown had just won, poll numbers were rotten, 
people were angry. The folks who I will always consider the real heroes of the ACA were 
the legislators, mostly younger and in swing districts, who had been from either the ’06 
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wave or the ’08 wave. They had tough races and were just a great bunch of guys. With 
them it was an entirely moral case: What’s the point of being here if not this? 
So they were saying, “I’d rather keep having a job,” and you were saying, “But think of 
the folks who are going to be helped.”172 
Obama made moral arguments to try to convince the elected officials to risk 
their career for this major piece of legislation. Bart Gordon was one of those Demo-
crats who needed to be worked on by Obama. In 2009, in one of the first votes on the 
reform bill, Gordon voted against it: “I voted… actually I was one of the critical votes. 
I was on the health subcommittee and so it was stuck, it couldn’t even get to the floor 
committee, and we spent a lot of time with the President talking, talking.”173 Gordon, 
who represented a rather conservative district in Tennessee, knew that public opin-
ion would not be in his favor is he supported the health care reform at that stage. 
However, given the moment of his career, he was willing to put an end to it after he 
voted for the health care bill. 
The passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act shows that the 
changes in leadership style were successful. However, not all changes in strategy 
were that fruitful. 
Just like Clinton, Obama wanted a reform that could achieve a broad consensus 
by merging ideas from across the ideological and political spectrum. In his 2009 Ad-
dress to a Joint Session of Congress to present the health care reform Obama de-
scribed the reform as follows: “And it's a plan that incorporates ideas from senators 
and congressmen, from Democrats and Republicans—and yes, from some of my op-
ponents in both the primary and general election.”174 
The Obama administration also very obviously integrated Republican ideas into 
their reform project. The individual mandate was a Republican idea that they had 
already advocated during the Clinton period and the 2010 reform was heavily built on 
that. Representative Pomeroy regretted the fact that they had not tried to integrate 
this during the Clinton attempt.175 Ironically, in the 2012 Sebelius lawsuit176 challenging 
the constitutionality of the ACA, it was, among other points like the Medicaid exten-
sion, the individual mandate that was attacked by Republicans. It is interesting to see 
that two of the points of the ACA that were supposed to please Republicans were lat-
er attacked. The challenging of the individual mandate shortly jeopardized the whole 
reform, because the system of less costly insurance only works if the whole popula-
tion, meaning also the younger and healthier population, pays into the health insur-
ance funds.  
The extension of Medicaid is less obviously a factor that is supposed to please 
Republicans. However, as the single payer plan had been discarded almost immedi-
ately because it is anathema to conservatives, another way had to be found to achieve 
universal coverage within a market-based system. Moreover, in order to avoid upset-
ting the population too much, the Obama administration wanted to build on the ex-
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isting system.177 The ACA sought to achieve universal coverage through three 
measures: an employer-mandate to secure employer-provided health insurance, the 
individual mandate for those who could not get health insurance through their em-
ployer and who could purchase subsidized health care plans through the health ex-
changes, and finally the Medicaid extension for the most fragile parts of the popula-
tion, the working poor, including able-bodied adults, up to 133% FPL.178 Despite the 
extension being fully federally funded until 2017, phasing down to 90% by 2020, the 
constitutionality of the mandatory extension was challenged and became optional. 
As of January 2017, 19 states still had not adopted the extension.179 This created a 
breach in the universal coverage that the ACA was supposed to provide.180  
All things considered, this overview of the overall development of social policies 
in the US may show the modification of programs over time, some of the attacks on 
the welfare state, and its increased privatization, but it does not explain why and how 
this happened. 
2.3. The Creation of “Welfare:” The Attack against So-
cial Policies 
2.3.1. Different Theories about the Decline of Social Poli-
cies 
The central question here is the reason why social policies came under attack—
more importantly, why did the population not ask for more equality in a time of ris-
ing inequalities? It must be noted, that while social policies were under attack, and 
this particularly harshly in discourse, many programs nonetheless expanded their 
spending, such as Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, because of an increase of 
the number of beneficiaries. In the case of Medicare and Medicaid, benefits were 
added, and as far as Medicaid is concerned, eligibility criteria were expanded for 
pregnant women by 1990.  
Before discussing the different theories dealing with the decline of social poli-
cies, it must be mentioned that there is no consensus on whether such policies, and 
especially the Great Society, were actually efficient. Sociologist Dennis Gilbert, who 
studies socio-economic stratifications, affirms that the rise of class inequalities which 
started in the late 1970s and increased sharply during the 1980s with the first applica-
tions of neoliberal principles, compared to the reduction of inequalities during the 
1950s and 1960s, meant that redistribution through social policies worked. He points 
out the measures that work, if the stated aim is lifting people out of poverty. Accord-
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ing to him, means-tested programs, like public assistance and food stamps, for exam-
ple, have little impact on poverty rates. This is partly due to the fact that these bene-
fits are not included in the pre-tax income that is used in the statistics. On the other 
hand, measures like the increase of Social Security benefits and EITC have had a 
huge impact. To explain increasing class inequalities, Gilbert points to the erosion of 
the safety net, namely unemployment benefits and the minimum wage. Up to the 
1970s, these provided for a family of three, nowadays they do not even cover for a 
family of two.181  
The decrease in poverty rates was especially spectacular during the 1960s. Over-
all poverty rates decreased from 22.4% of all people below the poverty line in 1959 to 
12.1% in 1969, and to an all time low of 11.1% in 1973. The 1980s saw increasing poverty 
rates, with the highest rate since 1966 in 1983 at 15.2% as a result of Reagan’s policies. 
The 1960s also had a great impact on black poverty rates, going from 55.1% in 1959 
down to 32.2% in 1969. The lowest poverty rate for blacks was in 1999 at 23.6%, com-
pared with 7.7% for whites the same year.182 However, the persistence of comparative-
ly high poverty rates for minorities that have never been below 20% has led many to 
conclude since the 1970s that social policies, especially those considered as ‘welfare,’ 
were inefficient.  
Attacks on the welfare state had already started during the New Deal era. An 
example of this would be the foundation of the short-lived American Liberty League, 
a conservative business organization, unhappy with the small limitations placed on 
the “formerly freewheeling economic operations.”183 Despite these early attacks, the 
main focus should be on the developments since the 1970s because they marked a 
turning point in the attitude shown by both the government and the public. This dec-
ade was the transition from building the welfare state to reducing it. 
Several explanations are offered as to the decline of social policies. None of the 
explanations are satisfying on their own. It appears, however, that the different fac-
tors complete and reinforce one another. 
Among the explanations given is the economic downturn that occurred during 
the 1970s and whose beginning was marked by the oil crisis of 1973. Jansson points to 
a set of elements leading to the ascendancy of conservatism during that period. The 
increasing standard of living experienced by the working and middle class slowed 
and even reversed. Stagflation destroyed the utopia of an ever-expanding economy, 
and the middle class lost on their real income because of inflation. Yet taxes were 
increased to pay for the expanding expenditures. The bad economic situation favored 
a backlash against groups that seemed to benefit from social spending and affirma-
tive action.184 Sociologist William Julius Wilson, in The Declining Significance of Race, 
also sees the 1970s as a turning point for social policies, because of the change these 
years brought to the economy: they marked the passage to a post-industrial society. 
This led to the disappearance of well-paying low-skill jobs, and especially to a chron-
ic scarcity of low-skill jobs in inner city neighborhoods. Wilson argues that these 
changes are among the reasons why existing social programs were not efficient any-
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more. The lack of education and real job opportunities made these programs seem 
useless, especially affirmative action.185 
It has also been argued that the decline of unions, due to these structural chang-
es in the economy, is a factor that has informed the decline of social policies.186 Histo-
rian Jacqueline Jones thinks that the demise of the unions in the early 1980s and the 
focus on the so-called black ‘underclass’ were among the reasons that ended the pre-
viously existing class alliance. This allowed for the spreading of divisive race poli-
tics,187 which in turn facilitated the deconstruction of the welfare state.  
Feagin, however, sees the racial division of the working class as going back to 
the 19th century. The process was twofold. The fact that the white working class had 
minorities below them made them “feel better” about “their own often inadequate 
economic conditions.” It also led to the weakening, compared to Europe, of the work-
ing class and its unions.188  
Sociologists Earl Wysong, David Perrucci, and David Wright see a similarly re-
duced initial role of unions in the American context. According to them, the labor 
movement was not successful in securing the middle class with a “social wage” for all 
citizens. Instead, the unions’ way of proceeding led to the creation of “private welfare 
states” within some large firms reserved to a small part of the population.189 Moreo-
ver, it has been argued that out of cronyistic and nepotistic interests local political 
machines relying on white ethnic votes opposed universalist measures for the welfare 
state. A more biased and unequal redistribution favored the interests of these politi-
cal machines as they could hog more resources to reallocate specifically to their pro-
tégées.190 
Another possible explanation is the ideological opposition between conserva-
tives and liberals regarding the role of government. According to this idea, conserva-
tive efforts to roll back the welfare state are simply informed by a wish for a smaller 
role for government and a greater reliance on private enterprise and Christian chari-
ty, whereas liberals see a legitimate role for government in showing solidarity 
through a safety net created through social policy. This is certainly correct, and an 
obvious part of the American political discourse, which can be seen in Nixon’s efforts 
to shift program administration to the state level; it showed in conservative Democrat 
Jimmy Carter’s vision of health care as being a private matter; it was reflected in 
Reagan’s discourse presenting the family as the unit of choice for reliance and help; it 
was demonstrated by George W. Bush’s shifting of Medicare Advantage to private 
insurers and encouragement of religious charity. However, this alone does not justify 
the extent of the attacks on social policy.  
Other analysts favor a more social and cultural explanation. The excesses of the 
late 1960s, the social upheavals and the increasing demands for more rights and ad-
vantages for racial, gender, and sexual minority groups triggered a backlash among 
the supposed “silent majority” receptive to Nixon’s “law and order” discourse. This 
backlash was further fuelled by the emergence in the 1970s of the now familiar situa-
tion in inner city neighborhoods or ghettos. The increase in entrenched poverty, the 
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rise of out-of-wedlock births, of drug abuse, and crime during that period confirmed 
for many that social policies aimed at the poor were inefficient, and even worse, that 
social policies, especially welfare, led to morally dissolute behavior. However, on its 
own, this argument seems weak and superficial. 
Wysong et al.’s explanation favors the theory of class warfare, not initiated by 
the working class, but by the elite class. According to them, the immediate goal in the 
1970s “was to blunt growing public support for higher taxes on the rich and large cor-
porations.” This turned, in the 1980s, into a larger goal, namely the creation of “a 
modern version of the 1920s economy situated in a global economic system.” The Re-
publicans rolled back the social policy gains made since the 1930s, with a special focus 
on the New Deal and the Great Society. They implemented massive tax reductions 
for the affluent, major reductions in government spending, and finally they substan-
tially limited the regulatory powers of government.191 Neoliberalism and the supply-
side theory provided the ideological framework to argue for lower taxes on the rich 
and a reduction of social programs. Smith sees a similar development in a political 
mutiny that had been going for some time in reaction to “governmental activism of 
the welfare state.” According to him, the reaction was sparked by a memo written by 
Supreme Court justice Lewis Powell in 1971, who was a close friend of the director of 
the US Chamber of Commerce. The memo warned business about Nixon’s new tax 
plan of 1971, which would have been hard on business and the wealthy. Powell saw 
the Chamber of Commerce as a well-suited institution to defend free enterprise and 
attack the regulatory efforts of government.192  
The reforms of the New Deal and the Great Society had managed to dent ine-
qualities by redistributing the economic growth more evenly among the population, 
but in doing so they also reduced the share of growth destined to the elites. The stag-
flation of the 1970s reduced the pie, and it offered new political possibilities to play 
out intergroup competition in order to divide the lower classes along racial lines. The 
tax argument mentioned above informs this part: because of the erosion of their real 
income, middle and working class people become more reluctant to pay taxes, let 
alone higher taxes, for other groups. Political scientist Charles Noble pointed out that 
this problem had already started during the late 1960s. The lack of impact of social 
policies on inner-city problems was already obvious, and support for liberalism was 
dwindling. The massive expenses for the Vietnam War made it easy for fiscal con-
servatives to pressure the administration into choosing between allocating the budget 
to war or social reform. Wilbur Mills, the chairman of the Ways and Means Commit-
tee, formulated the now famous phrase about the administration having to “choose 
between guns and butter.” Johnson chose to increase taxes by $10 billion, but spend-
ing was still cut by $6 billion.193  
Political scientists Thomas and Mary Edsall, in their 1991 book Chain Reaction: 
the Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics, admirably explain the strategy 
of fostering racial intergroup competition in order to undermine support for social 
policies and government intervention aimed at reducing inequalities. Edsall and Ed-
sall demonstrate how the tax issue that arose in the 1970s, and culminated in the 1978 
tax revolt exemplified by Proposition 13 in California, allowed for a division of the old 
New Deal coalition along racial lines. The line between tax payers and benefit recipi-
ents can be drawn roughly along racial lines, since it is statistically true that there are 
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more white tax payers but more minorities on the social program rolls, due to past 
inequalities and discrimination which stratified American society with minorities at 
the bottom. Edsall and Edsall stress the fact that this was a targeted approach to cre-
ate a new Republican majority by breaking up an economic interest based class alli-
ance that allowed for a top-down redistribution. Instead, Republicans created a new 
white Republican majority around shared conservative social values194 that allowed 
for an upward redistribution. Moreover, this conservative realignment led to a polari-
zation of the two parties along the lines of racial liberalism, cultural values, taxes, the 
scope of government intervention, the interpretation of equal opportunity, and social 
policies.195 Feagin defends the same theory regarding the deflection of the conserva-
tive economic strategy by shifting the focus to a cultural and racial divide.196 
Political scientist Larry M. Bartels offers a slightly different explanation of 
Americans’ political choices regarding taxes. He explains, according to his study of 
attitudes regarding the 2001 and 2003 Bush tax cuts, that Americans fail to make the 
connection between tax policy and the reduction of government programs. Moreo-
ver, he concludes that people’s perception of their own tax burden was the strongest 
factor (even stronger than party identification, conservative ideology, or the percep-
tion of government waste) in their support for the 2001 tax cut for the wealthy, and 
this despite voicing idea that the federal government should spend more on pro-
grams, that the rich pay too little taxes, and that the growing economic inequality is 
bad. Bartels expressed concerns and “significant doubts about the capacity of the 
American public to reason effectively about tax policy.”197 However, Bartels’ analysis 
does not necessarily contradict Edsall and Edsall’s interpretation, but rather under-
lines that Americans’ confusion regarding taxes and redistributive policies can be 
politically exploited.  
This picture is further explained through the problem that many people are un-
aware of government’s role in many social or redistributive programs. In her 2011 
book The Submerged State: How invisible Government Policies Undermine American De-
mocracy, political scientist Suzanne Mettler explains that many people are unaware of 
the benefits they receive and are also unaware that those benefits result from gov-
ernment programs, because in many cases these benefits are delivered through pri-
vate outlets. For example, before Obama’s student loan reform that created govern-
ment-financed student loans, the government subsidized private lenders to deliver 
student loans. Other forms of government help are not necessarily viewed as a form 
of redistribution, because they consist in tax cuts, such as the Home Mortgage and 
Interest Deduction that is greatly valued by the middle and upper classes. Mettler 
avers that such programs form a “submerged state” that obscures government’s role 
from the view of the general public, including these who number among the benefi-
ciaries.”198  
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As for political scientist Frances Fox Piven, she insists on the fact that president 
Reagan’s tactic was not only to take advantage of stagflation, but to increase the re-
source shortage in a twofold way: through tax cuts and through rising defense spend-
ing. The resulting growing deficit was used to argue for cuts in social spending. 
Moreover, Piven sees an additional dimension: according to her, a globalization rhet-
oric is used today, which argues that government is helpless in the face of markets. 
This is a revival of a 19th century laissez-faire rhetoric positing that government has 
no control over the market. This rhetoric has gained new credibility because of the 
vast international market that lent new authority to the idea that higher taxes pose a 
threat to international competitiveness.199 Hedrick Smith concurs in the interpreta-
tion offered by Piven and he points out that the three major tax cuts, in 1978 under the 
Carter administration, in 1981 under the Reagan administration, and in 2001 under 
the G. W. Bush administration were by no means accidents, but the result of a strate-
gy aimed at upward redistribution. Smith situates the power shift in favor of business 
in 1978 during the 95th Congress.200 
2.3.2. Cut Welfare Spending! But We Love Social Policies: 
The American Paradox 
Despite the description of the backlash above, it would be a hasty conclusion to 
say that Americans are stark opponents of any social policy. Quite to the contrary, 
Americans show an incredible amount of solidarity and are strong supporters of a 
wide array of programs in many areas and for many different populations. The en-
during support for Medicare and Social Security is just one example. However, a set 
of complementary factors explains why some programs are attacked and why there is 
a general impression of Americans being opposed to social policies. Political scientist 
Martin Gilens has analyzed the American welfare paradox in his 1999 book Why 
Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy. His conclu-
sion is that opposition to social policies depends on how a program is presented; 
meaning that if a program is framed as “welfare”, then opposition is strong. But this is 
not the only explanation; other, additional factors must be taken into account, nota-
bly because they help to explain the framing as welfare. Among these explanations 
are the context of rising economic inequality, individualism, a strong emphasis on 
charity, or a preference for a small role for government. Moreover, these additional, 
complementary explanations also show the wide range of possibilities for attacking 
social policies. Moreover, they help to decode some of the discourse on welfare, espe-
cially the more implicit messages or the coded language that exist on this issue. 
Americans favor health and education programs, particularly everything aimed 
at children. Gilens compiled a complete overview of public opinion on social policy 
spending from several surveys asking whether people wanted to cut or increase 
spending for different programs. The result is astounding. Americans overwhelming-
ly supported spending increases for programs by margins rating from 40 to 74 per-
centage points. The areas of strongest support are care for the elderly, education, and 
fighting poverty. Public opinion favored spending cuts only in some cases: for unem-
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ployed people, for welfare or for people on welfare, and food stamps. However, peo-
ple favored food programs for low-income families and retraining programs for dis-
placed workers; and they even slightly favored an increase in unemployment insur-
ance.201 The contradiction is consequently very plain. 
Sociologists and political scientists Leslie McCall and Lane Kenworthy explain 
that in eras of rising inequality, as it has been the case in the US and other western 
countries since the 1970s, people tend to favor programs aimed at giving more oppor-
tunity, instead of assistance, to the poor. Hence the greater support in areas such as 
education, health care, and social security.202 There is generally less support for 
means-tested programs aimed at the poor, and more support for programs favoring 
self-help or back-on-your-feet programs, like workfare, which associates benefits 
with work requirements. 
One of the reasons why Americans tend to support social programs less strongly 
than Europeans, for example, is because they favor charity. They do not see help to 
the needy as the sole responsibility of the government. Gilens points out that their 
strong involvement in private charities and the high membership in voluntary asso-
ciations show the strong commitment of Americans to help the needy and the poor. 
He considers this to be an alternative indicator to public opinion surveys. Jurist Joel 
Handler and political scientist Yeheskel Hasenfeld call charity the “third” sector, 
complementing the public and private sector.203 According to the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics, the nonprofit share of the GDP was 5.3% in 2001; in 2010, it ac-
counted for 9.2% of all wages and salaries. The biggest share of expenses in 2008 went 
to health (58.7%) and education (16.5%). Between 2000 and 2009, charitable contribu-
tions increased by 6% (inflation adjusted). In 2009, 26.8% of adults volunteered, most-
ly in religion-related organizations—on average, people volunteer 233 hours per 
year.204  
However, Gilens points out that charity is not the most efficient way to help the 
needy, since, for example, religious institutions use up to 44% of the donations for 
their own maintenance.205 Historian Michael B. Katz also puts this inefficiency in his-
torical perspective, and he explains that the enticement with charity largely rests on a 
myth, especially regarding the extent and efficiency of charity in the past: 
The history of American charity remains shrouded in myth: in the old days Americans 
helped their needy neighbors voluntarily and without money from the government. 
With no prodding from elected officials, the women and men who formed voluntary as-
sociations to provide services today performed by government made sure that the de-
serving poor remained neither hungry nor homeless. With compassion born of religious 
faith, they solved problems that, in our times, render government impotent.206 
Katz particularly insists on the fact that the charity myth is used to attack government 
intervention and social policies. Republicans in particular attribute a prominent 
place to charity and they consider that government should not overstep its bounda-
ries. For example, this belief is expressed in the 2004 Republican Party platform: 
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Government does have a role to play, but as a partner, not a rival, to the armies of com-
passion. These forces have roots in the areas they serve, often based in local churches, 
synagogues, mosques, and temples. Their leaders are people to whom the disadvantaged 
are not statistics, but neighbors, friends, and moral individuals created in the image of 
God.207  
This extract also illustrates one of the reasons why people prefer charity to govern-
ment intervention: a closer influence on who is helped, the certainty that the help 
goes to projects that they approve, and of course, the feeling of having personally 
contributed. 
Notwithstanding a certain mythical dimension and its relative inefficiency, char-
ity has a solid reality in the US. Political scientist Laura Katz Olson insists on the fact 
that charity is an integral part of the American health system. The 1946 Hill-Burton 
Act requires, as compensation for public subsidies in the construction of hospitals, 
mandatory care to all persons arriving with acute and severe symptoms. The same 
has applied for all hospitals participating in Medicare since 1986.208 Of course, this 
obligation has partly led to the crisis of the American health care system: the unin-
sured who are not able to afford to pay for their health care wait until their diseases 
have progressed so far that they can claim emergency care. These costs in turn are 
transferred in part to the bills of insured patients. Then the insurance companies de-
flect the costs back onto their clients, thus driving up insurance premiums. Finally, 
the increasing costs of the premiums mean that fewer and fewer people can afford 
health insurance, and consequently rely on costly emergency care. The vicious cycle 
of spiraling cost continues. 
The favoring of charity questions the role and scope of the government. One of 
the explanations that is often offered to justify the rejection of government-run social 
programs is ideology, usually in relation to Americans’ supposedly strong individual-
ism. Gilens discards these explanations as insufficient. However, these factors cannot 
be entirely refuted, since they are part of the discourse around social policies, and 
they partly shape policy preferences, such as greater preferences for self-help or op-
portunity-developing programs. So while on their own they do not offer a satisfying 
explanation, they are elements that are used in the rhetorical house-of-cards that 
frames perceptions about social policies. The question is rather why there is support 
for increased social programs only in certain areas.  
Gilens’s public opinion survey compilation shows that while 56% of Americans 
support increased government spending for food programs supporting low-income 
families (9% favor a decrease), 43% favor a decrease in spending on Food Stamps (9% 
favoring an increase), which is the government food program for low-income fami-
lies. People overwhelmingly favor assistance to the poor, help for the unemployed, 
childcare for poor children etc., but just as massively support spending cuts for ‘wel-
fare’ (63%) and an even greater cut for ‘people on welfare’ (71%).209 The problem does 
not lie primarily with internal contradictions in the American mind, or a kind of so-
cial policy schizophrenia, but with the phrasing of the surveys, and more importantly, 
with the discourse around social policies. Strong opposition can be triggered when 
programs are framed as welfare. Political scientists Theodore J. Lowi, Benjamin 
Ginsberg, and Kenneth A. Shepsle have also highlighted the problem of wording in 
polls regarding social policies. They have also noted that opposite results in polling 
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were obtained, depending on if the question was worded as ‘spending for the poor’ or 
as ‘spending on welfare.’210 
2.3.3. What Is “Welfare”? 
The conception of welfare that exists today—which consists in negatively iden-
tifying a program as benefiting mainly minorities—has little to do with the ‘welfare 
state’. Historian Edward Berkowitz offers a definition of the welfare state:  
In a welfare state, the government supplies a modicum of security to its citizens, rather 
than forcing them to rely exclusively on what they earn from working or investing or in-
heriting. […] [It is a] complex, interrelated system of subsidies, tax laws, protective legis-
lation, and income maintenance.211 
He points out that the term originated in Britain during World War II and was “an 
ideal worth fighting for.”212 In this sense the welfare state is radically opposed to the 
current use of ‘welfare’ as a means to dismantle the welfare state. Indeed, the current 
conception of welfare allows separating the welfare state in two distinct parts, one 
that is good, one that is bad. There are social policies on the one hand, and welfare on 
the other hand.  
The framing of social programs as welfare is one part of the current impossibil-
ity of implementing race-specific politics and policies. It is the other side of the attack 
against affirmative action. The important aspect is that welfare, or, in other words, 
the racialization of social programs, has a broader impact on social policies and ham-
pers the expansion, or even the maintaining, of the welfare state. Presenting a pro-
gram as a zero-sum game and as principally benefiting minority groups is enough to 
create opposition. 
‘Framing as welfare’ consists in identifying a program as principally benefiting 
minorities, preferably blacks. Then blacks are associated with negative stereotypes of 
moral breakdown, for which social programs are blamed. Lastly, it is claimed that 
whites do not benefit from the programs, but only pay for them. The programs de-
scribed in this manner are labeled welfare. The end result is that welfare is not asso-
ciated anymore with its original meaning of “the state or condition of doing or being 
well; well-being, prosperity, success; the health, happiness, and fortunes of a person 
or group,”213 but with wasteful spending for undeserving people (of color). Berkowitz 
offers an excellent description of how welfare is understood today:  
At a gut level, most people understand welfare to mean a form of government handout. 
The term evokes an instant shock of recognition and produces an almost visceral reac-
tion. When we think of welfare, we envision a black woman, who lives in a sinister sec-
tion of the city, miles from the suburbs in which many of us grew up, taking care of her 
illegitimate children and cashing government checks.214 
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Programs to fight poverty are especially framed as welfare. Starting in the 1970s, 
to fuel the backlash, the discourse of conservative politicians identified programs 
aimed at fighting poverty (such as AFDC, Food Stamps,215 public housing, and public 
employment) with minorities. Already in his 1968 campaign Nixon attacked the War 
on Poverty in terms of social programs having a nefarious effect: 
For the past five years we have been deluged by government programs for the unem-
ployed, programs for cities, programs for the poor, and we have reaped from these pro-
grams an ugly harvest of frustration, violence, and failure across the land.216 
Nixon blames social programs for violence and a moral breakdown. Moreover, 
by stressing programs for the cities and the poor, he creates an association with the 
ghettos, and thus with a black population, as white poverty is more associated with 
rural areas. Nixon’s anti-welfare rhetoric built on the idea that welfare fosters lazi-
ness and irresponsible behavior, an idea that dates back to the 16th century in the An-
glo-American world, and that was later used by Reagan. Nixon’s politics, however, 
were very far from consistent with this rhetoric. Part of his discourse did not entirely 
match this initial attack. For example, the introduction to Nixon’s Family Assistance 
Plan, which was supposed to reform AFDC, is not as virulent as his campaign speech: 
Aim of Plan: “(1) a greatly enlarged role for the federal government in federal-state public 
assistance or welfare programs;  
(2) a new federal plan to pay income supplements to all poor families with children, in-
cluding those headed by able-bodied men.  
BACKGROUND TO THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION  
The President has responded to a combination of discoveries, events and changes of atti-
tude of recent years. Among these are:  
The discovery and identification of poverty as a national problem and the commitment 
by President Johnson to eliminate poverty.  
The riots in the street and the quiet hunger in the countryside--both of which have been 
attributed in some degree to the malfunctioning of the welfare system.  
The shift from thinking of welfare as a non-enforceable privilege over to thinking of it as 
a legal right to stated benefits in response to objectively determined needs.  
The revolt by state and local taxpayers who see the escalating costs of welfare as too 
much for them to bear without at least some new sharing arrangement with Washing-
ton.217 
In this introduction to the reform project, there clearly is a wish to increase the role of 
the federal government in welfare programs and to expand the benefits to the work-
ing poor, in part as a reaction to the tax revolt. The plan was opposed by labor as 
“subsidized low-wage employment,” by the left in Congress as not going far enough. 
Labor also subjected to the “punitive work tests,” the clause that stipulated loss of 
benefits if beneficiaries refused suitable work or training opportunities.218 Finally it 
was an alliance of liberals and conservatives for different reasons, who made the re-
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form fail.219 This is widely different from later reactions during the Reagan presiden-
cy, where adaptation to tax resentment was simply translated into slashing programs. 
Moreover, in this extract, a link is made between social unrest and welfare, but social 
unrest is not seen as the negative consequence due to some perverse effect of 
handouts, but rather as the interpretation of a system that does not function well 
enough. And, quite importantly, the program is presented as a continuity of John-
son’s War on Poverty. While Nixon certainly campaigned using an anti-welfare rhet-
oric, his policy efforts did not reflect this. It was Reagan who perfected the anti-
welfare rhetoric. One may remember his most famous attack against the “welfare 
queen” during the 1976 Republican primaries: 
There’s a woman in Chicago. She has 80 names, 30 addresses, 12 Social Security cards 
and is collecting veterans benefits on four nonexisting deceased husbands. And she’s col-
lecting Social Security on her cards. She’s got Medicaid, getting food stamps and she is 
collecting welfare under each of her names. Her tax-free cash income alone is over 
$150,000.220 
The fictional welfare queen derived from an existing person, Linda Taylor, a black 
woman, who, according to the research of journalist Josh Levin, had used four aliases 
and had received $8,000.221 Although the welfare queen is the most extravagant ex-
ample, Reagan described the whole welfare system as being intrinsically corrupt. In 
his 1983 State of the Union Address, he called for action to stop seemingly systematic 
abuse, planting the idea that most people on the welfare rolls actually do not need 
assistance:  
Our standard here will be fairness, ensuring that the taxpayers' hard-earned dollars go 
only to the truly needy; that none of them are turned away, but that fraud and waste are 
stamped out. And I'm sorry to say, there's a lot of it out there. In the food stamp program 
alone, last year, we identified almost [$]1.1 billion in overpayments. The taxpayers aren't 
the only victims of this kind of abuse. The truly needy suffer as funds intended for them 
are taken not by the needy, but by the greedy. For everyone's sake, we must put an end to 
such waste and corruption.222 
Reagan also spread stories of unbelievably generous welfare payments, for example 
through a fictional description of a project in Harlem, the Taino Towers: “If you are a 
slum dweller, you can get an apartment with 11-foot ceilings, with a 20-foot balcony, a 
swimming pool and gymnasium, laundry room and play room, and the rent begins at 
$113.20 and that includes utilities.” In addition to these stories of abuse of government 
generosity, he also derided claims about dire need for social programs, such as Food 
Stamps by negating the problem of hunger and malnutrition in the US: “Ninety-five 
percent of all our families have an adequate daily intake of nutrients—and a part of 
the five percent that don't are trying to lose weight!”223 
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Reagan always denied being a racist, even when challenged directly. However, 
his stance on civil rights, welfare, and his repeated denunciation of affirmative action 
and busing during the 1980 presidential campaign left no doubt regarding his racial 
conservatism.224 Sociologist Orlando Patterson highlights the particular change 
brought by the Reagan presidency. He explains that while desegregation and affirma-
tive action were followed by an upsurge of direct racism in the form of overt racist 
attacks, he considers “the powerful cultural signals given by the Reagan presidency 
that racist intolerance is once again acceptable” as far more dangerous.225 Schuman et 
al. add the cuts in government aid to HBCUs, the re-staffing of the Civil Rights Com-
mission, and the rapprochement with South Africa as a less symbolic, but still telling, 
dimension of Reagan’s stance on race.226  
The negative association of minorities with anti-poverty measures did not come 
out of the blue. It is rather the period of the 1960s and the Great Society, with its War 
on Poverty, that constitutes an exceptional attitude. Economist and sociologist Gun-
nar Myrdal explained in 1944 that the conception of race as meaning the biological 
inferiority of non-white populations had long been a reason not to tackle social mis-
ery at the political level. 227 The structure of US society, in which past discrimination 
has kept minorities at the bottom of society, and the associated racial thinking, make 
it easy to frame anti-poverty programs as “welfare.”  
Several factors come into play here. Welfare plays on an intergroup competition 
that is fostered along racial lines. Elizabeth Anderson explains that opposition to re-
distributive policies can be based on two factors: in-group favoritism/ethnocentrism, 
which consists in wanting to hoard opportunities and/or resources, and out-group 
animus or stigmatization.228 With welfare, both factors are at work because tax ex-
penditures are portrayed as a loss of resources for one group (whites) in favor of an 
ethnically opposed group that is stigmatized (blacks). Berkowitz’s description of how 
welfare is understood today clearly highlights both factors: the terms “government 
handouts” and “cashing government checks” that reflect the fear about the loss of 
resources for one’s own group; the out-group animus found in the black woman 
whose perceived way of living is associated with loose morals. The separation of the 
two groups is also highlighted in his description: the locations of the two groups are 
clearly separated (suburbs vs. inner city sections).  
The welfare frame operates on racial stereotypes that have changed little since 
slavery. According to Handler and Hasenfeld, the welfare queen stereotype directly 
“drew on the historical slavery image of African-Americans as ‘lazy, hypersexed, 
reckless breeders.’”229 This also echoes a cultural racism that justifies the subordinate 
socio-economic position of blacks through cultural differences, such as a lack of em-
phasis on education or a lack of work ethic. Brader and Valentino explain that this 
belief that “blacks violate cherished values of hard work and self-reliance” results in 
the opinion that they do not deserve the resources they claim.230 The picture that 
emerges about the beneficiaries of the welfare state is one where part of the popula-
tion is deserving and white, who earn their programs through hard work and tax pay-
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ing, while the other part of the population is undeserving and black, people who do 
not work and want their laziness financed by (white) tax money. Social psychologist 
Michelle Fine and sociologist Lois Weis explain that the deserving-undeserving di-
chotomy in the perception of welfare and social politics is so strongly racialized that 
even white working class people who benefit themselves from welfare programs per-
ceive themselves as deserving, but blacks as undeserving.231  
Moreover, the association between redistributional policies and channeling 
benefits to blacks is sometimes presented as a government goal, as radio talk show 
host Rush Limbaugh said on his show on May 11, 2009: 
The deterioration reflects lower tax revenues and higher costs for bank failures, unem-
ployment benefits, and food stamps. But in the Oval Office of the White House none of 
this is a problem. This is the objective. The objective is unemployment. The objective is 
more food stamp benefits. The objective is more unemployment benefits. The objective 
is an expanding welfare state. And the objective is to take the nation’s wealth and return 
it to the nation’s quote “rightful owners.” Think reparations. Think forced reparations. 
Think forced reparations here if you want to understand what actually is going on.232 
In this extract, help for the poor is represented through a racialized prism with the 
reference to “reparations,” meaning the compensation for slavery. It triggers the idea 
of giving America’s wealth to blacks and thus represents welfare as benefitting only 
blacks to the detriment of white America. Limbaugh also presents this as unjustified 
and thus not deserved by putting the ‘rightful owners’ in quotes, which belittles the 
claim, and insisting that it would be ‘forced reparations’.  
In The Audacity of Hope Obama exposes his understanding of the discursive shift 
from the War on Poverty to attacks on welfare and the conservative policy demands 
this has supported: 
This concept of a black ‘underclass’—separate, apart, alien in its behavior and its val-
ues—has also played a central role in modern American politics. It was partly on behalf 
of fixing the black ghetto that Johnson’s War on Poverty was launched, and it was on the 
basis of that war’s failures, both real and perceived, that conservatives turned much of 
the country against the very concept of the welfare state. A cottage industry grew within 
conservative think tanks, arguing not only that cultural pathologies—rather than racism 
or structural inequalities built into our economy—were responsible for black poverty 
but also that government programs like welfare, coupled with liberal judges who cod-
dled criminals, actually made these pathologies worse. On television, images of innocent 
children with distended bellies were replaced with those of black looters and muggers; 
news reports focused less on the black maid struggling to make ends meet and more on 
the “welfare queen” who had babies just to collect a check. What was needed, conserva-
tives argued, was a stern dose of discipline—more police, more prisons, more personal 
responsibility, and to end welfare. If such strategies could not transform the black ghetto, 
at least they would contain it and keep hardworking taxpayers from throwing good 
money after bad.233 
Of course, this extract does not only highlight how Obama perceives the use of the 
black ‘underclass’ to turn the population against social programs by transforming 
them into welfare through the association with a negative black image. It also under-
lines the interconnectedness of the elements, how media representation feeds into 
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spreading and normalizing a negative black image, and how conservatives managed 
to integrate and respond to the backlash sentiment.234 
But beyond the dimension of representation, the way in which programs are 
administered, financed, and how benefits are attributed also helps reinforce the de-
serving/undeserving dichotomy. Political scientist Christopher Howard speaks of a 
two-tiered welfare state in which programs are separated into an upper tier and a 
lower tier. The upper tier includes Social Security, Medicare, Disability Insurance, 
Workers’ Compensation, and Unemployment Insurance. The lower tier includes 
Medicaid, EITC, TANF (formerly AFDC), Food Stamps, and subsidized and low-
income housing, as well as a range of smaller programs, such as Head Start and 
school meals.235 The programs in the upper tier are partly funded through direct con-
tributions via payroll taxes. Yet, most people ignore the fact that they are supple-
mented by government funds. Thus programs like Social Security or Medicare are 
seen as an earned entitlement after a life of hard work.236 Programs in the lower tier, 
however, do not require previous participation through taxes and are “means-tested”, 
meaning they are available to people below a given threshold of income. The issue of 
contributing to the program through payroll taxes is part of the deserving-
undeserving dichotomy that is reinforced by the racial stereotype. Quite tellingly, this 
separation into two tiers has led people to associate Social Security with retirement 
pensions alone, although the Social Security Act also established AFDC and unem-
ployment. 
For a better understanding, two examples can be given: AFDC/TANF and 
health care. The development of AFDC/TANF highlights the gradual racialization, or 
‘welfarization,’ of a program, while health care shows how two programs within the 
same area can be perceived in a racialized, or welfarized, way. The reform of AFDC 
into TANF in particular is the textbook example of a program that initially had a pos-
itive image, although it was not flawless, but which became negative once blacks 
massively joined, and eventually was reformed into a sparse and even punitive pro-
gram. 
AFDC (initially ADC) was developed as a program to help widows care for their 
children. It replaced the previous Mothers’ Pensions program. It was initially viewed 
in a positive way and required mothers to stay at home. During the 1960s, more and 
more black women accessed the program and it became widely criticized. Staying 
home was no longer seen as a sign of quality care for the children, but as a sign of 
laziness. The initial requirement of the program to apply only to single mothers 
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without a male provider got twisted around: these single mothers were now shown as 
sexually promiscuous women who preferred to have babies out-of-wedlock instead of 
working. Indeed, the program itself required women, in order to be able to benefit, 
not to be married. This was changed in 1962, in order to encourage marriage, hence 
the name change to Aid for Families with Dependent Children.237 AFDC is the pro-
gram now most closely associated with welfare and the stereotypical beneficiary is 
seen as a black teenage mother who has several out-of-wedlock children born from 
different fathers, and who sits at home waiting for the welfare check instead of going 
to work. This perception of AFDC as primarily benefiting black women led to strong 
attacks against the program. In 1996, it was eventually reformed into TANF. The new 
system imposes lifetime limits, strong work incentives and requirements, and a loss of 
benefits if additional children are born. 
Regarding the two government health programs, Medicare and Medicaid, an in-
teresting perception exists. Medicare is perceived as a white program for deserving 
seniors, who earned their entitlement through lifelong contributions. Political histo-
rian Christy Ford Chapin explains that Medicare, in its inception was promoted as a 
moderate program “for a deserving aged population.”238 On the other hand, political 
scientist Laura Katz Olson describes Medicaid as a stigmatized program that is asso-
ciated with “fears of fiscal disaster and images of unworthy clients taking advantage 
of taxpayer dollars.”239 Medicaid is strongly associated with minorities because, be-
fore the TANF reform, AFDC beneficiaries were automatically eligible for Medicaid. 
Reagan described Medicaid beneficiaries as “a faceless mass, waiting for 
handouts.”240 
First of all, Medicaid, before the extension possibilities provided by the Afforda-
ble Care Act, was a program that covered the disabled, children, poor elderly persons, 
pregnant women, and, to a certain extent, the parents of poor children. Eligibility 
levels for children and pregnant women are quite high (in 2009, the highest eligibility 
level for children under age 1 was at 300% FPL in the District of Columbia, Hawaii, 
Iowa, Maryland, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Wisconsin). But they are markedly 
lower for parents and caretakers (as low as 17% FPL in Arkansas in 2009). The exten-
sion of Medicaid to able-bodied adults without children was only allowed through 
the Affordable Care Act, and 19 states still have not applied the extension as of Janu-
ary 2017. Despite the fact that Medicaid serves populations that are needy, the pro-
gram is associated with the undeserving. Moreover, Medicaid’s recurrent problem is 
costs. A major part of Medicaid costs stems from care to the disabled and dually eligi-
ble Medicare patients. In other words, a program associated with welfare gets blamed 
for costs created through people who are perceived to be covered by Medicare, a pos-
itively connoted program.  
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Diagram 32 Medicaid Beneficiaries and Spending by Eligibility Group, in Percent, 2008.241 
Moreover, although Medicaid is largely associated with minorities, nearly fifty per-
cent of all Medicaid payments are made to the white population.242 This is lower than 
the proportion of whites in the total population of the US, but higher than their pro-
portion of the Medicaid population. 
 
 
Diagram 2 Share of Medicaid Payment by Race, in Per-
cent, 2009.243 
 
Diagram 3 Medicaid Population by Race, in Percent, 
2009.244 
 
The welfare status of Medicaid became apparent once again when the New York 
Times reported on the vote on the Affordable Care Act on March 21, 2010. The NYT 
reported that Democrats in Congress “hailed the votes as a historic advance in social 
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justice, comparable to the establishment of Medicare and Social Security.”245 Medi-
caid was conspicuously left out. 
The examples of AFDC/TANF and Medicare/Medicaid show how, on the one 
hand, a program can become welfare over time when associated with minorities, or, 
on the other hand, how, within a given domain, one program can be identified as 
good, when associated with white elderly persons. This is essential, because even 
within a social policy area that is supposedly favored by the public, a particular pro-
gram can be viewed negatively when it is racialized, meaning that any program that 
too obviously helps blacks, even if this is statistically justified, will be vulnerable to 
attack. 
2.3.4. The Welfare Myth 
As the example of Medicaid shows, perceptions about welfare do not necessarily 
coincide with reality. Statistical evidence shows that beneficiaries of means-tested 
programs are within the truly needy populations and are not exclusively black. A 2015 
US Census report on participation in government programs between 2009 and 2012 
shows that families in poverty mainly participated in the programs (56.1% and 61.3% 
of families below poverty level between 2009 and 2012). The age category with the 
highest participation rates is children (34.6% and 39.2% of children between 2009 and 
2012) compared with 13.7% and 16.6% of adults aged 18-64 for the same period or 12.6% 
of elderly persons over the same period. Although female-headed single households 
have the highest program participation rates (55.7% and 58% between 2009 and 2012), 
a significant proportion of male-headed single households participate (35.1% and 
37.2% over the same period), as well as a non-negligible percentage of married-couple 
households (18.2% and 19.9%).246 
  
 
Diagram 33 Average Monthly Participation 
 Rate in Means-Tested Programs, by Race, 2010247 
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Minorities have high participation rates in means-tested programs, with blacks 
having the highest participation rate, which is consistent with the concentration of 
the black population in the lowest income categories, but they represent only 36.3% of 
the total population of the United States. This means that in absolute numbers, the 
white population has the most beneficiaries (almost 25 million, compared with almost 
16 million blacks, 18 million Hispanics, and 2.7 million Asians or Pacific Islanders).248 
 
Diagram 34 Participation Rates for Major Means-Tested Programs, 2010249 
Regarding means-tested programs, the highest participation rate is in Medicaid, 
and Food Stamps (SNAP) also has a rather high rate. The other programs, however, 
have very low rates. Moreover, many participants only used the programs for a short 
period. Among these beneficiaries, 31.2% used one or more programs for under a 
year, the proportion being particularly high for TANF: 62.9% of beneficiaries stayed 
in the program for less than twelve months. For all programs, less than half of the 
beneficiaries participated between 37 and 48 months over the four-year period rang-
ing from 2009 to 2012.  
The representation of welfare is quite inaccurate, but is relies on the distortion 
of statistical trends. Although blacks disproportionately benefit from means-tested 
programs, they do not represent the majority of the welfare rolls. The bulk of the 
programs is food and health care, which is quite at odds with the image of a person 
waiting for a check. Most participants use welfare only shortly, to eke out insufficient 
resources in a difficult period, which is contrary to images of intergenerational wel-
fare dependency and abuse of the system by greedy, as opposed to truly needy, peo-
ple. 
Despite statistical evidence, certain images are deeply entrenched in people’s 
minds, notably because they are part of a long-established discourse and because 
they have become part of a racial stereotype. This is partly due to the fact that issues 
about welfare are disproportionately illustrated with black faces in popular culture. 
Gilens explains that pictures of the people chosen to illustrate reports on poverty 
have a far higher impact on the reader/viewer than the statistical evidence, although 
the latter is more accurate.250 The problem is that since the mid-1960s, poverty and 
race have been increasingly linked in discourse and representation. Gilens’s study 
shows that before 1964, media coverage of poverty was mostly illustrated with white 
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faces. If, in 1964, only 27% of the pictures of the poor were black people, it went up to 
72% in 1967. Until 1992 blacks on average accounted for 57% of the pictures of poor 
people in the magazines Time, Newsweek, and US News and World Report, which is 
about twice the real proportion of blacks among the poor. Moreover, this was directly 
linked to the discourse about poverty: “As media discourse on poverty and welfare 
became more negative in the mid-1960s, the complexion of the poor grew darker.” 
This not only facilitated the association of blacks with negative ideas about poverty, 
but also led to a gross overestimation by the public of the actual proportion of blacks 
among the poor: 50% instead of 27%.251  
Political scientist Bas W. van Doorn repeated Gilens’s study for the period from 
1992 to 2010 and found that blacks still accounted for 52.3% of all the poor pictured in 
the magazines although they represented only 25.7% of the poor in 2000 and 23.6% in 
2010. In stories about welfare, blacks are also dramatically overrepresented. Blacks 
represented 38% of welfare beneficiaries over the period. However, overall, the maga-
zines illustrated 55.1% of the stories with black faces. US News and World Report came 
closest to reality with 41.2% of blacks; Newsweek, made the most blatant exaggeration 
with 78.9% of welfare stories illustrated with pictures of blacks. Moreover, van 
Doorn’s analysis shows that the age group considered as most sympathetic in terms 
of social policy, the elderly, is almost exclusively portrayed as white.  
The negative racialization of the coverage is even more striking when taking the 
economic situation into account. Van Doorn looked at two distinct economic periods: 
1998-2000 and 2008-2010 to see if a good or bad economic context had an influence 
on the coverage, as a bad economic context favors sympathy and the attribution of 
poverty to structural factors rather than to a lack of work ethics. The results are quite 
telling: during the good economic period the proportion of blacks as poverty illustra-
tions was 56.3%, compared with 34% during the bad period (32.8% of whites during 
the good period, and 53.2% during the bad period). Van Doorn explains that the asso-
ciation of black faces with issues triggered far less sympathetic reactions in people 
and suggestions for remedies to poverty that emphasized individualism, and a greater 
readiness to attribute poverty to structural factors when illustrated with a white 
face.252 This means that the same stereotypes are still alive and blacks are still the ma-
jor group that is negatively associated with welfare, which in turn triggers opposition 
to welfare. 
This negative view of social policies when associated to a black face can be 
found in the health care reform. A 2012 analysis by political scientist Michael Tesler 
found out that opinions about the health care reform were racialized. Tesler found 
that racial resentment played a stronger influence in the rejection of Obama’s reform 
proposal than it had for Clinton. Even in a shorter time span, attitudes changed be-
tween 2007 and 2009 and became more racialized once Obama had become the 
spokesperson for the health care reform proposal. Two elements stand out: support 
for health care reform was divided along racial lines, with 83% of the black popula-
tion supporting the Obama reform in 2009-2010, compared with 38% of whites. This 
racial polarization regarding support for the reform was less sharp for the Clinton 
reform proposal in 1993-4: 69% of blacks supported the Clinton reform compared 
with 43% of whites. Moreover, Tesler found that racial resentment played a role in 
rejecting strong government involvement in health care. This rejection was com-
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pounded when the reform proposal was associated with Obama. In September 2007, 
the most racially resentful respondents preferred private health insurance over gov-
ernment-run health insurance by 30% compared to the least racially resentful re-
spondents. This increased to 60% by November 2009, when Obama had become the 
spokesperson for the health care reform.253 It seems that the association with a black 
face has an effect, even when the policy proposal is not called “welfare.” 
Several years after the passing of the Affordable Care Act, confusion seems to 
reign, partly due to the association of the health care law with Obama through the 
nickname Obamacare. A 2013 poll showed that whereas 46% of Americans were op-
posed to Obamacare, only 37% opposed the same law when it was called Affordable 
Care Act. However, support can also be changed when the name is changed: 29% 
support Obamacare, compared with 22% who support the ACA. 30% of the respond-
ents did not know the Affordable Care Act, compared with 12% who did not know 
Obamacare.254 
Similarly, a 2017 poll by the research institute Morning Consult found that 35% 
of Americans did not know that Obamacare and the Affordable Care Act were the 
same. This ignorance was especially high among young adults and low-income peo-
ple, who are among those most affected by the new health care legislation. 45% of 
respondents did not understand that a repeal of Obamacare actually meant a repeal 
of the Affordable Care Act. Differences in awareness also existed along party lines: 
50% of people identifying as Republicans thought that people would lose their Medi-
caid coverage if the Act were repealed, compared with 80% of Democrats. Among 
Republicans, the name had a strong impact as well: 80% of Republicans disapproved 
of Obamacare, but only 60% disapproved of the Affordable Care Act.255 The racializa-
tion of Obama’s health care reform seems to have worked, despite the Democrats’ 
appropriation of the nickname. 
This situation was compounded by another problem, akin to the problem with 
Medicare-Medicaid of not knowing exactly what the law or program does or does not 
do. A 2011 Kaiser Family Foundation poll found that among the uninsured aged 18 to 
64, only 52% said that subsidies for purchasing health insurance for low and moder-
ate incomes was provided by the ACA, compared with 41% who that this was not the 
case and 7% who did not know. Only 47% were aware of the Medicaid expansion, 
compared with 37% who thought that the Act would not expand Medicaid, and 16% 
who did not know. Only 51% knew about the individual mandate, compared with 38% 
who thought that it was not in the law, and 11% who did not know. In a similar trend, 
in the same population group, 31% of the respondents thought the law would help 
them, 14% thought the law would hurt them, and a staggering 47% thought it would 
not make much difference.256 This lack of information is particularly alarming con-
sidering that the uninsured population between 18 and 64 years old is the part of the 
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population that could potentially benefit most from the ACA and should have consti-
tuted a core advocacy group. 
Welfare offers an easy Weltbild for a complex reality and provides Manichean 
answers, instead of potentially painful and problematic ones, to difficult questions 
concerning the sharing of resources. Crenshaw points out the ease of the cultural 
explanation, as opposed to an explanation based on historical and structural discrim-
ination. The cultural explanation absolves mainstream America from intervening, it 
attributes blacks’ low socio-economic status to themselves, by insisting on their cul-
tural lack of work ethic, instead of attributing the status to an economic system that 
actually does not give the same opportunities to everyone, contrary to the promise of 
the American Dream. The cultural explanation is easier to accept because it does not 
question the economy and American society, and because it builds on tropes that 
have circulated since the 16th and 17th centuries, be it ideas about poverty or ideas to 
justify the subordination of blacks and their enslavement. The explanation works 
because believing that the person living next to you gets a small advantage in social 
benefits, and that this is the reason for the economy doing badly, is easier than to 
question the entire economic system of the Western world. 
2.3.5. The Reagan Democrats: When the White Working 
and Middle Classes Vote Against their Interests 
The central point in stopping the downward redistribution that started with the 
New Deal, and replacing it with an upward redistribution, akin to the one during the 
Gilded Age of the late 19th century, was to break up the racially-mixed class alliance 
based on shared economic interests, called the New Deal coalition. Since 1896, the 
Democratic Party had developed an ideology and a discourse that rallied their con-
stituency around issues of egalitarianism. This was case during its Populist period 
(1896-1948) and during the following Universalist period. The central dichotomy of 
this egalitarianism during the populist period was articulated around the theme of 
the people versus the interests. During the universalist period the party focused on 
civil rights, social welfare, and redistribution. The central dichotomy was built on the 
theme of inclusion versus exclusion.257 This created a solid period of defense of social 
policies and insistence on shared interests among a multi-racial and multi-ethnic 
constituency.  
Since it is difficult to convince a working-class person that they have a shared 
economic interest with the richest five percent of the population, the Republican Par-
ty aimed at convincing the white working and middle class that they had more differ-
ences than common points, and, after all, not that many shared economic interests, 
with the other groups in the New Deal coalition. According to Edsall and Edsall, the 
most powerful wedge to drive between the different groups making up the liberal 
coalition, was, and still is, race.258 The racial wedge works as a double-edged sword. 
One part of the equation consists in creating the perception of a zero-sum game 
around social policies. The second part of the equation is to increase the perception 
of shared values among the white working and middle class and the money elite. The 
result was the birth of the Reagan-Democrats, voters who had deserted the econom-
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ic-interest based New Deal coalition to join the values-based new Republican majori-
ty.259 
An analysis conducted by political scientists Alan Abramowitz and Ruy Teixeira 
sheds light on these developments. Abramowitz and Teixeira analyzed the change in 
voting behavior of the white working and middle class in perspective with the change 
of class structure in the United States. They especially studied the massive changes 
that occurred in the working class in the post-World War II period, notably the over-
all increase in income in these categories, an increase in educational attainment, and 
occupational changes.260 This drastic improvement of the economic situation of 
many working class whites can explain why during these years they increasingly per-
ceived themselves as not being any longer at the receiving end of the welfare state, 
but rather mainly as the taxpaying end of the welfare state. 
Abramowitz and Teixeira aver that the deep societal changes, be they racial or 
cultural, that occurred in the 1960s and which the Democratic Party embraced, espe-
cially the racial tensions resulting from the socioeconomic changes regarding blacks, 
were among the factors that contributed to break up the New Deal coalition. By em-
bracing the demands of new minority groups to capture those votes—blacks, wom-
en/feminists, homosexuals—the Democrats lost votes among working class whites. 
The Democrats lost among working class whites (without a four-year college degree) 
20% of their voter share between the elections of 1960-64 (55%) and 1968-72 (35%). The 
Nixon scandal and the economic downturn provided for a narrow Democratic victory 
in 1976, yet the ongoing focus on black rights and demands, and the difficult econom-
ic context of the late 1970s increased white working class rejection of the Democratic 
Party. Moreover, the economic difficulties also led many to doubt Democrats’ ability 
to manage the economy. Combined with the more difficult access to the middle class 
and the perception that the welfare state mainly benefits minorities, these events 
paved the way for the Republican Party. In 1980 and 1984, Reagan got 61% of support 
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among the white working class, compared to the average of 35% for Carter and Mon-
dale.261 
Three parallel developments took place that helped Ronald Reagan create a 
new Republican majority, as mentioned above: a greater inclusion and focus on soci-
oeconomic demands of blacks; deep cultural and societal changes, and a difficult 
economic context. Since Truman’s open advocacy of civil rights and first steps toward 
integration, the Democratic Party had started to split, torn between the opposing ra-
cial attitudes between North and South. This change was completed by the 1964 pres-
idential election, where a majority of the white votes in the Deep South went to Re-
publican candidate Barry Goldwater. The important development of this campaign 
was the realization for Republicans that they could court the racially conservative 
white voters of the South when running a campaign strongly focused on states’ rights. 
The 1966 Congressional mid-term elections marked a further turn to the right.262 
Moreover, by 1965, the party realignment of the black population was also completed, 
due to the strong positions of the Democratic Party on racial equality expressed in 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. In addition, the nomination 
of Goldwater as the Republican candidate made Republicans lose the “Party of Lin-
coln” legacy in the eyes of the black population.263  
The 1960s also brought a wide range of cultural and societal changes, with many 
demands for more rights from various groups, racial, ethnic, gender, and sexual mi-
norities, as well as a questioning of traditions and established social order by the 
younger generations. These social upheavals, combined with the violence of the late 
1960s, such as assassinations, urban riots, and the emergence of more and more radi-
cal groups, such as the Black Panthers who advocated self-defense, led to a backlash. 
These developments made the population very receptive to Nixon’s law and order 
discourse. Reagan had launched a successful gubernatorial campaign in California in 
1966 with a similar rhetoric.264 The importance of the effect of race riots such as the 
one in Watts in the summer of 1965 must not be underestimated. Historian and activ-
ist Howard Zinn analyzed these riots as an expression of frustration over long un-
addressed economic grievances and the slow pace of civil rights legislation. 265 How-
ever, the white population did not necessarily understand them in these terms and 
many “viewed the riots	   as intolerable lawlessness worthy only of severe punish-
ment.”266  
Moreover, as the riots occurred almost at the same time as massive legislative ef-
forts in favor of minorities, such as the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, the 
Great Society, and affirmative action, they enabled the negative association between 
social programs and violence. In his 1968 Nomination Acceptance Speech, Nixon em-
ulated these frustrations over increasing demands and violence. He depicted an 
America torn apart by violence at home, and he openly appealed to the silent suffer-
ing of the working people who “give steel to the backbone of America”. He described 
them in terms of traditional values: hard working, money-saving, tax paying, and car-
ing. Moreover, he absolved the white population of its guilt over slavery: “They are 
                                                        
261	  Abramowitz	  and	  Teixeira	  398–400.	  
262	  Noble	  113.	  
263	  Manza	  and	  Brooks,	  Social	  Cleavages,	  36.	  
264	  Coste,	  “Reagan	  Democrats.”	  
265	  Howard	  Zinn,	  “Solving	  the	  Race	  Problem	  (1973),”	  in	  On	  Race	  (New	  York:	  Seven	  Stories	  Press,	  2011),	  
173.	  
266	  Schuman	  et	  al.	  32.	  
204 Stephan Social Policies and Racial Questions 
not racists or sick; they are not guilty of the crime that plagues the land.” He also min-
imized discrimination by describing America as “a nation that has been known for a 
century for equality of opportunity.” This denied any legitimacy to the grievances 
that had led to the riots of the late 1960s. Later in his speech, Nixon linked Court deci-
sions with increased violence: 
 Let us always respect, as I do, our courts and those who serve on them. But let us also 
recognize that some of our courts in their decisions have gone too far in weakening the 
peace forces as against the criminal forces in this country and we must act to restore that 
balance.267 
Moreover, Nixon made a more direct link between violence and the Civil Rights Act 
by pointing out that “the first civil right of every American is to be free from domestic 
violence, and that right must be guaranteed in this country.” 268 
Frustration was further increased in the 1970s by the growth of inner city ghettos 
and the sharp increases in crime that often spilled over to surrounding white neigh-
borhoods (violent crime rates increased by 367% between 1960 and 1980). This was 
accompanied by increasing incarceration rates for increasingly younger offenders 
(from 35% in 1960 to 43.5% in 1979), multiplying rates of out-of-wedlock births (rising 
from 34.9% in 1965-9 for blacks, compared with 4.8% for whites, to 43% in 1970-4, 
compared with 6% for whites, and 51.7% in 1975-9, compared with 8.2% for whites), 
augmenting drug abuse, joblessness, and welfare dependency. For example, from 
1965 to 1975, the number of families receiving AFDC grew by 237%. The increase from 
1950 to 1965 had ‘only’ been of 65%. This growing so-called ‘underclass’ also led to a 
heightened visibility of social problems.269 Part of this increase of the welfare rolls 
was due not to the failure of the programs but to the opening of programs to minori-
ties that had previously been excluded. Political scientist Theda Skocpol claims that 
the multiplication of out-of-wedlock births and the increase of female-headed fami-
lies obliterated the objective successes of the war on poverty and made it difficult to 
contain the backlash.270 Moreover, this sudden increase of the number of black urban 
poor after acceding to many demands and the concentration of the phenomenon fa-
cilitated the association of social programs with the black population. 
Although the North was more in favor of civil rights in principle than the South, 
the above-mentioned changes and the fact that the Civil Rights Movement moved 
towards the North in the late 1960s triggered a white reaction against the implemen-
tation of Civil Rights, especially against busing. Besides, the enforcement of Civil 
Rights hit Northern industrial cities at the same time as the economic crisis of the 
early 1970s. This made the population more reluctant to share dwindling resources. 
This situation was worsened by the fact that white ethnic workers, but not profes-
sionals, were hit with increased competition at a period that witnessed massive job 
losses, especially in the industrial sector, for the first time since the Great Depres-
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sion.271 Political scientist and sociologist Leslie McCall explains that this fear of com-
petition and anti-social policy sentiment was further reinforced by Republicans who 
presented redistributive policies as anti-growth.272  
Other race-specific policies, especially affirmative action, exacerbated this feel-
ing of unwelcome and even unfair competition. Political scientist Jennifer Hochschild 
is less clement in explaining the backlash sentiment. She argues that there was an 
entrenched feeling in the white community that whites ought to dominate, associated 
with the fear of blacks “taking over,” which would lead to whites becoming a minority 
and being “brought down.” This is directly linked to the fact that many think that 
black gains came at the expenses of whites. This fear of black competition is also ex-
pressed in the gross overestimation by the white population, of the proportion of mi-
nority populations, going as far as an overestimation of 1/3rd for blacks and 1/5th for 
Hispanics.273  
In this strained economic and social context, the Democratic Party made the tac-
tical error of refusing to address the grievances of the white working class and their 
concerns about increasing crime. They particularly refused to address the issue of the 
growing ‘underclass,’ and refused to discuss social policies, not wanting to admit that 
some of the programs might not work the way they were intended to. This strategic 
error allowed Ronald Reagan to focus on disaffected white ethnics and tax-frustrated 
union workers in the East and the North. He precisely targeted this group, playing on 
his past as president of the Screen Actors Guild in Hollywood, and went so far as to 
make references to Franklin D. Roosevelt in his 1980 Nomination Acceptance 
Speech.274 The choice was well calculated since the programs of the New Deal were 
targeted at the white working and middle class. At their inception these programs 
even largely excluded minorities. This marked a clear demarcation with programs 
from the Great Society that were targeted at the very poor and at minorities, and with 
Johnson’s open endorsement of economic equality. This crystallized in the represen-
tation of the Democratic Party by Republicans as being led by intellectual elites that 
abandoned the white working and middle class to cater exclusively to minorities 
through inefficient and costly programs paid for by white taxpayer money. This idea 
is summarized in the phrase “tax-and-spend liberals.” 
Moreover, the development of the ‘underclass’ in the inner cities allowed the re-
surgence of a values discourse based on apprehensions about welfare dating back to 
the 16th century in the Anglo-American world: the belief that welfare leads to a 
breakdown of morality, encourages laziness and promiscuous sexual behavior.275 The 
identification of the Democratic Party with social policies and a breakdown of moral-
ity and work ethics allowed for rallying the Republican Party around traditional fami-
ly values, strong work ethics, self-reliance, and opposition to abortion. All these val-
ues, particularly the strong anti-abortion stance, were also aimed at winning over the 
religious voters of the Bible Belt. By putting strong traditional values in the fore-
ground, Republicans seemed to take the fears about societal changes and increasing 
violence seriously, whereas Democrats refused to talk about it. Political scientists 
Marc D. Brewer and Jeffrey M. Stonecash, in their 2007 book Split: Class and Cultural 
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Divides in American Politics, demonstrated how these values functioned as a binder to 
cement an alliance of classes despite their conflicting economic interests. Further-
more, Brewer and Stonecash explain that the abovementioned “cultural anger [was] 
marshaled to achieve economic ends.”276  
Thus, Reagan’s particular strength was to combine different conservative ideo-
logical trends (fiscal conservatism, social conservatism, racial conservatism, neo-
conservatism, and neoliberalism) into one coherent discourse. Reagan’s tactic 
worked: in 1980 he was elected with 22% of the Democratic vote. He captured 54% of 
the white working class and 47% of union members.277 
Obama largely shares this analysis of how Republicans managed to capture a 
significant part of previously Democratic voters. He explained this in The Audacity of 
Hope: 
That conservatives won over white public opinion should come as no surprise. Their ar-
guments tapped into a distinction between the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor that 
has a long and varied history in America, an argument that has often been racially or 
ethnically tinged and that has gained greater currency during those periods—like the 
seventies and eighties—when economic times are tough. The response of liberal policy 
makers and civil rights leaders didn’t help; in their urgency to avoid blaming the victims 
of historical racism, they tended to downplay or ignore evidence that entrenched behav-
ioral patterns among the black poor really were contributing to intergenerational pov-
erty. (Most famously, Daniel Patrick Moynihan was accused of racism in the early sixties 
when he raised alarms about the rise of out-of-wedlock births among the black poor.) 
This willingness to dismiss the role that values played in shaping the economic success 
of a community strained credulity and alienated working-class whites—particularly 
since some of the most liberal policy makers lived lives far removed from urban disor-
der.278 
Obama’s interpretation particularly overlaps with Edsall and Edsall’s, as well as 
West’s 1993 analysis. 
2.4. The Backlash against Race Specific Policies 
2.4.1. The Backlash Against Affirmative Action 
The best-known race-specific policy is affirmative action. Although affirmative 
action is not strictly speaking a purely redistributive policy, i.e. social policy, it is of 
central interest because it both crystallizes and amalgamates resentments about race-
specific measures in social policy. As sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva has written, 
attacks on affirmative action can be considered as “the clarion call signaling the end 
of race-based social policy in the United States.”279 
Affirmative action is increasingly perceived as granting unjustified preferential 
treatment to minorities in the job market and higher education. This perception, 
coupled with a belief that equal opportunity is a reality (or that discrimination no 
longer exists), and that one’s economic situation is consequently largely due to per-
sonal responsibility and personal efforts to succeed, has created a strong resentment 
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against targeted efforts for minorities. Affirmative action ‘crystallizes’ these resent-
ments in the sense that it is the most visible example of preferential treatment. The 
affirmative action issue ‘amalgamates’ in the sense that targeted social programs rap-
idly became seen as a type of preferential treatment for undeserving poor minorities. 
The affirmative action debate illustrates how difficult it has become to directly ad-
dress racial inequalities. It is one of the elements that explain why, in his effort for 
racial economic equality, President Barack Obama, although the first black president, 
did not choose a race-specific approach in social policies. 
It has been shown in the preceding pages that intergroup competition playing 
on deep-seated racial animosity was, and is, used to divide the class alliance that was 
created during the New Deal. Sociologist Jill Quadango argues that the War on Pov-
erty triggered a backlash because it also promoted economic racial equality. Accord-
ing to her, targeting minority populations, be it by income or by race directly, is not 
an effective strategy anymore for expanding the welfare state.280 In other words, ef-
forts that are explicitly and mainly aimed at the poorest populations are too strongly 
associated with racial minorities, especially with blacks. Besides, opposition to openly 
race-specific policies is particularly virulent. This means that any new reform has to 
be race-neutral in its language and should also put forward the idea that it is target-
ing the working and middle class to avoid a backlash. 
In When Affirmative Action Was White, Ira Katznelson demonstrated how the 
welfare state prior to 1964 was shaped and implemented to function as a systemic ad-
vantage for the white population.281 Johnson’s Great Society, and particularly the War 
on Poverty, partly leveled this inequality. It promoted equal access to social pro-
grams, which also resulted in an increase of welfare rolls, because minority popula-
tions finally claimed their entitlements. This steamrolling of the welfare state already 
created a sense of heightened competition for resources. Furthermore, Feagin insists 
on the aggravating role of civil rights policy, which led to a perception of the loss of 
the advantage of whiteness, known as the “wage of whiteness.” This “wage of white-
ness,” according to Feagin, refers to the deal of racial privilege between the white 
lower classes and the elite. This deal consists in the white lower classes accepting 
economic and political dominance by white elites, which becomes bearable as long as 
there is a glass-floor that keeps minorities at the far bottom of society.282 However, 
smoothing competition was not the only achievement of the 1960s: affirmative action 
was created. The ideology behind affirmative action was to reduce the effect of past 
discrimination, the legacy of slavery and segregation, through the active promotion of 
equality, and the strong denunciation of current discrimination. This also included, 
to a certain extent, preferential treatment of minorities with equal qualifications. Af-
firmative action seemed to give an undue advantage to minorities, turning the previ-
ous social order upside down, and exacerbating the feeling of increased and even 
unfair competition. 
Affirmative action was created in the context of an expanding economy and a 
spirit of sharing the growing prosperity. With the dwindling of resources starting at 
the end of the 1960s and the economic downturn of the 1970s, also came the backlash 
against race-specific policies. Sociologists Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, Law-
rence Bobo, and Maria Krysan point out that, since then, the cultural, material, and 
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political gains for blacks have been coupled with civil rights retrenchment and deep-
ening racial tensions, i.e. a backlash.283  
Sociologist William Julius Wilson insists on the role of the economic downturn 
of the 1970s in fostering new receptiveness within the public for race baiting in poli-
tics: 
Unfortunately, during periods when people are beset with economic anxiety, they be-
come more receptive to simplistic ideological messages that deflect attention from the 
real and complex sources of their problems. These messages increase resentment and of-
ten result in public support for mean-spirited initiatives. Candidates for public office and 
elected officials advance arguments that associate the drop on their living standards with 
programs for minorities, immigrants, and the welfare poor.284 
Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign had already appealed deeply to white backlash 
sentiments by promising to be tough on crime, by appealing directly to Southerners 
with promises to terminate federal efforts at school desegregation, and by giving con-
servative Southern Senator Strom Thurmond a prominent role. Moreover, he had 
chosen Spiro Agnew as vice-president to appeal to the white backlash sentiment and 
he had voiced repeated criticism at alleged social reform excesses, especially the 
Great Society.285  
Nixon had an ambivalent attitude about the welfare state and his discourse ap-
peared as quite contradictory with his actions in some cases. Although Nixon’s rheto-
ric in many cases appeared to be against the welfare state, he nonetheless expanded it 
as an appeal to blue-collar voters. And even though Nixon even expanded affirmative 
action, his election nonetheless marked a change in the political climate. Due to Nix-
on’s and Agnew’s rhetoric, white working and lower-middle class Americans became 
increasingly preoccupied with issues of crime, inflation, and government spending. 
They also developed the perception that African-Americans were receiving unwar-
ranted and disproportionate benefits from the federal government. This white back-
lash was concomitant with an increased disillusionment in the African-American 
community, who realized that civil rights gains were limited and had hardly any eco-
nomic effects. The expansion of segregation in urban ghettos and the growth of the 
‘underclass’ also fostered the urge to continue to develop racial and heritage pride. 
This increased visibility of the black minority was accompanied by growing demands 
from other outgroups, such as women, homosexuals, handicapped people, and other 
racial minorities such as Hispanics and Native Americans, which led, in the main-
stream population, to a resentment of separatism and the challenge to dominant pol-
icies.286 The clashing point was, and still is today, the sharply differing perceptions of 
racial progress. A majority of whites today believe that civil rights legislation was suc-
cessful, that equal opportunity is a fact, and that the largely black ‘underclass’ is re-
sponsible for their conditions. On the other hand, a majority of blacks see discrimina-
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tion as persisting and have the feeling that mainstream America has lost interest in 
equal opportunity.287 
All this has created a context of heightened intergroup competition. Especially 
when dealing with redistributive policies in a context of limited resources, this situa-
tion can rapidly lead to the perception of a zero-sum game. Phrased in the terms of 
the promise of the American Dream by political scientist Jennifer Hochschild, it cre-
ates a perception that “your dream comes at my expense.”288 Historian and sociologist 
Hugh Davis Graham explains how this perception of a zero-sum game leads to claims 
of reverse discrimination, which have become central in the attacks against affirma-
tive action: 
The perceived effect of competing individual and group claims to jobs and contracts, to 
appointments and promotions, to higher education and professional schools, when 
combined with the logic and force of rising federal efforts to rectify the “underutiliza-
tion” of minorities, ultimately raised the cry of “reverse discrimination.”289 
The reference to the “underutilization” of minorities comes from the phrasing of 
Nixon’s 1969 Philadelphia plan that established hiring quotas in the construction in-
dustry for a very short period. It has generated many misconceptions about affirma-
tive action and has greatly fuelled opposition to the program. Although quotas exist-
ed briefly for construction companies under the Philadelphia Plan, it was actually a 
mistake in the implementation of affirmative action at universities that was chal-
lenged in the Supreme Court. Indeed, many universities implemented affirmative 
action through set-asides for minority students. The most famous was the Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke case in 1978. The plaintiff claimed that he was vic-
tim of reverse discrimination because the admission program was divided into two, 
with a regular and a special program. The special program considered “economically 
and/or educationally disadvantaged applicants and members of a minority group”. 
White candidates were not considered, although many tried to apply under the spe-
cial program. Both in 1973 and 1974 the white applicant Allan Bakke had been denied 
admission to the medical school, although minorities with lower scores than him had 
been admitted. The Supreme Court ruled that special set-asides were unconstitution-
al, but still allowed race as being a factor that could be taken into consideration.290 
The next major challenges came in 2003 with the Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bol-
linger cases, in which the plaintiffs denounced an unfair and unjustified preferential 
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treatment of minorities.291 Both cases were rejected. More recently, in the Fisher v. 
University of Texas case an applicant to the university who was refused challenged the 
admission process that the university had devised in 2004, after the university had 
concluded that their race-neutral admission system did not provide for a diverse 
enough student body. UT’s admission process carefully took the rulings of the Gratz 
and Grutter cases into account, and devised a system automatically granting admis-
sion to the top 10% of graduates of any Texas high school. The remaining 25% of their 
freshman classes are filled through a combined evaluation of the SAT scores and a 
holistic review of personal achievement that among other factors include race. Fisher 
claimed that this disadvantaged Caucasians. The ruling decided that the University 
of Texas complied with the conditions set by the previous cases.292 
Despite these rulings several states have since then banned affirmative action 
in higher education, the first being California with Proposition 209 in 1996, soon fol-
lowed by Washington, Florida, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Oklahoma, the latest 
being Michigan in 2014. Colorado’s initiative to ban affirmative action narrowly failed 
in 2008. Most of the measures are phrased closely or identically to Proposition 209’s 
key provision: the state “shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treat-
ment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national 
origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contract-
ing.”293 Legal scholar and critical race theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw puts this anti-
affirmative action sentiment into perspective:  
The race neutrality of the legal system creates the illusion that racism is no longer the 
primary factor responsible for the condition of the black ‘underclass’; instead, as we have 
seen, class disparities appear to be the consequence of individual and group merit within 
a supposed system of equal opportunity. Moreover, the fact that some blacks are eco-
nomically successful gives credence both to the assertion that opportunities exist and to 
the backlash attitude that blacks have “gotten too far.”294 
The backlash against affirmative action is therefore mainly due to misconceptions 
about equal opportunity, discrimination, the actual economic situation of the black 
population, and it is partly due to a lack of knowledge about the program. 
2.4.2. Opinions on Affirmative Action 
Support for affirmative action is pretty straightforward and has not significantly 
changed since the program was first created. Affirmative action is mostly supported 
by some liberals (of all races) and grounded on the initial argument of alleviating the 
effects of past discrimination. However, Schuman et al. point out that this belief in the 
effects of past discrimination and present discrimination quickly vanished after the 
Civil Rights era in the mainstream population.295 Notwithstanding this change in the 
population’s beliefs, philosopher Elizabeth Anderson advanced this argument again 
in 2010 in her work The Imperative of Integration. She argues that the extensive and 
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deep unfairness of past discrimination through slavery and segregation, as well as the 
persistence of discrimination today, fully justify a temporary unfair advantage 
through measures like affirmative action. Katznelson makes a similar case. He argues 
that since discrimination was race-specific, the compensatory policy should be race-
specific as well. In other words, since the wound was unfair, the remedy might as well 
be unfair. Katznelson particularly insists on the long-lasting structural effects of past 
discrimination and curtailed opportunity that justify alleviating measures.296 Similar-
ly, in the 2014 Supreme Court lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the affirma-
tive action ban in Michigan, Supreme Court justice Sonia Sotomayor evoked past 
discrimination in her dissent about the decision.297 Another argument to defend the 
maintaining of affirmative action is to ensure diversity, which was made in the Bakke 
case. 
Opposition, on the other hand, is found across the whole political and racial 
spectrum, and is increasing among the population and among all races. 
White opposition to affirmative action is essentially framed in terms of reverse 
discrimination. Especially since the 1990s, the discourse that racism and discrimina-
tion belong to the past and the voiced criticism over race-specific policies, also con-
veyed by the media, led to the “perception that white elite males somehow had be-
come the most oppressed social class in the country.”298 This perception was made 
possible because the affirmative action pool had gradually been extended to all social 
minorities, which, in a still overwhelmingly patriarchal white society, is everybody 
except white males. The perception of reverse discrimination is further enhanced by 
the perception of a decrease in racism, which must certainly not be denied, but which 
also implies an increasing opposition to preferential treatment. William Julius Wil-
son points out that in this context, the ongoing demands for more race-specific poli-
cies, combined with the fact that black leaders continued to denounce the lack of 
progress, further fuelled the white backlash and the discourse of black progress com-
ing at the expenses of whites.299  
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva explains that this has reversed the race discussion: blacks 
are now often accused of “playing the race card” when denouncing racism, or when 
asking for more race-conscious policies.300 This accusation is linked to the decreasing 
support for affirmative action. According to Schuman et al., this decreasing support 
for affirmative action comes from a declining belief in job discrimination for equal 
qualification.301 This in turn favors the perception of demands for maintaining af-
firmative action as demands for preferential treatment. Besides, sociologist Dalton 
Conley gives analytical depth to the perception of reverse discrimination in educa-
tion. Conley agrees that affirmative action can be interpreted as unfair. As a matter of 
fact, at the same socioeconomic level, black students fare better. The difficulties that 
minority students experience in higher education are directly linked to class-related 
factors. According to his study, differences in educational attainment can be primari-
ly explained by class differences and class related factors. The first two predictors of 
college completion are the occupational status of the parents and the available assets 
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to finance higher education.302 In this sense, it is understandable that a white working 
class student feels discriminated against if a black middle class student benefits from 
affirmative action. 
The misconception of preferential treatment is further enhanced by the belief 
that it does not only apply to equal qualifications. It must be conceded that the way of 
taking race into account in higher education can easily justify this perception. Indeed, 
under some admission programs, minorities with lower SAT scores can be admitted. 
This has been be justified by invoking racial inequalities in initial education oppor-
tunities and by the fact that many white applicants benefit from a socio-economically 
biased meritocratic system that heavily relies on long-established white ad-
vantages.303 Nonetheless, these measures have led to criticisms against affirmative 
action, such as the lowering of standards at university and thereby a threat to excel-
lence.304 
As recently as 2015, during the debates around the affirmative action challenge 
in Fisher v. University of Texas, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia argued that 
achieving a diverse student body might not be of interest and that minority students 
might do better in other schools: 
You say that like it’s a bad thing [answered Scalia to UT’s lawyer Gregory Garre when 
the latter pointed out that without the consideration of race diversity had plummeted]. 
There are—there are those who contend that it does benefit African-Americans to get 
them into the University of Texas where they do not do well, as opposed to having them 
go to a less advanced, a … slower track school where they do well. […] I’m just not im-
pressed by the fact that the University of Texas may have fewer. Maybe it ought to have 
fewer.305 
In his answer, the UT lawyer replied that he did not “think the solution to the prob-
lems with student-body diversity can be to set up a system in which not only are mi-
norities going to separate schools, they’re going to inferior schools.” Supreme Court 
Justice John Roberts questioned the educational value of diversity, and Supreme 
Court Justice Samuel Alito wondered why minority students should not have a good 
career if they go to lesser schools.306 These criticism, even if they were made during 
the debate around a case that eventually upheld the race-conscious admission pro-
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cess at UT, show that the questioning of race-conscious policies has become less po-
litically incorrect. The opinions voiced by these Supreme Court justices are eerily 
reminiscent of some ideas voiced during segregation times and are quite at odds with 
the position of the Supreme Court in the Brown decision of 1954 that found that ra-
cially segregated schools could never be equal. 
However, whites are not the only critics of affirmative action. Black conservative 
criticism focuses on the creation of a double standard that devalues black achieve-
ment. Supreme Court justice Clarence Thomas has notably framed his opposition to 
affirmative action this way, despite having benefited from the program:  
As much as it stung to be told that I’d done well in the seminary despite my race, it was far 
worse to feel that I was now at Yale because of it. I sought to vanquish the perception that 
I was somehow inferior to my white classmates by obtaining special permission to carry 
more that the maximum number of credit hours and by taking a rigorous curriculum of 
courses in such traditional areas as corporate law, bankruptcy, and commercial transac-
tions.307 
Law professor Stephen L. Carter further expanded on this argument. According 
to him, affirmative action creates a situation in which minorities are not evaluated in 
the same way as white people. By creating special admission slots, special evaluation 
slots are created as well. He has termed this “the best black syndrome.” His reasoning 
is that affirmative action beneficiaries are not simply considered the best, but the best 
of their category, i.e. minorities.308 
The most famous liberal criticism of affirmative action may have been made by 
William Julius Wilson in his hotly contested 1978 book, The Declining Significance of 
Race. It must be admitted that Wilson’s provocative title has contributed to sparking 
the controversy. Wilson has been reproached with making the case for racists, but 
this is willfully misunderstanding his central point, which was to show the intersec-
tion of race and class. By doing so, he attempted to give minority issues a more im-
portant place in the political economy. In addition, Wilson wanted to explain why 
affirmative action programs are not efficient enough. He argued that the changes in 
the economy, the transition to a post-industrial society and the white flight to the 
suburbs had created an ‘underclass’ in the inner city ghettos. People from the ‘under-
class,’ because of problems of an intrinsic lack of education and a lack of well-paying 
low-skill jobs, are not able to compete on the new job market under the equal qualifi-
cation clause of affirmative action, because it does not compensate for a lack of quali-
fication. Affirmative action, by not tackling the problems of primary and secondary 
education, residential segregation, and changes in the economy, fails to help these 
populations. The progress of the black middle class, at the time of the publication of 
his book, made Wilson say that affirmative action had become useless. However, 
since then, as the revised 2012 edition shows, Wilson has changed his opinion. He did 
not anticipate the stagnation of the gains of the black middle class and its fragility. He 
now supports the maintaining of affirmative action for the middle class, but he con-
tinues to defend the theory that the program is not tailored to the needs of the ‘un-
derclass.’309 
Another prominent black scholar, historian Manning Marable, while not dis-
missing affirmative action, saw the need of rethinking the program and its defense in 
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the context of hostility to progressive reform. According to him, the focus on race 
issues obliterates the underlying class problem and prevents an alliance of the “eco-
nomically and socially disadvantaged of all ethnic backgrounds.”310 With this argu-
ment Marable gives a more politically outspoken and activist dimension to Wilson’s 
point. In the mid-1990s, Marable’s point of view on the matter was a little more com-
plex. Although at that moment he was against an approach that would solely focus 
on class or income, he nonetheless saw problems with affirmative action. First, he 
viewed the program as only “advancing remedial remedies for unequal outcomes 
than […] uprooting racism as a system of white power.”311 However, he also saw the 
way in which affirmative action was used by conservatives after Nixon, by portraying 
affirmative action as a rigid system of quotas that allowed the hiring of incompetent 
and unqualified minorities to the detriment of hard-working and tax-paying whites. 
In this representation merit was used to reinforce white male privilege and made the 
victims of discrimination, through an inversion of language, appear as ‘racists.’312 In 
other words, the problem that Marable perceived was the divisive utilization of af-
firmative action as reverse discrimination. It is interesting to see that the discourse 
described above regarding the welfarization of social programs matches the discourse 
Marable perceived around affirmative action. 
The previous opinions, however, represent academic or political points of view. 
Public opinion about affirmative action, on the other hand, is rather difficult to assess 
and is mostly based on quantitative analysis. A puzzling picture emerges. In a 2013 
Gallup poll, there was still a majority of the population (58%) supporting affirmative 
action.313 It seems strange then that affirmative action should have been under such 
harsh attack for years. However, when opinions are more detailed and the phrasing 
of the poll questions is analyzed, opposition becomes clearer. When asked whether 
they wanted race or merit to be considered as admission criteria in college, people 
overwhelmingly rejected affirmative action. Here the racial opinion gap is apparent: 
75% of whites prefer merit as the only criterion (vs. 22% in favor of race), whereas 
slightly more African-Americans favored race as critical admission criterion (48% vs. 
44%)—which still is not an absolute majority.314  
It might be assumed that blacks would overwhelmingly support affirmative ac-
tion, but as shown in this Gallup poll, when confronted with an either/or question 
pitching merit against race, black opinion is rather divided and, to a certain extent, it 
echoes the opinions voiced by Thomas and Carter. This should be completed with 
another element. By 2010, fewer blacks believed that “blacks not getting ahead” was 
caused by discrimination (34%), rather than by their not taking responsibility for their 
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own situation (52%).315 This belief may explain why an increasing proportion of the 
black community favors merit as the only criterion for college admission.  
This interpretation can be sustained by an explanation offered by sociologists 
Lawrence D. Bobo and Camille Z. Charles. They show that opposition to affirmative 
action increases through the belief that people are unwilling to help themselves. De-
spite the overall rejection of affirmative action, the slightly greater proportion of af-
firmative action supporters among the African-American population stems from the 
fact that blacks see the effects of past discrimination more concretely, but also be-
cause they have a heightened awareness of ongoing discrimination.316 Another poll 
from 2003 gives more insight into the apparent contradiction between supporting 
affirmative action in principle while at the same time rejecting affirmative action 
measures. It shows that although 63% of the total population pronounced themselves 
in favor of affirmative action, only 57% were in favor of making a special preference 
for minorities, and an overwhelming majority of 72% was against any preferential 
treatment.317  
These conflicting and contradictory views can be explained by at least two fac-
tors: a general misunderstanding, misconception, and lack of information about what 
affirmative action actually does; and of course the phrasing of the question. Opposi-
tion towards affirmative action, it appears, can be triggered by the simple fact of 
framing it as “preferential treatment,”318 a term which still clearly triggers feelings 
similar to those initially at work in creating the backlash. 
Lastly, Barack Obama’s opinion on affirmative action was twofold, as he did not 
entirely reject the program, and combined both Wilson’s and Marable’s arguments. 
Obama famously stated in an 2008 interview that he was against affirmative action. 
He explained that his daughters should not benefit from affirmative action when ap-
plying to college because of their privileged background, especially if that meant that 
socially and economically advantaged minority children got a “more favorable treat-
ment than a poor white kid who has struggled more.”319  
Despite his opinion about his daughters not needing affirmative action, he still 
supports affirmative action in higher education, mainly because of the stark under-
representation of qualified minorities.320 Two factors are likely to influence Obama’s 
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support for affirmative action in higher education. It seems that there generally is 
greater support for affirmative action in higher education, as the Michigan case illus-
trates: although all three levels of affirmative action were threatened by Proposal 2, 
affirmative action supporters rallied only around defending it in higher education.321 
The other reason is the major achievement gap between white and black students, 
and education reform, as advocated by Obama to close this achievement gap,322 
would take a long time before really kicking in. Moreover, he does not reject affirma-
tive action as a matter of principle and he concedes that, in some cases of entrenched 
discrimination, no other solution might work: 
Moreover, as a lawyer who’s worked on civil rights cases, I can say that where there’s 
strong evidence of prolonged and systemic discrimination by large corporations, trade 
unions, or branches of municipal government, goals and timetables for minority hiring 
may be the only meaningful remedy available.323 
Despite this principled support for affirmative action, Obama has often voiced his 
preference for a class approach rather than a race approach. In The Audacity of Hope 
he clearly explains that he thinks that black progress was mainly the result of more 
favorable economic conditions and economic redistributive measures implemented 
by the government, not of affirmative action: 
This pattern—of a rising tide lifting minority boats—has certainly held true in the past. 
[…] The same formula holds true today. As recently as 1999, the black unemployment 
rate fell to record lows and black income rose to record highs not because of a surge in 
affirmative action hiring or a sudden change in the black work ethic but because the 
economy was booming and government took a few modest measures—like the expan-
sion of the Earned Income Tax Credit—to spread the wealth around.324 
Obama clearly saw affirmative action as not having enough impact on deep-seated 
inequalities and problems. He certainly did not call for an immediate end of affirma-
tive action, but rather for a change in strategy that focused on universal redistributive 
policies. He gave the examples of education and health care, where he strongly de-
fended the opinion that universal reform would do more for minorities than any 
race-specific affirmative action approach: 
Even as we continue to defend affirmative action as a useful, if limited, tool to expand 
opportunity to underrepresented minorities, we should consider spending a lot more of 
our political capital convincing America to make the investments needed to ensure that 
all children perform at grade level and graduate from high school—a goal that, if met, 
would do more than affirmative action to help those black and Latino children who need 
it the most. Similarly, we should support targeted programs to eliminate existing health 
disparities between minorities and whites (some evidence suggests that even when in-
come and levels of insurance are factored out, minorities may still be receiving worse 
care), but a plan for universal health-care coverage would do more to eliminate health 
disparities between whites and minorities than any race-specific programs we might de-
sign.325 
 The important aspect to note is that Obama’s criticism of affirmative action is a de-
cidedly progressive one: he favors a different approach because he considers that 
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affirmative action does not do enough. This is the complete opposite of conservative 
criticism, which denounces affirmative action as an unfair advantage. Moreover, his 
appeals to consider other solutions than affirmative action did not recommend doing 
nothing and just letting the market run its course, but to focus instead on universal 
redistributive policies and strong government intervention to remedy the deep-
seated problems that affect the whole of America.  
2.4.3. Obama and the Backlash 
Obama’s partial rejection of affirmative action is similar to the argument made 
by Manning Marable: the race focus is too divisive, it alienates the white working and 
middle class, and it even fosters intergroup competition among minorities. Being 
convinced that a universal focus on specific issues would have a positive impact on 
problems that present a particularly difficult issue for minorities he argues:  
Ultimately, though, the most important tool to close the gap between minority and white 
workers may have little to do with race at all. These days, what ails working-class and 
middle-class blacks and Latinos is not fundamentally different from what ails their white 
counterparts: downsizing, outsourcing, automation, wage stagnation, the dismantling of 
employer-based health-care and pension plans, and schools that fail to teach young peo-
ple the skills they need to compete in a global economy. (Blacks in particular have been 
vulnerable to these trends, since they are more reliant on blue-collar manufacturing jobs 
and are less likely to live in suburban communities where new jobs are being generated.) 
And what would help minority workers are the same things that would help white work-
ers: the opportunity to earn a living wage, the education and training that lead to such 
jobs, labor wages and tax laws that restore some balance to the distribution of the na-
tion’s wealth, and health-care, child care, and retirement systems that working people 
can count on.326 
In this passage from The Audacity of Hope, Obama very clearly insists on the particular 
issues that, according to him, represent a problem for all Americans. Although he 
highlights that most of these issues more heavily impact African-Americans, none-
theless, he insists strongly on the fact that whites face the same problems. He also 
indicates the fact that it is primarily a class problem, by explicitly mentioning the 
working and the middle class, and by insisting on ‘workers.’ Although Obama admits 
that within the same economic class the situation is worse for minorities, he nonethe-
less advocates a decreasing focus on race-specific measures, like affirmative action, in 
order to build a political alliance in favor of progressive redistributive measures.327 
Obama further insists on the political dimension of a neutral, but issue-focused, ap-
proach: “An emphasis on universal, as opposed to race-specific, programs isn’t just 
good policy; it’s also good politics.”328 In this, Obama is representative of new black 
politics.  
His position during the 2008 presidential campaign clearly took white backlash 
sentiments into account. As he said in his A More Perfect Union speech, he understood 
how a feeling of unfairness could develop in certain cases. He particularly pointed to 
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recent white immigrants who could feel unjustly disadvantaged by affirmative ac-
tion:329 
Most working- and middle-class white Americans don’t feel that they have been particu-
larly privileged by their race. Their experience is the immigrant experience - as far as 
they’re concerned, no one’s handed them anything, they’ve built it from scratch. […] So 
when they are told to bus their children to a school across town; when they hear that an 
African-American is getting an advantage in landing a good job or a spot in a good col-
lege because of an injustice that they themselves never committed; when they’re told 
that their fears about crime in urban neighborhoods are somehow prejudiced, resent-
ment builds over time.330 
This was not a purely rhetorical concession to appeal to white voters, but a strategic 
taking into account of the evolution of the attitudes of whites about racial questions, 
especially since the 1970s backlash. As a pragmatic politician, Obama adapted to the 
context and evaluated the situation as follows:  
Rightly or wrongly, white guilt has largely exhausted itself in America; even the most 
fair-minded of whites, those who would genuinely like to see racial inequality ended and 
poverty relieved, tend to push back against suggestions of racial victimization—or race-
specific claims based on the history of race discrimination in this country.331  
This assessment of the ongoing effects of the backlash was one part of Obama’s advo-
cacy for universal politics. The mentioning of whites’ rejection of racial victimization 
points to the more complex debate over the issue of responsibility, which will be dis-
cussed in detail later. This also reminds that there is little awareness of persistent 
structural racial inequalities and ongoing discrimination among the white popula-
tion. Towards the end of the speech, Obama addressed the political exploitation of 
the backlash sentiments openly. After relating the story of Ashley Baia, a young white 
woman who had joined the Obama campaign because her personal story motivated 
her to fight for better health care, Obama said:  
Now, Ashley might have made a different choice. Perhaps somebody told her along the 
way that the source of her mother's problems were blacks who were on welfare and too 
lazy to work, or Hispanics who were coming into the country illegally. But she didn't. She 
sought out allies in her fight against injustice.332 
Obama addressed two of the themes that are used to divide the population along ra-
cial lines and quite neatly encapsulated the persisting 1970s backlash sentiment: un-
deserving blacks benefiting from welfare are the cause for the problems in the white 
population.  
However, Obama was also aware of the backlash against general social policies. 
He therefore insisted on policies that also largely benefited the white population in 
order to overcome the feeling that Democrats had favored minorities over the white 
working and middle class. He emphasized the white population’s need to feel eco-
nomically secure to prevent resistance to social programs: “Not only did tight labor 
markets, access to capital, and programs like Pell Grants and Perkins Loans benefit 
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blacks directly; growing incomes and a sense of security among whites made them 
less resistant to minority claims for equality.”333  This imperative for alleviating white 
fears and resistance is among the factors that made him focus on education reform 
and health care reform in the run-up to the 2008 election. Education and health care 
are also major concerns for the white middle and working class. Moreover, they have 
a deeper importance because they are crucial elements for upward social mobility 
and they are historically areas of deep racial inequalities.  
Obama’s concessions to white backlash sentiments did not go as far as denying 
the effects of past discrimination or pretending that discrimination had disappeared. 
While acknowledging the positive evolution of race relations in the US, he painstak-
ingly pointed out the inequalities that remain: 
And yet, for all the progress that’s been made in the past four decades, a stubborn gap 
remains between the living standards of black, Latino, and white workers. [...] Even mid-
dle-class blacks and Latinos pay more for insurance, are less likely to own their own 
homes, and suffer poorer health than Americans as a whole. More minorities may be liv-
ing the American dream, but their hold on that dream remains tenuous.334 
Obama also denounced the fact that the years 1964 and 1965 did not mark the end of 
all racial problems in the US, quite the contrary: 
We might start with completing the unfinished business of the Civil Rights Movement—
namely, enforcing nondiscrimination laws in such basic areas as employment, housing, 
and education. Anyone who thinks that such enforcement is no longer needed should 
pay a visit to one of the suburban office parks in their area and count the number of 
blacks employed there, even in the relatively unskilled jobs, or stop by a local trade un-
ion hall and inquire as to the number of blacks in the apprenticeship program, or read 
recent studies showing that real estate brokers continue to steer prospective black 
homeowners away from predominantly white neighborhoods. Unless you live in a state 
without many black residents, I think you’ll agree that something’s amiss.335 
The use of pronouns in this passage is very interesting. Obama uses ‘we’ quite often 
in The Audacity of Hope and alternates these pronouns with uses of ‘America’ when 
discussing subjects affecting the country or the population as a whole. However, the 
choice of using ‘we’ instead of ‘America’ or ‘the government’ is not innocent here. It is 
an inclusive ‘we’, which is one of the uses of ‘we’ Obama makes in the book to con-
nect the reader to his point of view when proposing policy solutions or a course of 
action. More importantly, the ‘we’ in this passage also serves to insist on the fact that 
civil rights are an issue that should concern everybody, as opposed to minorities 
alone. Through this, Obama argues against the view that racial inequalities are a 
problem only regarding minorities. To hammer home the message about greater 
awareness and concern for inequalities and persisting discrimination, Obama direct-
ly addresses the readers at the end of the passage through the use of ‘you.’ By this, 
Obama claims the readers’ adherence to his view on ongoing discrimination. It par-
ticularly stands out because it is a rare occurrence, if not the only one, of directly ad-
dressing the reader in the book. 
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2.4.4. Racial Backlash against Obama 
Despite his rather conciliatory stance on race matters, race-specific policies, and 
his transcending ethos,336  Obama’s campaigns and presidency were marked by a ra-
cial backlash. This racial backlash unfolded at two different levels. First, Obama’s 
election brought the first black president to the office. Despite the 2008 controversy 
that spread out during his first campaign about his racial identity, that fact reinforced 
claims about the US having reached a post-racial era and consequently comforted 
those who believed discrimination was now absent from American society. Second, 
Obama was accused of ‘playing the race card’ when overt and covert racism was de-
nounced (by either his campaign team or other politicians) or of showing racial favor-
itism. 
The first part of the racial backlash was the claim of having achieved a post-
racial America through Obama’s election. At first sight, it seems absurd to view this 
as a backlash. However, it is a backlash in the sense that his presidency makes it more 
difficult, even almost impossible, to argue for race-specific policies, since his election 
has been viewed as proof that racial barriers do not exist anymore. Political scientists 
Ted Brader and Nicholas Valentino point out this possible effect of Obama’s election 
on racial beliefs, especially with people who already shared the widespread belief 
that discrimination ended in 1964 with the Civil Rights Act and 1965 with the Voting 
Rights Act.337 Historian David Hollinger saw the Obama election as a sign of the emer-
gence “of a new, multihued racial order, a majority-minority society” and the end of 
static notions of race, but also as the end of race-specific policies of the affirmative 
action type.338  
Some, as anti-racism activist Tim Wise, think that this is partly Obama’s person-
al fault. Wise explains that this is to a certain extent due to Obama’s race-
transcending rhetoric. However, Wise points out that this rhetoric was the result of 
the race conundrum that Obama faced: racial transcendence was a premise for the 
election, but it also made it more difficult to talk about race. Wise also argues that this 
transcendence forced Obama into a race-neutral policy agenda.339  This assessment 
seems to downplay how deeply convinced Obama appears to be about this political 
strategy. Moreover, as demonstrated above, it appears that by 2008 the US had al-
ready reached a point where race-specific policies were not really a political option 
anymore.  
Sociologist Andrew Jolivétte also points out the race conundrum that came with 
Obama’s election. He admittedly greets the fact that the campaign and the election 
“ha[ve] brought the issues of race, ethnicity, and changing population demographics 
to the forefront of the US political arena.” However, he shares a similarly bleak as-
sessment of the eventual effect of Obama’s election, in the sense that it did not lead to 
a specific analysis of the factors that have allowed Obama to reach the presidency.340 
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To illustrate this through the lens of the particular topic of social policies here, the 
example of Obama’s upbringing can be used. The latter was determined by a white 
socioeconomic background, since he was raised by his white mother and white 
grandparents. Obama did not escape occasional racism in the form of prejudice, but 
he did benefit from the effects of “white affirmative action”, meaning a better access 
to social policies for his family. Obama explained this in detail in his speech at the 
2004 Democratic National Convention: 
She [Obama’s mother] was born in a town on the other side of the world, in Kansas. Her 
father worked on oil rigs and farms through most of the Depression. The day after Pearl 
Harbor, my grandfather signed up for duty, joined Patton's army, marched across Eu-
rope. Back home my grandmother raised a baby and went to work on a bomber assembly 
line. After the war, they studied on the GI Bill, bought a house through FHA and later 
moved west, all the way to Hawaii, in search of opportunity.341 
In this speech, Obama describes his own political career in the terms of the American 
Dream and he puts his social ascendance into perspective through the respective sto-
ries of his parents. By insisting on his grandfather studying on the GI Bill and becom-
ing a homeowner through the Federal Housing Agency’s program, he clearly shows 
how he benefited from a family network that had fully taken advantage of the great 
post-World War II welfare state. Moreover, Obama attended Punahou high school 
when he lived with his grandparents. Punahou is a private, college-preparing school, 
in which his grandfather managed to enroll him by claiming favors from his boss. 
Obama’s description of his admission to Punahou shows that Obama has a clear view 
about the role that his grandfather’s socio-professional network played: 
[…] Punahou had grown into a prestigious prep school, an incubator for island elites. Its 
reputation had helped sway my mother in her decision to send me back to the States: It 
hadn’t been easy to get me in, my grandparents told her; there was a long waiting list, 
and I was considered only because of the intervention of Gramps’s boss, who was an 
alumnus (my first experience with affirmative action, it seems, had little to do with 
race).342  
Obama’s description of his enrollment at Punahou shows that he shares the rather 
radical view of white meritocracy and white benefits of social programs that is pro-
fessed by Katznelson for example. Obama also calls this system of white privilege 
affirmative action. A deeper public discussion of Obama’s background would have 
allowed for a better analysis of the role of structural factors favoring the election of 
the first African-American president. This obliteration also became apparent in a 
comment made by Republican strategist Karl Rove. Rove pointed out that Obama 
“only had the potential of being ‘post-racial’” whereas his acknowledgment of black 
racial anger, for example, was a sign that Obama had not reached the post-racial 
stage yet.343 This shows that the conservative interpretation of ‘post-racial’ consists in 
denying racial issues and in considering the mere mention of race as divisive.  
This interpretation of the meaning of “post-racial” has led to several attacks 
against Obama accusing him of ‘playing the race card,’ when it was actually mostly 
other people, not him, who voiced indignation about racist attacks against Obama. 
Originally, ‘playing the race card’ refers to the initial Southern strategy of using cod-
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ed language for race baiting.344 However, in recent years, the meaning of ‘playing the 
race card’ has been inverted. Sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, in his analysis of a 
new form of racism, explains this change as part of the new racist strategy: blacks are 
often accused of playing the race card when asking for race-conscious policies or 
when denouncing racism.345 This accusation is particularly harmful because many 
researchers argue that the conservative strategy has not fundamentally changed, save 
for the fact that it has become even more devious. Historian Thomas Edge calls the 
conservative race-baiting strategy as adapted to the Obama presidency “Southern 
Strategy 2.0”. He explains that it is based on three main points: it first consists in argu-
ing that a nation that has elected a black president is free of racism. The next step is 
to argue that the remedies to racism enacted after the Civil Rights Movement will 
provoke “more racial discord, demagoguery, and racism against White Americans.” 
The last element of the strategy is “veiled racism and coded language of the original 
Southern Strategy.”346  
Despite the upsurge of racist outbursts, Obama has repeatedly been accused of 
‘playing the race card’. Fox contributor Greg Gutfeld accused him in 2010, when he 
supported candidates for the mid-term elections, of seeing “race in a post-racial 
world” on the ground of appealing to “young people, African-Americans, Latinos and 
women” and thus leaving out white men.347 Gutfeld’s outburst is a classic example 
that invites a closer analysis. Gutfeld accuses Obama of being racially divisive by ap-
pealing only to these populations: “For, in his mind, victory requires! splitting the 
population and only these folks matter [...]“ and then actually quotes Obama’s words, 
but without insisting on the fact that the list Obama made was outspokenly in the 
context of the voter coalition of 2008 that had elected him. Gutfeld then goes on in-
sulting Obama’s political constituency, explaining their vote either as a racial vote in 
the case of blacks, as a lack of political knowledge in the case of younger voters, as 
brainwashing in the case of women, and in the last case of Hispanics, as political 
bribery or racial catering in the form of “amnesty” for illegal immigrants. For Gutfeld, 
leaving out white men is a proof that Obama pays too much attention to race: “See, in 
the post-racial world, it's Obama who sees race. He looks at me and sees someone he 
can't win over.“ Most interestingly, Gutfeld points out the areas where he politically 
disagrees with Obama and openly states that he does not like progressives. But in-
stead of honestly seeing this as a reason why a progressive president with an agenda 
for major social policy reform should not try to reach out to him, Gutfeld gives the 
following justification: “Still, I feel Obama looks at me and just sees an AWG—‘angry 
white guy.’ Which is why I'm not on his list.“348  
However, angry conservative Fox contributors are not the only ones targeting 
Obama. During the Democratic primaries in 2008, Geraldine Ferraro, who worked 
on Hillary Clinton’s campaign team, accused Obama’s team of playing the race card 
after Obama had labeled some of her comments as divisive. Ferraro had said during a 
speech that Obama was doing so well because he was black: “If Obama was a white 
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man, he would not be in this position. And if he was a woman of any color, he would 
not be in this position. He happens to be very lucky to be who he is. And the country 
is caught up in the concept.”349 
Hailing Obama’s election as the advent of post-racial America and accusing 
Obama every so often of playing the race card is particularly strange considering the 
upsurge of racism during and after his campaign. It is difficult not to see the question-
ing of Obama’s origins by the birther movement, in which Donald Trump vehement-
ly participated, as an expression of racism. Obama was accused of not being a real 
American, of having a fake Social Security number, of actually being a Muslim. Soci-
ologists Adam Murphree and Deirdre Royster made a survey of the Obamathets (ra-
cial and political epithets directed against Obama during and after the campaign) on 
the blog AR15.com, which hosts right wing discussions. The list used here also in-
cludes Obamathets that translate a feeling of economic threat, since the white back-
lash of the late 1970s was largely fuelled by fears about economic competition. Among 
the examples listed by Murphree and Royster were: “Dear Leader”, “Comrade 
Obama,” “Obamunist/Obamunism.” More racist epithets included “Osamabama,” 
“The Halfrican,” “The Magic Negro,” “The Kenyan,” “Balack Obama,” 
“Obongo/Obungo,” “Obama bin Lyin’.” Murphree and Royster noted that the Oba-
mathets became more and more racist as the 2008 campaign progressed. At the be-
ginning, when his election was unlikely, epithets like Obambi and Obamessiah 
showed the patronizing strategy that consists in belittling a subgroup or an individu-
al.350  
A questionable incident even occurred on the floor of Congress. Obama made a 
health care speech to Congress in September 2009. When Obama said that his reform 
program would not include health care for immigrants, South Carolina Representa-
tive Joe Wilson interrupted the President’s address by shouting “You lie!”351 Many 
commentators qualified this incident as racist, such as Washington Post columnist Eu-
gene Robinson who asked if Rep. Wilson’s mark of disrespect towards the President, 
reinforced by Wilson’s refusal of an immediate apology (he apologized later) was evi-
dence of racism. Robinson also asked this in light of Wilson’s defense of flying the 
Confederate flag on the State House in Columbia, SC.352 New York Times columnist 
Maureen Dowd was bolder in her denunciation of this as racist. She wrote: “But, fair 
or not, what I heard was an unspoken word in the air: You lie, boy!”353 And indeed, 
Dowd’s rephrasing of Wilson’s outburst encapsulates all the disrespect that lay in the 
attack and rightly questions if something similar would have happened had Obama 
been white. Another racist incident occurred after Obama’s reelection in 2012. White 
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students at the University of Mississippi protested against his reelection and some of 
the protesters chanted racial epithets.354  
But more or less open racist attacks against Obama are only one part of the ra-
cial backlash against him. In her 1993 book Dilemmas of Black Politics: Issues of Leader-
ship and Strategy, political scientist Georgia A. Persons identified the recurrent diffi-
culty faced by African-American candidates seeking public office because of 
recurrent attempts to identify the black candidate “with the far left or with militant 
black figures who are known to frighten other blacks and most whites.”355 Similar 
attempts were made with Obama, most famously in the incident with Reverend 
Wright, when Obama was accused of sharing his extreme positions. However, in this 
particular case, the strategy backfired, since the “A More Perfect Union” speech 
Obama made in response to the incident proved to be a decisive success and gave 
great publicity to his transcending position. Nevertheless, Obama has been repeated-
ly accused of racial favoritism. The incidents with Professor Gates, Shirley Sherrod, 
or Van Jones were framed as racial issues,356 in which Obama was caught in a classi-
cal racial catch-22 situation: whatever he may have done, it was too much display of 
racial solidarity for some, while it was not enough for others.  
These are broader political incidents, however. Another incident is more direct-
ly linked to redistributional issues. In his 2009 State of the Union Address, Obama 
called for bipartisan efforts to overcome the effects of the 2008 crisis and he exempli-
fied his call for massive investment with different stories. He illustrated the call for 
more investments in schools with the story of a young student, Ty’Sheoma: 
And I think about Ty’Sheoma Bethea, the young girl from that school I visited in Dillon, 
South Carolina—a place where the ceilings leak, the paint peels off the walls, and they 
have to stop teaching six times a day because the train barrels by their classroom. She 
has been told that her school is hopeless, but the other day after class she went to the 
public library and typed up a letter to the people sitting in this room. She even asked her 
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principal for the money to buy a stamp. The letter asks us for help, and says, "We are just 
students trying to become lawyers, doctors, congressmen like yourself and one day pres-
ident, so we can make a change to not just the state of South Carolina but also the world. 
We are not quitters."357  
This story was used by conservative newspapers to accuse Obama of racial favorit-
ism, intrinsic Democratic irresponsibility, and compulsive spending urges. 358 The 
Dillon school district is a majority minority district, and the JV Martin school, which 
Ty’Sheoma attended, was a 100% minority school. 
The health care reform debate was not devoid of racial backlash and fears of ra-
cial favoritism either. Political scientists Michael Tesler and David O. Sears (who is 
also a specialist of political psychology) showed that the 2010 health care reform was 
full of racial undertones. First, they found that racial attitudes were “a prime deter-
minant in support for and opposition to Barack Obama.” They also concluded that 
people showed an even stronger opposition to policy proposals when they came from 
a black president. Moreover, they pointed out that  
[…] the spillover of racialization into public opinion on health care reform was a com-
mon media frame in the summer and fall of 2009. Some commentators regularly con-
tended during that time that at least some of the uproar provoked by Obama’s health 
care proposals was a product of race-related opposition to a black president’s agenda. 
Their analysis showed that the attitudes about health care became more racialized 
after Obama became its loudest spokesperson. According to their findings, 40% more 
people with racial resentment than people without such resentments were against 
health care reform and thought “health care should be voluntarily left to individu-
als.”359 
2.5. Scorched Earth Strategy: Polarization and Partisan-
ship 
Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act and the development of the Great Soci-
ety, the two political parties have become increasingly polarized along racial lines 
and over the issue of social policies. After 1964, the Democratic Party was increasingly 
seen as the party of racial liberalism. Their reluctance to discuss the issues of the ‘un-
derclass’ allowed the Republican Party to become the party of racial conservatism. 
According to Edsall and Edsall, race became an integral part of partisanship after 
1964.360 The election of 1964 marks a turning point when the parties clearly took posi-
tion about government intervention to help minorities, the Democratic Party being 
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clearly in favor of this, the Republican Party being clearly against it.361 After that the 
black electorate completed the transfer of their allegiance to the Democratic Party, 
something that had already started during the New Deal. The transfer was finalized 
through the clear position on civil rights and the commitment to economic justice 
expressed through the Great Society and the War on Poverty. During that period, the 
Solid South of the Democratic Party started to turn towards the Republican Party. 
The nomination of Barry Goldwater as the Republican presidential candidate in 
1964 changed the black populations’ party adherence. In 1964 blacks voted 96-4% for 
Johnson and against Goldwater. Since then, the lowest black support for a Democrat-
ic candidate was 82% in 1992.362 With Goldwater’s nomination, the Republican Party 
lost the “Party of Lincoln” legacy for blacks. 363  
Most scholars agree on the fact of party polarization since the 1970s. Some 
scholars, however, disagree with the idea of a racial polarization of politics. Accord-
ing to political scientists Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal race 
disappeared as a polarizing factor with the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act. They think that there is no racialization of American politics, but “that ra-
cial politics has become more like the rest of American politics.” Nonetheless, 
McCarty et al. agree on the fact that nowadays there is a real party polarization, with 
moderates vanishing since the 1970s. But they consider that race is not a factor in this 
phenomenon. They estimate that the levels of polarization are close to those at the 
end of the 19th century over regulatory and monetary policies. They see the parties as 
becoming more homogenous, as two blocs, and “voting coalitions that cut across the 
blocs [are] infrequent.”364  
McCarty et al. based their analysis on votes on race issues, meaning they eval-
uated racialization in the sense of race being a primary political issue. Their data is 
based on statistics of congressional votes and issue votes, but they do not take into 
account the political discourse surrounding social policies, for example. Nor do they 
really define what they consider as racial politics. The figures are based on elements 
like lynching, the Poll tax, and various renewals of civil and voting rights acts. This 
means that they are not taking into account how race plays out at the structural level 
and is part of racialized social policy issues. Since the only obvious race-related legis-
lative issues in recent decades were the renewals of the Voting Rights Act and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1990 and some anti-busing votes in the 1980s, it is easy to conclude 
that race does not play a role anymore. 
The strong adherence of blacks to the Democratic Party was identified by Re-
publicans as a means to break up the old economic polarizations of the parties. Politi-
cal scientist Bruce Jansson explains that the Democrats’ refusal to discuss ‘under-
class’ issues was, for example, exploited by Nixon who identified the Democratic 
Party with the groups the white working and middle classes had turned against. By 
opposition, Nixon described the white working and middle class as the “silent majori-
ty of law-abiding citizens.”365 Political scientist John Gerring traces back the Demo-
cratic Party’s fight for economic justice to the party’s populist period (1896-1948), 
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when Truman first tried to include racial justice in his platform.366 Although Gerring 
simply uses the term ‘populism’, it should be modified into economic populism, as 
opposed to racial populism, in order to avoid confusion.  
The New Deal and the Great Society firmly established the Democratic Party’s 
identification with the expansion of social policies. Edsall and Edsall highlight the 
polarization of the two parties on several general themes. The Democratic Party be-
came identified with themes such as racial liberalism, opposition to big spending on 
the military, preferring civil liberties to an emphasis on crime, women’s rights, and a 
more permissive attitude regarding sexuality and culture. And logically the Demo-
cratic Party increasingly became identified with rising tax burdens. The Republicans, 
in turn, became identified with a more conservative and more traditional position on 
these themes.367  
This was further intensified by Republicans denouncing “tax-and-spend liber-
als” who had abandoned the white working and middle class in order to cater exclu-
sively to minorities. McCarty et al. posited the thesis that economic inequalities, 
which have been increasing since the 1970s, have accentuated the political polariza-
tion with Republicans firmly established against redistribution. This strong anti-
redistribution attitude of the Republicans also reinforced the Democratic Party’s as-
sociation with redistribution, despite attempts by the New Democrats in the 1990s to 
break the image of being “tax-and-spend” liberals. According to Katz Olson, the 
Democratic Party today is still strongly associated with social policies, and this de-
spite the Clinton presidency.368  
The polarization also extends to ideology. In his 2009 book The Partisan Sort: 
How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans, political scientist 
Matthew Levendusky369 explains that there is an increased partisan sorting, where a 
liberal Republican “sorts” either as a conservative Republican or becomes a Demo-
crat. According to Levendusky, this sorting is driven primarily by elite polarization 
and not by preferences of the electorate. He sees both Congress and the Presidency as 
more aligned with the ideology of their parties, on both general and specific issues. 
However, this increased partisanship becomes particularly apparent in the interrelat-
ed questions of taxes and social policy,370 and thus the role of government. However, 
whereas in the Republican Party liberals do not exist anymore and moderates have 
become a rare sight, the Democratic Party offers a more heterogeneous ideological 
landscape, ranging from very progressive and liberal to moderates and the conserva-
tive Blue Dogs. 
Clinton tried to break this polarization, or at least the negative associations 
made between “tax-and-spend” liberals and the Democratic Party. Clinton explains 
in his foreword to Al From’s 2013 book, The New Democrats and the Return to Power,371 
that he had already realized during George McGovern’s campaign in 1972 that the 
Democrats needed to win the middle class and meet their needs. He considered that 
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“[o]ur party was out of touch with the demands and desires of the American people.” 
The New Democrats decided to focus on economic growth instead of just redistrib-
uting wealth and to emphasize the values of “work, family, responsibility, individual 
liberty, and faith.” The New Democrats still defended a significant role for the gov-
ernment; they “believed in activist government, that government can and should play 
a positive role in our national life”, but they changed the tone in the sense that they 
required also a more active role of the citizens.372 Clinton explains this attitude: “We 
believed in an ethic of mutual responsibility—that government has a responsibility to 
its citizens to create opportunities, and that citizens have an obligation to their coun-
try to give something back to the commonwealth.”373  
However, despite Clinton’s tough stance on crime, his calls to “end welfare as we 
know it”, and the passing of a conservative-dream-come-true welfare reform that 
transformed AFDC into TANF, the old labels still stuck. In his health care reform 
proposal, Clinton tried to accommodate everyone and create a market-based system 
that would reign in cost in order to satisfy conservative Republican requests, yet “[…] 
he was being accused by the Bush campaign of being just another tax-and-spend, big-
government Democrat when it came to health care in an eerie precursor of the Re-
publican attacks to come.”374 Moreover, partisan polarization increased during the 
Clinton years, notably because Newt Gingrich devised a new political strategy that 
consisted in completely refusing to cooperate. Only one Republican in Congress, 
Senator James M. Jeffords of Vermont, backed the health care bill and the Republi-
can leaders discouraged House Republicans from offering amendments that might 
have helped the passage of the bill.375 The Senate Minority leader Bob Dole (R-KS) 
went so far as to deny the need for health care reform. He said at the Republican Na-
tional Committee’s winter meeting that there was “no crisis” in the American health 
care systems, since polls showed that 85% of Americans were satisfied with their cov-
erage. At the same RNC meeting, Jack Kemp, a GOP official, former Representative 
and United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development until 1993 under 
President G. H. W. Bush, decried Clinton’s health reform proposal as government 
takeover: “President Clinton has scared the American people into thinking we’ve got 
to radically nationalize and have the government control all the decisions in the mar-
ketplace.” He further insisted that Clinton was turning dangerously leftist regarding 
his approach to health care, as well as crime.376 This strategy of denying a health care 
crisis and thus presenting Clinton’s health care reform as an illegitimate government 
takeover was recommended by Republican strategist William Kristol in a memo in 
December 1993.377  
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Newt Gingrich as speaker of the House marked a new step in partisan division in 
Congress. Refusal to cooperate has increased since then and bipartisan efforts for 
social policy have become virtually impossible. Political scientists Sidney Milkis and 
Michael Nelson identified an even greater polarization after the campaign of 2004 
and called it “a milestone in the development of united, ideologically distinctive polit-
ical parties.”378 
Political journalist Hedrick Smith also observes an increased movement to the 
right of the Republican Party culminating in the Tea Party movement. He notes less 
change for Democrats. In this sense it appears that the polarization is mainly a result 
of the Republicans moving to the right, instead of a dual movement. Smith summa-
rizes the Republican political attitude as one of no compromise that consists in 
“sharpen[ing] partisan division by exploiting wedge issues that play upon concerns of 
white middle-class religious voters, such as abortion, school prayer, and ERA (wom-
en’s rights)” and fighting an uncompromising battle with extreme positions on anti-
issues such as taxes, unions, homosexuality, Washington, and government generally. 
Moreover, Smith considers that, so far, Gingrich has tried the biggest attack on social 
policies, and sees him as the personification of the confrontational politics of the New 
Right as well as being a believer of polarization. Smith described Gingrich’s political 
strategy as “guerilla warfare,” which coupled a strong use of media coverage to “capi-
talize on voter frustration” over blocked Democratic legislation in order to gain the 
1994 midterm elections. 379  
Opinions vary regarding polarization. Political scientist Norm Ornstein, alt-
hough he works at the American Enterprise Institute, defends the idea that this polar-
ization between the two parties is asymmetric, and that it is stronger on the Republi-
can side. Based on data compiled by political scientist Keith Poole and Howard 
Rosenthal, he shows that the average ideological position in the House among Re-
publicans had moved sharply to the right between 1977-9 and 1995-7, and had moved 
even further right after that until 2012. The ideological move to the left by the Demo-
crats was three times less than the move to the right from the Republicans. Moreover, 
Ornstein points out that this ideological move toward the right is accompanied by 
increasing levels of antipathy towards the opposition and by an increasing disregard 
for the value of compromise. Ornstein also points out that this tendency within the 
Republican Party elite is reflected to a certain extent within the conservative public. 
However, he insists on the fact that the public’s polarization developed only after the 
Gingrich era, increased during the Obama years and was driven, according to him, by 
the elites via the media. Moreover, he highlights that Democrats collaborated on a 
bipartisan basis during the George W. Bush years, which stands in sharp contrast to 
the Republicans’ attitude during the two Obama terms.380 
Political scientist Nolan McCarty co-authored a report, entitled Political Negotia-
tions, written by a task force initiated by the American Political Science Association.381 
In a 2014 article published in the Washington Post he explained that his sub-group 
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working on political polarization comprised many different opinions. However, he 
highlighted the aspects on which the group could agree. Thus, the report also traces 
this polarization back to the mid-1970s, sees the origins in the realignment of South-
ern politics in the post-civil rights period, and links it also with increasing economic 
and social inequality. McCarty concurs with the idea of an asymmetric polarization in 
both chambers of Congress. Even though the polarization in the House is stronger, 
both chambers have experienced a sharp increase in polarization since the mid-1970s 
to levels higher than in the late 19th century. Just as Ornstein’s and Smith’s, McCarty’s 
analysis suggests that the polarization comes mainly from the Republicans and he 
points out that each new cohort of Republican congresspeople has taken more con-
servative positions than the previous cohort. The movement to the left among Demo-
crats, less marked than the movement to the right among Republicans, is explained, 
according to McCarty, by the increase of African-American and Hispanic representa-
tives to the detriment of Southern Democrats. McCarty also points out that the inter-
nal ideological makeup of the two parties has become increasingly more homogene-
ous and shows less regional and racial variation. He also points to an ideological 
realignment among the electorate, with conservatives increasingly identifying as Re-
publicans and liberals as Democrats. However, the extent of this phenomenon has 
not yet been precisely assessed. The report has no conclusion about the institutional 
causes of this polarization, but they see the motivations as being founded on real ide-
ological divergences as well as being grounded in political strategy.382 
Earl Pomeroy, the Democratic Representative for North Dakota’s at-large dis-
trict from 1993 to 2011 and who was part of the conservative Blue Dog caucus, corrob-
orates this analysis in a lengthy comment in an interview: 
See, I was there for one term before Newt Gingrich [as Speaker]. Although he had cer-
tainly started to influence the body. He’s a strategic genius, but it’s a… […] You know, 
Gingrich has a scorched earth tactical approach at politics. You don’t have respectful dis-
agreement with the other side. The other side, they’re fools, they’re crooks, they’re idiots, 
they don’t have our values, and that’s how you distinguish yourself from the other side. 
You basically demonize and polarize the debate, and that’s how you can distinguish 
yourself and win. And it worked for him. It did enormous harm to an institution. […] you 
know, we have people from all over the country charged with coming up with a common 
path for the vast and diverse nation of the United States, 350 million people existing in 
the 21st century. Regional, racial, and every other difference among us. We have to find a 
common path. Well, that’s best achieved by people of good will respecting philosophical 
differences and trying to find where they agree. Instead, we have a political process now 
where we demonize those of different opinions, and essentially try to sharpen the differ-
ences for the success it may provide us in an election. The politics has overrun our sys-
tem.383 
Pomeroy insists here on polarization as a process that is wanted for short-term elec-
toral success and on the absence of a desire to find a common solution to pressing 
problems. Another Congressman of the Gingrich-Clinton era, Bart Gordon, who was 
the Democratic Representative for Tennessee’s 6th district from 1985 to 2011, con-
curred with Pomeroy, albeit in a more moderate tone. Although characterizing him-
self as fairly liberal, Gordon was the representative for—as he described it himself—
“one of the most Republican districts held by a Democrat in the country”, which in-
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fluenced his voting record and made him adopt a more moderate stance. Both Gor-
don and Pomeroy are among the Democrats who are the likeliest to be interested in 
bipartisan efforts for ideological and political reasons motivated by the composition 
of their electorate. Gordon described the changes brought about by Gingrich as fol-
lows: 
Well, it has become much less civil, I have to say, it has become more parliamentary, and 
I think that the majority party is… their leadership is attempting to really push a lot of 
things down, even to their members, and the minority oftentimes is trying to stop what-
ever happens, and that there really is no conversation about compromise. There is very 
little, what we call regular order, where you go through the subcommittee and the com-
mittee process, which allows more buy in and more compromise. So, it’s not a good situ-
ation now.384 
The accounts Gordon and Pomeroy give about the changes that have occurred in 
Washington since the Gingrich years match the analysis of Ornstein and McCarty et 
al. In 2008, Obama made a similar assessment of the politics of Washington: 
Whatever the explanation, after Reagan the lines between Republican and Democrat, 
between liberal and conservative, would be drawn in more sharply ideological terms. 
This was true, of course, for the hot-button issues of affirmative action, crime, welfare, 
abortion, and school prayer, all of which extensions of earlier battles. But it was also now 
true for every other issue, large or small, domestic or foreign, all of which were reduced 
to a menu of either-or, for-or-against, sound-bite-ready choices. […] In politics, of not in 
policy, simplicity was a virtue.385 
Moreover, Obama did not attribute this new trend in politics to the presidency. To 
him it appeared that “in the mouths of men like George H. W. Bush and Bob Dole, 
the polarizing rhetoric and the politics of resentment always seemed forced, a way of 
peeling off voters from the Democratic base and not necessarily a recipe for govern-
ing.”386 He sees a clear difference, however, when it comes to party leadership, and he 
accuses them of establishing a sharply partisan work order that renders any coopera-
tion in Congress impossible and discourages any nuance of opinion: 
But for a younger generation of conservative operatives who would soon rise to power, 
for Newt Gingrich and Karl Rove and Grover Norquist and Ralph Reed, the fiery rhetoric 
was more than a matter of campaign strategy. They were true believers who meant what 
they said, whether it was “No new taxes” or “We are a Christian nation.” In fact, with 
their rigid doctrines, slash-and-burn style, and exaggerated sense of having been ag-
grieved, this new conservative leadership was eerily reminiscent of some of the New 
Left’s leaders during the sixties. As with their left-wing counterparts, this new vanguard 
of the right viewed politics as a contest not just between competing policy visions, but 
between good and evil. Activists in both parties began developing litmus tests, checklists 
of orthodoxy, leaving a Democrat who questioned abortion increasingly lonely, any Re-
publican who championed gun control effectively marooned. In this Manichean strug-
gle, compromise came to look like weakness, to be punished or purged. You were with us 
or against us. You had to choose sides. 
Obama particularly insisted on the fact that party polarization was not only a matter 
of taking opposing positions about issues, but was accompanied by a sharply decreas-
ing will to find a bipartisan solution. The extreme positions highlighted by Obama’s 
description of an opposition between good and evil illustrate this difficulty of finding 
a middle ground, and he especially insisted on the fact that through this political 
strategy devised around partisanship, entering a compromise became a political lia-
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bility. Obama sees the Democratic Party as less intransigent and ideologically more 
diverse. He describes it as follows: 
Of course, there are those within the Democratic Party who tend toward similar zealotry. 
But those who do never come close to possessing the power of a Rove or a DeLay, the 
power to take over the party, fill it with loyalists, and enshrine some of their more radical 
ideas into law, the prevalence of regional, ethnic, and economic differences within the 
party, the electoral map and the structure of the Senate, the need to raise money from 
economic elites to finance elections—all these things tend to prevent those Democrats in 
office from straying too far from the center. In fact, I know very few elected Democrats 
who neatly fit the liberal caricature; last I checked, John Kerry believes in maintaining 
the superiority of the US military, Hillary Clinton believes in the virtues of capitalism, 
and just about every member of the Congressional Black Caucus believes Jesus Christ 
died for his or her sins.387 
Obama’s description of the Democratic Party insists on the fact that he judges Repub-
licans’ depiction of Democrats as a gross oversimplification. In addition, it is a fact 
that the Democratic Party is more ideologically diverse than the Republican Party, 
comprising conservatives, moderates, progressives, and liberals. For example, Demo-
cratic Michigan Representative Bart Stupak jeopardized the health care reform be-
cause he insisted that an amendment be added, preventing federal subsidies from 
being used to pay for abortions.388 
Yet, Obama is also adamant about how the political game of polarization and 
unyielding partisanship has hurt the Democratic Party and played in favor of the Re-
publicans. He describes the simple and relentless defense of the existing welfare state 
as “exhausted, a constant game of defense” and he criticizes a simplistic centrist ap-
proach as losing to Republicans: “Others pursue a more ‘centrist’ approach, figuring 
that so long as they split the difference with the conservative leadership, they must be 
acting reasonably—and failing to notice that with each passing year they are giving 
up more and more ground.”389 Smith had already highlighted that Republicans had 
taken extreme “anti” positions on most of the central liberal issues, meaning that any 
attempt to reach out to Republicans, who defend an all or nothing position, means 
giving up significant ground on the liberal side, unless Democrats are ready to appear 
just as uncompromising as Republicans. 
2.5.1. Polarization and Partisanship in the Obama Era 
I would say this is one of the reasons the parties had no success in working together on health 
policy; it’s just too good an issue to use politically to beat the other party in the election.390 
Earl Pomeroy 
 
If anything, polarization and partisanship have even increased since Clinton’s 
terms. This became obvious during the 2008 presidential campaign. According to 
political scientists Kate Kenski, Bruce W. Hardy, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson “the 
most frequently aired attacks” during the 2008 campaign were accusations of Obama 
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being a “tax-and-spend liberal.” Republican candidate McCain insisted that Obama’s 
liberal agenda would worsen the economy and be detrimental to the middle class.391 
By insisting on these themes, McCain drew on classical themes of conservative rheto-
ric going back to Reagan. 
The stark partisanship was expressed for example, through a dinner, organized 
by Republican party strategist Frank Luntz, which gathered GOP officials such as 
Representative Eric Cantor (R-VA) and former House speaker Newt Gingrich, or Paul 
Ryan (R-WI), as well as, for example, Senators Jim DeMint (R-SC), Jon Kyl (R-AZ), or 
Tom Coburn (R-OK). In a 2013 interview with PBS Luntz claimed that, contrary to 
what Democrats had said, the dinner was not about devising a strategy to block and 
thwart everything Obama might do during his presidency. According to Luntz the 
three hour debate focused on how the GOP could be relevant after this terrible de-
feat. However, Luntz said that the GOP officials left the dinner with the idea of 
“creat[ing] an alternative budget, and alternative approach to the size and scope of 
Washington; that they could communicate an alternative point of view.”392 Republi-
cans’ attitudes in the years to follow give little credibility to these claims. 
Political scientists Sidney Milkis, Jesse Rhodes, and Emily Charnock analyzed 
Obama’s stance on partisan politics. According to them, Obama walked a fine line 
between post-partisanship and partisan politics, each appealing to different parts of 
his voter base. They contend that some of Obama’s political difficulties stemmed 
from this ambivalent approach. According to them, the extremely strong partisan 
polarization quickly made Obama realize that he had to adopt, to a certain extent, 
partisan leadership strategies in order to fulfill his party’s political agenda.393 
Despite Obama’s outspoken wishes, there was virtually no bipartisan collabora-
tion on the Affordable Care Act. The Democratic majority in both the House and the 
Senate was slightly large enough to be able to tackle the health reform on their own. 
The Democrats had a solid majority in the House with 257 seats out of 435, but in the 
Senate they had, though a historic majority, just the 60 seats for filibuster-proof ma-
jority, with 2 independents participating in the Democratic majority. Then the death 
of Massachusetts’ Senator Edward Moore “Ted” Kennedy, on August 25, 2009, 
changed the balance, because a Republican, Scott Brown, was elected to replace him. 
In the Senate, there was a minimum of bipartisanship, with 4 Republicans participat-
ing: Chuck Grassley from Iowa, Olympia Snowe from Maine, Orrin Hatch from Utah 
(who left the group early), and Mike Enzi from Wyoming. Along with Max Baucus 
(D-MT) chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Jeff Bingaman (D-NM), and 
Kent Conrad (D-ND), they formed the Gang of Six (after Hatch left) that came up 
with the final Senate bill that was supposed to represent an acceptable compromise. 
Both Bingaman and Conrad retired in 2011 instead of running for a new election. 
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However, despite their collaboration, they all voted ‘no’ on both the ACA and 
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (although Olympia Snowe voted 
for the bill to get it out of committee). 
Democratic Representative John F. Tierney, who represented Massachusetts’ 6th 
congressional district from 1997 to 2015, regretted in an interview that the House Re-
publicans refused to participate, despite continuous invitations to do so. In his com-
mittee, the Committee on Education and Labor, one of the 3 House Committees with 
jurisdiction over health care, the Republicans refused to work with the Democrats. 
Tierney said the Democrats tried but they encountered a total refusal from Republi-
cans, who did not even make recommendations, even though the Republicans said 
they wanted something different. According to Tierney, health care reform became a 
“crazy conversation,” moving away from the issue of the health care system and what 
to do about it. It was reduced to a purely “political” conversation. He saw that Repub-
licans only focused on the overreach of government, and went as far as to say that he 
thought it was “apparently personal against the president”. 394 Representative Gordon 
confirmed the absolute refusal of Republicans to collaborate in the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce. Democratic Representative Robert E. Andrews, who repre-
sented New Jersey’s 1st congressional district from 1990 to 2014, and who was a mem-
ber of the subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions, had this to 
say about efforts at bipartisanship in the health reform:  
Republicans really never attempted to compromise on this bill. One of their arguments 
after the bill was passed was that they were excluded from the writing of the bill, and, 
you know, it was forced on them. And that is not true. What is true, is that Republicans 
reached a point of philosophical disagreement with the Democrats on one central ques-
tion. And that central question was: Was it our goal to try to cover every American? […] 
But when you get to the point when you talk about covering everyone, a lot of Republi-
cans said that’s something they wanted to do. That that was a goal they aspired to. […]So, 
I was in a lot of discussions with Republicans who said that they were ready to embrace 
the goal of getting everyone covered, but when you had specific discussion of how to do 
that, requiring employers to provide coverage, or requiring employees to buy it, or hav-
ing the government extend taxpayer-funded programs, they didn’t want any of those 
three. But when you say, what would you do instead? they really never had a plausible 
answer. […] so I’m disappointed that the Republicans did not meaningfully participate in 
the process of writing this bill. They were given ample opportunity to do so.395 
Andrews highlighted the Republicans’ unwillingness to collaborate on two essential 
points: none of the solutions that were offered found Republican approval, even the 
individual mandate, which originally was a conservative idea, nor did they offer solu-
tions or make proposals that could be considered by Democrats. This is perfectly 
consistent with the kind of political game initiated by Gingrich that consists in oppos-
ing everything coming from the other party in an attempt to make it look bad. The 
aim is not to find a solution that works for a pressing problem, but to defeat the other 
party.  
Bruce Braley, the Democratic Representative for Iowa’s 1st congressional district 
from 2007 to 2015, lamented the way in which the legislative process of the ACA was 
criticized: 
That’s one of the other frustrating things about the attacks from the Tea Party and con-
servative Republicans…. I think you would be hard pressed to find a piece of legislation 
that had more hearings before it was passed, that had more markups, that had more 
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lengthy debates than the ACA, and yet all you heard about was the fact that it was passed 
in the middle of the night when nothing could have been further from the truth.396 
He described his perception of bipartisan efforts: 
They were abysmal. It was clear from the beginning that because of the statement made 
by Senator McConnell that his number one goal was to make Obama a one-term presi-
dent that there would be no cooperation with Republicans on actually shaping the bill 
other than attempting to destroy it. […] So, yeah, there was no legitimate bipartisan effort 
and that is regrettable, because I think that the bill would have been much more accept-
ed by the American people, if Republicans had come to the table and tried to help shape 
the bill. We wouldn’t have spent the last four years wasting so much time and energy try-
ing to prevent the repeal of the ACA and the country would be much better off. 
Braley especially insisted on the negative consequences for the country that result 
from the lack of bipartisanship. He deplored the energy that is necessary for the de-
fense of a much needed reform, which is attacked because of partisanship. It must be 
added that the McConnell statement Braley refers to was made during an interview 
on October 29, 2010. Both the Washington Post and PolitiFact denounced the Demo-
cratic narrative of the events, which situated the statement far earlier in time than it 
had actually been made and which took it out of the context of the interview. 
McConnell had meant this in the context of the mid-term elections with the view of 
the Republicans regaining the presidency later. Moreover, PolitiFact pointed to 
McConnell’s outreach when he said that: "If President Obama does a Clintonian 
backflip, if he’s willing to meet us halfway on some of the biggest issues, it’s not inap-
propriate for us to do business with him."397 However, the common-ground outreach 
in the health care reform was so strong that many progressives were disappointed, so 
that it is difficult to argue that Democrats did not try to find an acceptable solution. 
Moreover, the “Clintonian backflip,” based on the reform of AFDC into TANF, can 
be understood as consisting basically in abandoning any Democratic idea and enact-
ing a conservative Republican reform, which can hardly be called bipartisanship. 
Earl Pomeroy is equally harsh in his assessment of the Republicans regarding 
bipartisan efforts in the health reform process, but he is also very harsh in his as-
sessment of Democratic outreach. In his opinion, Democrats did not try to achieve 
bipartisanship all that hard. He insists on the fact that in many committee meetings 
Republicans were not invited in: 
You know, earlier I mentioned the endless meetings of Democrats on the Ways and 
Means Committee. It was Democrats only. Republicans were not invited in. It was a 
very… there were very few hearings held, and basically any open process on a bipartisan 
basis in the Ways and Means Committee was only for show. There was no substantive 
bipartisan participation in health reform in the House at all.398  
Besides denouncing the closed aspect of the health care bill negotiations, Pomeroy 
made a similarly harsh assessment of the only open display of bipartisanship in the 
Senate, which he considered being mostly for show to prove their good will: 
The only effort made was a Committee of six, working in the Senate Finance Committee, 
called the Gang of Six […] Even now, I think that even that process was one where the 
bipartisan character was somewhat for show. I don’t think the Republicans were serious. 
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I think that even though they had been invited in, they dragged out the process, they 
slowed the whole bill. […] So, I don’t think that in the end any one of them [Pomeroy 
mentioned Enzi and Grassley by name] had a serious prospect of being for it. Other Re-
publicans of more moderate nature, like Olympia Snowe, was one that made demands 
throughout the process, I really like Olympia Snowe by the way, but in the end she did 
not vote for it, and I don’t know whether she was ever very seriously evaluating voting 
for it. I do know this, the politics turned so hard against that any Republican supporting 
it or seen as even having their fingerprints on it in any way, would have been defeated 
within their own political party. And I think this applies to 100% of the Republicans in 
the Senate, and probably most of them in the House.399 
Pomeroy’s comment also puts forward the difficulty for Republicans who want to 
cooperate on a more bipartisan basis. The party leadership discourages this, just as it 
did during Clinton’s health reform attempt. Again, Smith traces this back to Newt 
Gingrich, when he purged RINOs (Republicans In Name Only), meaning that more 
moderate Republicans were gotten rid of to sharpen polarization, unless they moved 
further to the right, as it was the case for Orrin Hatch or Richard Luger. Washington 
Post columnist Dana Milbank even spoke of “ideological cleansing.”400 This attitude 
does not belong to the past. Pomeroy deplored Republican attacks against Olympia 
Snowe, the unwillingness of Republicans to find a solution to one of the country’s 
most pressing problems, as well as the Republicans’ focus on political damage:  
Olympia Snowe paid the political price simply for expressing open-mindedness. You 
know, in the end she voted against it, but just even appearing to be open-minded and en-
tertaining thoughts about some of these ideas was un… was hugely politically unpopular 
with Republicans. You had to be basically saying, ‘this is the worst thing we’ve ever seen, 
this is the work of the devil himself,’ or you weren’t accepted in the Party line. So, it 
brought out the worst in both parties. Democrats did not reach out meaningfully. We 
wanted to drag a Republican or two in, so we could claim it was bipartisan, but basically 
we did not reach out to the other side. Now, the other side also made it clear, right from 
the beginning, they weren’t going to play, they almost double-dared us to do this, and 
there was much more interest in the political damage that they could inflict on the Party, 
than try to make the bill acceptable by any goals they had for health reform. 
After being criticized for her modicum of collaboration on the ACA, Olympia 
Snowe decided not to run again. On March 2, 2012 she published a text in the Wash-
ington Post explaining her reasons for leaving the Senate after 17 years in office. In this 
document, she renewed her commitment to bipartisanship: “Two truths are all too 
often overshadowed in today’s political discourse: Public service is a most honorable 
pursuit, and so is bipartisanship.”401 She grounded her decision in the political turn 
that the Senate had taken, far from the principles that the Founding Fathers thought 
should guide it. She regretted that the Senate is not working anymore as the tool of 
moderation and compromise that it should be: “Some people were surprised by my 
conclusion, yet I have spoken on the floor of the Senate for years about the dysfunc-
tion and political polarization in the institution. Simply put, the Senate is not living 
up to what the Founding Fathers envisioned.” Snowe also denounced the harmful 
effects of this attitude on political results and the outcomes for the country, and she 
called out for change:  
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The great challenge is to create a system that gives our elected officials reasons to look 
past their differences and find common ground if their initial party positions fail to gar-
ner sufficient support. In a politically diverse nation, only by finding that common 
ground can we achieve results for the common good. That is not happening today and, 
frankly, I do not see it happening in the near future.402 
2.5.2. “So You Kind of Hit That Ideological Wall:”403 Obama 
on Bipartisanship 
Obama always strongly believed in bipartisanship. This stems from a true con-
viction that bipartisanship offers stronger and better solutions for the country and he 
seems genuinely convinced about it. In The Audacity of Hope, Obama devotes the first 
chapter, entitled “Republicans and Democrats,” to bipartisanship and the importance 
of finding feasible and efficient solutions together to address the country’s needs. In 
this chapter, Obama explains how he perceives the attitude and tactics of the Repub-
lican Party, and insists on their sharp and uncompromising partisanship. He ap-
plauds Clinton’s Third Way, the attempt to find a working basis with the Republi-
cans: 
It was Bill Clinton’s singular contribution that he tried to transcend this ideological 
deadlock, recognizing not only that what had come to be meant by the labels of “con-
servative” and “liberal” played to Republican advantage, but that the categories were in-
adequate to address the problems we faced. […] Still, he instinctively understood the 
falseness of the choices being presented to the American people. He saw that govern-
ment spending and regulation could, if properly designed, serve as vital ingredients and 
not inhibitors to economic growth, and how markets and fiscal discipline could help 
promote social justice. […] In his platform—if not always in his day-to-day politics—
Clinton’s Third Way went beyond splitting the difference. It tapped into the pragmatic, 
nonideological attitude of the majority of Americans.404 
Obama especially insisted on the fact that the bipartisan approach attempted by Clin-
ton who tried to build solutions including ideas from both sides, is what corresponds 
best to what Americans want and how they approach policy. Moreover, Obama 
pointed out that some of the changes Clinton made were vital for the Democratic 
Party in order to win majorities again: “Politically, he [Clinton] had wrung out of the 
Democratic Party some of the excesses that had kept it from winning elections.”405 
This also translated into Obama’s own more moderate stance and willingness to find 
a middle ground. In Obama’s opinion Clinton’s failure to achieve health care reform 
and a broader government coalition was not due to Clinton’s lack of effort or willing-
ness to move toward the center, but was rather due to that fact that Clinton’s ap-
proach threatened the Republican strategy of polarization and partisanship: 
And they understood the threat Clinton posed to their vision of a long-term conservative 
majority, which helps explain the vehemence with which they went after him. It also ex-
plains why they invested so much time attacking Clinton’s morality, for if Clinton’s poli-
cies were hardly radical, his biography (the draft letter saga, the marijuana puffing, the 
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Ivy League intellectualism, the professional wife who didn’t bake cookies, and most of all 
the sex) proved perfect grist for the conservative base.406 
Despite this clear insight into the problems and the threat Clinton’s attitude posed, 
Obama remained deeply convinced about the need to find a common ground. His 
motivation was not only political, but also founded on the wish to find the best solu-
tion. The partisan approach of examining a policy solely on the grounds of what the 
party’s ideological precepts on the question are, is contrary to his own more matter-
of-fact, pragmatic approach of focusing simply on what works: 
But our history should give us confidence that we don’t have to choose between an op-
pressive, government-run economy and a chaotic and unforgiving capitalism. It tells us 
that we can emerge from great economic upheavals stronger, not weaker. Like those who 
came before us, we should be asking ourselves what mix of policies will lead to a dynam-
ic free market and widespread economic security, entrepreneurial innovation and up-
ward mobility. And we can be guided throughout by Lincoln’s simple maxim: that we 
will do collectively, through our government, only those things that we cannot do as well 
or at all individually and privately.  
In other words, we should be guided by what works.407 
Obama clearly states that he does not want to take an intransigent stance between the 
two classical antagonistic positions defended by liberals on one side and conserva-
tives on the other. He asserts that he wished to search for solutions that allow ac-
commodating the ideas of both parties, that he does not view them as necessarily ex-
cluding one another. The reference to Lincoln is not only interesting because it 
allows the defense of a reasonable role for government, but also because Lincoln is 
one of the most loved and admired American presidents and the first Republican 
president. It is most of all a reminder for the Republicans that being a Republican 
does not have to mean being opposed to any government intervention at all. 
Because of these deep convictions, despite his early insights into the state of bi-
partisanship in Washington, and despite the example of Clinton’s failure to achieve 
health care reform, Obama called for bipartisanship on the health care reform. In 
2009, Obama addressed a Joint Session of Congress on the matter of health care. He 
said:  
Now, this is the plan I'm proposing. It's a plan that incorporates ideas from many of the 
people in this room tonight—Democrats and Republicans. And I will continue to seek 
common ground in the weeks ahead. If you come to me with a serious set of proposals, I 
will be there to listen. My door is always open.408 
Obama clearly stated that he wanted to find a compromise acceptable for everyone. 
But this call for bipartisanship was not based on illusions. In the same address, 
Obama denounced the partisan confrontation over the health care reform: 
But what we've also seen in these last months is the same partisan spectacle that only 
hardens the disdain many Americans have towards their own government. Instead of 
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honest debate, we've seen scare tactics. Some have dug into unyielding ideological camps 
that offer no hope of compromise. Too many have used this as an opportunity to score 
short-term political points, even if it robs the country of our opportunity to solve a long-
term challenge. And out of this blizzard of charges and counter-charges, confusion has 
reigned.  
Well, the time for bickering is over. The time for games has passed. (Applause.) Now is 
the season for action. Now is when we must bring the best ideas of both parties together, 
and show the American people that we can still do what we were sent here to do. Now is 
the time to deliver on health care. Now is the time to deliver on health care.409 
It could be argued that he tried for too long. Representative Gordon comments on 
Obama’s efforts to achieve bipartisanship over health care reform as follows: 
Well, I think he did [make huge efforts to reach out]. He was, I’m afraid, a bit naïve at 
that time, thinking that there could be bipartisanship. He never received it, and still 
hasn’t. So, and I think that he wasted some of his time in the presidency… you know, 
again, it’s a good instinct, I’m glad that he tried, but it was an effort that wasn’t going to 
be successful.410 
Gordon’s comment illustrates the problem: the wish, the hope that business in Wash-
ington could once again be conducted in a different manner, but also the complete 
resignation regarding the current situation. Most importantly, in Gordon’s eyes, the 
attempt to achieve bipartisanship was detrimental to the Democrats in the end: they 
made concessions, they invested time in this, but got absolutely nothing in return.  
At the end of his second term as president, Obama had not changed his opinion 
on the ideological deadlock. In a 2016 interview he describes at length a typical policy 
discussion with Republicans: 
Look, typically what would happen, certainly at the outset, it would be that I would say, 
“We’ve got a big problem: We’re losing 800,000 jobs a month. Every economist I’ve 
talked to, including Republican economists, thinks that we need to do a big stimulus, and 
I’m willing to work with you to figure out how this package looks.” And typically, what 
you’d get would be, “Well, Mr. President, I’m not sure that this big spending approach is 
the right one, and families are tightening their belts right now, and I don’t hear a lot of 
my constituents saying that they want a bunch of big bureaucracies taking their hard-
earned tax money and wasting it on a bunch of make-work projects around the country. 
So we think that government’s got to do that same thing that families do.” So you kind of 
hit that ideological wall. I’m sure that after about four or five of those sessions, at some 
point, I might say, “Look, guys, we have a history here dating back to the Great Depres-
sion,” and I might at that point try to introduce some strong policy arguments. What I 
can say unequivocally is that there has never been a time in which I did not say, “Look, 
you tell me how you want to do this. Give me a sense of how you want to approach it.” 
And I think consistently there’s been resistance—and you don’t have to take my word for 
it. You can look at the public record, for example with respect to the alternative to 
Obamacare that we’re still waiting on seven years later.411 
Obama’s perception and summarized rendering of Republican opposition to his pro-
posals highlight several elements. He saw his proposals refused as “big spending” 
projects, as bureaucratic, and as a waste of “hard-earned tax money” on derided poli-
cies. This shows that Obama is very sensitive to the discourse around the backlash 
against social policies and government intervention. Moreover, Obama insisted on 
the fact that he tried to convince them by highlighting the efficiency of the Roosevelt 
policies that helped overcome the Great Depression, and which had enjoyed a certain 
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consensus for a brief period.412 However, as has been shown above, in the polarized 
context the rejection of a bill is not grounded on the objective quality and effective-
ness of the bill, but it is rather motivated by political calculus. Regarding health care 
reform, Republicans renewed their intransigence after the passage of the act, first 
verbally, then by concrete attacks in the form of the Supreme Court lawsuits that 
challenged the ACA’s constitutionality or specific provisions. Before that, House 
Leader John Boehner had said in a radio interview with Sean Hannity on October 27, 
2010 that “this is not a time for compromise… We’re going to do everything—and I 
mean everything—we can do, to kill it, to stop it, to slow it down.”413 These words are 
very far from any proposal of trying to find a common solution to improve an admit-
tedly not ideal reform. 
In an interview in 2016 Obama explained that, when he took office, he thought 
that the context of crisis, which had begun under a Republican administration, would 
constitute a motivational force for Republicans to cooperate. His deep conviction may 
explain why he tried to achieve bipartisanship for so long, despite the obvious unwill-
ingness of the other side to cooperate. In the same interview, Obama revisited the 
Democrats’ first interaction with Republicans on the stimulus bill, which Republican 
minority leader John Boehner publicly rejected even before the Democrats had ex-
posed it:  
And I think we realized at that point what proved to be the case in that first year and that 
second year was a calculation based on what turned out to be pretty smart politics but 
really bad for the country: If they cooperated with me, then that would validate our ef-
forts. If they were able to maintain uniform opposition to whatever I proposed, that 
would send a signal to the public of gridlock, dysfunction, and that would help them win 
seats in the midterms. It was that second strategy that they pursued with great discipline. 
It established the dynamic for not just my presidency but for a much sharper party-line 
approach to managing both the House and the Senate that I think is going to have con-
sequences for years to come. 414 
Obama highlights the continuity of the Republican scorched-earth tactic that 
exclusively aims at short-term political gains, which even the context of an economic 
crisis and the onset of the Great Recession could not deflect. In a 2016 article pub-
lished in the Journal of the American Medical Association, Obama denounced “hyperpar-
tisanship” regarding the health care reform: “Republicans reversed course and reject-
ed their own ideas once they appeared in the text of a bill that I supported.“ The 
wording makes it quite clear that Obama believes that the problem was that he 
championed the bill, not that Republicans might have changed their opinion about 
the efficiency of the proposed measures. Among the examples, he quoted the indi-
vidual mandate, but also the public plan fallback, a measure that Republicans had 
introduced in the 2003 Medicare reform, and the employer mandate they had sup-
ported in 2007 in California. He also insisted on the fact that Republicans tried to un-
dermine the implementation of the ACA provisions whenever possible.415  
                                                        
412	  Obama’s	  discourse	  regarding	  the	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  of	  government	  intervention	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Already in 2011, the White House had launched the ‘We Can’t Wait’ Campaign 
that introduced a new series of executive actions that the President was planning to 
boost the economy. Among the aims of the campaign was to pressure Congress into 
passing the American Jobs Act. This was aimed at Congressional Republicans who 
were urged “to put country before party.”416 
The government shutdown of 2013 over the budget vote, which was nothing else 
than a badly disguised blackmailing attempt at repealing the ACA, marked another 
level for Obama. He then became more vocal about Congress’s refusal to cooperate. 
Although the shutdown also revealed some divisions within the Republican Party, as 
the shutdown was driven by a rather small group of up to 40 hardliners,417 the overall 
intransigent attitude of the GOP did not change afterwards. In his 2014 State of the 
Union Address, he repeated his readiness to work on a bipartisan basis, but also 
clearly said that he would go forward without Congress, if need be: 
But what I offer tonight is a set of concrete, practical proposals to speed up growth, 
strengthen the middle class and build new ladders of opportunity into the middle class. 
Some require congressional action, and I'm eager to work with all of you. But America 
does not stand still, and neither will I. (Applause.) So wherever and whenever I can take 
steps without legislation to expand opportunity for more American families, that's what 
I'm going to do. (Cheers, applause.)418  
In the 2014 SOTU, Obama openly discussed the issue of minimum wage, one of the 
issues of major importance that Congress had not acted upon. He clearly denounced 
Congress’s lack of action and he stated his willingness to work around Congress 
through the use of executive orders: 
To every mayor, governor, state legislator in America, I say, you don't have to wait for 
Congress to act; Americans will support you if you take this on. And as a chief executive, 
I intend to lead by example. Profitable corporations like Costco see higher wages as the 
smart way to boost productivity and reduce turnover. We should too. In the coming 
weeks I will issue an executive order requiring federal contractors to pay their federally-
funded employees a fair wage of at least $10.10 an hour because if you cook -- (cheers, 
applause) -- our troops' meals or wash their dishes, you should not have to live in pov-
erty. (Sustained applause.)419  
                                                        
416	   Dan	   Pfeiffer,	   “We	   Can’t	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  hundred	  thousands	  of	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Obama’s use of executive orders did not increase after this announcement, it even 
slightly decreased.420 Yet, his statements have been used to accuse him of governing 
by executive order. Of course, the problem clearly resides in the manner the execu-
tive orders are used, more so than in the number. Many E.O.s have nearly no impact 
and are completely within the range of the power that a president should exercise. 
For example, in April 2016, Obama signed an E.O. to allow the change of the logo of 
the Peace Corps,421 which has hardly any political impact. Others have more far-
reaching consequences, such as for example E.O. 13544 (June 10, 2010) that established 
the National Prevention, Health Promotion, and Public Health Council, E.O. 13548 
(July 26, 2010) that increased the federal employment of individuals with disabilities, 
E.O. 13555 (October 19, 2010) that created the White House Initiative on Educational 
excellence for Hispanics, or the much-discussed E.O. 13658 that increased the mini-
mum wage of $10.10 per hour paid to the employees of federal contractors and estab-
lished this minimum wage also for federal subcontractors.422 Additionally, Obama 
used presidential memoranda to exercise executive action. During his two terms, 
Obama issued 332 memoranda, some pertaining to far-reaching points.423 
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  of	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  of	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  to	   in-­‐
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   than	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   (2010),	   to	   the	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  of	  an	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  to	  the	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  of	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  to	  same-­‐sex	  domestic	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  of	  federal	  em-­‐
ployees,	  or	  to	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  in	  public	  health	  research	  on	  the	  causes	  and	  prevention	  of	  gun	  violence	  (2013),	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  cite	  just	  a	  few	  examples.	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Without an in-depth qualitative and comparative analysis, which would assess 
the policy scope of all the E.O.s and memoranda issued by the various presidents, it is 
difficult to make a sweeping assessment of whether or not Obama governed by Exec-
utive Order, but the major problem was that Obama clearly stated that he would use 
E.O.s to circumvent Congress after they had shown their complete refusal to cooper-
ate. In the 2016 interview, Obama explained that in his opinion the base of the Repub-
lican Party, strongly opposed to any cooperation, dominated the decisions of Repub-
lican leadership: 
It might not have been representative of Republicans across the country, but it meant 
that John Boehner or Mitch McConnell had to worry about that mood inside their party 
that felt that, No, we shouldn’t cooperate with Obama, we shouldn’t cooperate with Democrats; 
that it represents compromise, weakness, and that the broader character of America is at 
stake, regardless of whatever policy arguments might be made. As a consequence, there 
were times that I would meet with Mitch McConnell and he would say to me very blunt-
ly, “Look, I’m doing you a favor if I do any deal with you, so it should be entirely on my 
terms because it hurts me just being seen photographed with you.”424 
In the same interview Obama appears completely disillusioned about Republi-
can cooperation on health care reform: 
During the health-care debate, you know, there was a point in time where, after having 
had multiple negotiations with [Iowa senator Chuck] Grassley, who was the ranking 
member alongside my current Chinese ambassador, [Max] Baucus, in exasperation I fi-
nally just said to Grassley, “Is there any form of health-care reform that you can sup-
port?” and he shrugged and looked a little sheepish and said, “Probably not.”425 
2.5.3. A Fragile Majority 
The likelihood of being able to do something of this magnitude in the future was very 
uncertain, and that’s why we, uhm, agreed to swallow our concerns and go to try to get the 
best deal we could.426 
Bruce Braley 
 
The political context of the 2010 midterm election campaign and the beginning 
of the unsettling of public opinion, greatly fuelled by the prominence of the small but 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
Kenneth	   S.	   Lowande,	   “After	   the	   Orders:	   Presidential	  Memoranda	   and	   Unilateral	   Action,”	   Presidential	  
Studies	  Quarterly	  44,	  no.	  4	  (2014):	  725-­‐6,	  731,	  738.	  Lowande	  argues	  that	  memoranda	  contain	  important	  
policy	   content	   and	   that	   they	   have	   increasingly	   been	   used	   interchangeably	   with	   E.O.s.	   Just	   as	   E.O.s,	  
memoranda	  constitute	  essentially	  orders	  to	  administrators.	  Between	  1960	  and	  2012,	  the	  issuing	  of	  E.O.s	  
declined,	  while	  the	  use	  of	  memoranda	  increased.	  Although	  the	  use	  of	  memoranda	  for	  important	  policy	  
goals	  is	  not	  recent,	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  use	  made	  by	  Obama	  is	  unprecedented,	  as	  for	  the	  first	  time	  a	  presi-­‐
dent	  issued	  more	  memoranda	  than	  E.O.s.	  The	  use	  of	  memoranda	  is	  also	  driven	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  me-­‐
dia	  pay	  less	  attention	  to	  them	  and	  are	  less	  challenged.	  Although	  the	  use	  of	  both	  E.O.s	  and	  memoranda	  
decrease	   during	   a	   divided	   government,	   previous	   research	   showed	   that	   during	   a	   divided	   government	  
presidents	   tend	   to	   issue	  more	   E.O.s	  with	  major	   policy	   orders,	   as	   compared	  with	   symbolic	   or	   routine	  
orders.	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vocal Tea Party movement and the opposition from Congressional Republicans, had 
a significant impact on the Democratic majority. Representatives feared for their 
reelection if they supported the health care reform. The 257 seats majority included 
people who had been elected in split districts and many freshmen, representatives 
only recently elected to Congress (2006 and 2008). As many as 49 Democrats came 
from split districts, meaning districts with a Democratic representative but which had 
voted for the Republican presidential candidate, indicating the more conservative 
orientation of those districts. The fact that they were elected in a split district had a 
noticeable impact on their voting record. Political scientist Jeffrey M. Stonecash ana-
lyzed their votes on the two major redistributive policies at the beginning of the 111th 
Congress: the stimulus bill427 and the health care reform. 83.8% of the 39 splitters who 
ran for reelection in 2010 had voted yea on the stimulus, but only 42.1% cast their yea 
for health care. In comparison, 96% of the non-split Democrats voted for both bills. 
The apprehension of the splitters was justified: only 30.8% of them were reelected. 
From the two bills, the stimulus vote had the lighter impact on the split candidates 
(the percentage difference of reelection between the candidates who voted no on 
both bills and those who voted for the stimulus was only 1.2 percentage points). Only 
two of the 16 yea-voters for health care were reelected. From those who voted yes on 
both bills, only one won reelection. Among the 2008 freshmen elected in split-
districts who voted for both bills none was reelected.428  
Representative Pomeroy stressed the sacrifice all Congressional freshmen (not 
only those from split districts) made for the health reform: 
In 2006 we elected 30 freshmen. In 2008 we elected 30 more. Giving us this governing 
majority in the House that we hadn’t had in many years. A lot of those people had… and 
I’m using 30 roughly, a lot of these people had taken districts long held by Republicans 
and they were conservative districts. So we asked the people that had come to Congress 
to fulfill their life dream to get here, to basically get on the line… After we were all de-
feated, I told them like, you were very efficient, you came to Washington, you made a big 
difference, and now you can go on with your life. Took me 18 years to make a difference 
like this, and that is some of what I felt, although I know that some number of them were 
really heartbroken, you know, that their opportunity of serving in Congress came to such 
a quick end. When you run for Congress it’s not like you preserve plan B. I mean, it’s all 
in. So, you work for maybe a year on a campaign, you’re elected, you serve two years, and 
it’s all over. It’s a blink of an eye. But on the other hand, three years outside of a normal 
career leaves these people really floundered to get something else established and some 
of them still haven’t quite got back on their feet from 2010’s defeat.429 
Obama also mentioned these freshmen who sacrificed their seats: 
Right, but to their credit they were not the ones that I had to make the hardest sale to. 
The toughest sales were the folks who were least at risk. Or I won’t say least at risk, be-
cause, for example, the black caucus was there, and the Latino caucus and the progres-
sive caucus. But a lot of times it was these young guys who had the most to lose, had the 
                                                        
427	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  American	   Recovery	   and	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   Great	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  certain	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  CBO	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  of	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toughest races, a guy like Tom Perriello in Virginia, who were the first ones to say, “This 
is why I wanted to get elected, I want to help people and I think it’s the right thing to do.” 
And they almost all lost their seats.430 
The make-up of the Democratic majority not only had an impact on the vote on the 
bill, but also shaped its content. The fragile majority in the Senate proved particularly 
harmful. Because of the threat of a filibuster the more moderate and conservative 
Democratic senators were paramount. According to Skocpol and Jacobs they pre-
vented a more progressive bill and the public option had to be sacrificed on their de-
mand.431 Democratic Massachusetts’s Representative John F. Tierney (1997-2015) said 
that the death of Senator Kennedy greatly contributed to this more conservative turn. 
According to Tierney, with Kennedy alive, the bill would have been much more pro-
gressive. In this respect Tierney, who describes himself as very progressive, said that 
the House bill was much better. He also stressed the impact of the procedure, using 
the budget reconciliation strategy to avoid a filibuster, which allowed the passing of 
the bill, but which prevented the House from making amendments on the Senate bill. 
However, the pressure of time and the fragility of the majority had left no other 
choice. It was the “Senate bill or no bill at all.”432 
Former Representative Braley expressed a similar opinion and voiced his frus-
tration over the final result. He was particularly upset because he is deeply convinced 
that the House bill was better in terms of outcomes for the people: 
Well, it was difficult from the standpoint that the version we had passed in the House 
had provided a public option that would have allowed greater competition for consum-
ers in obtaining more affordable pricings structures for their health care coverage. And 
those of us who had worked very hard to get that public option included in the House 
bill were incredibly frustrated when conservatives in the Senate prevented that from be-
ing included in the Senate version. But at that point we also knew that we were on the 
brink of something historic and the likelihood of being able to do something of this 
magnitude in the future was very uncertain, and that’s why we uhm agreed to swallow 
our concerns and go to try to get the best deal we could.433 
However, Braley also asserted that the room to maneuver was limited. Past experi-
ence had taught them that enacting health care reform was extremely difficult, and a 
new opportunity might not come soon.  
Obama explained very clearly that Kennedy’s death nearly put an end to health 
reform: 
The most important phone call I made after that [Kennedy’s death] was to Nancy Pelosi, 
because the question I posed to her and to Harry Reid was, “Are you guys still game? Be-
cause if you guys are still game, we’ll find a way. But I can’t do it unless Democrats are 
willing to take what are going to be some tough votes.” Now, part of my argument to 
them was, you’ve already paid the price politically, it’s not as if a failed health-care effort 
would be helpful in midterm elections, it’s better to go ahead and push through and then 
show that we had gotten something done that was really important to the American 
people. […] the truth is that the ACA vote showed that when push came to shove and 
people had to do something they thought was right, even if it was not going to be helpful 
to their reelection, the majority of Democrats were willing to do it. And certainly Nancy 
and Harry were willing to do it. […] So once Nancy said, “I’m game,” then it was really 
just, at that point, a set of tactical questions: What legislative mechanisms could we use 
to advance legislation that was 90 to 95 percent done but still had 5 percent of stuff that if 
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we had gone through a regular process could have been cleaned up but that ultimately 
was still going to deliver real help to millions of people across the country?434 
Obama’s recounting of the critical events after Kennedy’s death highlight an im-
portant aspect: the Democratic majority was so fragile, and the passing of the bill was 
so immediately jeopardized, that the Democrats resorted to using legislative leger-
demain to get the ACA passed: the budget reconciliation process. This then avoided 
the filibuster because the reconciliation process sets a time limit on debate. Hence, in 
this process, the majority needed to pass legislation is effectively back down to 51 sen-
ators. However, since reconciliation is a budget procedure, only matters that have a 
fiscal impact can be included, and no significant modifications can be made to the 
text. This limited what could be achieved in the final act, meaning that subsequent 
regulations would be important for defining the substance of the statute. 435  
Ideological diversity had yet another impact on the bill. Among Democrats, con-
flicting views are frequent; some people are almost mavericks in their own party on 
certain points. Michigan Representative Bart Stupak created problems for the bill, 
even jeopardizing it at moments, because he insisted on strict anti-abortion language 
in the bill. As the Senate bill was less restrictive on abortion, Stupak asked for an Ex-
ecutive Order banning the use of federal subsidies to pay for abortions as guarantee 
before voting for the bill.436 The same stance was defended by Democratic Senator 
Ben Nelson who was among the Democrats jeopardizing the Senate bill.437 Stupak 
managed to rally 39 House members to sign his letter refusing to support the bill if 
the anti-abortion clause was not included, and about 12 were serious enough about 
the issue. Although the 111th Congress had a solid Democratic majority of 257 and a 
simple majority required 218 votes, this majority was rapidly eroded: 30 Democrats 
were opposed to the health care bill, with or without anti-abortion clauses, bringing 
the majority down to 227. With these proportions, Stupak had a serious prospect of 
killing the bill. The situation became more complicated after the passage of the Stu-
pak Amendment when Colorado Representative and chair of the Congressional Pro-
Choice Caucus Dana DeGette sent a letter with 41 signatures to Speaker Nancy Pelosi 
pledging that they would vote against the bill in the final passage if the Stupak 
amendment were not removed.438  
The fragility of the Democratic majority because of its ideological diversity was 
perceived as threatening the reform by Democratic representatives supporting the 
reform. Representative Andrews described this diversity:  
Well of course, with as diverse a body the House of Representatives is, you have diverse 
views. On the Affordable Care Act diversity ranges from people who were hostile to the 
law, who have tried to protest, who have tried to repeal it multiple times, to people like 
myself, who are enthusiastic supporters of it. Now we have people in-between, and we 
had some Democrats who didn’t vote for the bill, they had various reasons, some of them 
frankly thought that it didn’t go far enough, they wanted a single-payer health system 
like Canada has, others thought it went too far and they didn’t want the taxes in the bill 
to help to pay for the extended coverage, other Democrats felt that it was a politically 
disadvantageous vote in their district and might cost them their election, and in fact it 
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did cost some of them their election. […] What matters at the end of the day, of course, is 
that a majority of the House and a sufficient number in the Senate voted for the legisla-
tion and it came along.439 
Former Representative Braley explained that the ideological diversity of the 
Congressional Democrats had an impact on the bill. This was particularly the case for 
the Blue Dogs: 
Well, in the early stages it clearly was. A number of them probably could see on the hori-
zon what was about to happen, the emergence of the Tea Party, and a lot of them were 
concerned about their own reelection, which turned out to be a realistic concern, and so 
they supported, some of them supported efforts to try to remove the public option from 
the bill. But, you know, I also saw a lot of those very courageous more conservative 
Democrats vote for the final bill knowing it could cost them the seat in Congress and for 
many of them it did.440 
According to Braley, it was clearly the fear fostered through loud and media-
tized protest actions that pushed some Democrats to remain on their more conserva-
tive positions. Nonetheless, he highlighted the fact that many sacrificed their career 
for the final vote. 
Obama had similar views to those mentioned above on what could be achieved 
with their majority and the political constraints. He explained the difficulties linked 
to their almost filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and the impact on legislative 
content: 
When I hear people say, for example, that the stimulus should have been bigger, I con-
stantly have to remind people that I had to give Susan Collins; Arlen Specter, who was 
then a Republican; Ben Nelson; and Joe Lieberman—I had to get those votes to get any 
stimulus, which meant that the fact that we ended up getting the largest stimulus pro-
gram in American history was no mean feat. Trying to take it over the trillion-dollar 
mark was going to be challenging even if it was good policy. Same thing with the public 
option [for health-care reform]. Even though we had very solid majorities in the House, 
the ceiling for what we could do was decent, but, with the filibuster, constantly threat-
ened majority in the Senate. That was complicated by the fact that, if you’ll recall, [Al] 
Franken hadn’t been seated yet, so that gave us even less room to maneuver.441 
In the Senate, managing to coax out the 60 dearly needed votes was a problem-
atic undertaking. Conservative Democrats, among them Max Baucus, were dispro-
portionately taken into account and obtained the dropping of the public option, 
while progressives, like Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, threatened to kill the bill if 
it became too conservative.442 The difficulties in the Senate had of course a negative 
impact on the mood in the House and the willingness to take political risks on a high-
ly polarized issue. Representative Gordon pointed this out: 
Well, again, you know, it’s always difficult in the Senate, but the threat of the filibuster 
was getting more and more prominent and so that clearly was going to be a difficult 
problem, which made people in the House not want to have to take a hard vote if it was 
going to be not passed in the Senate.443 
Representative Pomeroy put this into perspective and explained the terrible 
price he paid for his yea-vote on the health care reform, as well as both senators from 
North Dakota, none of which ran for re-election: 
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North Dakota had an all-Democratic congressional delegation, even though the state 
had a long voting history of trending Republican. And so, what they [opposition to 
health reform] wanted to do was make me pay a terrible price, so that the senators would 
both know they should not vote for the bill. In the end, both senators voted for the bill, 
but neither senator stood for reelection, they both retired. And so the ads [anti-health 
care reform ads] were very effective: they resulted in my defeat, who had not lost an elec-
tion for 30 years, I was defeated by 10 percentage points in the following fall, and neither 
senator is serving anymore. In the long run, the political… I think that speaks to kind of a 
political price that Democrats paid, especially in swing districts, by passing this bill. Now, 
on the one hand we achieved the most significant domestic policy change from a pro-
gressive viewpoint, extending health care to those who need it, that we had been able to 
achieve in decades, but also paid the worst political price we had paid in decades. […] 
There was a lot of very substantive accomplishments with this bill, despite all of its diffi-
culty in the implementation phase, difficulties that continue even while we talk today. 
But as I look back, who wanted… you know I was basically forced to put my career on the 
line for this, I feel like it was well worthwhile. That following November we took our 
worst defeat since 1938. That was a pretty brutal confirmation of what I was talking 
about.444 
Representative Gordon was less enthusiastic than Representative Pomeroy 
about the ACA. Nonetheless he made the choice to vote for it. Gordon also thought 
that just being a Democratic congressperson after the health care vote was detri-
mental to reelection prospects and cost Democrats dearly: 
But the fact I would assume, I haven’t looked at it, I would assume there were also people 
that lost who voted against the bill. It was just going, if you were a Democrat that year in 
a marginal seat, it was very tough. But, so, the health care, the so called health care vote 
was a part of it, but it was the vote in the bigger sense, not necessarily how you voted, but 
there was a vote, and that it did pass. 
[…]So I think that it was and that’s part of being in public service is, you have to take the 
risk and you have to take difficult votes and in 1994 there was some similar situations, I 
took the hard votes and I won by a few hundred votes in the election, but I won, where a 
lot of people got beat. In retrospective it makes you feel good to take the hard votes and 
to try to do the right thing.445 
Starr particularly insisted on the courage the final vote took, especially in light 
of the dissatisfaction with the bill: 
Political leadership requires different sorts of courage. Sometimes it is the physical cour-
age to face down a hostile mob—and Democratic members of the House of Representa-
tives had to show that fortitude as they walked to the decisive vote on March 21 through 
right-wing protesters who spat on them. Sometimes it is the courage to put a political ca-
reer at risk for the sake of deeply held principles; many legislators had to do that as well. 
And sometimes it is the courage to make a decision when the choices are less than ideal 
and the prospects for success are uncertain. All those who voted for reform had to make 
that leap too.446 
Although one Republican, Representative Joseph Cao from Louisiana’s 2nd con-
gressional district, voted yea on the House health care bill (H.R. 3962) thus providing 
for a 2 voice margin on November 7th, 2009 (220-215), the final vote on health care re-
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form which consisted in accepting the Senate bill (H.R. 3590) was a slim 219-212 with-
out a single Republican vote.447 
2.6. Conclusion 
The building of the welfare state and the subsequent attacks against it since 
show how the issues of race and class intersect. This shows, first, in the fact that the 
initial welfare state reinforced and exacerbated racial economic differences, thus cre-
ating a greater structural overlapping of race and class; second, in the use of social 
policies to try to alleviate these racial disparities; and finally in the use of race as a 
dividing factor in a class alliance based on shared economic interests. It is important 
to keep in mind that the welfare state is under attack precisely because of its efficien-
cy, of its ability to even out inequalities, as demonstrated by the strong (white) middle 
class that emerged as a result of the New Deal and other post-WWII programs. The 
class war initiated by the economic power elites in the 1970s quite successfully aimed 
at turning downward redistribution into upward redistribution as rising inequalities 
prove. It has been shown that the criticism of programs and their representation is 
mostly based on a twisted reality. Redistribution is a highly ideological issue because 
of the nature of social policies and their scope. Thus redistribution divides the parties 
along polarized lines of race and class, with Republicans having taken over the agen-
da of the economic power elite. The political strategy devised by the Republican Par-
ty has moved the debate toward the right and has created a political gridlock. This 
stark polarization and uncompromising attitude continued during the Obama presi-
dency. As a result of the uncompromising partisan confrontation and the strong ideo-
logical dimension, most of the debate takes place in discourse. The stake is not to give 
the best account of reality, but to convince others that the advocated ideas are the 
right ones. A whole discourse has been built around social policies, creating a politi-
cal context that has to be taken into account in the quest for reform, which also cre-
ates political and rhetorical traps that must be avoided at all costs and which Obama 
tried to either circumvent or to overcome by reworking the political discourse and by 
painting a different vision of reality in his discourse that favors and legitimizes the 
creation of social policy. 
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Words are important, words matter, and the implication that they don’t, I think, dimin-
ishes how important it is to speak to the American people directly about making America as 
good as its promise.1 
Barack Obama 
 
 
At the political level, discourse plays a central role as a means to make ideology 
known, to advocate ideas, and to defend and promote policy choices. In a democracy, 
public opinion plays a central role, in the sense that election and re-election must be 
achieved, but also because it is used as a tool in the political game. Public opinion is 
used to model discourse, to find out what people want to hear and how the message 
must be constructed to hit home. But public opinion can also be used to undermine a 
policy proposal. It is nearly impossible for a government to pass a bill that the popu-
lation strongly opposes, not only because the politicians would fear retaliation on 
election day, but also because it denotes a lack of legitimacy, the fact of not having a 
mandate to create this legislation. Political scientists Theodore J. Lowi, Benjamin 
Ginsberg, and Kenneth A. Shepsle insist that public opinion has an impact on policy.2 
A democratic government is supposed to represent the will of the people. How-
ever, discourse is there to manipulate the will of the people. As philosopher Arthur 
Schopenhauer pointed out in his treatise on rhetoric, The Art of Being Right, the most 
important thing to keep in mind, as far as dialectics is concerned, is that the truth 
does not matter. The fundamental aspect in a dispute is not to tell the truth, it is not 
important to be right in the sense of having said the truth—in terms of facts corre-
sponding to reality— but to be perceived as being right. It is important to be seen by 
the public as being the winner.3 To be the rhetorical winner in a confrontation, it is 
important to persuade, to make the public adhere to your opinion, to your words, 
even if they are blatant lies. Easy answers are given for complex problems. Schopen-
hauer’s definition of eristic dialectic can be applied to political discourse, because 
political discourse and counter-discourse can be viewed as disputes in a wide sense. 
The discourse of a given politician does not exist on its own, it is influenced by pre-
ceding political discourse, the doxic dimension of many terms, the system of values of 
the nation, and the given political context. Thus, when politicians give speeches, they 
are not speaking alone, they are in a dispute with previous speeches. In their new 
speech, politicians try to shape a different worldview through a different representa-
tion of reality to make the public adhere to their ideas and proposals. 
The racial wedge driven between the different racial groups of the working and 
middle class is one of these easy answers to the current state of economic inequality 
that make the Republicans look like the winners of the political argument, despite the 
fact that the Republican discourse rests on a twisted representation of reality and es-
pecially disguises the real political goal of conservatives: upward redistribution. This 
racial wedge, however, has become more difficult to identify, especially in political 
discourse, because political correctness has moved the racial discourse under the sur-
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face. Although openly racist appeals encounter rejection, more subtle discourse 
manages to trigger deep-seated stereotypes and prejudices. Moreover, it must be said 
that the structural overlapping of race and class, although created and maintained 
through political choices, tends to reinforce those preconceptions and stereotypes, 
especially since they are spread through the media. In other words, racially divisive 
discourse to attack the welfare state exists, hidden in code words and racially laden 
images.  
A counter-discourse must be developed by supporters of the welfare state to 
adapt to the discursive change brought by Republican discourse. Discourse manages 
to influence the political context, despite the fact that fundamental aspects of reality 
have not changed. It is the case, for example, of discourse denying discrimination or 
the consequences of past discrimination, despite the vast amount of statistical evi-
dence showing the effects of this past and present discrimination. A politician who 
wants to address racial inequality, like Obama, must adapt his own discourse to take 
into account this denial, accusations of reverse discrimination, and the perception of 
an unfair favoring of minorities through social programs, even if this is not true. The 
rejection of affirmative action by public opinion or the 1970s backlash have shown 
that the public is not receptive anymore to a discourse and policy solutions anchored 
on racial inequality and white guilt, which partly results from Reagan’s racial popu-
lism. Obama thus had to develop a new counter-discourse taking the parameters of 
the backlash and racial populism into account, a discourse that would overcome the 
racial wedge and to create a new class-based alliance. 
The influence of this discourse of racial populism, and what people want to be-
lieve, means that the political solution will, most likely, neither be ideal, nor fair, but 
based on a new ideological approach. Once again, an ideological approach is not a 
rational approach, but one based on ideas and beliefs, and is not necessarily the ob-
jectively and scientifically best solution. Ideology develops in a political context that 
factors in what should be achieved depending on the given interests and beliefs, but 
also taking into account what the economic, social, and political parameters are. This 
necessarily exposes the discrepancy between what should ideally be achieved, and 
what is actually possible. 
3.1. “A Hell of a Lot More Abstract Than ‘Nigger, Nig-
ger:”4 Code and Doxa 
The title quote comes from a 1981 interview conducted by political scientist Al-
exander Lamis with Lee Atwater, a Republican strategist, former chairman of the 
Republican National Committee and advisor to both G. H. W. Bush and Ronald 
Reagan. He openly explained how conservative race baiting had evolved under the 
pressure of political correctness: 
You start out in 1954 by saying ‘Nigger, nigger, nigger.’ By 1968 you can’t say ‘nigger,’ that 
hurts you. Backfires. So you say stuff like forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff. 
You’re getting so abstract now [that] you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these 
things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a by-product of them is [that] 
Blacks get hurt worse than Whites. And subconsciously maybe that is part of it. I’m not 
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saying that if it is getting that abstract, and that coded, that we are doing away with the 
racial problem one way or the other. You follow me—because obviously sitting around 
and saying, ‘we want to cut this,’ is much more abstract than even the busing thing and a 
hell of a lot more abstract than ‘Nigger, nigger.’ 
Atwater’s description of the evolution of conservative race discourse highlights three 
essential points. First, the discourse evolved over time, adapting to social and political 
conditions. Second, it clearly mentions the intersection of race and class. Third, it 
openly admits that the discourse is coded, and also that the code has evolved so far 
that it is difficult to prove the racial undertones, which depend in part on historical 
evolution, statistical evidence of cuts and slashed programs disproportionately affect-
ing minorities, and on context. Moreover, political scientist Tali Mendelberg explains 
that the power of this implicit race-baiting stems from “the coexistence of two con-
tradictory elements in American politics: powerful egalitarian norms about race, and 
a party system based on the cleavage of race.”5 The discourse is politically correct in 
appearance, but the strong association of the parties with their ideology and their 
constituencies allows its racial meaning to be understood.  
The race discourse has undergone a gradual evolution. According to political 
scientist Joe Feagin, racial coding started in the first election after the Civil War in 
1868 with the Democratic Party using phrases like “states’ rights” and “laissez-faire” 
government to replace their usual anti-black rhetoric. After Nixon’s loss in the 1960 
election, Barry Goldwater reactivated this discourse for the Republican Party—the 
well-known Southern Strategy—to appeal to southern conservatives and make them 
switch their party allegiance from the Democrats to the Republicans. However, 
Feagin argues that “Southern Strategy” is a misnomer, and prefers the term “White 
Southern Strategy”, since many Southerners are not white. The overt and covert rac-
ist appeals were for whites only and emphasized over time the interests of white 
Southerners and suburbia in all states.6 Edsall and Edsall also insist on the crucial 
dimension of the Goldwater campaign. According to them, the Goldwater movement 
not only changed the structure of the Republican nomination process, but also the 
Party itself. The decisive aspect of this campaign was that it demonstrated that con-
servatism offered an ideological mechanism to capitalize on whites’ opposition to 
racial integration, without risking being labeled a racist. The campaign showed that 
race was a useful tool to break the class base of the New Deal which built on shared 
economic interests. This created an ideological shift to the right among a population 
that was formerly committed to a redistributive political agenda.7 Sociologists Jeff 
Manza and Clem Brooks explain that social cleavages at the political level are not 
stable; it is not a permanent fact that race trumps class. However, when the race 
cleavage increases, the class cleavage diminishes, and this has been the case since the 
1960s. But to increase the race cleavage, cuing and priming is necessary, and they in-
sist on the fact that very implicit cuing works.8 
It has been mentioned earlier that a sharp distinction must be made between ra-
cial populism and economic populism. Economic populism had been used by the 
Democratic Party to advocate their social policy agenda. Racial populism, or cultural 
populism as historian Michael Kazin calls it, is used by conservatives to undermine 
the progressive social policy ideology. According to Kazin, racial or cultural populism 
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worked for Nixon, especially through the use of his running mate and Vice President 
Spiro Agnew, who functioned as a surrogate: Agnew did the racial populist part, rail-
ing against liberals and depicting liberals as promoting the interests of minorities, 
fostering disorder, and undermining traditional values. According to Kazin, this divi-
sive role was clearly attributed to Agnew, who said in 1971 about his role in the 1970 
election that “dividing the American people has been my main contribution to the 
national political scene since assuming the office of vice-president… I not only plead 
guilty to that charge, but I am somewhat flattered by it.”9 However, Nixon’s politics 
did not entirely match this discourse, as shown by his record on social policies and 
expansion of affirmative action.  
According to Schuman et al. Reagan’s election marks a good boundary as start-
ing point of the retrenchment against racial progress.10 Edsall and Edsall share this 
perception that Reagan marked a new degree of racial conservatism. Reagan took 
Nixon’s discourse on anti-government, states’ rights, law and order, anti-liberalism, 
and the anti-welfare rhetoric further, driving the public perceptions of the Republi-
can Party’s racial conservatism to levels comparable to the 1964 Goldwater campaign. 
The major difference was that because of changing racial attitudes, instead of result-
ing in a defeat, the Reagan candidacy resulted in victory.11 
Reagan started in politics as a Democrat and even campaigned for Truman in 
the 1948 election, drawing on classical economic populist rhetoric when he attacked 
“corporate greed, defended the common man, and attacked the Republican Congress 
for tax cuts” that favored the rich.12 Reagan’s conversion to conservatism came during 
the 1950s and 1960s. His rhetoric still drew on the language of economic populism, 
but with a notable change: corporations were replaced by government. In 1964 
Reagan campaigned for Goldwater and gave what his advisers referred to as “the 
Speech,” which set the baseline of Reagan’s discourse. It marked an important step in 
attacking government social programs, including the progressive income tax. It ce-
mented three central themes: the attack on big government for cost and the waste of 
taxpayer money; the portrayal of the Democratic Party as socialist with phrases like 
“down the roads under the banners of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin,” and the attack on the 
little intellectual elite of “do-gooders” and “government planners” who advocate for 
the welfare state that strips citizens of their freedom.13 According to Kazin “Reagan 
drew upon the populist language coined in the 19th century by dramatically reinter-
preting the meaning of the people and special interests to fit his conservative agen-
da.”14 During that campaign, Republicans developed a radical image, and Reagan 
pointed out the necessity to soften the discourse to make it more acceptable to peo-
ple, but without compromising ideas. Since Reagan has been described as “a populist 
crusader along the lines of Andrew Jackson, William Jennings Bryan, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, and George Wallace” by writer Richard Reeves, for example,15 it can be 
argued that he was rather successful in softening his discourse, because the mixed 
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references show that he managed to blur the lines between economic and racial pop-
ulism. “The Great Communicator” Reagan proved to be an effective rhetorical leader 
who focused on “consensual appeals that unified the nation”, by using, in the formu-
lation of political scientist Bert Rockman, “dulcet tones” to mask the sweeping chang-
es he proposed to make in government.16 Political scientist Thomas Cronin highlights 
that Reagan “explains policy in a neighborly way”17 and basically came over as a “very 
nice guy,” in the words of historian Françoise Coste, who also points out that Reagan 
was not shy denying any charge of racism.18 By blending economic populist phrasing 
with conservative aims and racial populism, Reagan managed to hide racial under-
tones.  
Edsall and Edsall explain that the insistence on generalized government re-
straint was a means to “excise” racial language from conservative discourse while 
keeping a politics and a governing strategy that attacked programs targeted at minori-
ties without explicitly mentioning race. This strategy effectively managed to weaken 
the previous economic division between Democrats and Republicans along racial 
lines. Edsall and Edsall insist on the fact that this excision of racial language from the 
conservative discourse was an essential element in building Reagan’s broad coalition. 
His “ostensibly neutral language” allowed the polarization of voters on race issues, 
such as welfare, busing, and affirmative action, yet without openly appearing as racist 
or as appealing to anti-black sentiments, at least in the eyes of white voters. In con-
trast, by 1986, 56% of blacks thought Reagan was racist.19 Most importantly, through 
the use of the language of economic populism applied to racial populism, Reagan 
effectively managed to make the white working class believe that he had their inter-
ests at heart, while making policies favoring the rich. 
The discourse Reagan established proved very enduring, and was used by 
G.H.W. Bush and to a certain extent by G.W. Bush; on the Democratic side, Clinton 
devised his rhetoric and politics to adapt to the Reagan discourse, and during the 
Obama campaigns and presidency, the same type of discourse and phrases were used 
by Republicans, from “tax-and-spend liberals” to “socialized medicine.” 
3.1.1. Code 
Manza and Brooks insist on the fact that although the direct racial appeals that 
were common for the 1940-1960 period are now used in a more subtle way in coded 
and symbolic forms, they still have the “powerful effects of racial attitudes in struc-
turing whites’ political behavior.”20 Schuman et al. explain this interaction between 
norms and attitudes. The change in norms, such as political correctness, makes some 
ideas and beliefs, such as support for discrimination or segregation, or the verbalizing 
of prejudice, unacceptable. However, this does not mean that the ideas and beliefs 
have entirely disappeared.21 Bonilla-Silva sees the “increasingly covert nature of racial 
discourse and racial practices” as one of several characteristics of the new racial struc-
ture, the others being the avoidance of racial terminology, whites’ claims of “reverse 
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racism,” a political agenda that is indirectly racialized, the “invisibility of most mech-
anisms to reproduce racial inequality,” and the “rearticulation of some racial practic-
es characteristic of the Jim Crow period of race relations.”22  
Political scientists Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley explain that racial appeals and 
any representation of race have become more difficult, even more so since the infa-
mous Horton ads used by G.H.W. Bush, pushing towards an even greater reliance on 
code words, which are “words that are fundamentally nonracial in nature that have, 
through the process of association, assumed a strong racial component.”23 This only 
means that the language to appeal to those ideas, beliefs, and attitudes must be sub-
tler. Sociologists Lawrence D. Bobo and Camille Z. Charles explain that despite equal 
treatment and racial integration as the norm in all public spheres, mentioning issues 
associated with African-Americans, like welfare and crime, “can cue underlying nega-
tive racial attitudes and thereby lend such tendencies greater political conse-
quence.”24  
Moreover, Jacobs and Shapiro explain that politicians use public opinion to 
craft their talk in order to change public opinion, not in order to adapt their policies. 
They give the example of both Reagan and Clinton. In the first case, a senior aide to 
President Reagan, Michael Deaver, said: “With [Reagan], polls were not used to 
change policy to follow the prevailing winds. Instead, they were tools to determine 
how to persuade people about an idea.” Dick Morris, a pollster for President Clinton, 
gave a similar explanation: “[Legislators and the Clinton White House] don’t use a 
poll to reshape a program, but to reshape the argumentation for the program so that 
the public supports it.”25 Both examples clearly show that the content was not 
changed, but the phrasing and shaping of the message were adapted to convey the 
same content in a more convincing manner.  
In the context of turning downward redistribution into upward redistribution, 
this means that the dissatisfaction of public opinion over a stagnating economy, ex-
pressed in terms of protest against taxes and racial backlash, was exploited in politi-
cal discourse to forward the conservative agenda of reversing redistribution. And in-
deed, conservative politics and economic policies have not resulted in economic 
progress for the white working and middle classes, quite the contrary. However, their 
opinions have been taken into account to craft a political discourse that led them to 
support a political agenda that was contrary to their interests. 
However, the racial backlash sentiments could not be addressed in openly racist 
terms anymore, hence the resort to code words, which are developed over time 
through priming. Priming means that decisive elements of the discourse are used 
everywhere and on every occasion; in the case of conservative Republicans, it is based 
on stock phrases like “big government” or “socialism.” Moreover, the fact that a set of 
phrases is used over and over again increases their meaning, associates them with 
more and more ideas over time according to the contexts in which they have been 
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used, and ultimately turns them into code words with a deeper meaning. priming, or 
“staying on message” is used to highlight standards or considerations for the public to 
use in evaluating policy proposals.26 In addition, political scientists Shanto Iyengar 
and Donald R. Kinder found in their study on the impact of television on American 
public political opinion formation that priming—understood by them as drawing 
attention to some aspects of political life at the expense of others—as used in televi-
sion news has an effect on setting the parameters for reaching political judgments 
and choices.27  
Rhetorician Ruth Amossy uses the term doxa (common opinion) to describe 
code elements. According to her, in rhetorics the sine qua non condition of efficiency is 
adapting to the public. This is consistent with Schopenhauer’s insistence on being 
perceived as being right in the eyes of the public. A discourse aimed at convincing 
and gaining the adherence of the public needs to build on common points of agree-
ment. These common points of agreement are based on the opinions, values, and 
beliefs of the public.28 This means that the doxa can only be decoded through the 
analysis of the public the discourse is addressed to, and the opinions and beliefs that 
influence the public’s interpretation of the discourse. In the case of the racial dis-
course, Mendelberg explains that “the racial reference, while subtle, is recognizable 
and works most powerfully through white voters’ racial stereotypes, fears, and re-
sentments.”29 The racial reference is recognizable because it plays on the doxa and 
addresses deep-seated concerns. Sociologist Michael P. Jeffries explains that the ra-
cial meaning of the vocabulary and meta-language also depends on the context.30 
This context can be a discursive context of association, oblique references to stereo-
types, or even a situational context. For example, political scientist Gerard Boychuck 
justified the racialized dimension of the health care opposition in the 1960s through 
the fact that the language used to frame the opposition to health care matched the 
language used to oppose Civil Rights. According to Boychuck, “in Mississippi in this 
period the ‘federalization of medicine’ clearly implied a direct challenge to segrega-
tionist practices.”31 
The race code thus relies heavily on implicit associations. Amossy insists on the 
potency of the implicit as a factor that helps convincing the public. The implicit is the 
presentation of the uncontested premises of the implied, or elements that are better 
not openly voiced, in a veiled and indirect manner. The implicit pushes the public to 
fill in the blanks, thus making it an active part of the discourse, but even more im-
portantly, it creates an effect of appropriation through the reconstruction of the mes-
sage. Moreover, the implicit is powerful because the values and positions implied 
enter the discourse in needless-to-say manner that eschews contestation, presenting 
them as so obvious and clear that they need not be formulated explicitly. In addition, 
the use of the implicit makes it possible to say without saying, and enables the speak-
er to refute later accusations.32 Mendelberg insists on the crucial aspect of the implicit 
in coded racial discourse:  
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When a society has repudiated racism, yet racial conflict persists, candidates can win by 
playing the race card only through implicit racial appeals. The implicit nature of these 
appeals allows them to prime racial stereotypes, fears, and resentments while appearing 
not to do so. When an implicit appeal is rendered explicit—when other elites bring the 
racial meaning of the appeal to voter’s attention—it appears to violate the norm of racial 
equality. It then loses its ability to prime white voters’ racial predispositions. As a conse-
quence, voters not only become more disaffected with the candidate, but also prevent 
their negative racial predispositions from influencing their opinion on the issues of race. 
Political communication that derogates African-Americans does little harm if it is widely, 
immediately, and strongly denounced. In an age of equality, what damages racial equali-
ty is the failure to notice the racial meaning of political communication, not the racial 
meaning itself.33 
Mendelberg explains that the implicit racial messages or codes manage to prime ra-
cial resentment, but allow evasions of the mechanism of self-censorship, because 
most people are not able to recognize an implicit racial appeal as such. Only openly 
racist messages are identified as such.34 Schuman et al. also insist on this aspect. Ap-
peals that are too direct, especially regarding the traditional stereotype of black-white 
ability difference, are rejected or treated as counternormative.35 An example to illus-
trate this would be the publication in 1994 of The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class 
Structure in American Life by Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, which pro-
voked controversy in the media, but also among scientists. Indeed, Herrnstein and 
Murray argued that socio-economic stratification reflected natural intelligence, but 
they also hinted that racial differences in intelligence might not be only due to envi-
ronmental differences, but also to genes. This gross attempt at reviving biological 
racism was sharply criticized.  
Similarly, some remarks and cartoons made about Obama, which played too 
openly on the crudest racial stereotypes met loud criticism. During the 2007 Demo-
cratic primaries, the then candidate for the primaries Senator Joe Biden said in the 
New York Observer about contestant Obama: “I mean, you got the first mainstream 
African-American who is articulate and bright and clean and a nice-looking guy. I 
mean, that's a storybook, man.”36 Biden’s statement too openly referred to the oldest 
and most racist stereotypes, as Biden highlighted that Obama was the contrary of 
these stereotypes, in order to be acceptable under current standards of political cor-
rectness. Similarly, the cover of The New Yorker of July 21, 2008, depicting Michelle 
and Barack Obama in the Oval Office, Michelle in Black Panther garb and Obama 
dressed as Osama bin Laden with an American flag burning in the hearth was sharp-
ly criticized. The New Yorker’s editor David Remnik contended that it was supposed to 
be a satire about the rumors circulating on Obama at that time. Moreover, Remnick 
insisted that the editorial board thought their readers were intelligent enough to un-
derstand the satire.37 However, for many readers the satire was too close to the racist 
opinions voiced about Obama. 
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3.1.2. Stereotypes 
The race code, being conveyed through the doxa, heavily relies on images, ste-
reotypes and representations of different populations. These stereotypes and repre-
sentations are built on old racist beliefs and spread, among others, through the me-
dia. Amossy defines the stereotype as being quintessentially doxical. According to 
her, stereotyping consists in thinking reality through a preexisting cultural represen-
tation, a collective and rigid concept. Thus a real individual or group are perceived 
and evaluated according to a previously constructed model. In the case of a famous 
person, this person is seen according to the public image the media crafted and which 
circulates in public opinion.38  
Political scientist Martin Gilens insists on the fact that racial stereotyping goes 
further than the simple expression of antipathy or sympathy and considers it a specif-
ic racial judgment in which prejudice certainly plays a role but, most importantly, 
something which has consequences on the political views of whites.39 Negative black 
stereotypes also have an impact on the beliefs of the black population itself. Bobo and 
Charles underline the dichotomy that emerged after the Civil Rights Movement: ra-
cial attitudes have changed, equal treatment and racial integration in all public 
spheres are the norm, and yet racial tensions persist, negative racial stereotypes are 
widespread, and the perceptions of discrimination differ widely. Moreover, Bobo and 
Charles point out that minorities also have negative stereotypes, about whites, but 
also about themselves.40 This can be seen in the case of the black working poor who 
try to differentiate themselves through values from the ‘underclass,’ or middle-class 
blacks making conscious efforts to distinguish themselves from the culture of the 
lower classes; it can be seen in the condemnation of the behavior of the ‘underclass’ 
by other blacks, or in the fact that an increasing part of the black population believes 
that lack of taking responsibility is among the reasons why some blacks are not get-
ting ahead.41 Bobo shows that, in 2011, there was an increasing belief, both among 
blacks and whites, of cultural attributions of racial inequality, as well as strong nega-
tive racial stereotyping.42  
Superficially, racial stereotyping is an easy phenomenon to explain. Sociologist 
and economist Gunnar Myrdal highlighted the explanatory powers of race as early as 
1944, especially because race—meaning physical differences—allows a simplistic 
explanation for complex political, social, and economic interrelations. The explana-
tion is all the easier and more readily accepted when racial characteristics appear to 
correspond to cultural characteristics:  
Race is a comparatively simple idea, which becomes easily applied to certain outward 
signs of “social visibility,” such as physiognomy. Explanations in terms of environment, 
on the contrary, tax knowledge and imagination heavily. It is difficult for the ordinary 
                                                        
38	  Amossy	  45.	  
39	  Gilens	  170.	  
40	  Bobo	  and	  Charles	  246–47.	  	  
41	   Lacy	   73,	   75,	   93,	   117.	   See	   also	   the	   condemnation	  of	   negative	  black	  behavior	   in	   popular	   culture,	   for	  
example,	  Bill	  Cosby	  or	  Chris	  Rock,	  and	  the	  use	  of	   ‘nigger’	  to	  talk	  about	  blacks	  showing	  negative	  social,	  
economic,	  and	  cultural	  behavior.“	  Optimism	  about	  Black	  Progress	  Declines:	  Blacks	  See	  Growing	  Values	  
Gap	   Between	   Poor	   and	   Middle	   Class”	   (Pew	   Research	   Center,	   November	   13,	   2007),	  
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/Race-­‐2007.pdf.	  	  
42	  Bobo,	  “Jim	  Crow,”	  27.	  
262 Stephan Social Policies and Racial Questions 
man to envisage clearly how such factors as malnutrition, bad housing, and lack of 
schooling actually deform the body and the soul of people.43 
This dimension of ‘simplicity’ is a crucial one. Most people have neither the time nor 
the willingness to study the complex political and historical reasons of the racial class 
stratification of the US Historian and political scientist Howard Zinn pointed out the 
explanatory capacities of race, and especially their endurance: “Physical difference is 
so gross a stimulus to human beings, cursed as they are by the gift of vision, that once 
it is latched onto as explanation for difference in personality; intelligence; demeanor; 
it is terribly difficult to put aside.”44 Sociologist Howard Winant asserts that political 
correctness, in the form of non- or anti-racialist rhetoric and even policies, and ex-
pressed through multiculturalism, diversity, racial pluralism, and equal opportunity, 
for example, did not have a significant impact in altering “long-prevalent patterns of 
racialized identity-formation and cultural representation.”45  
Historian and sociologist Hugh Davis Graham concurs in this assessment. Alt-
hough the Civil Rights Movement briefly managed to create a new image of “a peti-
tioning black voter being brutalized by Sheriff Jim Clark in Selma,” this “dominant 
symbol” had been displaced by 1966 by images of “the rampaging ghetto rioter in 
Watts, or the black racist harangues of an H. Rap Brown.” Moreover, Graham attrib-
utes a role to the media, quoting magazine like Time and Newsweek, as factors con-
tributing to this changing image.46 These embedded stereotypes are triggered by as-
sociation in opinion formation. Iyengar and Kinder explain this opinion formation, 
especially regarding the information feeding through the media: 
It seems to us highly unreasonable to demand of average citizens that they carefully and 
skeptically examine news presentations. If politics are ordinarily subordinate to the de-
mands and activities of earning a living, raising a family, and forming and maintaining 
friendships, then citizens could hardly be expected to spend much of their time and en-
ergy each day grappling with the flow of news. How then do Americans “understand” 
politics? 
The answer is that we muddle through. Faced with the enormous complexity and uncer-
tainty of the political world, possessed of neither the motivation nor the wits to optimize, 
we strike various compromises. We resort to cognitive shortcuts and settle for acceptable 
solutions. As a consequence of such compromises, our judgments are often creatures of 
circumstance. 
When we think about the federal deficit, turmoil in Latin America, or the performance of 
our president depends less on what we know in some complete sense and more on what 
happens to come to mind.47 
The racial stereotype, deeply embedded in the culture and often repeated, 
comes readily to mind. Moreover, the fact that race and class overlap lends associa-
tional credibility to the racial explanation, as it is difficult, afterwards, to distinguish 
which is at the origins of which. Political scientist Kimberlé Crenshaw points out that 
this is especially the case since racial stereotypes have long been used and associated 
with political, religious, and scientific theories to legitimize the oppression of blacks, 
creating a racial dichotomy in which white is the normal and black the abnormal. 
Crenshaw typologized the historical oppositional dualities. In this dichotomy, whites 
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are described as the norm with the following qualities: industrious, intelligent, moral, 
knowledgeable, with an enabling culture, law-abiding, responsible, virtuous and pi-
ous. Blacks, on the other hand, are abnormal, and described as lazy, unintelligent, 
immoral, ignorant, with a disabling culture, criminal, shiftless, and lascivious, as op-
posed to whites.48 Political philosopher Elizabeth Anderson explains that to make 
stigmatization ‘work’, an association between specific character traits and talents is 
needed which allows for the differentiation between groups and for the creation of a 
feeling of superiority for the other group. These characteristics need to be seen as 
intrinsic to the group so as to exclude the notion of free choice, of situational explana-
tions, and discriminatory explanations.49 This characterization is at work in racism, 
biological and cultural racism overlap in their stereotypes, but differ in the explana-
tion of the origins of those alleged character traits. Crenshaw is adamant about this 
continuity between old and new forms of racism and its associated cultural norms: 
The end of Jim Crow has been accompanied by the demise of an explicit ideology of 
white supremacy. The white norm, however, has not disappeared; it has only been sub-
merged in popular consciousness. It continues in an unspoken form as a statement of the 
positive social norm, legitimating the continuing domination of those who do not meet it. 
Nor have the negative stereotypes associated with blacks been eradicated. The rationali-
zations once used to legitimate black subordinations based on a belief in racial [biologi-
cal] inferiority have now been reemployed to legitimate the domination of blacks 
through reference to an assumed cultural inferiority.50 
The most powerful aspect of the racist explanation is the fact that the oppres-
sion and subaltern status of a group of people, defined as a different race through 
their physical characteristics to which alleged character traits are associated, is justi-
fied by their supposedly inherent inferiority, making cause and effect the same. This 
also lends power to the stereotype: through the subordinate position created through 
oppression, more and more individuals actually end up corresponding more or less to 
the stereotype. Systemic oppression and discrimination have indeed created a racial 
stratification of poverty, making it likely for a black individual to be poor, and all its 
related consequences, but leaving the rhetorical field open as to the reasons for this 
situation: biological inferiority, deficient cultural values, or systemic oppression. 
Gilens explains this gradual association of blacks with poverty and the related stereo-
types: 
Since the mid-1960s, poverty and race have been closely linked in the public mind. 
Where “the poor” once conjured up images of southern European or Irish immigrants, 
or of white dust-bowl farmers, urban contemporary images of the poor—the homeless 
beggar, the welfare queen, the teenage ghetto gang member, the heroin addict shooting 
up in an abandoned building—are strongly associated with minorities in both the mass 
media and the public imagination.51 
Several figures emerge which represent stereotypes of black poverty: the homeless 
beggar, the welfare queen, the teenage ghetto gang member, the heroin/drug addict. 
The welfare queen and the gang member, reinforced through the dress code in the 
rap universe, are the most widespread ones. Amossy insists on the importance of the 
probability of truthfulness for the doxa to function. The doxa is founded on points of 
agreement between sensible people, but without having the value of truth. It only 
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needs to be plausible as it partly relies on probability.52 In this the structural overlap-
ping of race and class plays in favor of the stereotype and the doxa: structurally it is 
true that the black population has a higher poverty rate, a proportionally heavier re-
liance on welfare programs, higher crime rates,53 and higher levels of out-of-wedlock 
births. In this sense, the stereotype builds on a certain structural probability that has 
been created through oppression in the first place, and makes it more likely to find a 
concrete example to confirm the stereotype, especially if one is looking for it.  
Historian Jacqueline Jones explains that, during the 1970s, a gradual perception 
emerged, identifying poverty with blacks and the middle class with whites, which was 
accompanied by an emerging perception of a distinct ghetto culture with different 
aspirations and values. The northern ghetto culture became seen as representing 
blackness.54 Political scientist Jennifer Hochschild evokes the problem of the repre-
sentation of blacks in the media, newspapers, TV, and movies. Men are often depict-
ed as predators, children as doomed to failure, and women as loud and morally 
doubtful.55 Mendelberg denounces the case of ads against violent crime or with a 
strong anti-welfare stance, which are often illustrated with African-American faces. It 
is this association of an apparently “neutral” message with a race visual that is part of 
the racial code,56 because the association plays on the stereotype that attributes a 
propensity for crime or welfare dependency to blacks.  
One of the most widely discussed examples in this context is the infamous Wil-
lie Horton political ad that was used by Republican candidate G.H.W. Bush in the 
1988 presidential campaign against Democratic opponent Michael Dukakis, then the 
governor of Massachusetts. Willie Horton, a convicted criminal sentenced to life, had 
benefited in 1986 of a prison furlough program in Massachusetts, signed in 1972 by 
Republican governor Francis Sargent. In 1987, Horton attacked a couple, assaulting 
the man, raping the woman, and stealing their car. Horton was shot during his arrest. 
The Bush campaign used the incident to attack candidate Dukakis for being lax on 
crime. The ad showed African-American Willie Horton’s mug shot and recounted the 
facts of what happened in the attack. Mendelberg, and many others, count this as 
playing the race card because the Horton case so perfectly matches the stereotypes 
about black male criminality and sexuality.57 The additional potency of the ad came 
from the fact that the events were true, thus extending veracity to adjoining prejudic-
es. The untruthful dimension was that the Democrat Dukakis was depicted as lax on 
crime, notwithstanding the fact that a Republican governor had signed the furlough 
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program. The perception primed, as the incident happened while Dukakis was gov-
ernor.58 
In The Audacity of Hope Obama described his perception of racial stereotypes 
and the way in which he thinks it still impacts people: 
This isn’t to say that prejudice has vanished. None of us—black, white, Latino, or 
Asian—is immune to the stereotypes that our culture continues to feed us, especially ste-
reotypes about black criminality, black intelligence, or the black work ethic. In general, 
members of every minority group continue to be measured largely by the degree of our 
assimilation—how closely speech pattern, dress, or demeanor conform to the dominant 
white culture—and the more that a minority strays from these external markers, the 
more he or she is subject to negative assumptions. If an internalization of antidiscrimina-
tion norms over the past three decades—not to mention basic decency—prevents most 
whites from consciously acting on such stereotypes in their daily interactions with per-
sons of other races, it’s unrealistic to believe that these stereotypes don’t have some cu-
mulative impact on the often snap decision of who’s hired and who’s promoted, on who’s 
arrested and who’s prosecuted, on how you feel about the customer who just walked into 
your store or about the demographics of your children’s school.59 
It appears that Obama’s perception largely matches academic research: he stresses 
the major traits of negative black stereotypes, the pressure for assimilation, and the 
impact of the stereotypes at a rather subconscious level. 
A little later in the book, Obama exposes at length his understanding of how the 
representation of blacks and issues of poverty in the media influence political deci-
sions and how they feed into the overall mindset: 
There was a time, of course, when such deep intergenerational poverty could still shock 
a nation—when the publication of Michael Harrington’s The Other America or Bobby 
Kennedy’s visits to the Mississippi Delta could inspire outrage and a call to action. Not 
anymore. Today the images of the so-called ‘underclass’ are ubiquitous, a permanent fix-
ture in American popular culture—in film and TV, where they’re the foil of choice for 
the forces of law and order; in rap music and videos, where the gangsta life is glorified 
and mimicked by white and black teenagers alike (although white teenagers, at least, are 
aware that theirs is just a pose); and on the nightly news, where the depredation to be 
found in the inner city always make for good copy. Rather than evoke our sympathy, our 
familiarity with the lives of the black poor has spread spasms of fear and outright con-
tempt. But mostly it’s bred indifference. Black men filling our prisons, black children un-
able to read or caught in a gangland shooting, the black homeless sleeping on grates and 
in the parks of our nation’s capital—we take these things for granted, as part of the natu-
ral order, a tragic situation, perhaps, but not one for which we are culpable, and certainly 
not something subject to change.60 
In this extract Obama highlights how representations in the media, according to him, 
have led to indifference about issues of black poverty. More importantly, the prepon-
derance of these images has also led to a normalization of this vision. And lastly, 
Obama underlines his perception that this state of affairs is accepted as a “natural 
order” and has led to a feeling of not being responsible for the situation. This recalls 
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elements of cultural racism: the idea that this stratification is a normal result stem-
ming from failing black values, but certainly not from a failure of society at large. In 
addition, as he also mentions this with the case of black stereotypes, Obama is keenly 
aware of how these images influence the subconscious of the population at large and 
still might negatively influence its political opinions and decisions. 
3.1.3. “Oh, You Got to Be—You Got to Be Careful About 
Them Cable Networks, Though:”61 Politics and the Media 
The media, but also pop culture, play a significant role in spreading and main-
taining stereotypes and negative images of blacks. The political messages conveyed 
through the media and the persistence of racial stereotypes and conservative ideolog-
ical messages in pop culture reinforce each other. But the media also have an impact 
on politics because of the manner in which they report on issues, especially in the 
case of social policy reforms. 
Iyengar and Kinder explain that the media, while not necessarily managing to 
persuade, can reinforce already embedded views. Through the studies of Gilens and 
van Doorn, it has already been shown that the media played a role in associating 
blacks with poverty, which in turn allowed for the welfarization of anti-poverty pro-
grams. Edsall and Edsall identify the media as a central tool in Republican political 
strategy: 
Among the principal Republican strategy responses to Democratic vulnerability was the 
initiation of a major extension of the language of politics—the enlargement of a televi-
sion language empowering the Republican party and its candidate to reach voters 
through a set of majoritarian “values-oriented” images and phrases that, for key seg-
ments of the electorate, set the GOP apart from the Democratic party. This television 
language was most fully expressed in 1984 in the series of campaign commercials collec-
tively known by the phrase from one of them, “It’s morning again in America.”62 
Campaign spots play a central role, but so does political advertising. Conservative 
rhetoric was at the forefront of the infamous “Harry-and-Louise ads” aired from Sep-
tember 1993 to September 1994, paid for by the Coalition for Health Insurance Choic-
es, an organization funded by the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), 
one of the biggest health interests in the US. Jacobs and Shapiro assert that the ads 
had a negative influence on public opinion and ultimately on the reform proposal.63 
Harry-and-Louise were used again in favor of the 2010 Obama reform, this time paid 
for by a trade group of drugmakers and Families USA, a nonprofit group in favor of 
affordable health care.64 
The role played by the media in reaching people must not be underestimated. 
Sociologist Patricia Hill Collins sees the media as “another kind of public education” 
because popular culture often supplants school as a source of knowledge.65 Iyengar 
and Kinder share this assessment of the importance of the media in the formation of 
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political opinions. According to them, TV news is the “single most important source 
of information about political affairs” for American citizens, which strongly shapes 
their views about the country and society. According to their study, a majority of 
Americans believe that TV news is the most reliable source of information.66  
Political scientist Kathleen Hall Jamieson and journalist Paul Waldman ex-
plained that the press has an influence on moving events through the shaping of pub-
lic opinion, especially for political issues where public opinion plays an important 
part.67 This is the case for social policies, in particular because they have a direct im-
pact on the population and because social policies concern the redistribution of re-
sources, which is a highly sensitive issue. The strong role of the media in influencing 
public opinion and choices regarding social policies also leads to sharp criticism, es-
pecially because of a certain failure to debunk manipulative political discourse. The 
manner in which issues are covered is also criticized because it does not always con-
tribute to the building of informed opinions.  
Jacobs and Shapiro criticize the fact that the media, when covering government 
reforms, tend to focus more on political conflicts and strategy than on the substantive 
issues raised by the reform. They made a detailed analysis of how the media coverage 
of the dispute between Democrats and Republicans during the Clinton reform at-
tempt in 1993 provoked uncertainty in public opinion and, eventually, the rejection of 
the reform—even though the population had initially been in favor of health care 
reform. In this sense they also highlight the opinion-shaping capacities of reporters, 
although the latter claim to be neutral. But the choice of the press not to cover issues 
that they deem doomed to failure contributes to opinion shaping, because less im-
portance or no attention at all is paid to those possibilities.68 The Obama reform did 
not escape this fact. In an interview, Dan Riffle, health advisor to Democratic Michi-
gan Representative and single-payer advocate John Conyers, lamented this situation 
about the specific issue of single payer: 
You know, I think, there it becomes this feedback perpetuating cycle where Congress 
doesn’t move on single payer, so the media assumes that this is a dead issue and has no 
chance, and so because the media assumes it’s dead and doesn’t cover it, there is a lack of 
support for it, and because there’s a lack of support for it the media doesn’t cover it, and 
like it said, it becomes a feedback route at that point. So, frankly, I think it’s incumbent 
on the activists in the grassroots community who support this to build support and show 
viability for it, and when it gets to this, the media will take them seriously.69 
However, Riffle also voices his frustration over a perceived lack of activism and 
commitment of the population to make their interests heard, which in turn makes it 
difficult for Congress to defend the proposal if a lack of public support is perceived. 
Former Representative Tierney voiced a similar opinion, saying that it is evident that 
the interests have their voice, but that the lack of public support is harmful.70 Lowi, 
Ginsberg, and Shepsle have also pointed out this problem regarding diffuse majority 
opinions: minority voices are frequently better represented than broader opinions, 
because people often do not feel themselves directly or strongly enough affected. 
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They give the example of gun control, where the voice of the NRA is far better 
heard.71 
Jamieson and Waldman criticize the fact that journalists do not investigate 
enough or do not question the assertions of politicians enough. Jamieson and Wald-
man consider that it is the journalists’ job to “fill in the blanks” and to question the 
definitions.72 This was, for example, the case with the allegations about fictional 
“death panels” supposedly created by the Obama health care reform, which were first 
being circulated by Sarah Palin and conservative politician and commentator Betsy 
McCaughey. In 2009, on her Facebook page, Palin described the alleged death panels 
as follows: 
The Democrats promise that a government health care system will reduce the cost of 
health care, but as the economist Thomas Sowell has pointed out, government health 
care will not reduce the cost; it will simply refuse to pay the cost. And who will suffer the 
most when they ration care? The sick, the elderly, and the disabled, of course. The Amer-
ica I know and love is not one in which my parents or my baby with Down Syndrome 
will have to stand in front of Obama’s “death panel” so his bureaucrats can decide, based 
on a subjective judgment of their “level of productivity in society,” whether they are wor-
thy of health care. Such a system is downright evil.73 
Interesting parallels exist between these allegations and some of the criticism 
and allegations made during the Clinton health reform attempt. Just like health ex-
pert Robert E. Moffitt for the Heritage Foundation,74 Palin raised the specters of 
health care shortage which would be created through the attempt to reduce the cost 
of health care, which would come at the detriment of the citizens. The positive aspect 
of bringing costs down, which Obama tried to put forward in his reform, in order to 
show that neoliberal concerns were being taken into account and that the economy 
was duly taken into consideration, was turned by Palin, just as by Moffitt in 1993, into 
a liability, into a danger, a “rationing” of health care. Of course, the term “rationing” 
was meant to create an association with socialism and communism, just as Palin’s 
claim of people being evaluated according to “their level of productivity in society” 
creates associations with totalitarian regimes. Palin only hinted at Nazi euthanasia 
programs on her Facebook page; the Washington Times had made the comparison 
openly a few months earlier regarding some health care provisions in the ARRA, but 
the editorial insisted on the fact that these provisions would be found on a greater 
scale in the health care reform.75 
Many news channels, especially conservative ones, just repeated these allega-
tions, but did not question, let alone debunk, them, although that would have been 
easily possible by reading the bill. Moreover, many conservative politicians also start-
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ed talking about these entirely made-up death panels.76 Eventually it was President 
Obama himself who had to refute these allegations in a speech.77  
Moreover, the media also provide an outlet for private groups that try to influ-
ence public opinion. Lowi, Ginsberg, and Shepsle point in particular to conservative 
corporations and business organizations, like the Chamber of Commerce or the Pub-
lic Affairs Council, or to think tanks like the Heritage Foundation or the American 
Enterprise Institution. According to them, liberals tend to rely less on tactics that im-
ply money, such as political advertisements.78 Negative advertising was used to sink 
the Clinton reform, and the organization Americans for Prosperity, lavishly funded by 
the conservative Koch brothers, also launched an attack through massive negative 
advertisement against the Obama health care reform. Political scientist Mordecai Lee 
highlighted the fact that public and policy communication is an inherent feature to 
health care administrations, and has now become a decisive element in determining 
the success or failure of a program. The issues have to be framed in an acceptable 
way in the news media to prevent failure.79 
Representative Pomeroy recounted his experience with negative advertisement 
against the ACA in his state, North Dakota: 
So, within North Dakota, there was such a ferocious onslaught of negative advertising 
that people who were not well informed on the legislation learned from these TV com-
mercials. It was very damaging for North Dakota and learned that I was perpetuating a 
massive harm on the state and its people by supporting it. This is in spite of the fact that 
the North Dakota Nurse’s Association, the North Dakota Medical Association represent-
ing doctors, and the North Dakota Hospital Association, all endorsed the legislation. In 
the end, the people they would most trust with their medical care, they wouldn’t listen to 
for a second about whether this was a good bill or not, because the advertising was so 
heavy and it was so effective. […] The vote in the House occurred in November, the vote 
in the Senate occurred in January. North Dakota had an all-Democratic congressional 
delegation, even though the state had a long voting history of trending Republican. And 
so, what they wanted to do, was make me pay a terrible price, so that the Senators would 
both know they should not vote for the bill. In the end, both senators voted for the bill, 
but neither senator stood for reelection, they both retired. And so the ads were very ef-
fective: they resulted in my defeat, who had not lost an election for 30 years, I was defeat-
ed by 10 percentage points in the following fall, and neither senator is serving anymore.80 
Pomeroy further insisted on the massive funds that allowed buying long run-
times for such ads. Pomeroy particularly insisted on the influence these negative ads 
had on public opinion in North Dakota, despite the political support of all congress-
people of North Dakota, as well as the support of medical associations. 
The media thus have become a powerful tool to reach citizens and impact their 
opinion on social policies, notably because coverage remains mostly superficial, and 
focused on conflict that fosters uncertainty in public opinion, without providing the 
in-depth information that would allow people to make an informed decision. Of 
course, this is only a general tendency, there is also carefully researched issue-
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focused information and outlets specialized in debunking political lies, such as Politi-
Fact, for example. However, people do not necessarily choose to consult these outlets 
and these types of articles. New York Times journalist David Herszenhorn, who cov-
ered the political process of the health care reform with Robert Pear, said in an inter-
view with the author that he was well aware that his readership was a privileged one 
and did not represent the majority of Americans.81 The majority does not necessarily 
rely on this type of media outlet. A 2013 Kaiser Family Foundation poll found that, for 
their information regarding the health care reform, only 46% of the respondents 
trusted at least one media outlet. 19% relied on cable TV, and the majority of trust 
went to Fox News with 10%, followed by CNN at 5%, national TV (including ABC, 
NBC, and CBS news) at 4% and MNSBC at 2%. The New York Times got only 2% of the 
reliance, NPR 3%, and PBS 1%!82 A similar opinion was explained to President Obama 
at a town hall meeting about the health care reform in 2009, in Belgrade, Montana: 
Q: Okay. My name is Randy, I'm from Ekalaka, Montana. And as you can see, I'm a proud 
NRA member. (Applause.) I believe in our Constitution, and it's a very important thing. I 
also get my news from the cable networks because I don't like the spin that comes from 
them other places. 
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, you got to be—you got to be careful about them cable networks, 
though. (Laughter.) But that's okay, go ahead, go on with your question. 
Q: Max Baucus, our senator, has been locked up in a dark room there for months now 
trying to come up with some money to pay for these programs. And we keep getting the 
bull. That's all we get, is bull. You can't tell us how you're going to pay for this. You're sav-
ing here, you're saving over there, you're going to take a little money here, you're going to 
take a little money there. But you have no money. The only way you're going to get that 
money is to raise our taxes. You said you wouldn't. (Applause.) Max Baucus says he 
doesn't want to put a bill out that will. But that's the only way you can do that. 
THE PRESIDENT: Well, let—I'm happy to answer the question.83 
Randy’s focus on the issue of financing the reform makes it likely that he relies on 
conservative media outlets, since the wedge of taxation is a traditional conservative 
tool to split the lower classes along racial lines. Moreover, this extract shows that the 
whole tax discourse described by Edsall and Edsall still works. People like Randy, 
who would most probably greatly benefit from the health reform, oppose the reform 
because of taxation issues. Despite the calculations of the CBO showing that the re-
form is paid for and would help reduce the deficit, the priming managed to convince 
people of the contrary. This attitude of only questioning social spending and not de-
nouncing any other waste of taxpayers’ money is very persistent and has become the 
norm.  
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3.1.4. “A Cat Dancing on YouTube:”84 The ACA and the 
Media 
Some Congressmen shared their experience regarding the media and the health 
care reform. In an interview, former Representative John Tierney explained that he 
faced strong opposition in the Massachusetts district that he represented from 1997 to 
2015, partly because of the Tea Partiers, but also because of the impact of defamations 
relayed in the media which drowned important provisions of the bill, like the exten-
sion of Medicaid to the lower middle class and the focus on small business. He men-
tioned examples of lies like the death panel allegations. Tierney voiced his anger, 
calling the media “a failing institution” that is biased toward controversy, because 
they did not denounce the “ludicrous” statements as being “wrong” and without fac-
tual basis. According to him, the media were “not educating people” as they should 
have. In his conception, the media have the obligation “to say it’s wrong” when cover-
ing issues like the death panel allegations.85 
Representative Earl Pomeroy made a similarly harsh assessment of the media in 
general, and regarding the coverage of the reform in particular: 
We’re at a very disappointing period of time with media here. I mean, they love to treat 
policy debate in our country like a horse race. Who’s ahead, who’s making what charge; 
it has a lot to do about the game of politics, not about the substance of the legislation 
moving forward. And I believe that that certainly was the case in 2009 and 2010. ‘Oh, the 
Democrats were in trouble on this one.’ ‘Oh, look there is a Tea Party… Oh, here we go, 
it’s a big fight!’ Very, very little about… we’ve got 45 million uninsured, how shall we cov-
er them, this business of having young people up to the age of 26 on their parents’ policy, 
there are some families where this would make a difference. These are features that are a 
very popular part of the bill. I would try to describe the bill back home as doing two 
things: if people are sick and unable to find anyone that would write them an insurance 
policy because of the illness, now they can get coverage. If people don’t have enough 
money to afford the premium, but want and need to have this kind of protection for their 
families, so that they can get to see their doctor whenever they need to, we should help 
them be able to afford it. I believe those two simple concepts are broadly acceptable and 
that is at the heart of the bill. But Democrats got too into the nitty gritty trying to explain 
the … a bill so complicated they couldn’t begin to explain it. We had no cover from the 
White House, and the media was very disinterested in what we were trying to achieve, 
other than the politics of who’s up, who’s down, and the ideological excitements. So I 
fought the media very significantly for not being more engaged in the substance of what 
we were trying to accomplish in expanding coverage for the American people.86 
An essential aspect in Pomeroy’s comment is his highlighting of how to convey some 
of the key provisions of the ACA, which would have been an alternative to just cover-
ing the political “horse race”. Political scientist Arthur Lupia, in his 2015 book Unin-
formed: Why People Seem to Know So Little about Politics and What We Can Do About It, 
insists on this crucial aspect of favoring a simple and easily understandable message 
over complicated explanations because of the limited attention span of people and 
because of the sheer mass of information breaking over them every day. 87  
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And yet, Pomeroy’s interesting statement about the absence of ‘cover’ from the 
White House must be slightly qualified. First of all, Obama held a series of town hall 
meetings to promote the health care reform and organized a highly publicized bipar-
tisan summit on the subject on February 25, 2010.88 Regarding the aspect of breaking 
down key provisions of the reform, the White House tried to make particular efforts, 
via the DNC and the vice-president, OFA,89 and email campaigns.90 The most inter-
esting part of the email campaigns was that they explained key aspects, such as ex-
tended coverage, children staying on their parents’ coverage until age 26, and no de-
nial of coverage for preexisting conditions, in very simple, easy to understand and 
illustrated terms.91 It could be argued that these email campaigns reached only peo-
ple who were already in favor of the reform, since they had subscribed to the DNC or 
OFA, but, as the Clinton disaster has shown, even the support side must be main-
tained during the reform process. Moreover, this information also gave people argu-
ments to defend the reform in discussions.  
Meg Sussman, senior policy advisor to California’s 5th district Democratic Rep-
resentative Doris Matsui, was less critical of the media and commented on the diffi-
culty of explaining the ACA in the media: 
I think it’s such a big law that it’s hard when you’re not in the everyday business, or even 
when you are, that it’s very hard to understand what’s really being done. Some passages 
are just wielded down into one sentence, we would have to go back to the talking points 
of pre-existing conditions, which is a great thing that has been done under the law, but 
there are so many other things that you can’t possibly talk about in a way that people will 
understand. So sometimes the media has picked up on a detail in a way that is really 
helpful, and sometimes people just latched on the one line, the buzzword message. So I 
think it’s been both ways in the media.92 
However, Sussman also blamed Congress for not having done a better job in reaching 
out to the public: 
You can’t always just blame the media, right? It’s a lot of the members of Congress need to 
take the responsibilities as well. And it takes an administration to explain all the benefits. And 
I think that we felt from the inside that we haven’t always done a good job. 
Moreover, Sussman explained that some tools were provided to help promote the 
ACA, notably after the reform passed:  
I think that our leadership, so leader Pelosi, have done a lot to help, give members the 
tools to do that kind of thing. So it’s like she said: Hey everybody that’s what we kind of 
need to do. People, you could do a video, you know. Getting stuff out like that. […] But at 
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the staff level there has been a conversation about, you know, we care so much about the 
facts and figures, getting the policies right and implementing them, that we need to make 
sure that we are projecting them as well.  
Representative Matsui, for example, promoted the ACA on her official congressional 
website and made a video to explain the ACA in simple terms. 
Just as Tierney, Representative Robert E. Andrews bemoaned the role of the 
media: 
[The media coverage of the ACA] says more about the American media than it does 
about the Affordable Care Act. There has been an unfortunate, in my view unfortunate, 
dynamic in journalism in the last ten or fifteen years where there is really no market an-
ymore for traditional journalism, quite objectively, factually, lays out the facts so that 
people make their own judgment as to what facts mean. To be blunt, there is no money 
in that anymore. And so, newspapers are closing all over the country and traditional 
news organizations are dying. […] What passes for news now in America is really diver-
sion or pop culture. So there are more Americans now who know about the Kardashians 
than who know about the Affordable Care Act. […] I guess it’s up to people to decide 
what they want to care about and what they don’t, but in that world political coverage 
has devolved into pretty very little more than an advocacy. You know, when I like some-
thing so I say good things about it, you don’t like some things, so you say bad things 
about it, and we never really engage in a factual debate or discussion, and the reaction to 
the Affordable Care is that people who liked the President generally liked this law. I 
don’t think it’s perfect, but they generally view it as an achievement. And the half of the 
country that doesn’t like the president actually views the law as a failure and a bad thing 
and so on. The press reaction to the Affordable Care Act is really more a reflection of the 
collapse of journalism than it is of the Affordable Care Act. 
Andrews insisted on the absence of outlets conveying objective analysis, accusing 
both ideological sides of conveying biased news. He did not necessarily agree that 
there was overall more negative coverage: 
[That] depends on the media outlet, I mean, you know, Fox News and more conservative 
organizations had had nothing good to say about the Affordable Care Act, that’s their 
point of view. If you go to more liberal outlets, and MSNBC is an example, they would be 
more favorable, but I guess what I’m saying to you is that the concept of objective analy-
sis in American journalism is withering. And so you’re not going to find much of a bal-
anced account of the Affordable Care Act or anything else. 
Former Representative Tierney was less lenient on the media than Andrews. He 
denounced the fact that according to him the media are biased towards controversy 
and deplored the fact that the experts who lauded the bill got so little coverage.93 
Bruce Braley, who represented Iowa’s 1st congressional district from 2007 to 2015 
made an even harsher criticism of the media regarding their coverage of the health 
care reform, which, in his opinion, was not fair. Among other elements, he had the 
impression that there was more coverage of Tea Party meetings against the reform 
than of town hall meetings in favor of the reform: 
[…] I think what the media focused on was the controversy that it generated, the refusal 
of the Republicans to participate in the process, the rise of the Tea Party and their loud 
outspoken opinions about the ACA. I did 17 town hall meetings in my district on the ACA 
that were large, loud, and widely attended, and people would show up with printed talk-
ing points that they were getting from the internet and that’s what the press tended to fo-
cus on. Rather than what the provisions of the bill were and how it was going to help the 
people. 
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In this respect, Bart Gordon saw a greater media mobilization on the conserva-
tive side and denounced, just as Tierney, the untruthfulness of coverage: 
 […]The mainstream or the conservative talk show host made it a… there was a market-
ing tool there for them, they were the ones who really rallied up, and I think in a proba-
bly unfair way, much of the opposition. 
However, he did not blame this solely on the media, but also incriminated the Demo-
crats for not working enough on public opinion: 
No, there hasn’t [been done enough on the Democratic side to work on public opinion], 
but it goes back, once again, the President had a lot of momentum coming out of the 
election, that momentum would be gradually lost, and they had to balance moving 
quickly versus educating the public. And it would have been better if they could have 
done more education, and maybe they could have. But they certainly could not have 
waited two years. 
The perceptions of the media on the part of the representatives who were inter-
viewed for this work are astonishingly close to the criticisms made by some academ-
ics: a focus on political strategy and dispute to the detriment of substantive issues and 
information, a lack of questioning, and lack of fact checking. Moreover, the ideologi-
cal bias and lack of objectivity Andrews pointed out might inform as to why less than 
half of the American population found the media trustworthy regarding information 
about the health care reform. 
3.1.5. Cracking the Code 
The embedded meaning of a set of stock phrases that have become the corner-
stones of conservative discourse will be explained here. These different elements, like 
big government, tax-and-spend liberals, welfare, socialism, choice, and others, are 
interrelated and feed one another, creating a coherent discourse that has effectively 
managed to divide the working and middle classes along racial lines in order to turn 
downward redistribution into upward redistribution. 
The most obvious code words with racial overtones may very well be the notori-
ous “states’ rights”, often coupled with “laissez-faire.” “States’ rights” can get their 
racial meaning from the geographical context since the States’ Rights doctrine was 
used by Southern states to defend slavery and later segregation. So, in 1980, when 
presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, very shortly after his nomination, went to 
Neshoba County, Mississippi, just a few miles from Philadelphia, MS, where three 
civil rights workers had been murdered in 1964, and advocated his defense of states’ 
rights, especially in relation to education, the racial hint was barely disguised:  
I believe that there are programs like that, programs like education and others, that 
should be turned back to the states and the local communities with the tax sources to 
fund them, and let the people [applause drowns out end of statement]. 
I believe in states' rights; I believe in people doing as much as they can for themselves at 
the community level and at the private level. And I believe that we've distorted the bal-
ance of our government today by giving powers that were never intended in the constitu-
tion to that federal establishment. And if I do get the job I'm looking for, I'm going to de-
vote myself to trying to reorder those priorities and to restore to the states and local 
communities those functions which properly belong there.94 
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The 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka decision had been protested against by 
Southern Congressmen in the 1956 Southern Manifesto, on the grounds of states’ 
rights. The laissez-faire argument completes this, hinting at the idea that, just as the 
appeal for states’ rights, the federal government should not interfere and try to 
change things, but leave them alone. Edsall and Edsall explain that Reagan’s opposi-
tion to government intervention, first articulated in 1964 in his support of the Gold-
water campaign, was understood as including the basic provisions of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act.95 This link is made notably because historically it has been the federal 
government that has tried to improve the conditions of blacks in the US, first through 
the attempt to end slavery, then by fighting segregationist practices. As a result, 
blacks have a greater trust in federal government and since the end of World War II 
their economic fate has been linked to the federal government. Moreover, blacks are 
more in favor of a proactive role for the federal government, notably as a means to 
end racism and discrimination.96 In 1976, Reagan gave the speech “To Restore Ameri-
ca” during the campaign for the Republican nomination. In this speech he declared 
that welfare should also be administered at the state level:  
The truth is, Washington has taken over functions that don't truly belong to it. In almost 
every case it has been a failure. Now, understand, I'm speaking of those programs which 
logically should be administered at state and local levels. Welfare is a classic example. 
Voices that are raised now and then urging a federalization of welfare don't realize that 
the failure of welfare is due to federal interference. Washington doesn't even know how 
many people are on welfare—how many cheaters are getting more than one check. It on-
ly knows how many checks it's sending out. Its own rules keep it from finding out how 
many are getting more than one check.97 
Here again Reagan plays on the idea that states are better being left alone to discrim-
inate in whatever way they want. The irony being that some of the programs identi-
fied as welfare (AFDC and Medicaid) already are under state administration regard-
ing the eligibility of the beneficiaries, and the states have huge discretion in denying 
benefits. 
Legal scholars Anne Richardson Oakes and Ilaria Di Gioia show that the states’ 
rights and nullification language was used in the opposition against the ACA. States’ 
resistance against the ACA, in general or against specific measures, has been wide-
spread. Before the ink had dried on Obama’s name when he signed the ACA into law, 
26 states (their Attorneys General and/or Governors) had joined two private citizens 
and the National Federation of Independent Businesses in the Sebelius lawsuit chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the ACA. This got wide international attention, but 
the states have also been busy challenging the ACA at the state level. Between 2010 
and 2016, 22 state legislatures considered laws and measures challenging, or opting 
out of, mandatory provisions of the ACA. Many of those state bills and measures, 
which mostly focus on the non-enforcement of the individual mandate, were not en-
acted. The reason for this is the language used in the state bills, which is too closely 
associated with the language used during secession, Jim Crow, and the Massive Re-
sistance to the Brown decision. These state bills use terminology of the states’ rights 
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doctrine of nullification. Oakes and Di Gioia’s analysis focused on the 120 opposition-
al bills considered in 26 states in 2014 alone. Of these bills, 37 were signed into law in 
10 different states. They identified 3 types of bills. The first type openly used nullifica-
tion language and claimed the unconstitutionality of the individual mandate. The 
second type did not use nullification language, but “declarations of state sovereignty 
and assertions of rights, freedoms and liabilities of citizens within the state”.98 These 
prohibit state agencies or employees from implementing the individual mandate 
within the state. This stance is closely linked to the notion of “interposition,” the idea 
that a state should interpose itself between an unconstitutional law and its citizens. 
This notion was used interchangeably with nullification. The third type of bill does 
not use any such language and aims at creating an interstate compact to oppose fed-
eral regulation over health matters.99 
Oakes and Di Gioia deemed the South Carolina Senate Bill n° 147/2014 as illus-
trative of the nullification type of bill. The bill declares that Obamacare “is not au-
thorized by the Constitution of the United States and violates its true meaning and 
intent as given by the Founders and Ratifiers, and is invalid in this State, is not recog-
nized by this State, is specifically rejected by this State, and is null and void and of no 
effect in this State” (emphasis added).100 According to Oakes and Di Gioia’s analysis, 
most of these nullification bills have been proposed in Southern States, Tennessee 
having proposed most bills of this type (14), followed by Oklahoma (12), and Georgia 
(10). In the South, only Texas and Florida did not propose such bills. All of the states 
proposing nullification bills were held by Republicans. 
For the state sovereignty type of bill, Oakes and Di Gioia cite the example of Ar-
izona’s Proposition 122 that was voted into law by referendum on November 4, 2014 
and which amended the Arizona Constitution. It enabled the state to “exercise its 
sovereign authority to restrict the actions of its personnel and the use of its financial 
resources to purposes that are consistent with the Constitution” (emphasis added) 
and to prohibit “this state and all political subdivisions of this state […] from using 
any personnel or financial resources to enforce, administer or cooperate with the des-
ignated federal action or program.”101 Oakes and Di Gioia explain that even Republi-
cans were aware of the problem the language posed, especially in the nullification 
case, and that it needed to be toned down in order to make these bills acceptable.102 
As of November 2016, 18 states had enacted laws or had amended their constitu-
tions to opt out of the individual mandate, the employer mandate, or the penalties for 
not purchasing health insurance.103 Ten states voted a bar on the implementation of 
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the ACA or the health exchanges without the consent of the state legislature.104 The 
notion of states’ rights, in its softer form of states’ sovereignty, also resurfaced in the 
2014 Michigan affirmative action ban lawsuit.105 In her dissent, Supreme Court Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor criticized Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia for his emphasis 
on the “near-limitless notion of state sovereignty” in upholding the ban.106 
In a 2014 interview conducted by journalist David Remnick, Obama commented 
on conservative challenges to federal power, specifically in relation to the ACA: 
There is a historic connection between some of the arguments that we have politically 
and the history of race in our country, and sometimes it’s hard to disentangle those is-
sues. […] You can be somebody who, for very legitimate reasons, worries about the pow-
er of the federal government—that it’s distant, that it’s bureaucratic, that it’s not ac-
countable—and as a consequence you think that more power should reside in the hands 
of state governments. But what’s also true, obviously, is that philosophy is wrapped up in 
the history of states’ rights in the context of the civil-rights movement and the Civil War 
and Calhoun. There’s a pretty long history there. And so I think it’s important for pro-
gressives not to dismiss out of hand arguments against my Presidency or the Democratic 
Party or Bill Clinton or anybody just because there’s some overlap between those criti-
cisms and the criticisms that traditionally were directed against those who were trying to 
bring about greater equality for African-Americans. The flip side is I think it’s important 
for conservatives to recognize and answer some of the problems that are posed by that 
history, so that they understand if I am concerned about leaving it up to states to expand 
Medicaid that it may not simply be because I am this power-hungry guy in Washington 
who wants to crush states’ rights but, rather, because we are one country and I think it is 
going to be important for the entire country to make sure that poor folks in Mississippi 
and not just Massachusetts are healthy.107 
While Obama recognizes that there may be very valid reasons to be worried about 
the scope of federal power, he also insists on the fact that because of the racial history 
of the US, he was worried about the inequality resulting from too great a delegation 
to the states. As shown in Part 2,108 he was right. The non-extension of Medicaid dis-
proportionately affects African-Americans.109 
The term socialism may be among the trickier ones, because there is a clear non-
racial dimension to the term, based on a long history of the strong ideological con-
frontation during the Cold War. However, links can be made with race, especially 
when the term socialism is linked to the discourse against the federal government. 
According to historian Terri Brimes, Reagan had a simple view of a socialist threat 
from within and without: through big government and communism.110 ‘Socialism,’ 
‘socialist,’ and their derivatives are readily used by conservatives to describe the fed-
eral government and denounce what is perceived to be exaggerated influence or 
meddling in affairs better left to the states, the people, or business. 
 Political scientist Gerard Boychuck explains the racial dimension he sees in ac-
cusations of socialism. First of all, he considers the accusation of ‘socialism’ to be the 
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“easiest and most common approach to opposing any progressive social legislation.” 
He traces this rhetoric back to the mid-20th century. Boychuck thinks that the South-
ern opposition to health care in the 1940s was greatly motivated by fears of challenges 
to the racial status quo, because Truman had strongly linked his health care pro-
posals with his civil rights proposals. Moreover, Southerners actually favored health 
care legislation, but only on the model of Social Security, which would not have rep-
resented a threat to the racial order at that time, since domestic and agricultural 
workers were made eligible for Social Security only in 1950. Boychuck highlights how 
the language used to frame the opposition to health care matched the language used 
to oppose civil rights legislation. In the protest against ‘socialized medicine,’ he sees 
as the most potent item the issue of doctor choice, which works both ways: can the 
patients choose their doctor, but also can the doctors choose their patients (meaning 
can they refuse to treat minorities): 
Moreover, by framing opposition in the language of choice, opponents reflected and 
evoked the language of “choice” that was so central to opposition to civil rights in the 
South. Fair employment practices legislation as well as antisegregation legislation were 
argued to pose a threat to the civil rights of white southerners by limiting their ability to 
“choose” their employees as well as to “choose” with whom they would associate (Con-
gressional Record 1948, A1864, A2338, A4749).111 
In addition, in the 1940s support and opposition to health care legislation was divided 
along racial lines as well: Southern Democrats and the white American Medical As-
sociation opposed it, whereas the NAACP and the black National Medical Associa-
tion supported it.112 This echoes the marked racial division of the support and opposi-
tion of Obama’s health care reform that is also rather sharply marked along racial 
lines.113 
The issue of ‘choice’, socialized medicine, and accusations of being a bureau-
cratic nightmare were widely used against the Clinton reform, notably in the Harry-
and-Louise ads aired from September 1993 to September 1994. One of the ads played 
on the loss of coverage, starting with “Sometime in the future” with the ad opening 
on a remark by Louise leafing through paperwork with her husband Harry: “This was 
covered under our old plan!” and Harry answering: “Yeah, that was a good plan, 
wasn’t it?” The voice-over commented: “Things are changing, and not all for the bet-
ter. The government may force us to pick from a few health care plans designed by 
government bureaucrats.” Louise adds: “Having choices we don’t like is no choice at 
all.” Harry chips in: “They choose” and Louise completes: “We lose.”  
The ad clearly plays on people’s fear of losing what they have in an unknown re-
form. The message is reinforced by the insistence on plans created by government 
and the wariness regarding bureaucracy.114 It can be argued that this only plays on 
people’s fears of losing what they have and having less choice in the type of coverage. 
However, the origins of the rhetorical utilization of ‘choice’ and ‘socialized medicine’ 
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must not be forgotten, which links it to Southern, racially motivated, opposition to 
health care reform. Moreover, the idea that a government control results in less 
choice and a form of shortage openly relies on images of communist government 
mismanagement and ensuing shortages and rationings.  
Moreover, in the context of the 1993/4 Harry-and-Louise ads, a second ad com-
pleted the previous one, giving a dimension of intergroup competition to the issue of 
choice, understating that whites would have less choice in health care because the 
system was generalized to the whole population, including minorities. The ad shows 
Louise coming home on her bike and meeting Harry and a friend of theirs, Pat; play-
ing basketball in the driveway. They start discussing a new measure, ‘community 
rating’. Louise explains that this means everybody pays the same insurance fees, “no 
matter their age, no matter if they smoke, or whatever.” This posits irresponsible in-
dividual behavior or even individual health conditions, such as increased care need-
ed in old age, in opposition to obviously less irresponsible and younger people (in the 
ad, they all appear to be in their mid-thirties) who take care of their health by doing 
sport. Louise then asks if it works. Pat explains that his insurance went up from $1200 
to $3200 a year and that many people had to drop their coverage because of this cost 
increase. At the end of the ad, the voice-over exhorts people to tell Congress to do 
better and to oppose this measure. This ad plays on the fear of having to pay for the 
expansion of coverage to other people, with the subtle addition of the irresponsibility 
factor. This is often exploited in matters of social policy and a standard message from 
conservatives to oppose redistributive policies: the fear of white taxpayers paying for 
(minority) people too irresponsible and lazy to take care of themselves.115 
The accusations of ‘socialized medicine’ are still used in conservative rhetoric 
today. According to sociologist and political scientist Paul Starr, such an opposition is 
a unique feature of American thinking: “Only in the United States is public responsi-
bility for health-care costs equated with a loss of freedom.”116 Accusations of social-
ized medicine have also been used against Obama, notably in many political car-
toons, Americans for Prosperity ads, and in other contexts. A 2010 AFP ad “Hands off 
my Health care” stars a woman telling her breast cancer story, explaining that with 
the new system she would have died, because of over-regulation and a government-
created shortage in possibilities to see your doctor.117 This representation of govern-
ment clearly plays on a view of government regulation resulting in communist-type 
situations of shortage and bureaucratic insanity. 
Another 2010 AFP ad played on the fear of government takeover resulting in 
unwanted redistribution, playing on intergroup competition and rekindling old ideas 
of whites’ paying higher taxes to finance programs for minorities. The ad exhorts 
people to say ‘No to government-run health care’ because that would mean a $6 bil-
lion tax increase and $4 billion cuts in Medicare. The ad then warns people that 10 
million people would lose their current insurance and end up on a government 
plan.118 Of course, it is implied that a government plan would be of lower quality. The 
reference to tax increases and cuts in a ‘white’ program, Medicare, clearly hints at the 
old fear of the 1970s tax revolt interpreting redistribution as meaning whites paying 
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for programs that benefit blacks. The Medicare cuts evoked here directly point at the 
fear of whites losing their advantages. 
The issue of health care plan choice and doctors choice was, and still is, a prom-
inent issue in the Obama health care reform. Assuring people that they could keep 
their plan or their doctor under the new reform was a rather prominent aspect in 
Obama’s promotion of the new reform. In a March 3, 2010 speech on health care, 
Obama said: 
Now, the proposal I put forward gives Americans more control over their health insur-
ance and their health care by holding insurance companies more accountable. It builds 
on the current system where most Americans get their health insurance from their em-
ployer. If you like your plan, you can keep your plan. If you like your doctor, you can 
keep your doctor. I can tell you as the father of two young girls, I would not want any 
plan that interferes with the relationship between a family and their doctor.119 
PolitiFact found 37 occurrences where Obama or a top official (including the White 
House web page) promised this. However, this was not entirely true, as some plans 
were indeed cancelled because the insurance companies changed them after the pas-
sage of the law.120 
The railing against socialism and government takeover also plays on the public-
private dichotomy, which is among the racial code words. According to Feagin, the 
public is associated to blacks, the private to whites. This association stems from the 
school desegregation crisis and the efforts to privatize schools in order to avoid de-
segregation. This is also directly linked to the perception of government action in 
favor of minorities.121 However, the federal scope, of affirmative action in particular, 
only concerns institutions with federal funding or contracts. The perception of the 
federal government is closely linked to the notion of the public intruding into the 
private. 
Another important stone in the conservative rhetorical construct is ‘law and or-
der’, which spills over into values. Feagin sees the law and order discourse as being 
first developed by Goldwater against the Civil Rights Movement, and then increas-
ingly used by other Republicans, notably Nixon, who successfully campaigned on 
that theme. Feagin argues that the riots in the 1960s were framed as ‘ghetto riots’ 
caused by black ‘criminals,’ thus strongly associating the protest over the socioeco-
nomic situation of blacks with lawlessness. Feagin also points to attempts by con-
servative Republicans and Southern Democrats to link Johnson’s Great Society to 
“the generation of crime by eroding off the work ethic and fostering black laziness.” 
Feagin sees a historical continuity with the criminalization of “the race problem”, i.e. 
civil rights protest, in the 1930s and 1940s and the portrayal of desegregation as 
threatening social stability and leading to a lack of safety of formerly safe segregated 
places.122  
According to Jansson, over the late 1960s and 1970s the Republican Party pur-
sued the strategy of associating “the Democratic Party with welfare programs, urban 
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riots, high taxes, busing, and affirmative action” on the one hand, while on the other 
hand the Republican Party “identified [itself] with law-abiding citizens,” thus manag-
ing to wrest two support groups from the Democratic Party: Northern white Catholics 
and working- and lower-middle class white Southerners. The strong association with 
conservative values was further expanded when Republicans reached out to funda-
mentalist religious groups in the late 1970s, for example to the Southern Baptist 
Church. Many of these people had children in private segregated schools to avoid 
both racial integration and secular curricula. Following fiscal outrage, Republicans 
promised tax exemptions for those schools. The outreach to those groups brought 
many social conservatives who supported cuts in social programs to the Party, mak-
ing questions such as abortion, censorship of pornography, or school prayer, im-
portant issues.123 
Edsall and Edsall argue that “for a crucial segment of the white electorate, to be 
middle class, to hold traditional values, to endorse work, family, responsibility, 
achievement and the like, meant not supporting the presidential wing of the Demo-
cratic party.” Ultimately, in 1984, this resulted in a decisive victory for the Republican 
Party in the competition over values, giving it an electoral majority and enabling it to 
capture the white voters affected by racial issues. Edsall and Edsall explain that tap-
ping explicitly into voters’ anxieties and convictions about values and socioeconomic 
status allowed tapping implicitly into anxieties and resentment about race.124 Eliza-
beth Anderson also criticizes this conservative tendency to blame black behavior and 
values and views it as a framework in which the black and white cultures are de-
tached.125  
Moreover, the discourse over values inserts itself into a wider discourse on re-
sponsibility and the role of government. It could be argued that an emphasis on a 
small role for government, on self-help, and on individualism is the basis of contem-
porary neo-liberalism. However, with the cultural discourse, it also justifies the sub-
ordinate socioeconomic status of minorities, exculpates lack of opportunity, and justi-
fies broad economic inequalities. Political scientist and journalist Hedrick Smith 
argues that the plutocracy of wealth is built on work ethics ideas,126 meaning that suc-
cess is solely attributed to the result of personal effort and not to a system rigged in 
favor of the rich. So, through the cultural discourse questions of responsibility, indi-
vidualism, and the role of government acquire a racial dimension. 
The discourse around welfare reflects these combined codes. The stereotype of 
the welfare recipient so neatly reflects stereotypes about blacks that it becomes virtu-
ally unnecessary to explicitly say that the welfare recipient is black. Thus welfare be-
comes a code word that targets blacks.127 Political scientist Frances Fox Piven explains 
that the common anti-welfare discourse which exists at all levels is particularly per-
verse, because social policy is heralded as reflecting the kindness of the American 
spirit, but is nevertheless portrayed as being bad for society. According to conserva-
tive anti-welfare discourse, welfare leads people to give up working and also encour-
ages out-of-wedlock births. According to Fox Piven, in recent years, this discourse of 
welfare being bad for the people and bad for the economy has been augmented by a 
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new dimension: globalization. This allows a revival of the laissez-faire discourse from 
the end of the 19th century, positing that government is helpless in the face of the 
market. Because government has no power over international markets, it has to get 
out of the way.128 The argument posits that spending on social programs is bad for 
competitiveness, and that competitiveness is required when facing the unruly global 
markets and its cutthroat world of ever-lower taxes. In the end, globalization be-
comes a rhetorical tool where slackers and social parasites (who are embodied by 
racial minorities) at home become the scapegoats for the inequalities created by wild 
capitalism gone global.  
It has been explained previously that concept of welfare also includes a strong 
deserving/undeserving dichotomy. Political scientists Paul M. Sniderman and Ed-
ward G. Carmines show that this perception also becomes obvious in people’s prefer-
ence for measures like job training over ‘welfare.’ According to their study, the crucial 
elements of self-help and will to try, associated with the deserving poor, change poli-
cy support by 15-20 percentage points, for black and white recipients alike.129 Accord-
ing to Mendelberg, the image of the underserving is a full component of playing the 
race card, in which the racial priming of underserving blacks works on the “racial 
predisposition of racial resentment in vote choice.” The image of the undeserving 
also “primed the related racial predisposition of laissez-faire racism and perception of 
blacks’ undue influence.”130 In his 1981 State of the Union speech, Reagan used this 
idea of many beneficiaries not being truly needy, and hence not being deserving, to 
advocate cuts in social programs:  
There's nothing wrong with America that together we can't fix. I'm sure there'll be some 
who raise the old familiar cry, "Don't touch my program; cut somewhere else." I hope I've 
made it plain that our approach has been evenhanded, that only the programs for the 
truly deserving needy remain untouched. The question is, are we simply going to go 
down the same path we've gone down before, carving out one special program here, an-
other special program there? I don't think that's what the American people expect of us. 
More important, I don't think that's what they want. They're ready to return to the source 
of our strength.131 
The special programs associated in Reagan’s speech to the underserving echo the 
‘special preferences’ associated to affirmative action, which is reinforced by the ‘un-
due influence’ of blacks that can be primed through ‘undeserving’ according to Men-
delberg. Edsall and Edsall explain that 
[f]or disaffected white voters, Reagan drew the connection between taxes and “groups” 
and “special interests”—adding to Republican rhetoric phrases and words that now bore 
a new meaning—signifying for many working and middle-class voters the reliable oppo-
sition of Reagan and the Republican party to benefits targeted at blacks, feminists, ho-
mosexuals, and others seeking new rights, protections, or preferences from govern-
ment.132 
Thus, the deserving/undeserving dichotomy becomes a racial code, in which the de-
serving are whites who benefit from good contributory programs, and the undeserv-
ing are blacks who benefit from wasteful handouts because they are too lazy to work. 
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This negative association of blacks with social programs was still rhetorically 
exploited by Republicans during the Obama presidency. A 2013 CNN article by John 
Blake made a quick inventory of some of the welfare slurs made by Republicans dur-
ing the 2012 presidential campaign. Blake went so far as to say that the combined 
slurs were like a return of the Welfare Queen.133 For example, in the 2012 Republican 
primaries, candidate Rick Santorum said during his campaign in Iowa: "I don't want 
to make black people's lives better by giving them somebody else's money." This 
statement is linked to the perception of unjustified government handouts for unde-
serving minorities. Mitt Romney accused Obama several times of wanting to turn 
America into an “entitlement society.” Newt Gingrich gained renewed prominence by 
calling Obama “the Food Stamp President.”134 During the campaign, Gingrich also 
said “blacks should demand jobs, not food stamps.” Gingrich went so far as using this 
in a campaign spot that was aired mainly in South Carolina, according to The Econo-
mist.135 The spot begins with the statement that “Only Newt Gingrich can beat Barack 
Obama”, immediately followed by the affirmation that “More people have been put 
on food stamps by Barack Obama than any president in American history.” He then 
continues: “I believe that any American, of any background, has been endowed by 
their creator with the right to pursue happiness and if that makes liberals unhappy, 
I’m going to continue to find ways to help poor people learn how to get a job, learn 
how to get a better job, and learn some day to own the job.”136 Gingrich’s spot is in the 
precise line of blaming social programs for creating poverty. Moreover, he posits lib-
erals as not wanting people to become independent and self-reliant. The additional 
rhetorical virtuosity is to present the right to work in the language of the Declaration 
of Independence, thus not only heightening the association of social programs with 
dependence, but at the same time portraying liberals as being opposed to core Amer-
ican values of economic independence and self-reliance. 
The maybe most interesting embedded code word is taxes. ‘Tax-and-spend lib-
erals’ is a catch phrase derived from this issue. It has been explained earlier how the 
backlash against social policies was strongly racialized along the lines of protest 
against the use of white middle class taxpayer money for programs seen as benefiting 
blacks, making taxes an issue that is also viewed in black and white. Although Nixon 
was receptive to the tax-driven backlash sentiments, it was Reagan who really man-
aged to make a highly racialized issue out of taxation, as Thomas and Mary Edsall 
demonstrate in their book Chain Reaction. This argument has been taken up by many 
scholars since then, for example by William Julius Wilson or Frances Fox Piven.137 In 
the Obama context, the old phrase of tax-and-spend-liberals has been slightly re-
vamped. New York Times journalist John Harwood talked with White House officials, 
presidential advisors, and scholars, and concluded that the term ‘redistribution’ has 
become the new “toxic” phrase. William M. Daley, White House chief-of-staff in 2011, 
explained to Harwood that: “Redistribution is a loaded word that conjures up all sorts 
of unfairness in people’s minds.” Harwood explained that according to Daley, “Re-
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publicans wield it ‘as a hammer’ against Democrats.” Daley concluded: “It’s a word 
that, in the political world, you just don’t use.”138 With the focus on redistribution, the 
stock phrases have been somewhat augmented, but the idea behind it remains the 
same: take money from white taxpayers to redistribute it to minorities. 
Tesler and Sears found that the tax discourse and the attack on downward redis-
tribution were still among the top-issues of the 2008 presidential campaign, with 
McCain calling Obama “Barack the Redistributor,”139 or “Redistributor-in-Chief.140 
Republican candidate John McCain used “Joe the Plumber,” Joe Wurzelbacher, a 
citizen who had voiced concerns about Obama’s tax plans, saying that if he owned his 
own plumbing business one day, he feared he might have to pay higher taxes. Obama 
tried to explain that he wanted “to spread the wealth around” and that Joe might even 
benefit from a big tax cut, but it was too late. A little later, in a Florida campaign 
speech McCain said:  
Senator Obama says that he wanted to spread your wealth around. […] When politicians 
talk about taking your money and spreading it around, you’d better hold onto your wal-
let. Senator Obama claims that he wants to give a tax break to the middle class, but not 
only did he vote for higher taxes on the middle class in the Senate, his plan gives away 
your tax dollars to those who don’t pay taxes. That’s not a tax cut, that’s welfare.141 
McCain’s discourse plays on the classics: “taxes” means “welfare,” which refers to 
people who do not deserve it since they do not pay taxes themselves. The blackness 
of welfare does not have to be proved again. Nothing has changed, the tax discourse 
has remained intact since the 1970s. Communication researcher Mark P. Orbe made a 
study in 2010 about Americans’ reactions to Obama’s rhetoric in his 2011 book Com-
munication Realities in a “Post-Racial” Society: What the Public Really Thinks about Barack 
Obama. He found that taxation was still a very sensitive issue, especially for the work-
ing and middle classes. A respondent, a twenty-something-year old white man from 
Michigan, explained his resentment at the Obama tax policy proposal:  
I’m blessed to be born into a family where my father worked extremely hard his entire 
life. We are—I’m not going to say well-off, but I don’t have to worry where my next meal 
is going to come from. I’m always going to have a roof over my head. I have parents who 
care. And we are going to get punished for it, because we worked hard? Yeah, tax the rich 
to give to the poor. Well, you know what? We’ve done this before. It’s failed then, and it’s 
gonna fail again. Who was it? Herbert Hoover fought poverty, and you know what hap-
pened? Poverty won. Things don’t work like that. I apologize because I’m getting worked 
up here and getting off topic. But, at the same time, that is the way I was raised. What you 
earn is what you get to earn. Now, okay, 10 percent of our population is real rich. Another 
part of it doesn’t want to do a damn thing. Pardon my language, I do apologize. So, we 
are going to take money from the rich folks and then pay for the rest of society and then 
we are going to take some money out and give you money for this, for that… It’s just one 
of those things… I don’t know… I’m kinda pissed about it all to be honest.142 
It is interesting to see how the respondent admits not being well-off, making him 
most likely lower middle class, but nevertheless feeling himself targeted by the tax 
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increases for the rich, which reflects the diffuse class awareness in the US. It is also 
interesting to note that this respondent’s conception of the American class structure 
closely resembles the model offered by Wysong et al. Moreover, he also sees poverty 
in a moralized way, attributing poverty to a lack of work and motivation. The re-
spondent’s words about his feelings regarding taxation exemplify what Edsall and 
Edsall, Wilson, and Fox Piven have said about the use of taxation rhetoric. Moreover, 
the extract highlights the fact that the War on Poverty is perceived as a failure and a 
waste of money. 
Communication researchers and political scientists Kate Kenski, Bruce W. Har-
dy, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson also found that issues of taxation were central to the 
2008 campaign, with “the most frequently aired attacks” against Obama being a “tax-
and-spend liberal,” McCain accusing Obama’s political program of being harmful for 
the economy and the middle class and of increasing the national debt, with campaign 
spots playing on those themes. The spots pitted Obama as the taxer and McCain as 
the champion of the working and middle class.143 The least that can be said is that 
McCain’s discourse is not original at all, but just a reheated version of Reagan’s dis-
course. The same type of rhetoric was and is used by the Tea Party. For example, in a 
Tea Party rallying speech on April 14, 2010 Sarah Palin, McCain’s running mate in the 
2008 campaign, said: 
So the people in Boston and all across the US, we're sending the message to Washington 
that, come November, that big government, big-debt Obama-Pelosi-Reid spending spree, 
that "there there, little children, we're here to take care of you," that agenda is over, we're 
voting them out! [ ... ] Cause they just don't get it. They think that we can borrow, and tax 
more, and spend more ... they're obviously digging us into a deeper darker hole, and that 
is insane. With their new record-busting 3.8 trillion dollar federal budget and their tril-
lion dollar plus Obamacare scheme ... , to keep borrowing and spending, and inventing 
these big new government programs with enormous price tags that make no sense, there 
is no way to pay for any of this, except to see your taxes rise.144 
It must be added that taxes and federal deficit are strongly associated with social pol-
icies and with the idea of endangering the economy, in the wider framework present-
ing government regulations as harmful to the economy. All of this is condensed in 
one magic code word: big government. Coste insists that for Reagan the danger was 
coming from the welfare state145 through its spending and regulations. Political scien-
tist Hugh Heclo insists on the fact that for Reagan the proper role of government was 
reduced to national defense, everything else being usurpation of power.146 Edsall and 
Edsall explain the central and embedded notion of big government in the Reagan 
rhetoric and ideology: 
A central pillar of Reagan’s success was the skill of his political entourage in manipulat-
ing the new Republican agenda of race and taxes in order to portray the Reagan admin-
istration as protecting the working man against “big government”. 
Big government was painted, in turn, as fueled by Democrats seeking ever larger infu-
sions of revenue, not only to raise welfare payments and government salaries, but to im-
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pose racial preferences on government contracts, on college admissions, and on em-
ployment and promotion in the public and private sectors.147 
‘Big government’ manages to encapsulate the tax backlash, racial resentment, and the 
association with the Democratic Party. Moreover, it is also strongly associated with 
wasteful spending and the idea of an incessantly growing bureaucracy.148 Feagin also 
insists on this centrality of big government in the framing of politics and race in the 
conservative movement. However, in the case of big government, this refers to an 
anti-federal government perspective, not to the state governments. Feagin sees this 
anti-federal government attitude as stemming from the federal government’s promi-
nent role and action against Jim Crow and in favor of civil rights. Through this strong 
role more and more people associated federal action with black Americans and per-
ceived anti-white interests, leading Feagin to establish a link between anti-black 
views and anti-federal-government views.149 Sniderman and Carmines also argue that 
race policies are embedded within the broader debate over the proper role of gov-
ernment.150  
The invasive and harmful perception of big government resurfaced also in the 
Clinton and Obama health reform contexts. Government regulations in health care 
were presented as harmful and detrimental to the people. The 1993 Harry-and-Louise 
ads played on that with the ad-slogan: “They [government] choose, we lose.” During 
the Obama reform, the best example of the big government threat would be the in-
famous death panels: government regulations push you toward death. John Borra’s 
political cartoon (see the beginning of part 1) is also an example of the representation 
of government regulation: death and abortion. The perception of government as to-
talitarian can be found in accusations of Obama being a dictator, as conveyed 
through the Obamathets “Dear Leader”, “Comrade Obama”, or “Obamunist.” Obama 
has also been compared to Hitler, for example by Texas Rep. Louie Gohmert in a 2010 
House Floor speech, by Georgia Rep. Paul Broun in 2010, and by conservative com-
mentator Glenn Beck in 2009.151 The reform was presented as a “government takeo-
ver” of health care. A 2010 PolitiFact article reports that a memo by Republican politi-
cal strategist Frank Luntz urged members of the Republican Party to attack the 
reform along those lines. Luntz wrote in the memo that “Takeovers are like coups. 
They both lead to dictators and loss of freedom.” Since then, it has become a punch 
line.152  
3.2. Responsibility Discourse and Debate 
The question contained in the code of big government is the question of the 
proper role of government and thus the question of responsibility. The notion of ‘re-
sponsibility’ is particularly interesting because it now takes a central place in both 
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conservative and now also liberal discourse. It raises the central question linked to 
social policies: Is it the responsibility of individuals to take care of themselves or has 
the government a responsibility in providing for the people? ‘Responsibility’ is a code 
word in the sense that it encapsulates a host of meanings and carries a strong ideolog-
ical package, and has a racial dimension as well. The idea that blacks were not able to 
take care of themselves was used as a paternalistic justification for slavery. Irrespon-
sible behavior or lack of responsibility is used in cultural racism, and the conservative 
behavioral approach of poverty argues that a low socioeconomic status does not re-
flect an unfair economy but a lack of work ethic and responsibility. This simple racial 
dimension is broadened by a larger ideological dimension of two different stances 
regarding the role of the government in providing safety and opportunity for the citi-
zens. Conservatives and neoliberals claim that government intervention should be 
restricted to national defense and law and order; everything else should be left to the 
private market and the individual, or the family. Equal opportunity exists as long as 
everybody has the same rights. Liberals defend the idea that government has a role to 
play in regulating the economy and providing a safety net in case of economic hard-
ship. They also view equal opportunity as a question of equal means, not only equal 
rights. Equality of means and the safety net are aimed at through social policies. The 
Democratic Party, representing the liberal ideology, is strongly associated with mi-
nority rights and social policy development, as well as with the advocacy of a stronger 
role for government. Moreover, Democratic policies are often portrayed by conserva-
tives as wasteful spending made by an irresponsible government. In addition, the 
black stereotype portrays this population as irresponsible, which creates a race-laden 
dimension to the responsibility debate and creates a code in which the notion of re-
sponsibility is used to attack social policies. Thus the notion of responsibility is par-
ticularly important because of its apparent innocence and uplifting character. How-
ever, the responsibility discourse has an impact on the support of social policies, as 
demonstrated by Bobo and Charles.153 
3.2.1. “The Dream Smells Like Peppermint but Tastes Like 
Strawberry Shortcake:”154 the Conservative Responsibility 
Discourse 
To a great extent, the conservative responsibility discourse rests upon the idea 
of the American Dream. America, it is said, is the land of opportunity; anyone can 
succeed through hard work and thrift. The persistence of a sizeable poor population, 
which on top of that is easily identifiable because of their color, and who claims more 
equality of opportunity is an element that questions the reality of the Dream. Two 
solutions exist. Accept that the Dream is a dream and start questioning the fairness of 
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the socioeconomic system. Or blame the aforementioned population for not being 
able to grasp the Dream because they do not meet some of the premises of the 
Dream. Hochschild sees a strong individualistic dimension in the American Dream 
since its premises focus on people’s behavior instead of economic processes.155 The 
crucial aspect is that the American Dream makes individuals responsible for their 
own success by negating structural barriers. Furthermore, it absolves government 
intervention as the Dream posits that equality of opportunity exists. West criticizes 
this conservative responsibility discourse: “In this way crucial and indispensable 
themes of self-help and personal responsibility are wrenched out of historical context 
and contemporary circumstances—as if it was all a matter of personal will.”156 The 
critical nexus is in absolving structural barriers and making social mobility an issue 
of personal behavior that is disconnected from the economic system.  
It is there that the responsibility discourse is closely linked to cultural racism, 
since it attributes a lower socioeconomic status to deficient black cultural values. 
Bonilla-Silva mentions accusations such as “lack of motivation, loose family organiza-
tion, and inappropriate values.”157 In this conception black poverty provides the evi-
dence of a lack of effort and lack of work ethic. Bonilla-Silva affirms that some people 
even think that denunciation of discrimination is used as an excuse for laziness. The 
same discourse is applied to social policy: because people are lazy, they ask for food 
stamps.158 Schuman et al. have shown that the beliefs about the reasons for racial so-
cioeconomic inequalities have changed over time, tending increasingly to a lack of 
will. Since 1977, the first cause consistently mentioned has been a lack of will for get-
ting ahead.159  
A 2007 PEW report shows that the belief in discrimination as the main reason 
for blacks not getting ahead was very low at the time (19% for the total population) 
and lowest among whites (15%), but also only 30% among blacks. On the contrary, 
most respondents believed that blacks were responsible for their situation: 71% of 
whites, 53% of blacks, and 59% of Hispanics. By 2010, this belief among blacks, at least, 
had dropped. A 2010 PEW report shows that 52% of blacks thought that blacks are 
mostly responsible for not getting ahead, whereas only 34% mentioned discrimina-
tion as a reason. Fifteen years ago, they had the opposite view. However, a majority 
(81%) of blacks still believe that the country has not done enough to give blacks equal 
rights with whites, whereas 54% of whites think that equal rights are a fact.160 What is 
surprising, however, is the discrepancy between the percentage of the population, 
blacks included, thinking that blacks are responsible for their situation, and people 
who think that discrimination is not a problem anymore. One would expect a con-
vergence of the numbers, since it seems impossible to believe at the same time that 
discrimination is still present but that people are responsible themselves for their low 
socioeconomic status.  
The Republican conservative discourse built on the notion of personal respon-
sibility emerged at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s in the context 
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of the backlash. The perversity theory also advocates that not giving help and subsi-
dies would force people to work and thus ultimately help them because they are 
forced to become responsible for themselves.161  
During the 1980s, this theory was freshly publicized and disguised as scientific 
proof by libertarian political scientist Charles Murray in his 1984 book Losing Ground: 
American Social Policy 1950-1980.162 Murray’s book was financed by The Manhattan In-
stitute, a conservative think tank, and was an instant bestseller. It is interesting to see 
that Murray’s following book dealing with race and socioeconomic status, The Bell 
Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life, written with psychologist Rich-
ard J. Herrnstein and published in 1994, was also a bestseller, but was rejected by 
most conservative politicians. According to sociologist Stephen Steinberg, conserva-
tive politicians rejected this theory, not primarily because it was not politically cor-
rect and had a terrible whiff of biological racism, but because it did not fit the behav-
iorist responsibility discourse. Murray’s first book, on the contrary, fit their discourse 
perfectly and was widely appreciated. Steinberg also points out that the responsibility 
discourse matches better with the myth of opportunity and the American Dream 
than does a genetically determined social hierarchy.163  
Although Nixon had already started to give a new tone to conservative dis-
course, the political climate was still too liberal for a harsh attack on social policies. 
Partly in discourse and, more essentially, in policy, Nixon still put forward a rather 
strong role for government in social policies. It was Reagan who really established the 
responsibility discourse, claiming that personal responsibility was the solution to the 
problems and deviances caused by the ‘irresponsible’ policies implemented by the 
Democrats. The Reagan-Democrats were particularly receptive to this discourse.  
Reagan’s personal responsibility doctrine is built on three elements. First, 
Reagan had a strong admiration for self-made men, people who had climbed the 
rungs of the social ladder through hard work and obstinacy. Second, he did not be-
lieve that racial discrimination persisted in the late 20th century. Documents in the 
presidential archives show that Reagan was convinced that discrimination had ended 
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that racial issues were not topical anymore. Ac-
cording to him, African-Americans and Hispanics did not face any barriers to integra-
tion anymore and had in fact the same opportunities and possibilities of succeeding 
as whites.164 And third, Reagan favored deregulation and a small role for government, 
which was reflected in the fact that any form of government intervention was pre-
sented as harmful, either for individuals, for business, or for the economy at large. 
According to Jansson, Reagan’s ideal world resembled America’s Gilded Age of the 
late 19th century, a period of economic deregulation strongly focused on individual-
ism. As for Katz, he analyses the conservative discourse warning against the perverse 
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effects of social policies and extolling the benefits of private charity as a mythicized 
interpretation of the late 19th century.165  
These ideas led to the construction of a discourse that presented the interven-
tionist social policies implemented by the Democrats as irresponsible, designating 
them not only as the cause for the economic downturn of the 1970s, but also as the 
roots of the alleged depravation of the ‘underclass.’ The Republican Party, on the 
contrary, proposed budget cuts in social programs to save the economy,166 but also to 
make the beneficiaries of social programs take responsibility by putting them to work 
and thus help them become independent and self-reliant. Additionally, Reagan’s 
conservative Weltbild made the poor responsible for their poverty, since, according to 
Republicans, it was possible to become rich if people were willing and worked hard. 
The ideological contrast is quite stark: during the same years, the Democratic Party’s 
platform insisted on the government’s responsibility towards citizens and people who 
had suffered from discrimination.167 
The ideology built around the notion of personal responsibility can be seen in 
Reagan’s 1986 State of the Union Address: 
We do not face large deficits because American families are undertaxed; we face those 
deficits because the federal government overspends. 
The detailed budget that we will submit will meet the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings target 
for deficit reductions, meet our commitment to ensure a strong national defense, meet 
our commitment to protect Social Security and the truly less fortunate, and, yes, meet 
our commitment to not raise taxes. How should we accomplish this? Well, not by taking 
from those in need. As families take care of their own, government must provide shelter 
and nourishment for those who cannot provide for themselves. But we must revise or re-
place programs enacted in the name of compassion that degrade the moral worth of 
work, encourage family breakups, and drive entire communities into a bleak and heart-
less dependency.168 
This short extract highlights how the different elements are intrinsically linked: the 
first level is the concern about the federal deficit and the national debt, alongside the 
voiced commitment over the maintaining of essential programs and budget lines, 
especially military spending. It must be observed that Reagan declares himself in fa-
vor of certain social programs, mentioning here Social Security. As mentioned before, 
Social Security is the most popular program in the US, it benefits from strong support 
by the white middle class, and is very difficult to attack.169 However, this defense of 
Social Security is immediately followed by something far more central to Reagan’s 
program: the promise not to increase taxes. Through this association Reagan creates 
a situation of resource shortage for social programs, the perception of a zero-sum-
game between the deserving and the undeserving. Through the reference to the lack 
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of work ethic, divorced families, and entire communities steeped in welfare depend-
ency, the association with the black ‘underclass’ is made.  
This description of the black ‘underclass’ is opposed to the (white) responsible 
and sound family, which, according to Reagan, is the basic unit of American life. In 
his 1985 State of the Union Address, Reagan presents the responsible family as the 
victim of Democratic policies:  
As we came to the decade of the eighties, we faced the worst crisis in our postwar history. 
In the seventies were years of rising problems and falling confidence. There was a feeling 
government had grown beyond the consent of the governed. Families felt helpless in the 
face of mounting inflation and the indignity of taxes that reduced reward for hard work, 
thrift, and risk-taking. All this was overlaid by an ever-growing web of rules and regula-
tions.170 
A little later in the speech Reagan presents his conception of government responsibil-
ity: 
This government will meet its responsibility to help those in need. But policies that in-
crease dependency, break up families, and destroy self-respect are not progressive; 
they're reactionary. Despite our strides in civil rights, blacks, Hispanics, and all minori-
ties will not have full and equal power until they have full economic power. 
Reagan’s rhetoric is particularly efficient in the sense that he advocates government 
help for the needy. However, thanks to the ideas of moral hazard and the perversity 
theory, it is not contradictory to proclaim helping the poor by slashing programs. 
Moreover, just by mentioning the lack of economic power of the black and Hispanic 
population after listing the evils provoked by social policies. Thus he makes sure that 
these populations are seen as the victims of social policies, he maintains the negative 
stereotype associated with these populations, and he makes it clear for the white part 
of the audience that only programs perceived as benefiting blacks are to be slashed. 
Reagan’s discourse playing on the notion of personal responsibility and Demo-
cratic irresponsibility has proven to be particularly enduring. George H. W. Bush 
used the same themes as Reagan, denouncing Democratic irresponsibility in his 1988 
Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican Convention in 
New Orleans: 
My friends, eight years ago this economy was flat on its back—intensive care. We came 
in and gave it emergency treatment: Got the temperature down by lowering regulation, 
got the blood pressure down when we lowered taxes. Pretty soon the patient was up, 
back on his feet, and stronger than ever. 
And now who do we hear knocking on the door but the doctors who made him sick. And 
they're telling us to put them in charge of the case again. My friends, they're lucky we 
don't hit them with a malpractice suit!171 
The medical analogy and the threat of a malpractice suit clearly accuse the Demo-
crats of being irresponsible in their policy choices. Bush also kept taxes as a central 
issue, insisting on his promise not to increase them, thus maintaining a zero-sum-
game around social policy and keeping the identification of the Democrats as tax-
and-spend liberals: 
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I'm the one who won't raise taxes. My opponent now says he'll raise them as a last resort, 
or a third resort. When a politician talks like that, you know that's one resort he'll be 
checking into. My opponent won't rule out raising taxes. But I will. The Congress will 
push me to raise taxes, and I'll say no, and they'll push, and I'll say no, and they'll push 
again, and I'll say to them, "Read my lips: no new taxes.”172 
The tone was kept during the rest of the campaign, sometimes combining the theme 
of Democratic irresponsibility with the old theme of law and order, notably through 
the Willie-Horton spot and the “Revolving Doors” ad. This ad denounced Democrats 
as being lax on crime and their proposals for prisoners’ rights as fostering criminality. 
Although Bush toyed with the idea of intervening in social policies, he spent little 
time and attention on his plans concerning education, drug abuse, or even social pro-
grams. He voiced the fundamental conservative idea: “you can’t solve problems by 
throwing money at them.”173 
In his Inaugural Address, Bush also continued the fundamental Reaganite rhet-
oric combining expressions of concern, compassion, and caring with an advocacy of 
cutting social programs: 
America is never wholly herself unless she is engaged in high moral principle. We as a 
people have such a purpose today. It is to make kinder the face of the Nation and gentler 
the face of the world. My friends, we have work to do. There are the homeless, lost and 
roaming. There are the children who have nothing, no love and no normalcy. There are 
those who cannot free themselves of enslavement to whatever addiction—drugs, wel-
fare, the demoralization that rules the slums. There is crime to be conquered, the rough 
crime of the streets. There are young women to be helped who are about to become 
mothers of children they can't care for and might not love. They need our care, our guid-
ance, and our education, though we bless them for choosing life. 
The old solution, the old way, was to think that public money alone could end these 
problems. But we have learned that that is not so. And in any case, our funds are low. We 
have a deficit to bring down. We have more will than wallet, but will is what we need. 
We will make the hard choices, looking at what we have and perhaps allocating it differ-
ently, making our decisions based on honest need and prudent safety. And then we will 
do the wisest thing of all. We will turn to the only resource we have that in times of need 
always grows: the goodness and the courage of the American people.174 
This extract perfectly encapsulates the tenets of the conservative discourse: welfare is 
thrown into the same pot as drug addictions, thus hammering home the negative 
view of welfare and insisting on the dependency dimension dear to the perversity 
theory. Concern is expressed for the poor, especially the welfare mother, and on the 
same occasion, a little word is thrown in for the Religious Right, insisting on the 
commitment against abortion, which allows him to blame the welfare mothers for 
their behavior while sounding caring and paternalistic at the same time. The refer-
ence to crime and welfare mothers primes the association with the black population, 
thus ensuring that the next sentence, about money not solving the problem, is rightly 
understood as applying to programs perceived as benefiting the black population. 
Cutting programs is justified and portrayed as urgently necessary and responsible 
through the weapon of choice, the deficit.  
Bush insists on the issue of willpower as opposed to money, and thus also 
primes racial stereotypes of people too lazy to work and unwilling to succeed, people 
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who ask for food stamps instead. The “honest need” and “prudent safety” also trigger 
racial priming, appealing, by opposition, concepts of the undeserving and irresponsi-
ble who do not really need help; the prudent safety recalls the law and order dis-
course and echoes Nixon’s denunciation of social programs as having resulted in so-
cial unrest. And lastly, all this is advocated in the name of morality, doing the best for 
America, while at the same time congratulating the people for their high moral char-
acter, when actually proposing to leave the (black) poor to fend for themselves. Thus, 
in conservative discourse, responsibility becomes a prime tool to advocate the with-
drawal of government from the sphere of social policies in order to promote a system 
based on the individual and to let people fend for themselves in an unregulated mar-
ket. In this sense, the issue of responsibility is closely linked to the notion of big gov-
ernment as irresponsible government and the conservative view on the role of gov-
ernment. 
3.2.2.  “Do for Self:”175 the Black Responsibility Discourse 
In light of the conservative use of “responsibility” as a tool to advocate govern-
mental disengagement from social policies it might be surprising that there is also a 
strong black responsibility discourse. However, on essential parts, the black respon-
sibility discourse is quite different from the conservative one. The title quotation is 
taken from an interview conducted by social psychologist Jonathan Kozol during his 
study of inner city schools. A young black student expressed his disillusionment with 
the public education system and the inferior education he received with these words, 
meaning that he could not rely on the system because it defaulted on him. The 
phrase is not unique, it is often used, and strongly echoes Du Bois’s responsibility 
discourse.  
In his 1897 essay, The Conservation of Races, Du Bois wrote that blacks “must do 
for themselves.” Du Bois insisted on racial solidarity for the purpose of politically 
organizing as a racially defined group and making themselves a place in history. To a 
certain extent, Du Bois’s words are not that far off of the conservative discourse by 
insisting on an irreproachable morality within the black population, but with a dif-
ferent end—obtaining equality: “But—and here is the rub—they must be honest, 
fearlessly criticizing their own faults, zealously correcting them; they must be ear-
nest.” He also criticized the state of the black community, his words bearing a strong 
echo with problems that are pointed out today:  
The Academy [to be created Black Academy, the point of his argument here] should be 
impartial in conduct; while it aims to exalt the people it should aim to do so by truth—
not by lies, by honesty—not by flattery. It should continually impress the fact upon the 
Negro people that they must not expect to have things done for them—they MUST DO 
FOR THEMSELVES; that they have on their hands a vast work of self-reformation to do, 
and that a little less complaint and whining, and a little more dogged work and manly 
striving would do us more credit and benefit than a thousand Force or Civil Rights 
bills.176 
The end of the extract highlights the fact that Du Bois is aware of, and concerned 
about, the outside perception of the black population, making his insistence on re-
sponsibility and morality a tool of political power, in the sense that through this, Du 
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Bois wanted to avoid being vulnerable to attacks of the conservative type. In a similar 
way in his 1957 book Black Bourgeoisie, sociologist E. Franklin Frazier described the 
emphasis of the black middle class on piety, thrift, and respectability.177  
In her study of the black middle class, sociologist Karyn Lacy shows that the 
emphasis on responsibility is still strong among the black middle class, through the 
insistence on hard work as a moral obligation, the condemnation of people who try to 
avoid work, the condemnation of welfare on the basis of the association with shirking 
work obligations. Work is viewed as the pathway to economic independence. Middle 
class blacks also tend to view able-bodied welfare recipients as lacking work ethic and 
personal initiative. These work boundaries also exist among the lower classes, allow-
ing the working poor to distinguish themselves from the ‘underclass’ through morali-
ty and responsibility, if not through geographical boundaries. Some blacks at the 
time of the study even thought that the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Act did not go far enough, due to a belief in work compensation for welfare 
benefits, at least in the area of community work, such as working in a library or pick-
ing up trash. Lacy explains that this is related to the fact that the government under-
funds these areas.178  
There are some obvious parallels with the conservative discourse on lacking 
work ethic and lacking responsibility, but the major difference is that, here, the em-
phasis on work and responsibility is not used to advocate budget cuts in social policy, 
but rather to compensate for a lack of public service and to avoid a stigmatizing asso-
ciation with the ‘underclass.’ These aspects fit the responsibility discourse, and are 
still present in contemporary black ideology and political attitude.  
Political scientist Melissa Harris-Lacewell describes the complexity of black po-
litical thought which encompasses aspects of all three major ideological political atti-
tudes, sometimes in a single individual. This mix can include pride at integrationist 
efforts, black nationalist thought in relation to racism, more conservative tones re-
garding social behavior, especially regarding responsibility. Some go as far as to call 
blacks, whose behavior they disapprove of, the N-word, and to advocate non-reliance 
on white help or not waiting for white action.179 Zinn explains that the realization that 
having to take responsibility for political action on behalf of blacks had to come from 
blacks, came in the 1970s, alongside the rising white backlash:  
Yet, was not the goal of real equality, of stature as a human being, always so far away as 
to be barely visible? By 1970 this was just beginning to be understood, and with it one 
great lesson: that the premise of liberal reform, that “someone,” the white reformer, 
would solve the problems of the black man, was false. Now, especially among the young 
black people, the most essential element of a real democracy had begun to take hold—
that an oppressed people can depend on no one but themselves to move that long dis-
tance, past all defenses, to genuine dignity.180 
This idea of not waiting for white society for more rights and a better economic situa-
tion is best expressed by black nationalism as voiced, for example, by the Black Pan-
ther Party or by the Nation of Islam and Minister Louis Farrakhan, who also advocate 
the ‘Do for self’ credo, in the sense of not relying on anyone else for their rights. In his 
famous 1964 speech “The Ballot or the Bullet,” Malcolm X advocated black self-help 
and responsibility in all spheres of life, political, economic, and social:  
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And the gospel of Black Nationalism, as I told you, means you should control your own, 
the politics of your community, the economy of your community, and all of the society in 
which you live should be under your control. […] Join any kind of organization, civic, re-
ligious, fraternal, political, or otherwise that’s based on lifting the black man up and 
making him master of his own community. 
Malcolm X’s advocacy of self-reliance and taking responsibility is also linked to his 
disappointment in the American government, which he characterizes as hypocritical 
and criminal earlier in the speech:  
This government has failed us; the government itself has failed us, and the white liberals 
who have been posing as our friends have failed us. And once we see that all these other 
sources to which we’ve turned have failed, we stop turning to them and turn to ourselves. 
We need a self-help program, a do-it-your-self philosophy, a do-it-right-now philosophy, 
a it’s-already-too-late philosophy. This is what you and I need to get with, and the only 
way we are going to solve our problem is with a self-help program. Before we can get a 
self-help program started we have to have a self-help philosophy. 
Responsibility is also a notion that is used by black conservatives, such as econ-
omist Thomas Sowell or Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, in exactly the 
same sense as white conservatives. In his 1983 book The Economics and Politics of Race: 
An International Perspective, Sowell defended the idea that the low socioeconomic po-
sition of a racial or ethnic group is not primarily due to discrimination or exploita-
tion, but rather to cultural factors, such as work ethic, entrepreneurship, and propen-
sity to save money, in short, living a responsible life. Sowell also compared rates of 
success depending on whether people relied on the market or on political processes, 
and concluded that minorities fared better when fending for themselves in a free 
market—even though he explained that this is contrary to the interests of political 
minority leaders. He greeted regulatory policies that grant equal access, like Civil 
Rights, but condemned government intervention in the form of redistributive 
measures as counterproductive. In short, Sowell thought that blacks are responsible 
for themselves if they want to succeed.181  
In his memoirs, Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas states his adherence to 
Sowell’s ideas and explains his opposition to government intervention on behalf of 
the poor through the idea that it fosters dependency, which he compares to a new 
form of enslavement: 
On the other hand, I didn’t think it was a good idea to make poor blacks, or anyone else, 
more dependent on government. That would amount to a new kind of enslavement, one 
which ultimately relied on the generosity—and the ever-changing self-interests—of poli-
ticians and activists. It seemed to me that the dependency it fostered might ultimately 
prove as diabolical as segregation, permanently condemning poor people to the lowest 
rungs of the socioeconomic ladder by cannibalizing the values without which they had 
no long-term hope of improving their lot.182 
Thomas very openly states that he equates taking responsibility with true freedom, 
hence his opposition to an interventionist government. He says in his memoirs how 
this conviction stemmed from his grandfather who had bad memories of government 
officials coming into the houses and poking around because people received some 
meager subsidies:  
 […] real freedom meant independence from government intrusion, which in turn meant 
that you had to take responsibility for your own decisions. When the government as-
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sumes that responsibility, it takes away your freedom—and wasn’t freedom the very 
thing for which blacks in America were fighting?183 
This, however, did not prevent Thomas from asking to benefit from affirmative ac-
tion when he applied to Yale. He justified himself by explaining that he requested it 
on account of his unfavorable economic background. However, it would seem para-
doxical that his reasoning on freedom from government should only apply over a 
given threshold of income. 
Another responsibility discourse also emerged in the 1980s, mixing liberal views 
on race and government with conservative and even nationalistic tones on social be-
havior and culture. Among them Bill Cosby and the Cosby Show, which advocated 
conservative social values like emphasis on education, work, and responsibility 
alongside black culture. Psychiatrist Dr. Alvin Poussaint was hired as a consultant to 
screen the script of the show for negative stereotypes and to replace white cultural 
references with black ones when necessary. The collaboration between Cosby and 
Poussaint resulted in a 2007 book, Come On, People: On the Path from Victims to Victors, 
which encouraged people to take responsibility in all areas of life and explained even 
basic steps to take good care of one’s health, especially for pregnant women.184 In an 
NPR interview about the book, Dr. Poussaint spelled out his motivation behind the 
book:  
In order to fight systemic racism, institutional racism, you have to be a strong people. 
And by wallowing in degradation with the drugs, with the alcohol, with the non-
responsible sexual behavior that exposes you to all kinds of things, particularly AIDS, is 
not the way to go.185 
The approach is quite different from the conservative one or the perversity the-
ory approach reheated by Murray: behavior is not used to solely blame and justify 
cuts in social programs. Yet negative behavior is denounced and encouraged to be 
overcome out of true concern and because it is seen as harmful for the population 
and as a liability. It is also quite close du Du Bois’ concern of fighting prejudice. In a 
2007 speech given at St. Paul’s Church in Detroit, Cosby adopted a tone more infused 
with nationalism than during his Cosby Show years in advocating responsibility and 
fighting the deviances of the ‘underclass’: 
Men, if you want to win, we can win. […] We are not a pitiful race of people. We are a 
bright race, who can move with the best. But we are in a new time, where people are be-
having in abnormal ways and calling it normal ... When they used to come into our 
neighborhoods, we put the kids in the basement, grabbed a rifle, and said, ‘By any means 
necessary.’  
I don’t want to talk about hatred of these people. […] I’m talking about a time when we 
protected our women and protected our children. Now I got people in wheelchairs, para-
lyzed. A little girl in Camden, jumping rope, shot through the mouth. Grandmother saw 
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it out the window. And people are waiting around for Jesus to come, when Jesus is al-
ready within you.186 
The type of responsibility discourse as voiced by Poussaint and Cosby resonates ra-
ther well in the black community. A 2007 PEW poll showed that 85% of blacks viewed 
Cosby as a good influence, in second position after Oprah Winfrey (87%). Rapper 50 
Cents only got a 17% approval rate.187 
West also puts an emphasis on the values and responsibility discourse and men-
tioned the need to reject victimization. He agreed that not everything said by some 
black conservatives, such as economist Glenn Loury, must be completely rejected. 
Alongside victimization, he also mentioned blind racial solidarity and not acknowl-
edging “pathological and dysfunctional aspects of black behavior.” Lastly, West criti-
cized the fact that an intellectual discussion about “the plight of poor black people” 
was avoided and that any criticism was censored.188 Finally, differences in achieve-
ment between African-American blacks and more recent black immigrants are often 
mentioned to defend the rejection of victimization.189  
3.2.3. “A New Culture of Responsibility:”190 Clinton and G. 
W. Bush 
Given the weight of the conservative rhetorical framework after twelve years of 
Republican presidency, by 1992 many political analysts, for example Edsall and Ed-
sall, reached the conclusion that the Democratic Party could not continue to ignore 
the values of work, self-reliance, and autonomy contained in the notion of personal 
responsibility if it wanted to recapture a presidential majority.191 
Bill Clinton shared this conviction and symbolized the conservative turn voters 
had taken. After the defeat of George McGovern in 1972, Clinton had already noted 
that the Democratic Party was no longer responding to the concerns of its traditional 
voter base. Clinton said that he became a New Democrat that year, at least from an 
ideological point of view, as the term was coined later. He mentions the notion of re-
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sponsibility as a decisive element in the ideological renewal of the Democratic Party 
through the New Democrats and the return to, according to him, fundamental values 
of the Democratic Party: the new Third Way which “was rooted in common sense, a 
common devotion to our party’s oldest values of opportunity and responsibility.”192  
Moreover, Clinton was highly aware of the harmful effects of the attitude that 
Democrats had hitherto adopted. This attitude consisted in basically refusing to talk 
about the problems of the ‘underclass,’ exactly what some conservative and liberal 
blacks, for example, economist Glenn Loury, sociologist William Julius Wilson, and 
political philosopher Cornel West, had denounced as well. According to Al From, the 
founder of the Democratic Leadership Council and political advisor to Bill Clinton, Clin-
ton insisted on the urgent need for an intellectual and political renewal of the party.193  
During the 1992 campaign, Clinton was careful not to appear too liberal. This 
was part of the aim of creating a new image of the Democratic Party, to show respon-
sible New Democrats who were opposed to wasteful social policies, who were in fa-
vor of a balanced budget, and who wanted to limit the scope of government. This new 
approach of the New Democrats was expressed in the campaign slogan “To end wel-
fare as we know it.”194 Clinton had decided to play on Republican ground, going so far 
as to claim the same conservative values as the Republican Party195 in his 1993 Ad-
dress Before a Joint Session of Congress: “I believe we will find our new direction in 
the basic old values that brought us here over the last two centuries: a commitment to 
opportunity, to individual responsibility, to community, to work, to family, and to 
faith.”196 Of course, values like equal opportunity, work, family, and faith are common 
to a majority of Americans.197 However, it is the context here that allows for a more 
conservative interpretation of the values enumerated by Clinton. He had centered his 
1992 campaign on his ideological moderation and his centrist approach, based on a 
resolutely New Democrat ethos. Indeed, the notions of family and work are used in 
conservative discourse as elements that complete the personal responsibility dis-
course, by putting the stress on more work and more reliance on the immediate fami-
ly, as opposed to reliance on government help through social programs. Katz Olson 
considers familism (meaning the primary focus of importance on the family), person-
al responsibility, consumer empowerment and choice (in the case of health policies), 
and strong individualism, as the four principles of antistatist values as advocated by 
Republicans.198  
The other face of social policies, i.e. fiscal policy, was Clinton’s major success, 
and he not only managed to balance the budget, but he actually generated a budget 
surplus by 1998. Regarding social policies, however, Clinton lost to his centrist, or 
even conservative strategy. His reform for universal health care was quickly killed by 
Republicans, despite the fact that Clinton’s reform proposal built on many conserva-
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tive principles.199 Using the upcoming presidential election, Republicans managed to 
pressure Clinton into signing a very conservative welfare reform: the Personal Respon-
sibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 (PRWOA). Many aspects stressed measures of 
personal responsibility (in a conservative sense): lifetime limits on benefits, restricted 
eligibility criteria, severe limitations on access to benefits for teenage parents, and 
strong work incentives for former AFDC recipients. AFDC was reformed into TANF 
(Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), with a maximum of 5 years of benefits over a 
lifetime, putting an end to the notion of entitlement.200 Some provisions aimed at in-
creasing parental responsibility, such as clauses that stipulated the loss of benefits for 
people (married or not) who had additional children while on the TANF rolls. Some 
critics, such as Schmidtz and Goodin, consider that by signing PRWOA, Clinton 
completed the Reagan revolution.201 
Not only did Clinton try to play on the opponents’ ground, but G. W. Bush ven-
tured as well on the other side of the political spectrum between 2000 and 2008, alt-
hough in a very mild and superficial way. G. W. Bush decided to avoid the errors his 
father had made and that had cost him his reelection. Bush saw himself as Reagan’s 
political heir and he openly declared that he wanted to continue his politics. And yet, 
he was careful to appear less harsh and presented himself as a compassionate con-
servative, concentrating his efforts on education reform, the 2001 No Child Left Behind 
Act (NCLB). Compassionate conservatism as an ideology seeks to appear less intransi-
gent and harsh than classical conservatism. In this sense, social policy reform is not 
solely advocated as slashing budgets and massive privatization. However, expansion 
focuses on areas of interest to the middle class, such as education and other areas that 
emphasize back-on-your-feet programs and autonomy. By adopting this stance Bush 
got the support of moderate voters in the 2000 campaign and at the beginning of his 
first term.202  
His choice to focus on education reform to apply his compassionate conserva-
tism was based on two criteria. Education is one of social policy areas where people 
are willing to accept increased spending.203 Moreover, education is among the pre-
rogatives of the states; federal intervention is rather limited. Education reform thus 
remains compatible with conservative criticism of big government. The 2000 and 
2004 Republican party platforms insisted on this aspect.204 NCLB is compassionate 
because it insists on learning help for disadvantaged children and aims at reducing 
the racial and social class education gap.205 Nonetheless, among the biggest short-
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comings are budgetary problems. Between the fiscal years 2002 and 2008 the gap be-
tween the authorized funds and the funds that were effectively appropriated was 
$70.9 billion. The gap increased to $85.7 billion in 2009.206 
The political and rhetorical heritage of Reagan was present in Bush era. The 
2004 Republican party platform begins with a tribute to Ronald Reagan. His values 
and principles are picked up in the platform:  
The measure of compassion is more than good intentions, it is good results. By being in-
volved and by taking responsibility upon ourselves, we gain something… We contribute 
to the life of our country. We become more than taxpayers and occasional voters, we be-
come citizens. Citizens, not spectators. Citizens who hear the call of duty, who stand up 
for their beliefs, who care for their families, who control their lives, and who treat their 
neighbors with respect and compassion.207 
The Reagan spirit is alive in this extract. The GOP insists on the same elements as 
Reagan: personal responsibility, work, family, and religion. The Republican discourse 
remained neoliberal in a pure Reaganite tradition as far as taxes are concerned. The 
GOP continued to advocate economic deregulation and low taxes in order to stimu-
late economic growth and promised to create legislation that would make levying 
future taxes more difficult. Among these proposals was the idea of requiring a super-
majority for every vote on new taxes in Congress. The 2004 platform promised to 
limit the growth of the federal government and public spending. The same passage of 
the platform which promised to limit tax increases also promised to favor private 
charity and individual support of charities, considering taxes as detrimental in that 
area. Bush had voiced a similar opinion in his 2001 State of the Union Address:  
Government has a role, and an important role. Yet, too much government crowds out 
initiative and hard work, private charity and the private economy. Our new governing vi-
sion says government should be active, but limited; engaged, but not overbearing. And 
my budget is based on that philosophy. It is reasonable, and it is responsible.208 
This passage shows how personal responsibility in the form of initiative and hard 
work is used to argue against government intervention, and how an emphasis on pri-
vate charity serves the same end, as highlighted by Katz when he criticized the chari-
ty myth. 
Bush also tackled Medicare reform where Reagan had failed. Although the Bush 
reform did expand Medicare, it did so in a conservative way: the expansion was a pri-
vate one, not an expansion of government. The 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug, Im-
provement, and Modernization Act moved ever more Medicare beneficiaries to the pri-
vate insurance market. It also introduced Medicare Part D, which covers prescription 
drugs on a subsidized and voluntary basis.209 But both additions also had major flaws 
and would prove costly for both the beneficiaries and the government. Medicare Ad-
vantage, created by the Bush reform, is more costly than regular Medicare. 
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3.2.4. “It’s a Both/And Proposition:”210 Obama’s Responsi-
bility Discourse 
As shown before, personal responsibility has a long discursive tradition in black 
thinking. By adopting a discourse on personal responsibility, Obama echoes those 
black voices. Although these ideas exist within the black community, the voicing of 
such a discourse by a Democratic president is far from easy. Clinton’s failure showed 
that it is not possible for a Democratic president to adopt the conservative responsi-
bility discourse and hope that it works to their advantage. Bush’s approach also 
showed that Democrats do not have the monopoly on positive social reform, alt-
hough he kept his compassionate conservatism within safe and acceptable bounda-
ries for conservatives and the Republican Party. 
Obama changed the tone on responsibility, as far as the Democratic Party is 
concerned. Obama was well aware of the importance of the discourse on values such 
as responsibility, and its political use. He stated in The Audacity of Hope: 
I think that Democrats are wrong to run away from a debate about values, as wrong as 
those conservatives who see values only as a wedge to pry loose working-class voters 
from the Democratic base. It is the language of values that people use to map their world. 
It is what can inspire them to take action, and move them beyond their isolation. […] the 
broader question of shared values—the standards and principles that the majority of 
Americans deem important in their lives, and in the life of the country—should be the 
heart of our politics, the cornerstone of any meaningful debate about budgets and pro-
jects, regulations and policies.211 
Some critics accused Obama of talking only about personal responsibility and leaving 
out government responsibility in the fight against inequalities.212 A detailed analysis 
shows, on the contrary, that Obama’s ideas are far more nuanced than that. His rhet-
oric builds a complex message that combines personal responsibility with govern-
ment responsibility.  
Reagan, for example, almost never used the word ‘responsibility’ itself, its mean-
ing being always inferred through other words. Democratic discourse, on the other 
hand, abounds with the term. This is certainly partly due to the will to counter accu-
sations of Democratic irresponsibility. In Obama’s case, it is also motivated by the 
wish to change the use of the term, i.e. the conservative doxa associated with it. In 
part of his discourse, Obama makes a conservative use of the notion of personal re-
sponsibility, as did other African-Americans before him. The major difference is that 
he uses the notion in order to advocate the expansion of social policies and more 
government intervention in social policies. Through this approach Obama’s dis-
course not only contrasts with the conservative Republican discourse, but also with 
the New Democrats’. Obama’s use of the term develops layers of responsibility at 
different levels, which he applies to different areas of social policies, such as educa-
tion, health care, and work. 
To a certain extent, Obama also ventured on conservative Republican terrain, 
just as Clinton had. Obama is well aware that the conservative discourse on personal 
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responsibility promoted by Republicans still resonates strongly with the electorate. 
Regarding education, among others, Obama frequently insists on the responsibility 
students have for their own education: “And that’s what I want to focus on today: the 
responsibility each of you has for your education. I want to start with the responsibil-
ity you have to yourself.”213 Education remains a sensitive issue, precisely because of 
the pejorative and denunciative connotation the notion of responsibility has acquired 
through the conservative use Republicans made of it, in addition to the negative ste-
reotype about the lack of emphasis on education in black culture. Obama was con-
fronted with this issue and tried to deflect accusations of racism and discrimination:  
We also know that as significant as these reforms are, there’s going to be one more in-
gredient to really make a difference: parents are going to have to get more involved in 
their children’s education. […] Then some people say, well, why are you always talking 
about parental responsibility in front of black folks? And I say, I talk about parent re-
sponsibility wherever I talk about education.214 
Obama’s defense strongly highlights the racist interpretation that is made of “person-
al responsibility” and underlines a dimension of cultural racism that imputes lack of 
responsibility to African-Americans. Obama carefully highlights that not only does 
personal responsibility count, but that responsibility is at stake at every level, from 
the federal government through the intermediate levels, and all the way down to the 
individual student. 
So, yes, our federal government has responsibilities that it has to meet, and I will keep on 
making sure the federal government meets those responsibilities. Our governors, our su-
perintendents, our states, our school districts have responsibilities to meet. And parents 
have responsibilities that they have to meet. And our children have responsibilities that 
they have to meet.215 
Thus Obama’s use of personal responsibility puts forward more government inter-
vention, even in education, which is a state prerogative. In this his discourse marks a 
sharp contrast with conservative Republican rhetoric. Through this strategy, Obama 
manages to combine elements of the conservative and the liberal approach, to unite 
the old Democratic discourse with the Republican discourse: everyone is in for their 
level of responsibility. For Obama this constitutes a mutual, reciprocal responsibility; 
the different levels are inseparable responsibilities. In no case could it only be per-
sonal responsibility, as is advocated by Republicans. In this, he clearly claims his ad-
herence to Democratic ideology: 
That is one of the things that makes me a Democrat, I suppose—this idea that our com-
munal values, our sense of mutual responsibility and social solidarity, should express 
themselves not just in the church or mosque or the synagogue; not just on the blocks 
where we live, in the places where we work, or within our own families; but also through 
our government.216 
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Obama openly distances himself from the conservative view where the main reliance 
is on the family and the church. For Obama, it is clearly a government responsibility 
that must meet personal responsibility, and letting charity do the government’s job is 
not an option. It is rather considered as a form of disengagement. In the context of 
health care, Obama particularly insists on the collective character of responsibility, 
on the fact that the system cannot work if one link or another fails: 
Now, even if we provide these affordable options, there may be those—especially the 
young and the healthy—who still want to take the risk and go without coverage. There 
may still be companies that refuse to do right by their workers by giving them coverage. 
The problem is, such irresponsible behavior costs all the rest of us money. If there are af-
fordable options and people still don't sign up for health insurance, it means we pay for 
these people's expensive emergency room visits. If some businesses don't provide work-
ers health care, it forces the rest of us to pick up the tab when their workers get sick, and 
gives those businesses an unfair advantage over their competitors. And unless everybody 
does their part, many of the insurance reforms we seek—especially requiring insurance 
companies to cover preexisting conditions—just can't be achieved.  
And that's why under my plan, individuals will be required to carry basic health insur-
ance—just as most states require you to carry auto insurance. Likewise—likewise, busi-
nesses will be required to either offer their workers health care, or chip in to help cover 
the cost of their workers. […] But we can't have large businesses and individuals who can 
afford coverage game the system by avoiding responsibility to themselves or their em-
ployees. Improving our health care system only works if everybody does their part.217 
Obama also insists on the government’s responsibility to help people meet their re-
sponsibility. He voices this conviction in the context of the ACA: 
Our task has always been to seek the right balance between the dynamism of the mar-
ketplace, but also to make sure that it’s serving people. And sometimes that means re-
moving barriers to growth by lifting rules that place unnecessary burdens on business, 
but other times it means enacting common-sense safeguards like these—like the Afford-
able Care Act—to ensure our American belief that hard work and responsibility should 
be rewarded by a sense of security and fair play.218 
Obama is adamant about the idea that people can only be required to be hardwork-
ing and responsible for themselves if government meets them half way. In The Audac-
ity of Hope, in the chapter entitled “Opportunity,” he concludes the part detailing pos-
sibilities for reforming the health care system as follows:  
Americans are willing to compete with the world. We work harder than the people of 
any other wealthy nation. We are willing to tolerate more economic instability and are 
willing to take more personal risks to get ahead. But we can only compete if our govern-
ment makes the investments that give us a fighting chance—and if we know that our 
families have some net beneath which they cannot fall.219 
Obama’s opinion on government responsibility also extends to the area of work. He 
considers that individuals have to make efforts, and yet he is convinced that govern-
ment has to provide the means to take this responsibility, for example by offering 
training opportunities for the unemployed. This position contrasts with the 1996 
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PRWOA, which required a work compensation for social benefits but did not offer 
training opportunities.220 
Obama’s notion of responsibility is stratified on three levels: personal, collective, 
and governmental. Collective responsibility includes the idea of shared responsibil-
ity, and government responsibility both includes the states and the federal govern-
ment. But Obama’s rhetorical power resides in the fact that those layers of responsi-
bility are inserted into the wider notion of reciprocal responsibility. There is a back-
and-forth movement between the different levels. He insists on the fact that one can-
not work without the other: it is not possible to ask people to take responsibility if the 
government does not. In this, Obama’s discourse reflects public opinion regarding 
social policies, meaning a combination of the two main approaches: the government’s 
responsibility in taking care of people facing hardship and a moral demand of taking 
more personal responsibility in order to complete the effort made by government.221 
Obama expresses this, for example, in the context of education, where he explains 
that the efforts made by government are useless if the students do not do their part: 
“I’m working hard to fix up your classrooms and get you the books, equipment and 
computers you need to learn. But you’ve got to do your part too.”222 Obama insists 
that each has to take their share of responsibility for things to work: 
But to paraphrase Dr. King, education isn’t an either/or proposition. It’s a both/and 
proposition. It will take both more focus from our parents, and better schooling. It will 
take both more money, and more reform. It will take both a collective commitment, and 
a personal commitment.223 
Obama thus managed to create a new and coherent discourse through the notion of 
reciprocal responsibility, which plays on all levels of responsibility. By making per-
sonal and governmental responsibility interdependent, Obama managed to legiti-
mize greater government intervention without appearing to be a traditional Demo-
crat who would try to compensate personal shortcomings with an unjustified burden 
for society. 
3.3. Obama’s Image 
The new discursive approach is also accompanied by a carefully crafted image 
that is based on Obama’s identity, which in turn allows him to construct his ethos—
his discursive identity. Obama’s power to transcend the racial cleavage and to craft a 
convincing discourse rested in part on his identity and the use he made of it. Yet, this 
identity is quite complex, because of his mixed origins, which means that people can 
project many identities on him. This complexity is also due to the fact that Obama 
himself was for a long time in search of his true self, which allowed him to make a 
nuanced and informed use of his multifaceted identity in his political discourse. 
Many things have been said about Obama’s racial identity, especially during his first 
presidential campaign and at the beginning of his first term. There were many con-
tradictory opinions, and Obama himself was not always very constant regarding his 
self-identification. Academics have analyzed Obama’s racial identity, but so far the 
different analyses have considered only one of its multiple facets, be it black, biracial, 
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or other. None of these analyses has shown how Obama uses his multiple self for his 
discursive needs. 
Racial identity is a complex issue in contemporary American society. And yet, 
the issue is also evolving rapidly in a period that some described, maybe prematurely, 
as post-racial, especially since the concept of multiraciality seems to be gaining in 
prominence. 
The point here is not to give the final assessment of Obama’s racial identity, but 
rather to show how Obama uses the complexity of his racial experience in his politi-
cal speeches in order to establish a particular relationship with his audience. Indeed, 
depending on the racial makeup of his audience and depending on the topic of his 
speech, Obama has used different identities since the beginning of his political ca-
reer. When talking about certain matters, notably race relations, Obama often drew 
on his intricate personal history to find the element that would allow him best to le-
gitimize his authority to talk about these sensitive matters. 
As previously seen, a racial code exists that attaches a certain doxa to certain 
terms, adding a whole dimension of meaning and political positions to a word like 
personal responsibility. Obama, whose position combines government intervention 
and personal responsibility, also advocates race-neutral but issue-focused policies: 
his policies target problems, not racial populations. This is founded in part on per-
sonal convictions and personal experience, but also on the evolution of the debate on 
race since the 1990s.224 Another factor that explains this position is political calcula-
tion within a wider strategy. Racial questions being a particularly divisive issue in the 
United States, Obama tried to create the necessary unity within the population in 
order to get the support and cohesion needed for his reform projects.225 Moreover, 
Obama was determined to try to achieve bipartisanship,226 which explains in part 
why he incorporated more conservative rhetoric. Because of the strong rhetorical 
polarization between the two parties, this discourse which allies personal responsibil-
ity and government intervention, the two prominent features of the opposed dis-
courses, is a very delicate construction, because it entails the obvious caveat of not 
getting caught in the negative doxa associated with either of the two discourses in 
order not to hurt political convictions and racial feelings. The central argument is 
that Obama uses his racially mixed background in order to create different oratory 
identities (ethos) which allow him to legitimize his liberal pragmatic discourse and 
policies. 
3.3.1. Identity 
In the US, racial identities were dominated until recently by the One-drop rule, 
which differs markedly from the way in which other countries define racial catego-
ries. During the segregation era in particular, the One-drop rule stipulated that any 
person who had even only one drop of black blood was considered as black and thus 
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submitted to segregation laws.227 Although segregation is over, the One-drop rule can 
still be used, for affirmative action for example. Moreover, the One-drop rule still 
dominates in society, and a black-white biracial phenotype is commonly identified as 
black,228 thus pushing aside any taking into account of the cultural dimension of indi-
vidual identity.  
Legally speaking, the One-drop rule had strong consequence until 1967 and the 
Loving v. Virginia Supreme Court decision that abolished the ban on interracial mar-
riages.229 This does not mean that prior to that date there were no children of mixed 
heritage; however, this means that demands for the recognition of this mixed herit-
age are rather recent.230 The population born in the “biracial baby boom” just after 
the 1960s refuses to identify according to one only of their racial origins.231 Among the 
more visible achievement of this movement for a better recognition of racially mixed 
identities are the changes made in the census questionnaire. Since the 2000 census, 
the page(s) of the questionnaire asking about the racial identity of the respondents 
has become more flexible. Now it is possible to tick several boxes for any racial com-
bination.232 This reflects the emergence of multiraciality in the United States, but for 
blacks and whites alike there are political stakes in maintaining, at least in part, the 
One-drop rule identification.233 Schematically it can be said that conservatives pro-
mote colorblind policies which erase racial distinctions, whereas liberals tend to 
promote a greater taking into account of racial differences, and some liberals still de-
fend color conscious policies akin to affirmative action. Some whites try to maintain 
their privileged position by refusing mixed identities, and some blacks try to keep a 
solid racial base that allows rallying to fight inequalities and to defend affirmative 
action. Thus the One-drop rule has become a notion that is difficult to deconstruct in 
the US.234 
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Due to this focus on a binary black-or-white racial order that offers a very lim-
ited space for multiraciality, Obama’s multiracial origins were rapidly overlooked 
and underestimated to explain his success.235 Of course, among the constraints that 
weigh on Obama’s racial identity is the fact that he is in national politics. This has 
two consequences: the first is that he cannot promote identity politics, which would 
openly create a zero-sum game between whites and minorities. He had to present 
himself as the president of all Americans. The incidents with Professor Gates or 
Shirley Sherrod,236 to cite only these two, illustrate this problem. In both cases 
Obama was accused of racial favoritism by some in the white community because he 
had intervened, whereas the black community considered that he had not done 
enough to help another member of the community. These examples perfectly 
demonstrate that Obama’s political positions constrained him to a carefully balanced 
racial neutrality.237 
In short, in the current American context, Obama was in a complex situation for 
his presidential campaigns and his terms in office. The present era is marked by an 
emerging multiracialism, but it is still largely dominated by the One-drop rule; a pe-
riod that condemns identity politics although communities want their specific prob-
lems to be solved and want their grievances to be taken into account. 
3.3.2. Obama Seen from Outside: Projections and Percep-
tions 
During his first presidential campaign in particular, many things were said 
about Obama’s racial identity. As soon as his campaign started to become successful, 
everyone claimed that Obama belonged to their racial group. During the same period 
of time he was described as black, multiracial, not black enough, or even white. 
At the beginning of the 2008 campaign, Obama was presented as a biracial or 
multiracial candidate,238 but he rapidly became black in the press. After his official 
nomination as the Democratic candidate, the New York Times portrayed him in its 
headline as the first black candidate, although it mentioned his mixed racial back-
ground further down in the article.239 This perfectly illustrates the fact that the One-
drop rule still largely influences racial identification and discourse. 
Some journalists and intellectuals seized the moment to question the prevalence 
of the One-drop rule, to denounce its anachronistic dimension and limitations by 
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recalling that Obama also is half white.240 This questioning is now shared by an in-
creasing number of people who reject this outdated, clear-cut, black-and-white vision 
of race relations. For many people who identify as biracial or multiracial, Obama 
simply was a mixed-heritage candidate. For them it was yet another evidence that the 
problem of the color line, announced by W. E. B. Du Bois as the problem of the past 
century, belonged indeed to the 20th century and had been replaced by something 
else.241 However, it must be highlighted that this position does not necessarily imply 
that racism is no longer an issue. It is important to distinguish the refusal of a limited 
either black or white racial identity from the belief that racism no longer exists in the 
United States (this would rather correspond to the premises that inform the con-
servative conception of colorblindness). 
Obama’s growing success raised questions about his blackness in terms of cul-
tural and political color. Quite paradoxically, it was mainly the black community 
which questioned Obama’s racial status. Many did not consider Obama as black, but 
as biracial, because of his white mother. This was, for example, the case of actor Mor-
gan Freeman in an interview with NPR.242 Beyond the purely genetic question of ra-
cial ascendance, racial identity also includes a cultural dimension. This cultural di-
mension goes beyond skin color and takes into account elements such as the 
environment in which a person was raised or their education. 
According to Representative G. K. Butterfield (D-NC), the choice belongs to 
Obama, but he thinks that a white identification would not have been accepted since 
Obama’s phenotype is black.243 Unlike Obama, Butterfield, although he was born to 
two black parents, has a white phenotype which could be mistaken for a Hispanic 
ethnicity. So Butterfield could have passed for white. According to him, his many 
white ancestors resurfaced in his person. Nonetheless, Butterfield chose a black iden-
tity because his biography is black indeed: he grew up in a black neighborhood, he 
went to black schools, he was very active in the Civil Rights Movement, and he be-
longs to a black church.244 Politically he appears as black as well: he is a member of 
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the Congressional Black Caucus, the Out-of-Poverty Caucus, and the State Medicaid 
Expansion Caucus.245 Moreover, he represents a majority-black district in Congress. 
Only 40% of his district is white, 53% is black, and about 2.5% of the population iden-
tify as racially mixed.246 Butterfield even has declared that he did not feel comfortable 
in a white environment.247  
This cultural dimension of one’s identity makeup is one of the arguments that 
has been used by those who do not view Obama as African-American. The cultural 
argument rests on two important points. The first point is the fact that Obama’s fa-
ther was not African-American but a Kenyan student who only stayed in the United 
States for a short time before returning to Kenya. As the racial debate has evolved, an 
increasing focus has been made on the different experiences and conditions faced by 
African-Americans who descended from slaves, as distinguished from more recent 
immigrants from Africa and even the Caribbean. This means that there are ethnic 
differences within the black population, just as within the white population.248 This 
leaves the possibility for some to consider that Obama is not legitimately part of the 
African-American community. The other point of the cultural argument is that 
Obama did not grow up in a black environment,249 as opposed to Butterfield, for ex-
ample, who considers that his cultural environment trumps his phenotype. Obama 
grew up in his white family. He lived with his mother for a long time, and then with 
his mother and Indonesian stepfather in Indonesia, and finally he lived as a teenager 
with his white grandparents in Hawaii, where he attended a high school with less 
than ten black students.250 These aspects of Obama’s upbringing were questioned by 
some black nationalists who wondered if he felt more connected to white elites than 
to “folks in the hood.”251 
However, Obama’s blackness has also been questioned by whites, 252 but rather 
to assert his white origins, the main point being not to overlook his mother. On the 
other hand, the major white questioning of Obama’s identity because of his blackness 
came from the Birther movement, which claimed that Obama was not American, that 
he was born in Kenya, not in Hawaii, or that he had taken the Indonesian national 
identity and thus forfeited his American nationality.253 These claims are tinted with 
racism and aimed mainly at questioning his legitimacy to run for president. 
As political scientist John K. Wilson put it: “He [Obama] was caught in the racial 
catch-22 of American politics, where a black candidate can be simultaneously too 
black and too white.”254 This debate regarding Obama’s racial identity reveals much. 
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On the one hand it shows the complexity and sensitiveness of racial questions in the 
US, as well as the still pressing nature of racial matters, despite the fact that many 
wanted to see in Obama’s election the proof of a post-racial America.255 On the other 
hand, according to some, Obama represents a transition. This opinion was expressed 
by a young white woman in a 2010 study conducted by Mark P. Orbe about the pub-
lic’s perception of Obama: “Barack Obama represents a transitional bridge. The Unit-
ed States wasn’t entirely ready for a black president. But they could be ready for 
Obama.”256 These varied opinions about Obama’s true racial identity demonstrate the 
real advantage of multiraciality: the possibility for everyone to project on Obama the 
identity they wish to see.257 However, since his first term, the novelty appeal of 
Obama’s racial identity has largely subsided. The media do not pay attention to this 
anymore, and for the population, the issue has faded into the background. Obama’s 
racial identity has become normal. This was captured by a young white man from 
Michigan: “He was the first black president, but over time, he has become the presi-
dent who happens to be black.”258 
3.3.3. Multiple Identities 
The multiple identities that have been attributed to Obama, projected, criti-
cized, debated, and commented upon, however, are only representations that society 
reflects onto him and do not necessarily correspond to the way Obama identifies and 
represents himself. 
Not surprisingly, as an individual with mixed ancestry and an eventful family 
history, Obama spent quite some time thinking about and constructing his racial 
identity. It must be noted that Obama searched for his racial self and slowly built it 
over time. The analysis here is mainly based on Obama’s two major books. The first is 
his autobiography Dreams from My Father: A Story of Race and Inheritance. The subtitle 
is often omitted, and yet, it perfectly states the topic: the search for his racial identity 
by a young man of mixed heritage in an America that has not achieved peaceful race 
relations yet and that is only slowly evolving towards a new era (Obama, who was 
born in 1961, slightly precedes the “biracial baby boom”). The second book is The Au-
dacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream, the book he wrote as a sen-
ator and which details his political philosophy. 
In Dreams from my Father, Obama explains that his youth was marked by the 
search for his racial identity. Obama details two complementary themes: he insists on 
his white heritage and his education in a white family, and he describes at the same 
time his search for a black identity and his learning about black culture. He admits 
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his utter confusion regarding his identity as a teenager when the normal difficulty of 
building one’s own identity was further complicated by his skin color. Even in Ha-
waii, where he lived with his grandparents, one of the most racially diverse states of 
the US, Obama noted his being different: “I was different, after all, potentially sus-
pect; I had no idea who my own self was.”259 He explains that he chose to come and 
live with his maternal grandparents in Hawaii rather than returning to Indonesia 
precisely to be able to focus on his identity quest. During his high school years 
Obama kept looking for signs explaining his identity in the letters he received from 
his father. He looked for a black male role model to try to build his identity. His 
grandfather had a few black friends with whom he played poker, but the young 
Obama did not manage to establish a real relationship with them, because they sel-
dom talked to the teenager and were not really interested in him. Through his grand-
father, Obama finally met a black poet named Frank, a contemporary of illustrious 
figures such as Richard Wright and Langston Hughes, but for Obama the generation-
al gap was too wide for Frank to be a role model. Thus, in his immediate social envi-
ronment, Obama did not manage to find the role model he was looking for. He tried 
to find other ways of learning how to be black. Obama heavily insists on the gap be-
tween his appearance, which is indeed black, and his inner feelings at that time, 
which were dominated by his white culture and education.260 
In high school, Obama met Ray who was a little older than him. The two black 
teenagers became friends, partly because there were very few black students at 
Punahou High School. Obama started his discovery of black culture partly through 
Ray.261 Obama also sought the meaning of blackness, what it means to be black, what 
a black identity is, in the writings of great black intellectuals such as Baldwin, Ellison, 
Hughes, Wright, and Du Bois, but he did not find an answer that satisfied him. Only 
in the writings of Malcolm X did he find something that corresponded to what he was 
looking for: 
Only Malcolm X’s autobiography seemed to offer something different. His repeated acts 
of self-creation spoke to me; the blunt poetry of his words, his unadorned insistence on 
respect, promised a new and uncompromising order, martial in its discipline, forged 
through sheer force of will.262 
It is interesting to note that it was self-creation that called out to Obama, which 
implies a certain rejection of stereotypes and clichés and a refusal to have an outside 
definition of blackness imposed upon him. Nonetheless, stereotypes and clichés 
played a role in his identity construction, because this intellectual search was only 
one part of his learning. Obama also tried to appear blacker in his behavior. For this, 
just like any teenager, he turned toward popular culture to try to copy an attitude that 
could be interpreted as black: “TV, movies, the radio; those were the places to start. 
Pop culture was color-coded, after all, an arcade of images from which you could cop 
a walk, a talk, a step, a style.”263 In his autobiography, Obama comments on this with 
a lot of insight. On the one hand he is aware that this approach is common among 
youths trying to find their identity as they grow up. He sees that, just like the others, 
he tried to play a role, even with the risk of becoming a caricature. On the other hand, 
he notes that the white kids had a wider range of roles to choose from: 
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[…] I was living out a caricature of black male adolescence, itself a caricature of swagger-
ing American manhood. […] the principal difference between me and most of the man-
boys around me—the surfers, the football players, the would-be rock-and-roll guitar-
ists—resided in the limited number of options at my disposal.264 
This limited black identity, which he denounces here through the small number 
of roles he could play as a black-skinned teen, is also criticized in another manner. 
Very quickly at the beginning of his identity quest, among the factors that partially 
triggered this search, Obama had observed that people very often did not see any 
further than physical appearance, skin color, to designate someone as black, without 
being able to explain the other implications, without attaching a cultural dimension 
to their definition.265 Two elements surface here: the first is the omnipotence of the 
binary categorization inherited from the One-drop rule which attributes a black iden-
tity to any black phenotype or any person, without considering the cultural and his-
torical dimension of the individual. This makes it still difficult today to take into ac-
count social and national nuances within the black population. Obama’s assessment 
also reveals the lack of consensus about black identity, the difficulty of defining 
blackness, or what a black American or African-American is. This lack of certainty 
and this confusion resurfaced in the debates about Obama’s racial identity. The 
young Obama’s identity quest reflects a question that an entire nation is asking. 
Among the answers Obama found was the necessity of being a “good” black 
man. In high school, he already understood that certain distinctions were made, such 
as the difference between a “good” black and a “bad” black. Obama discovered this 
during an argument with his basketball coach, when the latter used the terms “black 
people” and “nigger” to distinguish between “good” and “bad” blacks.266 Obama also 
understood that he must behave in a certain way and talk in a certain way so as not to 
scare white people, so that he would not appear as “an angry black man.”267 
The real encounter with, and discovery of, the black community happened later 
in Obama’s life, partly through his work as community organizer in Chicago’s South 
Side, when he learned a lot about the daily problems of this community, its social and 
economic difficulties.268 Eventually Obama integrated the community through his 
wife Michelle, who comes from a rather “typical” family from Chicago’s South Side, 
and through his joining the Trinity United Church, the black church led by Reverend 
Wright. 
Obama’s identity quest was not limited to a single continent, but he went to 
Kenya only once he was an adult. It would be excessive to say that this journey 
brought him the answers he was looking for, but it is just as exaggerated to say that it 
was a disappointment. Obama recalls a discussion he had in Kenya with Dr. Rukia 
Odero. She evoked this possibility of a disappointment for Obama during his jour-
ney, as is often the case for African-Americans coming to Africa in search for their 
cultural roots.269 Obama does not mention this feeling of disappointment in his auto-
biography. This is precisely where a major difference occurs between the experience 
of a person like Obama (who has one African parent) and African-Americans de-
scending from slaves who do not have direct African ancestors and who have lost the 
                                                        
264	  Obama,	  Dreams,	  79.	  
265	  Obama,	  Dreams,	  76.	  
266	  Obama,	  Dreams,	  80.	  
267	  Obama,	  Dreams,	  100.	  
268	  Obama,	  Dreams,	  157–58.	  
269	  Obama,	  Dreams,	  432–33.	  
3 — Words Matter 313 
 
direct cultural link with Africa. Obama went to discover memories of his father who 
had died and to meet the Kenyan part of his family. Contrary to many African-
Americans who make the journey to Africa, Obama did not make the terrible experi-
ence of feeling disconnected, of discovering that, after all, they felt more American 
than African. Obama, on the contrary, experienced a sense of normality, of belonging 
for the first time. His name was pronounced correctly, he was recognized, he was “the 
son of”: “For the first time in my life, I felt the comfort, the firmness of identity that a 
name might provide […]. No one here in Kenya would ask how to spell my name, or 
mangle it with an unfamiliar tongue. My name belonged and so I belonged […].”270 
Indeed, Obama found a family in the literal and figurative sense, even if everything 
did not go well, as for example when he tried to meet his younger brother George.271 
Through discussions with his family, he managed to get a better understanding of his 
father and found a sort of balance, or at least some satisfaction. 
It has been noted that the end of Obama’s autobiography is rather untypical of 
the genre, since it does not end with the usual self-discovery.272 Obama’s self-
presentation certainly remains indeterminate in Dreams from My Father273 as far as his 
racial identity is concerned. However, the assessment of no self-discovery should be 
slightly qualified. Although his racial identity is still not determined at the end of the 
book, his inner attitude about it seems to have changed. Obama repeatedly evokes 
the impossibility of belonging to a single racial universe, and writes that he rather 
saw himself as a bridge between the two worlds: “As it was, I learned to slip back and 
forth between my black and white worlds, understanding that each possessed its own 
language and customs and structures of meaning, convinced that with a bit of transla-
tion on my part the two worlds would eventually cohere.”274 There is certainly no 
dénouement in the sense that Obama does not embrace a single racial identity, but 
he appears to have found a sort of serenity and peace regarding his mixed heritage 
and his black roots stemming from Kenya. He apparently did no longer feel the need 
to fill a black or white mold in the end. Earlier in the text, he expresses the deep con-
viction that his identity cannot be limited by racial factors: “My identity might begin 
with the fact of my race, but it didn’t, couldn’t, end there.”275 A reminder of his refusal 
to accept this limitation is Obama’s frequent insistence on his patchwork family scat-
tered over three continents and which includes four different races.276 By frequently 
evoking his multiracial and multinational family, Obama reaffirms his multiracial 
identity. 
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Although at the personal level Obama seems to have found an equilibrium re-
garding his racial identity, it is slightly different as far as his public image is con-
cerned. As a politician, Obama does not have the same freedom regarding his identi-
ty. The way citizens perceive him is partly determined by their culture, which in the 
US is still largely influenced by the One-drop rule. Thus his multiracial identity is not 
really an option. This perception influenced his self-identification: “I identify as Afri-
can-American—that’s how I’m treated and that’s how I’m viewed.”277 The statement 
makes it clear that this identification is largely due to outside pressure. But this Afri-
can-American identity was not yet firmly established at the beginning of his fist term, 
when he often recalled his mixed identity.  
A racial faux pas which occurred at the beginning of Obama’s first term became 
notorious. During an interview the journalist asked the president which breed he 
intended to pick for the dog he was about to give to his daughters, as he had promised 
in case of an electoral victory. Obama answered that he would probably chose “a 
mutt like me.”278 This remark was considered as an insult by many people identifying 
as biracial or multiracial.279 Whether or not it is an insulting remark is of little interest 
here. This remark, however, shows once again Obama’s mixed racial background. 
Obama often evokes his biracial ancestry in his speeches in an indirect manner, 
through his parents: “I am the son of a white woman from Kansas and a black man 
from Kenya.”280 Obama introduced himself so often in this way that some less racially 
open-minded people did not want to hear it anymore.281 Although this way of pre-
senting himself could hurt some people who do not want to be reminded that bira-
ciality exists, it had one advantage: this way, Obama did not have to choose, or at least 
he does not have to say openly what he considers his racial identity to be. By evoking 
the origins of his father, Obama also said that he did not claim an African-American 
cultural heritage,282 and he left it to the public to project onto him the identity they 
wanted to see. 
In The Audacity of Hope, Obama does not present himself as an African-
American in the strict sense of the definition that excludes recent African immi-
grants. He describes himself as a “black candidate with an exotic background” or as “a 
black man of mixed heritage.”283 This presentation seems to indicate that he accepts a 
black identity, but without denying his origins or his mixed ancestry. Nonetheless, his 
endorsement of an African-American identity became official in 2010 when he ticked 
only the box “Black, African-American, or Negro” in the census questionnaire. Of 
course, this sparked a new controversy,284 because since 2000 the questionnaire has 
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offered the possibility to precisely state racial nuances; biracial or multiracial would 
have been an option.  
At the cultural level Obama more readily puts forward his African-American 
identity. But in this case again, he is careful to select elements that have a positive 
place in mainstream culture as well, such as sports or art. Obama repeatedly men-
tioned his playing basket ball in high school in his autobiography, he welcomed sev-
eral basket ball teams at the White House, and there are many pictures showing the 
president attending games, playing himself, or with a basket ball in hands. A photo-
graph illustrating a recent newspaper article on the president’s involvement with 
basketball shows Obama in between the columns of what looks like one of the main 
government buildings in Washington, in a sober suit, concentrated on a phone call, 
while distractedly bouncing a basket ball in his right hand. This picture was used to 
illustrate the close link perceived between the president and this sport.285 In the art 
field, the Obamas selected canvases from black painters to decorate the White House, 
such as the little known expressionist painter Alma Thomas, as well as William H. 
Johnson, and Glenn Ligon. From the latter, the Obamas chose the work Black Like Me 
No.2.286 Among the other pieces chosen by the Obamas to decorate the White House 
to their taste are two pieces with more political significance: the bust of Winston 
Churchill in the Oval Office was replaced by a bust of Martin Luther King Jr. and the 
original of the Emancipation Proclamation was displayed as well, thus insisting on 
decidedly African-American moments of American history. Besides this affirmation 
of African-American culture, Obama readily condemned aspects of black culture that 
are criticized by the mainstream population. Among those elements are the part of 
the rap music universe that glorifies gansta life and all its implications of violence, 
criminality, and misogynistic behavior.287 
Thus it appears that Obama has after all endorsed an African-American identity 
for his political persona, putting forward aspects of black culture that are acceptable to 
the white public. Moreover, he presents himself politically as racially conscious, but 
without appearing to be obsessed about race, and especially without resorting to 
identity politics. The MLK bust was the politically acceptable choice, compared to, 
for example, a bust of Malcolm X, who is less accepted by the mainstream, but to 
whom Obama nonetheless feels an intellectual closeness, as he mentions in his auto-
biography. This image, however, is not enough to grasp his full identity and does not 
show how he uses his rich identity palette in his political discourse. 
3.3.4. Identity Chameleon 
Although Obama endorsed a main identity, he also used alternative identities 
depending on the context. This type of behavior has been examined in theories about 
identities depending on the situation or the culture, by Henri Tajfel in Social Identity 
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Theory, or by David Heise in Affect Control Theory.288 These theories respectively pos-
tulate that an individual adapts their identity according to the social context. The 
individual does that in order to achieve an agreeable interaction with others, mean-
ing that they will adopt the identity best accepted by the other. 
Obama, as a politician, is confronted to situations where political implications 
determine the relevance of his identity choice. The variables include the makeup of 
the audience and the topic of the speech. Some subjects cannot be treated in the same 
manner depending on whether the audience is black or white, and also depending on 
the orator. This is particularly the case for racially sensitive subjects, and even more 
so in the context of the strong ideological polarization in social and racial policies. A 
statement made in this context will be received and interpreted in very different ways 
depending on the orator. Obama adapted his identity choice according to these vari-
ables. It is important to highlight that Obama did not play a role in the sense that he 
would take an identity he had no real claim to, but rather that he would put forward 
the facet of his multiracial identity that was most relevant in the given context. How-
ever, it is role-play in the sense that the different identities he endorsed were not 
fixed identities, but representations made in given moments. This representation is 
what Ruth Amossy terms the discursive ethos, which is distinct from the orator’s deep, 
personal, and intimate identity. This discursive ethos is also based in part on the pre-
liminary image or ethos the public has of the orator, depending on their institutional 
functions, their status, their power, and their collective representation or associated 
stereotypes. The orator builds their discursive ethos according to what they think 
their public believes regarding their Weltanschauung and their vision of their prelimi-
nary ethos. The modeling of the ethos is, among others, made through the doxa and 
the way in which the orator reworks this doxa.289 
The main identity that Obama adopted is the transcendent or supra-racial iden-
tity. It made his success and he was praised for it by the media.290 It was the identity 
he showed at the 2004 Democratic National Convention in his keynote address and 
which brought him to wider national attention. The quotation is famous by now: 
“There’s not a black America and white America and Latino America and Asian 
America; there’s the United States of America.”291 The identity deployed here sup-
presses any racial affiliation and reaches back to the melting pot myth. Obama used 
the same transcendent identity especially during his first presidential election, when 
his racial identity was still a salient issue. Subsequently, he regularly reaffirmed this 
identity, notably by insisting on the fact that he was the president of all Americans. 
His credibility for doing this stems precisely from his multiracial background. Quite 
paradoxically, his multiraciality can be seen as a proof of his colorblindness: as he 
belongs in a certain sense to all the communities, there is no immediate reason for 
him to favor one of these communities. In The Audacity of Hope, Obama commented 
on the above-cited declaration. He explained his deep belief in this statement 
through his patchwork family and the family Christmas gatherings which he likened 
to a UN General Assembly meeting. His family includes so many different races that 
it leaves him no other choice than to believe in colorblindness and to reject identity 
politics. Yet, he also defines what he understands by this declaration. For him, it does 
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not mean that the United States has reached a post-racial state as some have af-
firmed, although, to a certain degree, he acknowledges America’s capacity to inte-
grate newcomers. Thus he does not completely reject the melting pot model, and 
considers the US as a unique multicultural nation. Nonetheless, he denounces the 
persisting racism and nativism that still undermine this.292  
Obama needed racial unity for his election and he thus had to show a supra-
identity that helped deflect racial tensions and inter-group competition.293 For white 
voters in particular, Obama’s ability to transcend race was important.294 Even when 
directly confronted with reproaches and criticism from the black community, Obama 
repeated his deep conviction, already expressed in The Audacity of Hope, that race-
neutral policies are the best solution:295 
I can’t pass laws that say I’m just helping black folks. I’m the president of the United 
States. What I can do is make sure that I am passing laws that help all people, particular-
ly those who are most vulnerable and most in need. That in turn is going to help lift up 
the African-American community.296 
This quotation, although it illustrates Obama’s universalist aspirations well, also 
points to a deep-seated problem. The inter-group conflict in the US is particularly 
exacerbated between blacks and whites. Thus, beyond his transcending ethos, 
Obama also often endorsed a biracial identity to bridge the black-white divide.  
The biracial identity is the identity that Obama used when he wanted to func-
tion as a bridge between the black and the white communities. In his autobiography, 
Obama already mentioned his conviction that he could play this role, but it was in his 
famous speech, ‘A More Perfect Union,’ that he did so with the greatest success.297 In 
this speech he presents himself as biracial, through his parents: “I’m the son of a 
white woman from Kansas and a black man from Kenya.” This way of introducing 
himself fulfills two functions for his identity. The first is to establish his authority on 
both racial sides, black and white. The second is to reassure the white population: he 
insists on the fact that he is the son of an African immigrant who has a different his-
torical background than an African-American, and who does not have the same his-
torical grievances against the white population.298 This, in turn, could be seen as a 
problem of legitimacy with the African-American community, especially regarding 
his appeals to put resentment and conflicts aside and to stop victimization. Nonethe-
less, Obama legitimizes this through his wife Michelle, who provides him with the 
crucial link with the African-American community. In the same way, he uses his ma-
                                                        
292	  Obama,	  Audacity,	  10,	  120,	  231–32.	  
293	   John	  E.	   Transue,	   “Identity	   Salience,	   Identity	  Acceptance,	   and	  Racial	   Policy	  Attitudes:	  American	  Na-­‐
tional	  Identity	  as	  a	  Uniting	  Force,”	  American	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Science	  51,	  no.	  1	  (2007):	  79.	  For	  a	  more	  
detailed	  discussion	  of	  Obama’s	  unity	  discourse,	  see	  3.4.1.	  “A	  More	  Perfect	  Union:”	  the	  Unity	  Discourse.	  
294	  Orbe	  106.	  
295	  Obama,	  Audacity,	  247.	  
296	  Sheryl	  Gay	  Stolberg,	  “For	  Obama,	  Nuance	  on	  Race	   Invites	  Questions,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  February	  9,	  
2010,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/us/politics/09race.html.	  
297	  Obama’s	  openness	  in	  talking	  about	  race	  in	  this	  speech	  has	  been	  lauded,	  but	  has	  also	  been	  criticized.	  
Some	  critics	  considered	  that	  he	  described	  issues	  of	  racism	  and	  discrimination	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  past.	  
For	  a	  more	  detailed	  analysis,	  see	  Sarah	  McCaffrey,	  “Ghosts	  and	  Gaps:	  A	  Rhetorical	  Examination	  of	  Tem-­‐
porality	  and	  Spatial	  Metaphors	  in	  Barack	  Obama’s	  ‘A	  More	  Perfect	  Union,’”	  in	  The	  Obama	  Effect:	  Multi-­‐
disciplinary	  Renderings	  of	  the	  2008	  Campaign,	  ed.	  Heather	  E.	  Harris,	  Kimberly	  R.	  Moffitt,	  and	  Catherine	  
R.	  Squires	  (Albany,	  N.Y.:	  SUNY	  Press,	  2010),	  31–48.	  	  
298	  Chuck	  Todd	  and	  Sheldon	  Gawiser,	  How	  Barack	  Obama	  Won:	  A	  State-­‐by-­‐State	  Guide	  to	   the	  Historic	  
2008	  Presidential	  Election	  (New	  York:	  Vintage	  Books,	  2009),	  12.	  
318 Stephan Social Policies and Racial Questions 
ternal grandmother’s prejudice and racial fears to show to the white community that 
he perfectly understands the white point of view, even in its least politically correct 
recesses.299  
This way of introducing himself somehow justifies his political beliefs. The first 
assumption from the white population that must immediately be deflected is the sus-
picion that a black politician will necessarily advocate identity politics, which is pre-
cisely what parts of the black population expect. The incidents with Reverend 
Wright, Shirley Sherrod, professor Henry Gate, or Van Jones300 precisely illustrate 
this problem that any black politician will encounter at the national level. A repre-
sentative in the House can have a mainly black electorate; this, however, is not possi-
ble for a senator, and of course it is even less the case for a president. These offices 
require universalist politics that exclude any (minority) identity politics. 
Obama explains that while he did not receive an African-American education, 
he nonetheless daily experienced the same discrimination as all blacks in the United 
States. He gives the example of being followed by security agents in the mall, of being 
confused with a parking valet when waiting in front of a restaurant, of being fre-
quently stopped without any reason by the police.301 Despite being adamant about his 
race-neutral ideology, Obama’s tone was more virulent regarding racial inequalities 
when he was still a senator. His tone became more conciliatory during the first presi-
dential campaign. Yet, the theme of racial reconciliation and the need to understand 
the other exposed in ‘A More Perfect Union’ is already present in The Audacity of 
Hope. However, as president, he really had to be careful not to appear as an “angry 
black man.” This feature of racial constraints which weighed on Obama was particu-
larly exacerbated in the incident with Reverend Wright. In his speeches, which were 
considered as hateful by many, Wright appeared almost as the caricature of the angry 
black man. Obama distanced himself from Wright when the latter gave a second hate 
preach after the first speech which had attracted public attention. Some considered 
that this move and his own political stance were a good equilibrium in the Good 
Black Man/Bad Black Man dichotomy described by communication scholar Judy 
Isaksen.302 Obama managed to show that he has a racial conscience, without having a 
racial obsession. This was a major quality in presidential candidate Obama to sway 
his electorate.303 
Nevertheless, Obama did not work on his African-American identity with the 
sole aim of reassuring the white population. As mentioned above, because of his ori-
gins, because he was not born and raised in the African-American community, 
Obama also had to establish a black identity to create a basis for discussion with the 
African-American community.  
Among the sensitive topics that are difficult to discuss with the African-
American community is the question of personal responsibility, notably concerning 
education. As explained above, two major opposite strategies are advocated by con-
servatives and liberals, the first favoring personal responsibility to the detriment of 
government responsibility, the second favoring more government intervention with-
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out considering a change of behavior and moral values.304 For those who, like Barack 
Obama, wish to create a “third way” between the usual stances, a combination of per-
sonal responsibility and sustained government intervention, this polarization pre-
sents some caveats that must be avoided. By talking about issues of personal respon-
sibility, Obama runs the risk of being misunderstood, of being perceived as a 
politician who does not care about the interests of the black community.  
Obama was well aware of this political minefield, for example in his 2010 speech 
given at the Centennial Conference of the National Urban League.305 He talks about 
education reform to a mainly black audience. After having exposed his reform plans 
at length in relation to government intervention and his own political principles, 
Obama urges parents to be more involved in their children’s education. He also ven-
tures into the rhetorical terrain of personal responsibility, which is largely dominated 
by conservatives. To try to defuse this rhetorical mine and to model his ethos of the 
“third way” politician, Obama proceeds in three steps. 
First, he reassures his public that he is aware of the need for strong social poli-
cies and that he supports them: 
Now, in the past, even that statement has sparked controversy. Folks say, well, why are 
you talking about parents? Parents need help, too. I know that. Parents need jobs. They 
need housing. They need—in some cases—social services. […] We’re working on all 
those fronts.306  
The second step consisted in explaining that this is not a case of racial targeting, that 
he does not consider that this is an exclusively black problem, and that he does not 
mean this in a conservative sense that blames and attributes guilt, but in a universal 
sense: “Then some people say, well, why are you always talking about parental re-
sponsibility in front of black folks? (Laughter and applause.) And I say, I talk about 
parent responsibility wherever I talk about education.” Finally, Obama insists on his 
belonging to the black community and thus on his legitimacy to address these sensi-
tive issues: “Michelle and I happen to be black parents, so—(laughter and ap-
plause)—I may—I may add a little umph to it when I’m talking to black parents. 
(Laughter).” The laughter recorded in the transcript suggests that the strategy 
worked. 
The endorsement of a biracial or black identity is easy to fathom, but this is less 
plain for the connection Obama established with the Hispanic community. The prob-
lems encountered by the Hispanic community in matters of education are slightly 
different from the case of the black community. The Hispanic community has a very 
high rate of high school dropouts.307  
Obama addressed the issue of education reform and what had already been 
done through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 at a 2009 meeting at 
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the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce.308 He chiefly insisted on the role played by edu-
cation in global economic competitiveness. The underlying theme was the same as 
for African-Americans: the need to combine personal efforts with government efforts 
and the need for parents to be involved in their children’s education. Obama articu-
lated his messages around two complementary axes. First, he firmly planted educa-
tion as a core element of the American Dream and associated education to the sacri-
fices made for the better future of the children: “And when you're a kid you don't 
think about the sacrifices they're [parents] making. She [Obama’s mother] had to 
work; I [Obama] just had to go to school. But she'd still wake up every day to make 
sure I was getting what I needed for my education.”309 The doxa of the American 
Dream particularly insists on the idea that anyone can be successful in the US as long 
as they work hard. This is fuelled by the myth of the Land of Opportunity for new 
immigrants, the ideal that anyone can reach by making sacrifices, and with the core 
idea that a better future is being prepared for the children. Of course, this also sum-
mons the image of those who already live the American Dream, and of course, of 
Obama himself, who comes from a modest family and who became president of the 
United States.310 To establish his authority to ask for more sacrifices and more per-
sonal responsibility from recent immigrants who are still struggling to get their share 
of the American Dream, Obama recalls his own immigration experience: 
 I say this not only as a father, but also as a son. When I was a child my mother and I 
lived overseas, and she didn't have the money to send me to the fancy international 
school where all the American kids went to school. So what she did was she supplement-
ed my schooling with lessons from a correspondence course. And I can still picture her 
waking me up at 4:30 a.m., five days a week, to go over some lessons before I went to 
school. And whenever I'd complain and grumble and find some excuse and say, "Awww, 
I'm sleepy," she'd patiently repeat to me her most powerful defense. She'd say, "This is no 
picnic for me either, buster." (Laughter and applause.)311 
After this detailed description of the daily sacrifices his mother made when they lived 
in Indonesia, Obama presents himself as the successful result of this ordeal, the 
American Dream come true: “[…] I can stand here today as President of the United 
States. It's because of the sacrifices […].”312 Through this, he reminds his audience that 
his family experienced the exact same situation as most people in the room. 
Interestingly, Obama also used the immigration trope in a very different man-
ner. In his keynote address at the Democratic National Convention in 2004, Obama 
used this theme to go back to the foundations of the US, through the history of his 
parents. He told the story of his father seeking opportunity, and of his mother, whom 
he presents as the epitome of white low-income America. He insists on the fact that 
these modest white Americans greatly benefited from extensive government inter-
vention and aid, such as the GI Bill and the FHA programs. He depicts himself as the 
result of his parents’ American Dream, grounded in some fundamental American 
values: opportunity and equality. He describes his own experience not as anomaly, as 
something exceptional, but as something inherently American, what the US has al-
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ways been about: “I stand here knowing that my story is part of the larger American 
story, that I owe a debt to all of those who came before me, and that in no other coun-
try on Earth is my story even possible.”313 By slightly changing the point of view, by 
just marginally switching the focus, Obama managed to use one theme, immigration, 
for two different purposes: in the first case to establish a privileged and legitimate 
relationship with a specific racial group; in the second case to present himself as 
quintessentially American. 
3.4. “I Ran Because I Had a Different Idea About How 
America Was Built:”314 Obama’s Rhetorical Con-
struct 
Obama tried to establish a counter-discourse to an old, deep-seated, and well es-
tablished political discourse that has profoundly marked the American political land-
scape. As discourse analyst Frank Austermühl explained it, “presidential discourse 
constitutes a tightly woven web of American cultural texts,” which form a “discursive-
ly erected scaffold” also called “bibliothèque” by philologist Charles Grivel.315 Aus-
termühl defined this discursive scaffold as follows: 
A scaffold prevents the early stages of (cultural) construction work from falling apart, 
and supports the addition of new levels to the edifice. Moreover, a scaffold also guaran-
tees to uphold the stability of a building’s predetermined shape, and, in doing so, rules 
out the implementation of alternative designs. With every new discourse contribution, 
with every new cultural cross-reference, the scaffold is stabilized and strengthened. Sim-
ultaneously, with every new utterance the implementation of an alternative design of 
Americanness outside clearly established systemic boundaries becomes less likely.316 
Austermühl highlights a certain rigid dimension to this scaffold. This subpart intends 
to show how Obama works his discourse within this scaffold by using elements of 
this American library, by weaving a new web of American cultural texts, bending 
them to his needs, twisting them slightly as to insist on the aspects and interpreta-
tions of these texts that suit his discursive needs, are consistent with his ideology, and 
his Weltbild. These concepts are close to Amossy’s concept of doxa.317 
Political scientist, rhetorician, and communications analyst Martin J. Medhurst 
defines the study of presidential rhetoric as follows: 
If one conceives the principal subject of investigation to be rhetoric rather than the pres-
idency, then the nature, scope, and presumptions change rather radically. Under this 
construct the presidency is the particular arena within which one can study the princi-
ples and practices of rhetoric, understood as the human capacity to see what is most like-
ly to be persuasive to a given audience on a given occasion.318 
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Medhurst’s definition highlights once again the need of taking the context into ac-
count, in order for the orator to choose the elements of the doxa or texts of the Amer-
ican library that will be most persuasive depending on the audience and the occasion. 
Most presidential speeches Obama made were addressed to the nation at large, 
except for some speeches that he gave to very narrow audiences which can be identi-
fied rather reliably, such as addresses to the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, the 
NAACP, the National Urban League, or certain town hall meetings, such as the one 
in Belgrade, Montana, in 2009, that has already been discussed, where 94.2% of the 
population were white, most inhabitants have a high-school diploma, the median 
household income was $44,252, and the majority (66.9%) of the population was either 
working or middle class (with incomes between $15,000 and $74,999).319 These, how-
ever, are rather isolated cases, and most speeches are addressed to the nation as a 
whole, be they Inaugural Addresses, States of the Union Addresses, or even the 
speech at the 2004 DNC, which is certainly addressed mainly to Democrats but 
which is also a highly mediatized event likely to be watched by more than just regis-
tered Democrats. When possible and relevant, the scope and audience of the differ-
ent speeches will be discussed. However, the speeches will not be analyzed according 
to a typology of speeches, as it is done by some,320 or through the rather statistical 
analysis that is proposed by Austermühl, which combines a quantitative evaluation 
of word clusters in inaugural addresses with a qualitative analysis of the respective 
importance of the themes identified through the quantitative analysis.321 The method 
used here differs widely. Given the rather complex interweaving of the current Amer-
ican political discourse discussed so far, based on various types of political discourse 
(media echo and discourse, political advertisement, and policy enactment) this part 
attempts to give an overview of Obama’s discursive construct from the angle of the 
broad ideology he articulates in his speeches and writings (policy matters will be dis-
cussed in part 4). In this context the main reference is sociologist Jeffrey Prager’s def-
inition of ideology as  
[…] the dominant, more or less culturally universal scheme by which the social order is 
understood and explained. Through ideological formulation, members of the society ac-
count for and understand the social order of which they are a part. It is the public’s best 
effort—at any given time—to make sense of, comprehend, and explain the problematic 
world of everyday life.322 
Thus the following pages will try to show the Weltbild that Obama depicts in his at-
tempt at creating a new discursive context in which he builds a social order that is 
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widely different from the one painted by Reaganite discourse. This allows him to put 
forward his policy agenda, and specifically allows him to pursue the aim of enacting 
social policy which would help minorities, while attempting to deflect a reaction akin 
to the backlash against social policies that has dominated in the US since the 1970s. 
There is an academic debate over the impact of presidential discourse on legis-
lative matters. Some, as political scientist George C. Edwards, argue that presidential 
discourse has no power. Edwards quotes, for example, Clinton’s health reform failure 
or Reagan’s failure to get support for the Contras in Nicaragua.323 These findings, 
however, can be debated. In the case of the Clinton health reform failure it was, ac-
cording to Jacobs and Shapiro, the powerful opposition discourse that led to the de-
bacle and Clinton’s failure to work his public discourse enough, as the latter admit-
ted: “My first two years here, I was totally absorbed in getting legislation passed. I 
totally neglected how to get the public informed. It was my fault and I have to get 
more involved in crafting my message—in getting across my core concerns.”324 
Political scientists Richard J. Powell and Dean Schloyer’s analysis suggests “that 
presidential speechmaking has very little impact on the likelihood that members of 
Congress will support the president’s position on roll call votes.”325 Indeed, direct 
processes of policymaking in Congress appear less likely to be influenced by presi-
dential speeches, as the relations between the different actors are distinctive from the 
interactions with the wider public. The influence of party leaders, or direct discussion 
between the president and party members, appear to be more likely and effective.326  
However, public opinion has an impact on Congressional vote, although in a ra-
ther negative manner, as Congresspeople fear for their prospects of reelection. Be-
sides, public opinion can be used to defeat a legislative proposal when sufficient op-
position is voiced, as was the case with the Clinton health care reform, or Reagan’s 
attempt to attack Medicare.327 Other scholars have a more nuanced evaluation. Politi-
cal scientist Reed L. Welch found that presidential speeches are more successful with 
certain demographic groups, such as educated people, whites, men, or the elderly, 
although overall he sees a “limited success with his [the president’s] message to the 
public.” However, Welch concedes that “the president at the right times can use the 
bully pulpit to tremendous political advantage.”328 
Others concede a greater impact, although a rather diffuse one. Political scien-
tist Brandice Canes-Wrone avers that “the president’s proposals for potentially signif-
icant legislation virtually always make it on to the congressional agenda,” but she 
minimizes this claim as “we do not know the extent to which the president’s public 
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statements facilitate this process.”329 Political scientist Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha sees 
an impact of presidential discourse at two levels. He argues that the “presidential 
rhetoric increases the president’s legislative success on votes pertaining to policies 
that are both salient and complex” and that “instead of moving public opinion, presi-
dential speeches act as informational cues for legislators.”330 Political scientist An-
drew W. Barrett states that “[t]here is a strong, statistically significant and positive 
relationship between the number of times per month a president speaks publicly in 
support of a particular bill and the president receiving his legislative wish regarding 
that piece of legislation.”331 In this respect political scientist Theodore Lowi has 
shown that this is particularly true for redistributive policies, which would not pass, 
according to his analysis, without executive intervention and support.332  
Obama’s core message was greatly based on the political vision he had ex-
plained in his successful book The Audacity of Hope. The book tour organized for its 
publication led to calls for Obama to run as president. The main message that was 
devised from the book tour for the campaign was: “change versus a broken status 
quo; people versus special interests; a politics that would lift people and the country 
up; and a president who would not forget the middle class.”333  So not only was the 
campaign sparked by Obama’s own ideas and his writing, but he continued to strong-
ly influence speechwriting during the campaign, as explained David Plouffe, 
Obama’s campaign manager:  
 [Jon] Favreau was a brilliant writer, and he and Obama had a great collaborative 
rhythm. Jon understood Barack’s voice and, unlike many speechwriters, was open to 
feedback and constructive criticism on his speech drafts. He did not treat them like sa-
cred texts, but as living organisms that would change many times from start to finish. 
Now the draft sat with Obama, who wanted to add a few lines and spend some time re-
fining the entire speech. It was unusual that the best writer in the campaign was the can-
didate, but that was definitely our situation. It was a huge asset, not only because it pro-
duced effective and powerful speeches but also because by participating so thoroughly in 
the writing of major speeches, he internalized and owned the material, resulting in better 
delivery.334 
Thus there is a major ideological continuity between The Audacity of Hope and 
Obama’s speeches, as well as a strong personal influence on the content of the 
speeches. 
3.4.1. “A More Perfect Union:”335 the Unity Discourse 
Among the speeches that made Obama famous was the 2008 A More Perfect Un-
ion speech. He gave it in reaction to the criticism made against him for belonging to 
Trinity United Church of Christ led by Reverend Wright, who had made some in-
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flammatory speeches which were perceived as hateful by many whites. This incident, 
which was widely relayed by the media, was one of the worst moments of the prima-
ries, and Plouffe admitted that the Obama campaign had not been sufficiently pre-
pared for this: “we had got caught with our pants down on this one.” He characterized 
their initial response of just distancing themselves from the statements as insufficient 
and inadequate, given the divisiveness of Wright’s statements. Most importantly, 
Wright’s statements were at the opposite of the image that the Obama campaign had 
sought to build over the previous months: “It threatened to undermine the profile we 
had spent fifteen month building: Obama was someone who sought to and would 
bridge divides, a man of deep faith, a steady leader and pragmatic problem solver.”336 
Quite on the contrary, the association with Wright’s inflammatory remarks which 
virulently highlighted racial injustice, such as “The USA of KKK,”337 created a strong 
association with “the angry black man” who would practice identity politics and de-
mand racial preference.  
During the fall of 2007 Obama had already wanted to give a speech on race, but 
his campaign team, David Plouffe and David Axelrod in particular, had strongly ad-
vised him against it. After the Wright incident, and the initial interviews in reaction to 
the media storm, they changed their minds.338  According to Plouffe, Obama was very 
firm about making this speech and insisted on handling most of it himself:  
“I don’t want a big meeting or conference call on this,” he told me [Plouffe]. “You and Ax 
and I will arbitrate this. But know this is what I think I need to do, so I’ll need an awfully 
compelling argument not to give this speech. And I think it should be delivered in the 
early part of next week and I need to write most of it myself.”339 
The schedule was very tight and the campaign program very full, but coming up with 
the speech at such short notice was not a problem. Several days before the speech 
was to be scheduled, Obama told Plouffe late during the night: “[…] I already know 
what I want to say in this speech. I’ve been thinking about it for almost thirty 
years.”340 The main issue was the divisiveness of Reverend Wright’s words, and 
Obama gave this speech in reaction to that, claiming his aspiration for unity and his 
belief in American values. The incident was a moment of crisis for the campaign, 
which turned out to become one of its best moments.  
The location of the speech itself is already revealing; they chose the National 
Constitution Center in Philadelphia, which is located close to Independence Hall 
where the Constitution was signed. The background of the stage was covered in 
American flags. The flags might have been displayed to counteract accusations of 
divisiveness and a lack of patriotism, as well as the questioning of Obama’s origins 
and American nationality launched by the Birther movement. The other reason 
might be that the American flag is a symbol of American history and unity, but also of 
its diversity. 
Obama chose a segment of the most famous line of the Constitution as a title for 
his speech and began with a narration of the creation of the Constitution, from a ra-
cial perspective. In the speech Obama insisted on the fact that the Constitution was 
unfinished because it contained the compromise over slavery. He pointed out that 
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the union created through the Constitution was something that needed working on, 
that the ultimate union was contained in the values expressed in the document, but 
that they had to be brought into reality yet:  
Of course, the answer to the slavery question was already embedded within our Consti-
tution—a Constitution that had at its very core the ideal of equal citizenship under the 
law; a Constitution that promised its people liberty and justice and a union that could be 
and should be perfected over time.341 
A little further in the speech Obama explained that he was running for president pre-
cisely because he believed that this union was possible:  
This was one of the tasks we set forth at the beginning of this presidential campaign—to 
continue the long march of those who came before us, a march for a more just, more 
equal, more free, more caring and more prosperous America. I chose to run for president 
at this moment in history because I believe deeply that we cannot solve the challenges of 
our time unless we solve them together, unless we perfect our union by understanding 
that we may have different stories, but we hold common hopes; that we may not look the 
same and we may not have come from the same place, but we all want to move in the 
same direction—toward a better future for our children and our grandchildren.342 
Although Obama emphasized his strong belief in a possible American unity which 
played partly on the melting-pot myth, he also insisted on the fact that the future of 
the US was bound to the overcoming of the racial cleavage and the creation of a real 
American union, as promised in the Constitution. 
The major types of presidential speech that are likely to carry messages of unity 
are Inaugural Addresses and State of the Union speeches (SOTU), because they ad-
dress the nation at large. Political scientist Michael Nelson explains that the Inaugu-
ral Address is one of the most unifying speeches made as the president makes it in his 
function as chief of state (as opposed, for example, to the Nomination Acceptance 
speech, where the president acts as chief of party and thus has a dividing role). An 
Inaugural Address presents the orator as the president of all and is highly formalized. 
The function of the speech is to “remind the nation more of what we have in common 
than of what divides us.”343 And indeed, a critical element of Obama’s rhetorical con-
struct is the notion of unity in order to deflect the division of the population along 
racial lines that has constituted the basis of the new Republican majority since the 
1970-80s. 
In his Inaugural Address, Obama presented the moment when he took office as 
the moment that proved this unity, but he rooted this purpose of unity in American 
history and in the founding values of the Declaration of Independence:  
We remain a young nation, but in the words of Scripture, the time has come to set aside 
childish things. The time has come to reaffirm our enduring spirit, to choose our better 
history, to carry forward that precious gift, that noble idea passed on from generation to 
generation: the God-given promise that all are equal, all are free, and all deserve a 
chance to pursue their full measure of happiness.344 
Beyond the inherently unifying nature of the Declaration of Independence as one of 
the most unanimously cherished founding documents of the US, the extract that 
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Obama had chosen to rework is not only one that every American recognizes, but 
also one that includes elements that hint at his economic goals for a more equal soci-
ety that distributes opportunity more evenly.345 The extract also played on the deserv-
ing/undeserving dichotomy that Obama inserted in the sentence referencing the Dec-
laration of Independence. Obama significantly rephrased “the pursuit of happiness” 
into “all deserve a chance to pursue their full measure of happiness,” which sets the 
idea that all Americans are deserving in the universalistic perspective of the promises 
and values of the Declaration of Independence. It is impossible not to make a link 
with the doxa of the undeserving, who because of their inherent laziness and their 
insufficient work ethic, would not be deserving of the benefits of social programs. 
Moreover, Obama insists on “a chance” and “their full measure,” which hint at social 
and economic barriers, such as discrimination and deep inequalities, preventing 
some from pursuing their happiness.  
In his first Inaugural Address, Obama presents American unity in two other 
ways. The first hinges on the makeup of the population, where his description man-
ages to combine a multicultural perspective with the older aspirations of the melting 
pot. The second dimension is that of the more painful periods of American history 
marked by open racial oppression and internal American ideological conflict, but 
which Obama turns into a strength for the country and a proof of the solidity of 
American unity:  
For we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness. We are a nation 
of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus and nonbelievers. We are shaped by every 
language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth. And because we have tasted 
the bitter swill of civil war and segregation and emerged from that dark chapter stronger 
and more united, we cannot help but believe that the old hatreds shall someday pass, 
that the lines of tribe shall soon dissolve; that as the world grows smaller, our common 
humanity shall reveal itself, and that America must play its role in ushering in a new era 
of peace.346 
Obama’s evocation of the history of the Civil War and segregation as an eventually 
binding factor opens onto another crucial element of his rhetorical construct: the 
transcendence of racial divisions.347 
The other type of presidential speech that is most likely to convey messages of 
unity is the State of the Union Address. Nelson insists on the fact that despite declin-
ing numbers in the audience and increasing partisanship, the SOTU is still “that one 
communal moment a year when the country comes together.” Nelson highlights this 
unifying function of the SOTU, but explains the hybrid nature of this type of speech: 
“They invoke unifying, chief of state symbols to buttress the president’s effectiveness 
as chief of government [which is considered more divisive].” According to Nelson, 
SOTUs are largely bipartisan in appearance to make the president appear as running 
government, but are highly divisive as the content focuses on the legislative agenda. 
However, Nelson cautions that crisis speeches are less predictable in character.348 
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Obama’s SOTUs of 2009 and 2010 are clearly crisis speeches, as the US was still 
in the midst and wake of the Great Recession.349 In both cases, Obama began his ad-
dress with an evocation of the economic crisis. In both cases, Obama used the context 
of economic hardship as a unifying element to bring the population together: 
Our Constitution declares that from time to time, the President shall give to Congress in-
formation about the state of our union. For 220 years, our leaders have fulfilled this duty. 
They've done so during periods of prosperity and tranquility. And they've done so in the 
midst of war and depression; at moments of great strife and great struggle. 
It's tempting to look back on these moments and assume that our progress was inevita-
ble—that America was always destined to succeed. But when the Union was turned back 
at Bull Run, and the Allies first landed at Omaha Beach, victory was very much in doubt. 
When the market crashed on Black Tuesday, and civil rights marchers were beaten on 
Bloody Sunday, the future was anything but certain. These were the times that tested the 
courage of our convictions, and the strength of our union. And despite all our divisions 
and disagreements, our hesitations and our fears, America prevailed because we chose to 
move forward as one nation, as one people.  
Again, we are tested. And again, we must answer history's call.350 
The historical references Obama chose to remind the nation of its capacity to prevail 
in times of hardship sweep across a wide array of themes. Obama makes references to 
major historical moments of crisis, but which, in their eventual victory, evoke cher-
ished American values. The first major battle of the Civil War hints at the saving of 
the Union and the end of slavery; America’s commitment to democracy and combat-
ing totalitarianism is mentioned through the reference to D-Day and the liberation of 
France in WWII; the vanquishing of economic crisis is alluded to with the reference 
to the Crash of 1929 that led to the Great Depression; and the overcoming of racial 
divisions is inferred with the reference to the discouraging moments of the Civil 
Rights Movement. The latter two references are not innocent: the Great Depression 
was ended through massive government intervention and the building of the welfare 
state, while the Civil Rights Movement successfully ended in equal rights and opened 
a short period of a heightened commitment to racial equality in terms of means and 
redistribution.351 
Moreover, Obama used the context of crisis to call for political unity by appeal-
ing for bipartisanship:352  
So we face big and difficult challenges. And what the American people hope, what they 
deserve, is for all of us, Democrats and Republicans, to work through our differences, to 
overcome the numbing weight of our politics. For while the people who sent us here 
have different backgrounds, different stories, different beliefs, the anxieties they face are 
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the same. The aspirations they hold are shared: a job that pays the bills, a chance to get 
ahead, most of all, the ability to give their children a better life.353 
Most importantly, in this passage Obama bases his bipartisan call on what he per-
ceives to be a uniting and unifying factor in the American population: shared eco-
nomic needs and interests that boil down to a modest version of the American 
Dream.354 
Using the context of economic difficulties to try to draw Americans closer to-
gether was a rather recurrent theme in Obama’s speeches. In a 2010 speech, Obama 
argued for his agenda of governmental intervention to rebuild the economy on the 
background of past difficulties that have been overcome thanks to American unity: 
We are here today because in the worst of times, the people who came before us brought 
out the best in America. Because our parents and our grandparents and our great-
grandparents were willing to work and sacrifice for us. They were willing to take great 
risks, and face great hardship, and reach for a future that would give us the chance at a 
better life. They knew that this country is greater than the sum of its parts—that America 
is not about the ambitions of any one individual, but the aspirations of an entire people, 
an entire nation. (Applause.)  
That’s who we are. That is our legacy. And I’m convinced that if we’re willing to summon 
those values today, and if we’re willing to choose hope over fear, and choose the future 
over the past, and come together once more around the great project of national renewal, 
then we will restore our economy and rebuild our middle class and reclaim the Ameri-
can Dream for the next generation. (Applause.)355 
Obama draws on two images of the American doxa: the US as the land of opportunity 
and immigration that attracts people who fiercely believe in the American Dream 
and the idea of the melting pot: that these immigrants who believe in the American 
Dream become one united nation. He then musters these images as a foundation to 
build on in order to achieve his political agenda, the “great project of national renew-
al”—massive government intervention—that, according to him, would make these 
images of a middle-class America real again and the American Dream possible.356 It is 
interesting to note that the same images of the land of opportunity, hard work, and 
individuals driven by their dreams, also summoned by neoliberal discourse to argue 
for less government intervention, are used by Obama in the opposite way: the sharing 
of these values precisely brings the nation together and should result in a common 
commitment to make the aspirations and the Dream a possibility for everyone, 
through government intervention.357 
Obama’s capacity to convincingly express American unity, even by conjuring up 
again a renewed a vision of America as a melting pot, is what also attracted national 
attention to him when he first spoke on a national stage at the 2004 DNC convention: 
It's what allows us to pursue our individual dreams, yet still come together as a single 
American family: "E pluribus unum," out of many, one. 
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Now even as we speak, there are those who are preparing to divide us, the spin masters 
and negative ad peddlers who embrace the politics of anything goes. 
Well, I say to them tonight, there's not a liberal America and a conservative America; 
there's the United States of America. (APPLAUSE) 
There's not a black America and white America and Latino America and Asian America; 
there's the United States of America.358 
Obama’s use of the melting-pot image could be criticized through all the shortcom-
ings and inaccuracies of the concept. However, this image is necessary in his dis-
course focused on American unity and racial transcendence which create the class 
basis for his pro-reform majority. This does not mean that Obama was unaware of, or 
minimized, racial differences and inequalities. The melting-pot characteristics that 
Obama put forward were not based on a similar lifestyle or identity for all Americans, 
it did not presume assimilation to a stereotypical mainstream (white) middle class 
ideal based on a melting-pot identity, but it was rather based on a different type of 
shared Americanness. This Americanness, as presented by Obama, was based on 
shared values, based on the promises of the founding documents, and common be-
liefs. Thus Obama’s conception of a transcended melting-pot America was based on 
solidarity, hard work, family, and the American Dream. Obama expressed this idea of 
common values uniting the nation in the 2010 State of the Union Address: 
In the end, it's our ideals, our values that built America—values that allowed us to forge 
a nation made up of immigrants from every corner of the globe; values that drive our cit-
izens still. Every day, Americans meet their responsibilities to their families and their 
employers. Time and again, they lend a hand to their neighbors and give back to their 
country. They take pride in their labor, and are generous in spirit. These aren't Republi-
can values or Democratic values that they're living by; business values or labor values. 
They're American values.359 
Contrary to Republicans, who had claimed these values for themselves and who had 
used them to divide the working- and the middle classes further along racial lines, 
Obama expressed the idea that these values were a uniting element. The monopoly 
that Republicans claimed on those values is openly referred to by Obama in this 
speech. 
Such values are hardly new, but Obama presented them as something that fa-
vors government intervention and social policies. That use is quite new in recent 
years and opposed to the use that, for example, Reagan, and even Clinton, had made 
of these concepts.360 
3.4.2. “With a Bit of Translation:”361 Transcendence 
Obama’s unity discourse cannot work without his discourse on racial tran-
scendence. It is the aspect for which he has been both most lauded and most criti-
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cized. For example, rhetorician David A. Frank thought that Obama’s 2004 DNC 
keynote address went towards healing and moved the American nation “more effec-
tively toward racial reconciliation.”362 Among the critics was activist Tim Wise, who 
interpreted Obama’s transcendence and the absence of an openly racial discourse as 
a sign that Obama was not willing to address race issues: 
Sadly, if President Obama is willing to ignore the pain of race-based discrimination and 
injustice, so as to make whites comfortable, —and this, after he has already been elected 
and the campaign is long over—then the likelihood he will ever speak the truth about 
these matters, let alone address them, shrinks to nearly zero.363 
Wise went so far as to call Obama’s position “damag[ing] to the cause of civil rights 
and racial equity.”364 Wise was right to point out how little Obama spoke about race. 
A study by political scientist Daniel Q. Gillion showed that Obama spoke less about 
race during his first term than the average Democratic president since 1961. Despite 
the fact that Gillion clearly mentioned the particular political and discursive con-
straints faced by the black president, he also criticized Obama’s choice, going so far as 
to say that it is worse, in terms of public awareness and policy discussions, to speak 
little of race than to do so in a negative way, as Reagan did for example. According to 
Gillion, the latter spoke more about race than Obama, albeit in a negative fashion 
and with the aim of attacking some policies that were beneficial to the black popula-
tion.365 
This near absence of racial discourse, however, is partly due the wish not to ap-
pear as an “angry black man”, as communication researcher Judy Isaksen pointed 
out. She insisted that this transcendence—Obama distancing himself from race and 
race figures—was key to his success.366 Another Communication researcher, Ralina L. 
Joseph, concurs with Isaksen’s assessment: according to her, Obama was portrayed as 
positive only when he transcended blackness and when he shed “black characteris-
tics.”367 This became apparent, for example, in the infamous remark made by Joe 
Biden in 2007 during the primaries, when he highlighted how Obama did not corre-
spond to the negative black stereotype.368 As seen previously, Obama himself became 
aware, very early in his life as a teenager, of the danger of appearing as an angry black 
man when denouncing inequalities too bluntly. 369 In 2008, Obama maintained this 
stance, especially after the incident with Reverend Wright. Wright’s sharp criticism 
of race relations in the US made him the embodiment of the angry black man and led 
to an upsurge of accusations of fostering divisiveness, which tinted Obama by associ-
ation. In 2009, Obama refused to denounce some criticism against him as racism, alt-
hough many journalists and former president Jimmy Carter denounced this as 
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such,370 which is consistent with the wish to appear conciliatory and to distance him-
self of the image of the ‘angry black man.’ 
Refusing to appear as an ‘angry black man’ makes sense, especially at the politi-
cal level. Given the political context, the lasting effects of the backlash, and the cur-
rent rejection of affirmative action, open minority identity politics and strong racial 
demands are not an option. Besides, Obama’s racial transcendence discourse unques-
tionably is a key element of his rhetorical construct. 
In his 2004 DNC keynote address, Obama not only presented a melting pot 
America, but also insisted on the US being the land of opportunity and equality: 
Tonight, we gather to affirm the greatness of our nation not because of the height of our 
skyscrapers, or the power of our military, or the size of our economy; our pride is based 
on a very simple premise, summed up in a declaration made over two hundred years ago: 
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal... (APPLAUSE) ... 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these 
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." 
That is the true genius of America, a faith... (APPLAUSE) ... a faith in simple dreams, an 
insistence on small miracles; that we can tuck in our children at night and know that 
they are fed and clothed and safe from harm; that we can say what we think, write what 
we think, without hearing a sudden knock on the door; that we can have an idea and 
start our own business without paying a bribe; that we can participate in the political 
process without fear of retribution; and that our votes will be counted—or at least, most 
of the time.371 
Only after a long praise of American exceptionalism, quoting from the Declaration of 
Independence and listing rights safeguarded in the Constitution, Obama allowed 
himself to slip in a light criticism at the end, hinting at the fact that voting rights were 
not being fully respected.372 Although the extract insists on transcendence by point-
ing out the beauty of American rights and ideas applying to everyone, Obama also 
alluded to the fact that the reality was a little different: it is “a faith in simple dreams, 
an insistence on small miracles.” 
The speech that made Obama famous for his transcending stance was ‘A More 
Perfect Union.’ In it, he extolled a vision of a melting pot America which he ex-
pressed in the motto of the United States, based on the makeup of his own family: 
This belief comes from my unyielding faith in the decency and generosity of the Ameri-
can people. But it also comes from my own story. 
I am the son of a black man from Kenya and a white woman from Kansas. I was raised 
with the help of a white grandfather who survived a Depression to serve in Patton's Ar-
my during World War II and a white grandmother who worked on a bomber assembly 
line at Fort Leavenworth while he was overseas. I've gone to some of the best schools in 
America and lived in one of the world's poorest nations. I am married to a black Ameri-
can who carries within her the blood of slaves and slave owners—an inheritance we pass 
on to our two precious daughters. I have brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews, uncles and 
cousins of every race and every hue, scattered across three continents, and for as long as I 
live, I will never forget that in no other country on Earth is my story even possible. 
It's a story that hasn't made me the most conventional of candidates. But it is a story that 
has seared into my genetic makeup the idea that this nation is more than the sum of its 
parts—that out of many, we are truly one.373 
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However, this description, which presents Obama and his family as a multiracial 
melting-pot family and his own story in a certain rags-to-riches or American Dream 
fashion, did not mean for Obama that everything had been achieved yet. On the con-
trary, he asserted that this union had to be worked on, had to be perfected, and he 
stated openly that America still had to work through its race relations: “The fact is 
that the comments that have been made and the issues that have surfaced over the 
last few weeks reflect the complexities of race in this country that we've never really 
worked through—a part of our union that we have not yet made perfect.”374 In order 
to address some of these issues, Obama cited a long list of discriminations and ine-
qualities that African-Americans suffered from and he insisted strongly on the fact 
that these did not belong to the past. Moreover, Obama explained that anger over 
discrimination and inequality was not something that blacks felt could be expressed 
in the open, with white friends or colleagues, but which was confined to black spaces, 
such as the churches, the kitchen table, or the barbershop—the spaces that political 
scientist Melissa Harris-Lacewell terms the counterpublic.375 But as Obama criticized 
the anger expressed by Reverend Wright for its counterproductive nature, he also 
addressed white America and the need to acknowledge this anger: “But the anger is 
real; it is powerful. And to simply wish it away, to condemn it without understanding 
its roots, only serves to widen the chasm of misunderstanding that exists between the 
races.”376 
Obama also acknowledged white anger and resentment and showed under-
standing for the backlash sentiments. However, one of the major aspects of Obama’s 
transcending stance was that he did not require blacks to put their racial feelings 
aside, it did not mean total assimilation and forgetting; it did mean, however, that 
both sides had to make a better effort to understand the other and to acknowledge 
parts of their grievances. It was in the creation of this understanding, of explaining 
the point of view of the other, that Obama saw himself as the translator between the 
two racial groups, a role that he could fill because of his mixed heritage and his com-
plex history and identity. However, he pointed out that this resentment, described as 
being mainly over economic competition and perceived unfair advantage in the form 
of affirmative action, was misdirected along racial lines and should rightly focus on 
economic inequality produced by the current system:  
Just as black anger often proved counterproductive, so have these white resentments dis-
tracted attention from the real culprits of the middle class squeeze—a corporate culture 
rife with inside dealing, questionable accounting practices and short-term greed; a 
Washington dominated by lobbyists and special interests; economic policies that favor 
the few over the many.377 
This is Obama’s main approach of transcending the racial divide: to show how all 
suffer from the current economic system created through neoliberal economic poli-
cies, which are denounced in an economic populist manner.378  
In his first Inaugural Address, Obama worked on the trope of the most famous 
line of the Declaration of Independence in order to foster racial transcendence. He 
insisted on the fact that the nation needed to overcome its divisions and embrace the 
spirit of the Declaration: 
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On this day, we gather because we have chosen hope over fear, unity of purpose over 
conflict and discord. On this day, we come to proclaim an end to the petty grievances and 
false promises, the recriminations and worn-out dogmas that for far too long have stran-
gled our politics. We remain a young nation. But in the words of Scripture, the time has 
come to set aside childish things. The time has come to reaffirm our enduring spirit; to 
choose our better history; to carry forward that precious gift, that noble idea passed on 
from generation to generation: the God-given promise that all are equal, all are free, and 
all deserve a chance to pursue their full measure of happiness. (Applause.)379 
The same extract which has been commented upon to analyze Obama’s unity dis-
course can be used to analyze his transcending stance. The passage highlights Ameri-
can unity, but upon looking or listening closely, one notices Obama’s criticism: equal-
ity and freedom are described as a “promise”, not something that exists already; the 
possibility of pursuing happiness is not guaranteed yet, it is “a chance” that all “de-
serve,” which alludes to the fact that not all have it yet. Moreover, Obama slightly 
altered the original quote by inserting the phrase “full measure”, which hints at the 
idea that some people are shortchanged in the current context. Although Obama sub-
tly points at some inequalities, he is careful not to clearly state that these are exclu-
sively racial inequalities. First, because poor whites also suffer from economic ine-
qualities. Second, because an Inaugural is an address meant to gather the nation; 
consequently, it is not a tactical move to point out specific groups. And lastly, because 
by not openly saying who exactly is being denied their full measure of happiness, 
equality, and freedom, people from all backgrounds are free to feel included in this 
sentence. However, Obama posits as the transcending factor that all Americans be-
lieve in these rights. 
In his first Inaugural Address, Obama staged himself as a symbol of this racial 
transcendence: 
This is the price and the promise of citizenship. This is the source of our confidence, the 
knowledge that God calls on us to shape an uncertain destiny. This is the meaning of our 
liberty and our creed; why men and women and children of every race and every faith 
can join in celebration across this magnificent Mall, and why a man whose father less 
than 60 years ago might not have been served at a local restaurant can now stand before 
you to take a most sacred oath.380 
By highlighting the contrast between the racial situation his father had faced and his 
own situation when he was being sworn in as president, Obama insists on the racial 
progress that has been made in the US. Although it might seem that Obama gave a 
description of a post-racial America,381 he also carefully reminded the audience of the 
dark past of segregation, and of the fact that this past was not all that long ago. 
Obama negotiated this fine line between praise and criticism on several occasions 
and with a similar pattern: while lauding the greatness of America, he always slips in 
the comments which explain that the previously acclaimed quality is not fully 
achieved yet. 
In his 2010 State of the Union Address, Obama put forward common economic 
interests and aspirations to appeal for bipartisan collaboration: 
 So we face big and difficult challenges. And what the American people hope—what they 
deserve—is for all of us, Democrats and Republicans, to work through our differences; to 
overcome the numbing weight of our politics. For while the people who sent us here 
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have different backgrounds, different stories, different beliefs, the anxieties they face are 
the same. The aspirations they hold are shared: a job that pays the bills; a chance to get 
ahead; most of all, the ability to give their children a better life.382 
Although Obama acknowledges the differences and the diversity of the population, 
his rhetoric insists on the fact that economically people are united in their aspira-
tions. It is transcending in the sense that he does not evoke particular economic dif-
ferences between whites and minorities, or point out the historical economic discrim-
ination of blacks. Historian Jacqueline Jones has insisted on this common and very 
basic economic interest and values of “hard work, love for family, and commitment to 
schooling for their children” that transcend race and class lines. Jones explains that 
during her work on the American ‘underclass,’ she was startled by the convergence of 
values and experiences among poor people regardless of race, although she admits 
the heightened vulnerability of blacks.383 
To show that there are common interests transcending racial lines is para-
mount, especially when one considers one of the functions of racism as explained by 
legal scholar and Critical Race Theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw. She explains that rac-
ism creates an “Other” that unites and bonds the dominant group through the oppo-
sition and thus creates an illusory unity along racial lines.384 It is not superfluous to 
remind the nation that there are common interests transcending the divisive lines of 
society. Political philosopher Cornel West recalled the discursive work accomplished 
by the Republican Party to precisely make people forget these common interests 
which were shared during the New Deal Coalition: 
And given the way in which the Republican Party since 1968 has appealed to popular 
xenophobic images—playing the black, female, and homophobic cards to realign the 
electorate along race, sex and sexual orientation lines—it is no surprise that the notion 
that we are all part of one garment of destiny is discredited.385 
The claim of hope transcending the racial divide is by no means new in black 
discourse. In 1941 Richard Wright wrote in Twelve Million Black Voices:  
The differences between black folk and white folk are not blood or color, and the ties 
that bind us are deeper than those that separate us. The common road of hope which we 
all traveled has brought us into a stronger kinship than any words, laws, or legal 
claims.386 
It is likely that Obama has come across this often-cited quotation. Based on the suc-
cess of the New Deal coalition, on his knowledge of the white middle class because of 
his upbringing, and on his knowledge about the black population thanks to his work 
as community organizer, Obama knew that a focus on class populism and shared 
economic interests would make a powerful theme to transcend racial divisions. 
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3.4.3. “For Nothing More Than a Profit:”387 Class Populism 
Obama’s class discourse, based on shared economic interests, was meant to 
transcend the racial divide and to create a new unity, not unlike the New Deal coali-
tion. In the light of the backlash, the focus on economic issues appears particularly 
important. Given that the white middle and working class felt and still feel aban-
doned, economic populism opposing the privileged interests to the interests of the 
people of all backgrounds appears as a good strategy. 
The economic populist rhetoric that Obama used was very similar to the rheto-
ric used by the Democratic Party during its populist phase, i.e. from 1896 to 1948, ac-
cording to political scientist John Gerring. The central dichotomy of this rhetorical 
phase was articulated around the people versus the interests; the major themes were 
egalitarianism, majoritarianism, and Christian humanism. Gerring insists on the fact 
that the Democratic Party has always been the “champion of class politics,” although 
not explicitly so, with the central and lasting theme of equality, even in periods when 
this was not a forefront issue. The populist period witnessed a recentering of dis-
course on the people in a more outspoken class perspective, with terms like “common 
people,” “ordinary Americans,” or “struggling masses.” Yet, this class perspective was 
openly denied. For example, Democratic politician William Jennings Bryan said in a 
speech in 1896: “While I do not want to array one class against another,” he was none-
theless willing to “array all the people who suffer from the operation of trusts against 
the few people who operate the trusts.”388 Obama used a similar rhetoric with his core 
campaign message of “the people versus special interests.”389 
Obama’s rhetorical construct first emphasizes the fact that people of all back-
grounds, including racial backgrounds, share the same economic interests. Through 
economic class populism, he shows that the people (in a very wide and loose sense)390 
have interests that are opposed to these of a hazy elite. Moreover, Obama emphasizes 
the fact that in his opinion, the politics of the Republican Party, contrary to what the 
Republican Party has claimed since the Reagan era, does not represent the interest of 
the (white) working and middle classes. 
In The Audacity of Hope, Obama explains how, in his sense, the politics of the 
Republican Party has led to greater inequalities, and will lead to a sharply unequal 
society if this is continued, underscoring as well that this economic polarization 
would lead to more divisiveness among the population and make the US more politi-
cally unstable.391 He describes economic inequality in the US at length by insisting on 
the trends existing since the 1970s and the first implementations of neoliberal princi-
ples, and he accuses Republican tax cuts of worsening these trends. He states his posi-
tion regarding taxation as follows: 
I point out these facts not—as Republican talking points would have it—to stir up class 
envy. I admire many Americans of great wealth and don’t begrudge their success in the 
least. I know that many if not most have earned it through hard work, building business-
es and creating jobs and providing value to their customers. I simply believe that those of 
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us who have benefited most from this new economy can best afford to shoulder their ob-
ligation of ensuring every American child has a chance for that same success. And per-
haps I possess a certain Midwestern sensibility that I inherited from my mother and her 
parents, a sensibility that Warren Buffett seems to share: that at a certain point one has 
enough, that you can derive as much pleasure from a Picasso hanging in a museum as 
from one that’s hanging in your den, that you can get an awfully good meal in a restau-
rant for less than twenty dollars, and that once your drapes cost more than the average 
American’s yearly salary, then you can afford to pay a bit more in taxes.392 
Obama’s position on taxes here very clearly underscores the sense of solidarity he 
sees in taxation, and especially in the budget increase it would provide, which then 
could be used for more redistributive policies. Interestingly enough, just like Bryan, 
Obama denies that he wants to do class politics, and expresses his admiration for suc-
cessful people, although in a very careful context of references to hard work and 
fruitful economic contribution, which excludes the notion of people getting their 
wealth through speculation or inheritance. Obama justifies his tax position through 
his redistributive ideas, whose ideological roots he very carefully attributes to his 
white working and then later middle class family, to distance himself from the image 
of blacks demanding more welfare. He underscores this with the reference to the 
multibillionaire businessman Warren Buffet, who despite being one of the richest 
persons in the world, shares Obama’s opinions about taxation.393 
In his Inaugural Address, Obama speaks at length about the economy, although 
doing so in a rather conciliatory tone and emphasizing the plans he had for the fu-
ture. Yet, he blames the economic crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession on hazy 
elites: “Our economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and irresponsibility 
on the part of some, but also our collective failure to make hard choices and prepare 
the Nation for a new age.”394 The date of the speech (January 20, 2009) makes the al-
lusion plain enough as the recent mismanagements of the financial sector were still 
fresh in the minds of the audience. 
Obama expanded on this theme in his 2009 Address to a Joint Session of Con-
gress, where he most virulently used economic populism to try to unite public opin-
ion and create a climate favorable for social reform. In this Address, which Obama 
not only addresses to Congress, but also very insistently to the people, the President 
gibes his view of the causes of the 2008 crisis and the ensuing Great Recession: 
In other words, we have lived through an era where too often, short-term gains were 
prized over long-term prosperity; where we failed to look beyond the next payment, the 
next quarter, or the next election. A surplus became an excuse to transfer wealth to the 
wealthy instead of an opportunity to invest in our future. Regulations were gutted for the 
sake of a quick profit at the expense of a healthy market. People bought homes they 
knew they couldn’t afford from banks and lenders who pushed those bad loans anyway. 
And all the while, critical debates and difficult decisions were put off for some other time 
on some other day.395 
Although Obama does not attack the Republican Party openly in this passage, the 
time frame he gives, mentioning an era where a budget surplus was used to create tax 
cuts for the wealthy, clearly identifies the G. W. Bush presidency, since the only re-
cent budget surplus had been obtained by Clinton. Obama highlights the fact that 
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most of the decisions taken by the Bush administration favored economic elites, 
through the tax cuts for the wealthy, the short-term gains, or the deregulations that 
were detrimental to the long-term conditions of the market.396 By pitting these prac-
tices against “an opportunity to invest our future,” Obama indirectly voices his sup-
port for government intervention and an expansion of social policies, which is more 
explicit, for example, in the chapter “Opportunity” in The Audacity of Hope. There he 
explains at length that for him “investment in the future” also means federal inter-
vention in education or health care for example, and the strengthening of the social 
safety net. 
After explaining this mismanagement by the previous administration, Obama 
exposes broad plans to reinvest in the country,397 before he moves on to discuss the 
benefits of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), enacted 
only a few days earlier. He particularly highlights how this Act would help ordinary 
Americans: 
Over the next two years, this plan [ARRA] will save or create 3.5 million jobs. More than 
90% of these jobs will be in the private sector—jobs rebuilding our roads and bridges; 
constructing wind turbines and solar panels; laying broadband and expanding mass 
transit. 
Because of this plan, there are teachers who can now keep their jobs and educate our 
kids. Health care professionals can continue caring for our sick. There are 57 police offic-
ers who are still on the streets of Minneapolis tonight because this plan prevented the 
layoffs their department was about to make.  
Because of this plan, 95% of the working households in America will receive a tax cut—a 
tax cut that you will see in your paychecks beginning on April 1st. 
Because of this plan, families who are struggling to pay tuition costs will receive a $2,500 
tax credit for all four years of college. And Americans who have lost their jobs in this re-
cession will be able to receive extended unemployment benefits and continued health 
care coverage to help them weather this storm.398 
All the accomplishments of the ARRA which Obama cites are areas that concern ei-
ther the working or the middle classes, thus showing by contrast that his administra-
tion enacts laws that favor the masses, not the elites. Moreover, he taps into the great-
est concerns of Americans (health, education, and taxes of course) and is careful to 
mention jobs that emphasize solidarity and care, as health care professionals and 
teachers, or that are synonymous with steady and useful public employment, such as 
police officers. Moreover, these professions are also closely associated with honest 
middle-class jobs. It must also be noted that Obama insists on the fact that the job 
growth that would be created by the ARRA would be in the private sector. This ele-
ment shows how lasting and deeply entrenched the Reagan rhetoric is, which has 
made neoliberal discourse a central feature of American political discourse. This in-
sistence on jobs in the private sector was designed to ward off accusations of social-
ism or government takeover. 
In the same address, Obama presents his budget in an economic populist man-
ner: 
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In this budget, we will end education programs that don't work and end direct payments 
to large agribusiness that don't need them. We'll eliminate the no-bid contracts that have 
wasted billions in Iraq and reform our defense budget so that we're not paying for cold 
war-era weapons systems we don't use. We will root out the waste and fraud and abuse 
in our Medicare program that doesn't make our seniors any healthier. We will restore a 
sense of fairness and balance to our Tax Code by finally ending the tax breaks for corpo-
rations that ship our jobs overseas. 
First, Obama attacks spending waste as the result of privileges for economic special 
interests and big business subsidies. Then he targets aspects of government programs 
which were modified by the Bush administration—such as the No Child Left Behind 
Act of 2001, considered problematic and inefficient by critics,399 or Medicare Ad-
vantage, Bush’s 2003 Medicare reform, which moved Medicare beneficiaries to pri-
vate providers at a higher cost. This is in sharp contrast with, for example, the 
Reaganite discourse that located waste and fraud with the “undeserving” who were to 
be found among the program beneficiaries. Reagan’s fraud symbol was the welfare 
queen; Obama located waste and fraud within the economic system and with greedy 
business elites. 
Obama then exposes the plans for his tax reform: 
In order to save our children from a future of debt, we will also end the tax breaks for the 
wealthiest 2 percent of Americans. Now, let me be clear—let me be absolutely clear, be-
cause I know you'll end up hearing some of the same claims that rolling back these tax 
breaks means a massive tax increase on the American people: If your family earns less 
than $250,000 a year, a quarter million dollars a year, you will not see your taxes in-
creased a single dime. I repeat: Not one single dime. In fact—not a dime—in fact, the re-
covery plan provides a tax cut—that's right, a tax cut—for 95 percent of working families. 
And by the way, these checks are on the way.400 
Obama’s tax plan opposed the interests of a very narrow and wealthy elite of 2% of 
the highest incomes to the broad masses of “95 percent of working families,” with the 
promise that not only would taxes not increase for the masses, but that the latter 
would even receive a tax cut, thus opposing the traditional Republican tax-cut 
scheme which favors the wealthy. This opposition is very typical of the broad eco-
nomic populism that can work in the USA and echoes the dichotomy offered by the 
Democratic Party during its populist period which opposed “interests” and “trusts” to 
“ordinary Americans.” Interestingly, Obama’s promise of “not a single dime” of in-
crease strangely echoes G. H. W. Bush’s “Read my lips: no new taxes.” However, in 
Obama’s case the promise was explicitly circumscribed to the working and middle 
class and was opposed to a tax increase for the wealthy, thus highlighting the eco-
nomic populism and a more progressive taxation system. 
Obama also more explicitly linked his populist attacks against economic elites 
with the defense of the middle class. He did so, for example, in a speech given in Iowa 
in 2008: “I'll be a president who ends the tax breaks for companies that ship our jobs 
overseas and put a middle-class tax cut into the pockets of working Americans who 
deserve it.”401 This quote also takes up the deserving/undeserving dichotomy, but by 
subtly relocating it. Instead of evoking the usual dichotomy opposing the undeserv-
ing at the lower half of society, which opposes the deserving white middle class to the 
undeserving black ‘underclass’, Obama creates a new opposition between the masses 
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of American workers and elites. He identifies “working Americans” as the deserving 
group, but opposes them to “companies that ship our jobs overseas.” The latter are 
blamed for their bad behavior and indirectly identified as the new undeserving 
group, because their tax breaks are to be ended and are attributed to the deserving 
group instead. This is one of the ways in which it becomes apparent that Obama tried 
to create an interracial class alliance against economic power elites through the use of 
economic populism, thus creating the image of a new enemy.  
Obama also applied the populist rhetoric to his argument in favor of health care 
reform: 
 And when you hear about these experiences, when you think of the millions of people 
denied coverage because of preexisting conditions, when you think about the thousands 
who have their policies cancelled each year, like Katie, I want you to remember one 
thing: There but for the grace of God go I. (Applause.) Most of us have insurance. And 
most of us think, you know, knock on wood, that we're going to stay healthy. But we're no 
different than Katie and other ordinary Americans, no different than anybody else. We 
are held hostage at any given moment by health insurance companies that deny cover-
age, or drop coverage, or charge fees that people can't afford at a time when they desper-
ately need care.402 
In this passage, Obama first emphasizes that losing health insurance is something 
that any American could potentially face, making it an issue that concerns all Ameri-
cans, and not only some indigent people. These “ordinary Americans” are opposed to 
“health insurance companies”, the economic elites that exploit and oppress people by 
denying or dropping coverage and by charging exorbitant fees.  
Obama also explains the financial mechanisms of his health care reform in eco-
nomic populist terms: 
Now, it is true that providing these tax credits to middle class families and small busi-
nesses, that’s going to cost some money. It’s going to cost about $100 billion per year. But 
most of this comes from the nearly $2.5 trillion a year that Americans already spend on 
health care. It’s just right now, a lot of that money is being spent badly. 
So with this plan, we’re going to make sure the dollars we make—the dollars that we 
spend on health care are going to make insurance more affordable and more secure. And 
we’re going to eliminate wasteful taxpayer subsidies that currently go to insurance com-
panies. Insurance companies are making billions of dollars on subsidies from you, the 
taxpayer. And if we take those subsidies away, we can use them to help folks like Natoma 
get health insurance so she doesn’t lose her house.403 
Obama argues in a particularly clear way that the insurance subsidies for middle 
class families would come from fighting the former privileges of the insurance com-
panies and he very obviously insisted on the fact that those privileges—in the form of 
government subsidies for insurance companies—constitute a form of upward redis-
tribution that wastes taxpayer money on wealthy companies. 
Obama’s economic populism appears to have worked, as he managed to in-
crease his share of working and lower-middle class voters compared to previous elec-
tions. According to the New York Times exit polls, since 1992 when income categories 
started to be referenced, voters with incomes up to $50,000 have consistently voted 
for Democrats, but Obama managed to increase his voter share among those catego-
ries between 3% and 10%. Although he did not get a majority of the votes for the in-
come category between $50,000-$74,999, he managed to increase the Democratic 
share by 5 percentage points to reach 48%, thus scoring even better among those vot-
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ers than Clinton in 1996 with 47%. Obama also significantly increased the Democratic 
vote among people with incomes between $75,000 and $99,000 by 6 percentage 
points.404 And last but not least, Obama’s discourse focusing on the economic needs 
of ordinary Americans contributed to creating enough momentum for the enactment 
of his health care reform. 
3.4.4. “A Rising Tide Lifting Minority Boats:”405 The Issue-
Focused Approach 
And yet, Obama’s economic populism is not complete without the guarantee 
that all efforts would be made in a truly universalistic way to reassure whites—
meaning that there would be no racial preference—, while explaining to blacks that 
race-specific policies are not an option and that blacks would benefit from universal 
social policies. This part will only deal with the side of the discourse addressing mi-
norities. Given the context of the backlash against social policies, the reassuring of 
whites mainly comes from the promise that the middle class will not be forgotten, 
which will be detailed in the next subpart. 
Obama’s opposition to race-specific policies, which is partly grounded on their 
relative inefficiency and the political handicap they represent, has already been ex-
plained in Part I.406 As president, he remained especially adamant that he could not 
enact, or push for, race specific legislation. In a 2009 interview with journalist April 
D. Ryan on the black American Urban Radio Networks he stated this very bluntly: 
The only thing I cannot do is, you know, by law I can’t pass laws that say I’m just helping 
black folks. I’m the President of the entire United States. What I can do is make sure that 
I am passing laws that help all people, particularly those who are most vulnerable and 
most in need. That in turn is going to help lift up the African-American community.407 
This refusal to engage in race-specific policies does not mean that Obama was una-
ware of the inequalities and discrimination blacks face. In ‘A More Perfect Union,’ 
Obama described the conditions of the black population, emphasizing the ongoing 
effects of past discrimination, ongoing segregation in schools, the economically strati-
fying effects of exclusion from social programs that helped to build the white middle 
class, the destructive effects of economic and social exclusion that shatters the black 
‘underclass,’ and the deep psychological impact of discrimination and exclusion. He 
also highlights, even for mainstream blacks, the importance of race and racism, to 
which he has been confronted himself: 
Legalized discrimination—where blacks were prevented, often through violence, from 
owning property, or loans were not granted to African-American business owners, or 
black homeowners could not access FHA mortgages, or blacks were excluded from un-
ions or the police force or the fire department—meant that black families could not 
amass any meaningful wealth to bequeath to future generations. That history helps ex-
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plain the wealth and income gap between blacks and whites, and the concentrated pock-
ets of poverty that persist in so many of today's urban and rural communities.408 
Obama resituates the origins of economic stratification along racial lines with institu-
tionalized discrimination which prevented blacks from benefiting from the same ad-
vantages as whites and led to today’s deep inequalities as well as to the problems of 
the ‘underclass.’ Obama insists on the nefarious impact this had: 
A lack of economic opportunity among black men, and the shame and frustration that 
came from not being able to provide for one's family contributed to the erosion of black 
families—a problem that welfare policies for many years may have worsened. And the 
lack of basic services in so many urban black neighborhoods—parks for kids to play in, 
police walking the beat, regular garbage pickup, building code enforcement—all helped 
create a cycle of violence, blight and neglect that continues to haunt us.409 
Obama’s conciliatory stance can be seen here, through the combination of conserva-
tive and liberal criticism. He both admits that some aspects of welfare policies—such 
as initial requirements in ADC which prevented mothers from having a male partner 
living under the same roof or that prevented people from saving money—are not 
working well, and have effectively led to behavioral problems in urban neighbor-
hoods. On the other hand, he also proposes a rather liberal criticism in pointing out 
that a lack of government investment in these areas has strongly contributed to this 
phenomenon.  
Obama even resituates one of the major aspects of the white backlash, the ‘un-
derclass,’ in its rightful context of barred opportunity and residential segregation: 
For all those who scratched and clawed their way to get a piece of the American Dream, 
there were many who didn't make it—those who were ultimately defeated, in one way or 
another, by discrimination. That legacy of defeat was passed on to future generations—
those young men and, increasingly, young women who we see standing on street corners 
or languishing in our prisons, without hope or prospects for the future. Even for those 
blacks who did make it, questions of race and racism continue to define their worldview 
in fundamental ways.410 
Obama also explains that socioeconomic improvement does not prevent people from 
experiencing discrimination and does not mean that they are completely freed from 
racial problems and issues. And yet, in the same speech, Obama emphasizes the fact 
that too strong a focus on racial grievances prevents political progress: 
That anger [about racial injustice] is not always productive; indeed, all too often it dis-
tracts attention from solving real problems; it keeps us from squarely facing our own 
complicity within the African-American community in our condition, and prevents the 
African-American community from forging the alliances it needs to bring about real 
change.411 
The forging of political alliances would mean abandoning race-specific demands. 
Obama is strongly aware of racial inequalities and of fears in the black community 
linked to the abandoning of race-specific demands. He explains this in The Audacity of 
Hope: 
Such a shift in emphasis is not easy: Old habits die hard, and there is always a fear on the 
part of many minorities that unless racial discrimination, past and present, stays on the 
front burner, white America will be let off the hook and hard-fought gains may be re-
                                                        
408	  Obama,	  “A	  More	  Perfect	  Union.”	  
409	  Obama,	  “A	  More	  Perfect	  Union.“	  
410	  Obama,	  “A	  More	  Perfect	  Union.”	  
411	  Obama,	  “A	  More	  Perfect	  Union.“	  
3 — Words Matter 343 
 
versed. I understand these fears—nowhere is it ordained that history moves in a straight 
line, and during difficult economic times it is possible that the imperatives of racial 
equality get shunted aside.412 
And yet, despite this understanding, Obama remained firm that his vision of racial 
progress in America includes a change in tactics for the black population which con-
sists in abandoning race-specific demands and in linking its quest for economic jus-
tice to those of the rest of the American population: 
For the African-American community, that path means embracing the burdens of our 
past without becoming victims of our past. It means continuing to insist on a full meas-
ure of justice in every aspect of American life. But it also means binding our particular 
grievances—for better health care and better schools and better jobs—to the larger aspi-
rations of all Americans: the white woman struggling to break the glass ceiling, the white 
man who has been laid off, the immigrant trying to feed his family. And it means taking 
full responsibility for our own lives—by demanding more from our fathers, and spend-
ing more time with our children, and reading to them, and teaching them that while they 
may face challenges and discrimination in their own lives, they must never succumb to 
despair or cynicism; they must always believe that they can write their own destiny.413 
This extract, besides highlighting the common economic interests blacks have with 
other minorities and with the white population, is very delicate as it plays on two sen-
sitive themes: victimization and responsibility. By exhorting African-Americans to 
“embrace the burdens of our past without becoming victims of our past,” Obama, 
who identifies as African-American here, wants blacks to stop feeling victimized and 
asking for race-specific measures grounded in this victimization. For Obama, howev-
er, this does not mean to stop searching equality, but to do so in an economic/class 
approach instead. The issue of responsibility, which is directly linked to the notion of 
victimization, shows his black conservatism as far as social behavior is concerned. It 
also helps him to address white prejudice against the ‘underclass’ and backlash sen-
timents. However, Obama also explains the idea that part of this responsibility is not 
to victimize yourself and let yourself be defeated. In this context, victimization be-
comes a form of defeat. The major and most important difference with white con-
servative anti-victimization discourse is that Obama does not deny the reality of dis-
crimination, but he reacts to the social and political problems he perceives in 
victimization. 
In a 2009 speech given at the NAACP Centennial Conference, Obama highlight-
ed many areas where blacks suffer injustices and inequalities. But while acknowledg-
ing those deep inequalities, many of which result from ongoing discrimination, this 
speech also constitutes a list of areas where an issue-focused approach is possible: 
And yet, even as we celebrate the remarkable achievements of the past 100 years; even as 
we inherit extraordinary progress that cannot be denied; even as we marvel at the cour-
age and determination of so many plain folk—we know that too many barriers still re-
main. 
We know that even as our economic crisis batters Americans of all races, African-
Americans are out of work more than just about anybody else—a gap that's widening 
here in New York City, as a detailed report this week by Comptroller Bill Thompson laid 
out. (Applause.) 
We know that even as spiraling health care costs crush families of all races, African-
Americans are more likely to suffer from a host of diseases but less likely to own health 
insurance than just about anybody else. 
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We know that even as we imprison more people of all races than any nation in the world, 
an African-American child is roughly five times as likely as a white child to see the inside 
of a prison. 
We know that even as the scourge of HIV/AIDS devastates nations abroad, particularly 
in Africa, it is devastating the African-American community here at home with dispro-
portionate force. We know these things. (Applause.)414 
However, contrary to expectations, Obama does not use this long list of disparities, 
such as unemployment, higher uninsured rates, higher incarceration rates, overall 
worse health conditions, or the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the black population, to argue 
for specific racial measures to alleviate them. He explains that an approach similar to 
the one used by the NAACP against segregation is needed: an interracial alliance fo-
cused on specific issues and unjust laws driven by committed people and in which 
“reformers united, not by color, but by cause.”415 At the beginning of the speech 
Obama summarizes this strategy and lauds its efficiency. After exposing this long list 
of inequalities, Obama calls for the same type of approach: 
These are some of the barriers of our time. They're very different from the barriers faced 
by earlier generations. They're very different from the ones faced when fire hoses and 
dogs were being turned on young marchers; when Charles Hamilton Houston and a 
group of young Howard lawyers were dismantling segregation case by case across the 
land. 
But what's required today—what's required to overcome today's barriers is the same as 
what was needed then.416  
Later in the same speech, Obama explains how this is supposed to work, and how it 
would especially work in the context of the health care reform: 
That's why my administration is working so hard not only to create and save jobs in the 
short-term, not only to extend unemployment insurance and help for people who have 
lost their health care in this crisis, not just to stem the immediate economic wreckage, 
but to lay a new foundation for growth and prosperity that will put opportunity within 
the reach of not just African-Americans, but all Americans. All Americans. (Applause.) 
Of every race. Of every creed. From every region of the country. (Applause.) We want 
everybody to participate in the American Dream. That's what the NAACP is all about. 
(Applause.) 
Now, one pillar of this new foundation is health insurance for everybody. (Applause.) 
Health insurance reform that cuts costs and makes quality health coverage affordable for 
all, and it closes health care disparities in the process.417 
In his 2010 speech for the NUL, Obama explained through two concrete exam-
ples, the Fair Sentencing Act and the Race to the Top program, how this race-neutral 
approach worked for African-Americans by focusing on structural elements:  
Across agencies, we’re taking on the structural inequalities that have held so many of our 
fellow citizens back, whether it’s making more housing available and more affordable, 
making sure civil rights and anti-discrimination laws are enforced, making sure our 
crime policy is not only tough, but also smart. So yesterday, we took an important step 
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forward when Congress passed a fair sentencing bill that I look forward to signing into 
law—(applause)—a bipartisan bill to help right a longstanding wrong by narrowing sen-
tencing disparities between those convicted of crack cocaine and powder cocaine. It’s the 
right thing to do. (Applause.) We’ve gotten that done.418 
Moreover, Obama used these examples to openly address some of the criticisms he 
had faced for not pursuing more race-specific policies: 
So the charge that Race to the Top isn’t targeted at those young people most in need is 
absolutely false because lifting up quality for all our children—black, white, Hispanic—
that is the central premise of Race to the Top. And you can’t win one of these grants un-
less you’ve got a plan to deal with those schools that are failing and those young people 
who aren’t doing well. Every state and every school district is directly incentivized to deal 
with schools that have been forgotten, been given up on.419 
Obama shows how the criteria used by the program manage to target minority 
schools without naming them, simply by conditioning the grants to the schools that 
have been most neglected, which, because of structural inequalities, are mainly mi-
nority schools. 
In this speech, the President closes his demonstration using a combination of his 
best skills and favorite argumentative strategies. He uses a real life example in the 
form of a letter received from a 10-year-old girl. This has the advantage of giving the 
words more legitimacy, as they are a real example of the will of the people. The age of 
the student also allowed Obama to draw a link with his own family, which he would 
regularly do to give more legitimacy to his words, by pointing out that one of his 
daughters was the same age. This aims at convincing the audience that he has a per-
sonal stake in the issue, because he potentially faces the same situation. Moreover, 
Obama is very good at picking stories or anecdotes that contain a lot of pathos and 
are very touching, which reinforces the emotional bonding with his audience. Rhe-
torician Ruth Amossy insists on the importance of emotions and feelings in argumen-
tative discourse. According to her, intellectual persuasion is not enough to convince 
and trigger action. She distinguishes between ‘convincing,’ which implies intellectual 
capacities, and ‘persuading,’ which touches the heart. She explains that emotions and 
sentiments especially have their place when moral issues are being addressed.420 As 
demonstrated earlier, moral arguments are made in the defense of colorblindness.421 
The bond with the audience is also reinforced through the use of humor. In addition, 
storytelling is a characteristic of black discourse and also a rhetorical device used by 
Critical Race Theorists who devise their sense of authority from their own voices.422 
All these elements come together in this short extract aimed at bringing a largely 
black audience to adhere to Obama’s race-neutral but issue-focused politics: 
I got a letter recently postmarked Covington, Kentucky. It was from Na’Dreya Lattimore, 
10 years old—about the same age as Sasha. And she told me about how her school had 
closed, so she had enrolled in another. Then she had bumped up against other barriers 
to what she felt was her potential. So Na’Dreya was explaining to me how we need to 
improve our education system. She closed by saying this: 
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“One more thing,” she said. (Laughter.) It was a long letter. (Laughter.) “You need to look 
at us differently. We are not black, we’re not white, biracial, Hispanic, Asian, or any other 
nationality.” No, she wrote—“We are the future.” (Applause.)423 
Obama thus presents the demand for race-neutral but issue-focused policy as ema-
nating from the youngest generation of blacks424 to try to convince the old generation 
marked by the Civil Rights Movement to adopt a change in political strategy. 
3.4.5. “It's the Middle Class That Gets Squeezed, and 
That’s Who We Have to Help:”425 Obama’s Focus on the 
Middle Class 
As previously explained, the focus on the middle class was a political necessity 
that emanated from an assessment of the 1970s backlash and subsequent political and 
rhetorical tools used by Republicans. Moreover, this focus also makes sense from a 
racial perspective, as the black middle class is much more fragile than the white mid-
dle class. It is therefore potentially more dependent, for the conservation of its class 
status, on government programs, such as more affordable health care insurance, 
which help reinforce and stabilize this status. Health expenditures are actually 
among the main reasons for personal bankruptcies and have increasingly become a 
middle-class problem.426 
The strong focus on the middle class by the Obama administration goes beyond 
speeches. It can also be illustrated by the creation in 2009 of the White House Middle 
Class Task Force, chaired by Vice-President Joe Biden. The press release that an-
nounced the creation of the Task Force on January 30, 2009, within the first weeks of 
the Obama administration, insisted on the central place of the middle class in the 
American economy. In this release, both the President and the Vice-President em-
phasized the link between a strong and stable middle class and a prosperous Ameri-
ca.427 The early creation of this Task Force underscored the prominent position that 
the Obama administration wanted to give to the middle class and was supposed to 
signal to its members that this administration was aware of the difficulties they faced, 
especially during the Great Recession. In the 2010 Report of the Task Force, the Ex-
ecutive Summary highlighted what the administration had already done, or was do-
ing, for the middle class—the ARRA and the pending health care reform—and un-
derlined the fact that the Task Force’s purpose was to examine more long term policy 
needs.428 The report accentuated policy solutions that take into account the changing 
economic situation, as for example the fact that middle class status increasingly de-
pends on two incomes, which means that programs must be created that allow the 
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combining of work and care for dependents.429 This aspect is also very interesting in a 
racial perspective and for questions of upward social mobility. As it has been previ-
ously explained, the black middle class, to an even greater extent than the white mid-
dle class, bases their class status on two incomes instead of one.430 Moreover, combin-
ing childcare with work requirements is among the problems that are faced by people 
from the lower classes, who would like to move up socially into the middle class, but 
who have difficulties affording childcare. The report also emphasized this aspect.431 
The tone of the report is close to economic populism and emphasizes the conti-
nuity between the working and the middle classes and thus their shared economic 
interests. Besides highlighting the harmful consequences of the economic crisis and 
the Great Recession on the middle class, the report also pinpointed the increasing 
inequalities created by the neoliberal economic system: 
The new Administration did not develop these views overnight. During their campaign 
for office, then-candidates Obama and Biden observed the middle class struggling with a 
recession that began in December 2007. Moreover, this deep downturn came after an 
economic expansion that left too many middle-class families behind. As shown in the 
next section, productivity grew solidly over the 2000s expansion, but the real median in-
come of working-age households actually fell between 2000 and 2007.  
So when the Task Force was created, it was not intended simply to look out for the mid-
dle class over the course of the recession. The Task Force was created to keep a steady 
eye on a central goal of the Obama Administration’s economic policy: making sure that 
the middle class does not get left behind again. As the President’s Executive Order creat-
ing the Task Force puts it: “It is a high priority of my Administration to achieve a secure 
future for middle-class working families, one in which they share in prosperous times 
and are cushioned during hard times.” And importantly, as President Obama said that 
day, our mission extends not only to families who are currently in the middle class, but 
also to those who aspire to rise into the middle class.432 
This presentation of the purpose of the Task Force insists on the need for social poli-
cies and programs that “cushion” difficult periods and allow people to maintain their 
class status, as well as to move up. The report examines several factors that could ex-
plain the difficult situation of the middle class, among them stagnating, and even de-
creasing, real wages. Eventually the report concludes that insufficient economic re-
distribution is the cause: “In other words, there is strong evidence that a major cause 
of the middle-class squeeze is the wedge of inequality: the fact that, at any given level 
of growth, a smaller share of the benefits of that growth is flowing to the middle on 
down.“433 Thus the report, contrary to neoliberal claims, shows that the current eco-
nomic system is inherently unequal and does not work in favor of the middle class. 
Two other tropes are developed in the report that echo elements discussed in 
Part 3.4.3434: the effect of globalization and economic inequality: 
Globalization has played a role as well [in the growth of inequality], as increased compe-
tition with lower-wage countries has raised competitive pressures, especially in our 
manufacturing sector. And a very important factor that tends to get less attention is the 
diminished bargaining power of many workers in the middle class, in part because there 
is less of a union presence in the workplace, and in part because the combined dynamics 
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of technological change, trade, and the growth of the financial sector have tilted the bar-
gaining scale against many mid-level workers.435  
It must be noted once again that the denunciation of elites is very vague. The interest-
ing point here is the way the Obama administration portrays the elements that are 
the enemy of the middle class: growing inequalities resulting from insufficient eco-
nomic redistribution, the negative effects of globalization, and an economic system 
that privileges powerful economic elites. Even more importantly, the report goes be-
yond the traditional solution of economic growth to help the middle class. It also ad-
vocates government intervention in the form of social programs for a better redistri-
bution of this economic growth and to help the middle class over time: 
But the figures above underscore the critically important reality of today’s economy: a re-
turn to economic growth, or even robust job creation, is necessary but not sufficient to 
lift the living standards of middle-class families and loosen the squeeze.  
[…] But in order to reconnect the growth of American prosperity and productivity with 
the growth of middle-class living standards, we also need to ensure that middle-class 
families have access to the things they need in order to succeed: affordable child and el-
der care, opportunities for higher education, secure retirement savings options, and of 
course, quality, affordable health care.436  
The interesting fact is that the Obama administration emphasized the need for social 
policies favorable to the middle class, thus breaking the perception that social poli-
cies are only aimed at poor minorities. These elements are also strongly present in 
Obama’s discourse. 
In his 2009 Address to a Joint Session of Congress, Obama outlined the immedi-
ate measures the government had taken through the ARRA to try to help the middle 
class to face what would be the last months of the Great Recession: 
Because of this plan, 95% of the working households in America will receive a tax cut—a 
tax cut that you will see in your paychecks beginning on April 1st. 
Because of this plan, families who are struggling to pay tuition costs will receive a $2,500 
tax credit for all four years of college. And Americans who have lost their jobs in this re-
cession will be able to receive extended unemployment benefits and continued health 
care coverage to help them weather this storm.437 
By highlighting these provisions of the ARRA—a tax cut, help with college tuition 
fees, unemployment protection in a period of economic crisis, and maintained health 
care insurance in case of a job loss—the Obama administration addressed four items 
on the list of middle class concerns. The tax cut for working Americans is particularly 
interesting in this context, as it more openly addresses the backlash sentiment of hav-
ing to pay higher taxes for programs that benefit the poor and minorities. The ex-
tended unemployment benefits may seem less straightforwardly linked to the middle 
class. Yet, the aspirations that characterize the American middle class according to 
the White House Task Force and the Department of Commerce (“home ownership, a 
car, college education for their children, health and retirement security and occa-
sional family vacations”438) are linked to a well paying job. The economic crisis and 
ensuing Great Recession had created a particular context of crisis where middle class 
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status was threatened by a job loss. The extension of unemployment benefits thus 
represents a means to maintain this class status until a new job can be found. Moreo-
ver, it has been discussed at length how many social programs suffer from a negative 
image. Unemployment benefits can be seen as an earned right through the work con-
tribution that conditions participation in the program. In addition, during difficult 
economic times, a short reliance on a social program is linked to the necessities creat-
ed through exterior factors, the bad luck of the crisis, and is consequently not associ-
ated with a stereotype of laziness or personal fault or responsibility. This perception 
is reflected, for example, in a study conducted by political scientist Bass van Doorn. 
He showed that during bad economic times like the 2008-2010 period, 53.2% of the 
news articles were illustrated with whites, compared to only 32.8% in the favorable 
economic period of 1998-2000.439 The needed and deserved help in a period of eco-
nomic crisis was emphasized by the President, as the whole Address mainly dealt 
with the recession, but also in the extract itself, where this help is presented as a 
means to face the “storm” of the recession.  
Obama used very similar terms in the 2010 SOTU, where he insisted on what 
the administration had done for the middle class, even though the middle class was 
presented through its aspirations rather than being named explicitly: 
That's why we extended or increased unemployment benefits for more than 18 million 
Americans; made health insurance 65 percent cheaper for families who get their cover-
age through COBRA; and passed 25 different tax cuts. 
Now, let me repeat: We cut taxes. We cut taxes for 95 percent of working fami-
lies. (Applause.) We cut taxes for small businesses. We cut taxes for first-time homebuy-
ers. We cut taxes for parents trying to care for their children. We cut taxes for 8 million 
Americans paying for college. (Applause.)440 
In this extract, although Obama uses the term “working families,” which could be 
interpreted as referring rather to the working class, the themes that are mentioned, 
such as jobs, health care, and college education, make it clear that it refers to the 
middle class. Besides, the definition of the middle class given by sociologists Earl 
Wysong, Robert Perrucci, and David Wright insists on the fact that the middle class 
might have money that goes beyond immediate consumptive needs, but this money is 
derived from labor, not from capital investments etc. Once more, this extract stresses 
the importance of the tax issue, which played and still plays such a central role in the 
opposition of the middle class to social policies. 
This definition of the middle class hinging on aspirations also enables Obama to 
create a link between the different racial populations and between blacks and whites 
in particular. He emphasized this in his ‘A More Perfect Union’ speech, the purpose 
of which was to create a bridge between racial groups: “But it also means binding our 
particular grievances—for better health care and better schools and better jobs—to 
the larger aspirations of all Americans […].”441 Here Obama summarizes the same 
aspirations for blacks as for whites, with the slight difference of mentioning schools 
instead of college. This might seem trivial, but it is not necessarily innocent: for the 
black population, the problem starts with schools, because of the deep educational 
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inequalities and the overall worse primary and secondary education that blacks re-
ceive. 
In The Audacity of Hope, Obama makes this link more explicitly. After having ex-
posed the extent of racial inequalities over 18 pages in the chapter entitled “Race”, 
Obama expresses the idea that the problems faced by minorities today are not exclu-
sively related to race, but are middle- and working-class problems. Obama makes the 
connection through shared aspirations: 
Ultimately, though, the most important tool to close the gap between minority and white 
workers may have little to do with race at all. These days, what ails the working-class and 
middle-class blacks and Latinos is not fundamentally different from what ails their white 
counterparts: downsizing, outsourcing, automation, wage stagnation, the dismantling of 
employer-based health-care and pension plans, and schools that fail to teach our young 
people the skills they need to compete in a global economy. (Blacks in particular have 
been vulnerable to these trends, since they are more reliant on blue-collar manufactur-
ing jobs and are less likely to live in suburban communities where new jobs are being 
generated.) And what would help minority workers are same things that would help 
white workers: the opportunity to earn a living wage, the education and training that 
lead to such jobs, labor laws and tax laws that restore some balance to the distribution of 
the nation’s wealth, and health-care, child care, and retirement systems that working 
people can count on.442 
Among the uniting middle-class aspirations that Obama mentions, and which could 
come within reach through a better system of redistribution, is health care. And yet, 
making the case of health care reform from the angle of better redistribution was not 
a straightforward task, because of the negative rhetorical context created by con-
servative and neoliberal discourse around this issue.443 
To make health care reform palatable to the middle class and to try to avoid the 
Clinton health reform debacle, when the middle class ended up turning against the 
reform, Obama worked on several fronts at once. In his discourse, he presented 
health care as being mainly a middle class problem, stressed the middle-class friendly 
dimension of the reform, and argued on the reform’s capacities to reduce the deficit. 
This was also done through the mentioning of health insurance loss stemming from 
the “dismantling of employer-based health care” in the previous extract. This directly 
appeals to the middle class, as they were the ones left out in the previous government 
health care system as they initially got their health insurance through their employer. 
Moreover, this re-emphasized the link with the threat of globalization, as increasing 
health care costs were among the reasons that pushed many employers to sacrifice 
the health benefits of their employees for the sake of competitiveness and to be able 
to yield dividends for their shareholders. 
First, to array any suspicion that the proposed reform would be a program tar-
geted at the poor and thus at minorities, Obama tried to stress the fact that this was 
not the case:  
Our collective failure to meet this challenge—year after year, decade after decade—has 
led us to the breaking point. Everyone understands the extraordinary hardships that are 
placed on the uninsured, who live every day just one accident or illness away from bank-
ruptcy. These are not primarily people on welfare. These are middle-class Americans. 
Some can't get insurance on the job. Others are self-employed, and can't afford it, since 
buying insurance on your own costs you three times as much as the coverage you get 
from your employer. Many other Americans who are willing and able to pay are still de-
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nied insurance due to previous illnesses or conditions that insurance companies decide 
are too risky or expensive to cover.444 
In this extract Obama very openly addresses the backlash sentiments when he refutes 
the idea that health care issues concern “primarily people on welfare,” which again 
underscores the lack of willingness to support social programs for these populations 
and the inherently negative association made with the term. Obama precisely ex-
plains to what extent lacking health insurance has become a major concern for the 
middle class. It is interesting to notice that Obama’s description of the situation is not 
entirely accurate, but it serves the political purpose. In 2009, the highest uninsured 
rate (26.3%) was for people with incomes below $25,000, meaning the category most 
likely to benefit from means-tested programs. It is true, however, that over the past 
two decades uninsured rates had been more sharply increasing for the lower middle 
and the middle class (to 21% and 15.4% respectively).445 In this extract, Obama does 
the exact same thing as detractors of the welfare state: he twisted the statistics and 
used the perceptions people had of the situation to his discursive and political ad-
vantage.  
Obama also tried to put forward the idea that the reform was designed to help 
and favor the middle class: 
And my proposal says that if you still can’t afford the insurance in this new marketplace, 
even though it's going to provide better deals for people than they can get right now in 
the individual marketplace, then we'll offer you tax credits to do so—tax credits that add 
up to the largest middle-class tax cut for health care in history. After all, the wealthiest 
among us can already buy the best insurance there is, and the least well off are able to 
get coverage through Medicaid. So it's the middle class that gets squeezed, and that’s 
who we have to help.446 
Although in this case Obama’s representation is slightly oversimplified—the poor are 
not all able to get Medicaid coverage as eligibility criteria are rather restrictive447—it 
matches the overall perception of Medicaid and serves his discursive purpose: show-
ing that the reform would benefit the middle class and using the magic word of ‘tax 
cut’ by inserting the translation of what a tax credit actually means. 
Obama first tried to explain his campaign promises regarding taxation from an 
economic populist perspective to highlight the fact that the rich would pay more in 
order to enable that kind of reform: 
A: “When I was campaigning, I made a promise that I would not raise your taxes if you 
made $250,000 a year or less. That's what I said. But I said that for people like myself, 
who make more than that, there's nothing wrong with me paying a little bit more in or-
der to help people who've got a little bit less. That was my commitment. (Applause.)”448 
After this essential reminder, Obama tried to explain how the necessary funds for the 
reform were to be obtained: 
So my point is—my point is, number one, two-thirds of the money we can obtain just 
from eliminating waste and inefficiencies. And the Congressional Budget Office has 
agreed with that; this is not something I'm just making up; Republicans don't dispute it. 
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And then the other third we would have to find additional revenue, but it wouldn't come 
on the backs of the middle class.449 
The answer can seem slightly unsatisfying and vague, but it came at the end of a long 
explanation of measures that could be taken, such as the elimination of the greater 
tax exemptions that high incomes get for charity donations. Most importantly, this 
quote stresses the importance of not burdening the middle class. To try to synthetize 
his argument, Obama finally put forward the essential elements of his reform which 
would benefit the middle class: 
Now, let me say this: Under the proposals that Max is working on, more than 100,000 
middle-class Montanans will get a health care tax credit. More than 200,000 Montanans 
will have access to a new marketplace where you can easily compare health insurance 
options. Nearly 30,000 small businesses in Montana will be helped by new tax benefits, 
as well. (Applause.) And we will do all this without adding to our deficit over the next 
decade, largely by cutting waste and ending sweetheart deals for insurance companies 
that don't make anybody any healthier. (Applause.)450 
This passage also makes it apparent that Obama’s economic populism is aimed at the 
middle class, to deflect attention from the divisive anti-social policy discourse and 
create a new common enemy to unite all Americans of lower incomes. 
3.4.6. “In No Other Country on Earth Is My Story Even Pos-
sible:”451 the American Dream 
Arguing for social policy reform in a political context dominated by conservative 
and neoliberal discourse could not be done with a simple discourse that targeted the 
middle class on the basis of economic populism. To cement and consolidate his mes-
sage, Obama also had to rework the most quintessentially American element of the 
national doxa: the American Dream. Obama gave a rather prominent place to the 
American Dream as he enclosed it in the subtitle of his book detailing his political 
ideas: The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream. 
There are many definitions of the American Dream, but they all combine the 
basic set of middle class aspirations in a decidedly optimistic view of improvement of 
the situation. In Who Stole the American Dream?, which analyzed rising economic ine-
qualities and their political origins, political journalist Hedrick Smith defined the 
American Dream as the wish for a “steady job with decent pay and health benefits, 
rising living standards, a home of your own, a secure retirement, and the hope that 
your children would enjoy a better future.”452 
Wysong, Perrucci, and Wright offer a similar definition which insists on the 
idea, encapsulated in the American Dream, that everyone can succeed if they work 
hard, regardless of class origins. According to them, it has included since World War 
II the following elements: “financial security, home ownership, family, higher educa-
tional levels (leading to upward mobility), greater opportunities and rewards for the 
next generation (compared with the current generation), a successful career, happi-
ness, and a comfortable retirement.” However, they also emphasize the “potent ten-
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sions that exist between our cultural ideals and social realities” because of the inher-
ently dreamlike nature of the American, which they explain by using the iceberg 
metaphor of hidden structural inequalities hampering upward social mobility.453 
Reverend Jesse Jackson, in an interview with African-American studies profes-
sor Henry L. Gates, proposed a black and more militant understanding of the Ameri-
can Dream: 
After all, what Thurgood Marshall and Dr. King and Medgar Evers was about, was 
fighting for the American dream. What is the American dream? The American dream is 
one big tent: (Of the many, we are one). One big tent. And on that big tent you have four 
basic promises: equal protection under the law, equal opportunity, equal access, and fair 
share. Historically, we have been in the margins outside of that tent. Now, while in the 
margins, you can either adjust to the margins as if that is your plight and God will fix it 
after a while; you can glorify it as our own unique culture, therefore drop my buckets 
where I am (a conservative approach, a reactionary approach, a frightened approach); or 
you can demand your share of the tent. And that's where confrontation takes place, be-
cause as you seek to open the gates to get inside the big tent, where the opportunities are, 
where education is, where health care is, where wealth is, that's the point of confronta-
tion.  
Jackson’s description of the American Dream shows two notable differences, and one 
major and important similarity to the common or white definition of the American 
Dream. The first difference is the explicitly mentioned notion of equality, be it for the 
protection of the law, opportunity, access, or equal distribution. The other major dif-
ference is that for Jackson, African-Americans have been widely excluded from the 
Dream. Hence his conclusion that the black population has to “demand their share” 
of the Dream. However, what the promise of the Dream encompasses refers to the 
same basic aspirations to opportunity, to education, to health care, and to wealth. 
Jackson’s vision of the American Dream overlaps with the description that journalist 
and activist writer Ta-Nehisi Coates offers in his 2015 book Between the World and Me: 
I have seen that dream all my life. It is perfect houses with nice lawns. It is Memorial Day 
cookouts, block associations, and driveways. The Dream is treehouses and the Club 
Scouts. The Dream smells like peppermint but tastes like strawberry shortcake. And for 
so long I have wanted to escape into the Dream, to fold my country over my head like a 
blanket. And knowing this, knowing that the Dream persists by warring with the known 
world, I was sad for the host, I was sad for all those families, I was sad for my country, but 
above all, in that moment, I was sad for you.454 
Coates describes the American Dream as an illusion in which whites live, which does 
not coincide with reality, and that blacks watch from outside. Moreover, Coates’ de-
scription emphasizes a cultural dimension, betraying an assimilationist pressure to 
culturally resemble white America. This marks a notable difference with Obama’s 
conception, which insists more on shared values and economic aspirations than on 
cultural assimilation. 
Jackson and Coates are both at the more racially conscious end of the African-
American political spectrum and their interpretations consequently diverges consid-
erably from the white mainstream understanding of the Dream. In her book Facing 
Up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation, which proposes a de-
tailed analysis of the American Dream and its racial and class implications, political 
scientist Jennifer Hochschild emphasizes the general belief that the American Dream 
is for everybody in the US, regardless of race, class, gender, religion, as well as its ex-
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tremely wide scope ranging from religious freedom to the middle class ideal of own-
ing a home in the suburbs. According to Hochschild, the notion of success encapsu-
lated in the American Dream can be defined as “a high income, a prestigious job, 
[and] economic security.” She stresses the fact that this notion of success is strongly 
attached to the belief that achieving success is a matter of will and hard work. The 
reward of this hard work should come according to talent and accomplishment, not 
according to need.455 In this, the mainstream understanding diverges from the domi-
nant black political thinking that puts a greater emphasis on fairer redistribution and 
equality of means, instead of just equality of opportunity—which of course stems 
from a very different understanding of structural inequalities in the US. Despite this, 
Hochschild’s analysis shows that most blacks, even poor ones, believe in the Ameri-
can Dream with education and hard work as key elements.456 
In this sense, Obama’s use of the American Dream in his discourse is a racially 
uniting element. However, the way in which Obama has reworked the doxa is quite 
interesting and original in recent years: Obama makes social policies an integral part 
of the American Dream. Obama does so in two ways, the first being the example of 
his own story, which indeed sounds like an American Dream success story, the se-
cond being the presentation of social policies as a tool to reach the American Dream. 
He expansively played that card in his keynote address at the 2004 Democratic Na-
tional Convention, where he described his ascent as an American Dream come true. 
He put this in perspective in his family history, which allowed him to unite two typi-
cal American Dream stories, the immigrant story on the one hand and the rise into 
the middle class on the other. 
Obama starts his speech by presenting himself as the achievement of his fami-
ly’s American Dream: 
Tonight is a particular honor for me because, let's face it, my presence on this stage is 
pretty unlikely. 
My father was a foreign student, born and raised in a small village in Kenya. He grew up 
herding goats, went to school in a tin-roof shack. His father, my grandfather, was a cook, 
a domestic servant to the British. 
But my grandfather had larger dreams for his son. Through hard work and perseverance 
my father got a scholarship to study in a magical place, America, that's shown as a bea-
con of freedom and opportunity to so many who had come before him. 
While studying here my father met my mother. She was born in a town on the other side 
of the world, in Kansas. 
Her father worked on oil rigs and farms through most of the Depression. The day after 
Pearl Harbor, my grandfather signed up for duty, joined Patton's army, marched across 
Europe. Back home my grandmother raised a baby and went to work on a bomber as-
sembly line. After the war, they studied on the GI Bill, bought a house through FHA and 
later moved west, all the way to Hawaii, in search of opportunity.457 
Here Obama uses two stock images of the American Dream: the first focuses on the 
immigrant in search of opportunity and freedom, emphasizing the rise from extreme 
poverty and a background of British colonial oppression to the American freedom of 
a college education. The second tells the story of his white maternal grandparents’ 
rise into middle class America. The most interesting part is his insistence on the role 
played by two government programs, the GI Bill and the mortgage program of the 
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FHA, which allowed his white grandparents’ social and economic ascent and thus the 
fulfillment of their American Dream of a good job and homeownership. It is particu-
larly fitting, as many academics credit these two programs with having strongly con-
tributed to the creation of the prosperous middle class of the post-WWII era.458 
Obama elaborates on the story with the dreams his parents had for themselves 
and for him: 
My parents shared not only an improbable love; they shared an abiding faith in the pos-
sibilities of this nation. They would give me an African name, Barack, or "blessed," believ-
ing that in a tolerant America, your name is no barrier to success. 
They imagined me going to the best schools in the land, even though they weren't rich, 
because in a generous America you don't have to be rich to achieve your potential. 
They're both passed away now. And yet I know that, on this night, they look down on me 
with great pride. 
And I stand here today grateful for the diversity of my heritage, aware that my parents' 
dreams live on in my two precious daughters. 
I stand here knowing that my story is part of the larger American story, that I owe a debt 
to all of those who came before me, and that in no other country on Earth is my story 
even possible.459 
Although Obama’s rendition of his biography in American Dream fashion stresses 
images of racial harmony and the overcoming of racial barriers, he also articulated a 
slight criticism of the illusionary dimension of the Dream, when dealing with his par-
ents’ experience. When he mentions his parents’ hopes for racial tolerance, he care-
fully puts it as a “belief.” This presentation of social policies as being a substantial 
part of the American Dream, as being the tool that puts the Dream within reach, was 
developed by Obama in an even more explicit way on other occasions.460 
In a 2011 interview with NPR, he developed the same idea. When asked if he 
had any special responsibility to the African-American community he answered: 
I have a special responsibility to look out for the interests of every American. That’s my 
job as president of the United States. And I wake up every morning trying to promote the 
kinds of policies that are going to make the biggest difference for the most number of 
people so that they can live out their American dream.461 
While insisting on the role of the president to push for policies that bring the Ameri-
can Dream within reach, this statement both reaffirmed his transcending stance and 
his issue-focused approach aimed at alleviating racial inequalities through general 
social programs. 
However, just as Obama explained to the black population that he could not 
create race-specific programs for minorities, he tried in ‘A More Perfect Union’ to 
explain to the white population that they should abandon their backlash sentiments 
against special preferences: 
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In the white community, the path to a more perfect union means acknowledging that 
what ails the African-American community does not just exist in the minds of black peo-
ple; that the legacy of discrimination—and current incidents of discrimination, while 
less overt than in the past—are real and must be addressed, not just with words, but with 
deeds, by investing in our schools and our communities; by enforcing our civil rights 
laws and ensuring fairness in our criminal justice system; by providing this generation 
with ladders of opportunity that were unavailable for previous generations. It requires 
all Americans to realize that your dreams do not have to come at the expense of my 
dreams; that investing in the health, welfare and education of black and brown and 
white children will ultimately help all of America prosper.462 
In this quote Obama tries to put forward the argument that making the American 
Dream possible for minorities through social policies and anti-discrimination 
measures does not lead to a zero-sum game, as it is perceived in the backlash senti-
ment. On the contrary, it would help the whole population and bring the nation clos-
er to grasping the Dream of a strong, continuously improving country filled with op-
portunity. Obama thus uses the same argument for blacks and whites: the idea that 
shared economic interests would benefit all racial groups and would allow them to 
reach their common American Dream. 
In his 2010 “Budget Message of the President” announcing the budget for Fiscal 
Year 2011, Obama explained how neoliberal policies, not a racial zero-sum game, had 
shattered the American Dream of the middle class: 
As a result, the economy may have been working very well for those at the very top, but 
it was not working for the middle class. Year after year, Americans were forced to work 
longer hours and spend more time away from their loved ones, while their incomes flat-
lined and their sense of economic security evaporated. Beneath the statistics are the sto-
ries of hardship I’ve heard all across America. For too many, there has long been a sense 
that the American dream—a chance to make your own way, to support your family, save 
for college and retirement, own a home—was slipping away. And this sense of anxiety 
has been combined with a deep frustration that Washington either didn’t notice, or 
didn’t care enough to act.  
Those days are over. In the aftermath of this crisis, what is clear is that we cannot simply 
go back to business as usual.  
After accusing the previous administration of having destroyed the American Dream 
for many citizens, Obama goes on describing the negative consequences of the im-
plementation of neoliberal economic policies, such as a cyclic crisis, a failing educa-
tion system, a costly health care system that infringes on economic competitiveness, 
opposition to clean energy, the accumulation of a huge deficit after eight years of 
Bush policies, and the plundering of public money by special interests. Obama then 
goes on to expose how government intervention and social policies would help se-
cure a more stable and prosperous future which would allow living the American 
Dream: 
That is why, as we strive to meet the crisis of the moment, we are continuing to lay a new 
foundation for the future.  
Already, we have made historic strides to reform and improve our schools, to pass health 
insurance reform, to build a new clean energy economy, to cut wasteful spending, and to 
limit the influence of lobbyists and special interests so that we are better serving the na-
tional interest. However, there is much left to do, and this Budget lays out the way 
ahead.463 
                                                        
462	  Obama,	  “A	  More	  Perfect	  Union.”	  
463	  “Budget	  of	  the	  US	  Government:	  Fiscal	  Year	  2011,”	  2.	  
3 — Words Matter 357 
 
Of course, if Obama saw social policies as a means to reach the American Dream, he 
gave a special place to education and health care, the two areas where he wanted to 
achieve major reform. The example of health care will be the only one discussed, as 
the initial education reform died in Congress.464 
In his September 2009 Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Health Care, 
Obama argued for health care on a non-partisan basis, by appealing to the American 
sense of solidarity. After paying tribute to Ted Kennedy for his commitment to soli-
darity and health care, the President commented: 
That large-heartedness—that concern and regard for the plight of others—is not a parti-
san feeling. It's not a Republican or a Democratic feeling. It, too, is part of the American 
character—our ability to stand in other people's shoes; a recognition that we are all in 
this together, and when fortune turns against one of us, others are there to lend a helping 
hand; a belief that in this country, hard work and responsibility should be rewarded by 
some measure of security and fair play; and an acknowledgment that sometimes gov-
ernment has to step in to help deliver on that promise.465 
Obama tried to create bipartisanship for the enactment of the health care bill. Sena-
tor Kennedy had died just a few days before, on August 25, 2009, but the appeal to his 
memory went beyond the concomitance of his death. Kennedy enjoyed respect 
across the aisle and was a long-time health care champion. Obama also tried to play 
on common American values, among them the notions of hard work and responsibil-
ity, which Republicans had claimed for themselves since the 1980s, especially in the 
debate about social policy. However, Obama also asked Republicans to make a step 
towards Democrats, by asking them to envision some government intervention in 
trying to achieve common ideals encapsulated in the idea of the American Dream, 
the promise that if you are hard-working and responsible, your life should become 
better and more secure. 
In June 2010, shortly after signing the ACA into law, Obama presented the Act as 
a means to make the American Dream more secure and as a means to express the 
sense of American solidarity which allows more people to reach this Dream: 
In every story I heard out there, in every letter I read at night, people were not asking for 
much more than that. Nobody ever asked for a handout. Nobody ever asked for a free 
ride. A lot of times, folks wrote they were embarrassed or guilty about asking for help at 
all when so many of their fellow Americans were hurting as well. Some even apologized 
for writing in the first place. But they all said the same thing—please do something for 
people like me and families like mine.466 
In this extract, Obama explicitly detaches health policy from the negative perception 
of undeserved help, to make sure that no association with welfare will be made, by 
emphasizing the fact that the people he mentions did not want to ask for undeserved 
help, but only for fairness, adding: 
[…] every time this country has moved forward, it’s because ordinary Americans like the-
se summoned what’s best in each of us to make life better for all of us. (Applause.) And 
it’s because we as a people find the will to cobble together out of all of our differences 
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that American sense of common interest and common purpose that’s always been re-
quired to advance the dreams of all of our people.  
That’s why we got this done. And that’s what the Affordable Care Act does. And as long 
as I have the honor of being your President, that’s what we’re going to keep on doing to-
gether.467  
In this extract Obama presents the spirit of solidarity as quintessentially American 
and the ACA as a means to reach the American Dream. However, the place social 
policies have in the American Dream according to Obama’s definition also requires 
an additional element of justifying anew the role of government and its legitimacy to 
intervene on behalf of the people. 
3.4.7. “Keep Your Government Hands out of my Medi-
care”—“Sir, Medicare is a Government Program:”468 
Obama on the Role of Government 
The way in which Obama portrayed the role of government deserves a detailed 
analysis for three reasons. On a purely economic level, the attack on government in-
tervention is so strong and dominant in contemporary neoliberal and conservative 
discourse that this must be addressed. The dominance of the anti-government dis-
course in contemporary politics is so strong and pervasive that in order to achieve 
major social policy reform, a new discourse must be constructed that ‘rehabilitates’ 
government intervention. In addition, big government is also a racially loaded code 
word which embeds the notion of favoring minorities.469 And lastly, accusations of 
big government, government takeover, or socialized medicine were among the 
strongest accusations made against Obama’s health care reform. Among them were 
the widely mediatized death panel accusations, which were supposed to show the 
deadly dimension of government intervention, and which tried to prove that Obama 
wanted to establish the same practices as totalitarian regimes, such as Nazi-Germany 
or the USSR. 470 
The central part of the neoliberal and conservative argument is that government 
intervention, especially in the form of social policies, is bad for the economy. First, it 
would lead to socialism, which is the argument mostly used during the hot phase of 
the Cold War; and second, because it would increase the deficit as social programs, in 
this worldview, are considered to be expensive and a waste of money. The supply-
side theory advocates stopping to channel money to the consumer side and to chan-
nel money instead to the supply side, meaning businesses, because this would enable 
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them to produce more and thus hire more people, which eventually would benefit 
everyone. The wealth generated through lower taxes on businesses and the rich 
would eventually “trickle” down to the lower strata of society. But lower taxes neces-
sarily entail lowering social benefits. 
Obama adheres instead to a Keynesian view of the economy: he favors a more 
progressive taxation system and defends the idea that strengthening the middle class 
would boost the economy, meaning that channeling money to the consumer side 
would help the economy. This redistribution to the consumer side of the economy is 
traditionally operated either through tax cuts or redistributional social programs. 
Obama expressed this idea, in a simplified manner, in a 2010 speech given in Parma, 
Ohio:  
Now, I believe we ought to make the tax cuts for the middle class perma-
nent. (Applause.) For the middle class, permanent. These families are the ones who saw 
their wages and incomes flat-line over the last decade—you deserve a break. (Applause.) 
You deserve some help. And because folks in the middle class are more likely to spend 
their tax cut on basic necessities, that strengthens the economy as a whole.471 
This extract also clearly highlights the fact that Obama linked his economic discourse 
to the needs of the middle class and tried to put forward the idea that government 
intervention is beneficial for the middle class, to counter the previous discourse of 
trickle-down economics. Obama promoted a worldview in which it became apparent 
that government intervention and social policies would favor the interests of all 
Americans, from the middle class downwards. This of course was underscored by the 
use of economic populism. 
In The Audacity of Hope, Obama exposes his economic ideas and opinions in the 
chapter entitled “Opportunity,” the longest in the book. In it, he describes his under-
standing of the American economic situation, and the way in which he perceives 
American workers as being squeezed between greedy big business and the threats of 
globalization. Regarding globalization, Obama does not deny some of its benefits, but 
he strongly emphasizes the negative impact of the measures taken in the name of 
international competitiveness, which are also used to advance the interests of the 
stock market.472 
He criticizes laissez-faire economics at length, especially low or inexistent taxes, 
its vilification of government intervention, and its inherently negative and destructive 
image of social policies. The criticism extends to the Reagan and Bush administra-
tions, which tried to apply those ideas. In this, Obama insists on the channeling of 
funds toward the elites through the tax policies of these administrations.473 Obama 
then depicts the vision of a future resulting from these policies, should they continue 
unchecked. This future, closely resembling the late 19th century, would be inherently 
unequal, with a society sharply divided between the super rich and the poor workers 
who serve this elite. Moreover, Obama insists on the long-term dangers for the econ-
omy and its competitiveness should these trends continue. He also mentions the dan-
gers of social and political instability which would result from such an unequal sys-
tem.474  
The rest of the chapter is devoted to possible solutions, which Obama introduc-
es with a historical overview of how he perceives the creation of American prosperity. 
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He attributes this to the American spirit of business and enterprise on the one hand, 
and to government intervention, be it through market regulation, investments, or 
social policies, on the other. Obama discusses the domination of neoliberalism, or 
laissez-faire economics, and the strong ideological correlation between the tenets of 
these economic ideas and many American values, such as individualism, hard work 
and the protestant work ethic, private ownership, and the American Dream; values, 
which, according to Obama, contributed to America’s economic success. This ideo-
logical domination, Obama explains, is the reason for the difficulty of making people 
realize the importance of the role that government has played in the growth of the 
American economy.475 Political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson concur in 
this interpretation. They argue that the political discourse of the past decades has led 
to an “American amnesia,” which made the country forget what led to American 
prosperity in the first place, meaning the well-balanced tension between market and 
government in the mixed economy that made America prosper in the first half of the 
20th century. They even draw attention to the fact that current economic dysfunc-
tionalities, such as economic crises, are due to “too little effective government.”476 
In order to rehabilitate the role of government, Obama exposes the ways in 
which, according to him, government has contributed to build American prosperity 
since the beginning of the US; through massive investments that help private enter-
prise to prosper, such as in infrastructure or in science; by making opportunity avail-
able, for example through the public education system or the GI Bill; or through the 
providing of a safety net to deal with market failures, such as economic crises, but 
also consumer protection, and regulations that prevent the market from running 
wild. Lastly, Obama insists on FDR’s creation, through government intervention, of a 
“social compact between business and the American worker,” the most controversial 
aspect of government intervention in Obama’s view—in other words: the welfare 
state and its social policies.477 
Obama explicitly praises FDR’s choice to follow Keynesian economic tenets to 
overcome the Great Depression, and he also lauds the following 25 years of bipartisan 
consensus around this model and around the American welfare state.478 Obama cites 
the effects of globalization and the two oil crises of the 1970s as economic turning 
points which led to Reagan’s election and the massive implementation of neoliberal 
policies at a national level479—which he described as a failure earlier in the book. As a 
solution to the current economic situation, he simply offers to learn the lessons of 
history and to go back to Lincoln’s view of government, which emphasized the vir-
tues of a mixed economy based on interaction between the public and the private 
sectors:  
But our history should give us confidence that we don’t have to choose between an op-
pressive, government-run economy and a chaotic and unforgiving capitalism. It tells us 
that we can emerge from great economic upheavals stronger, not weaker. Like those who 
came before us, we should be asking ourselves what mix of policies will lead to a dynam-
ic free market and widespread economic security, entrepreneurial innovation and up-
ward mobility. And we can be guided throughout by Lincoln’s simple maxim: that we 
will do collectively, through our government, only those things that we cannot do as well 
or at all individually and privately. 
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In other words, we should be guided by what works.480 
Through these words Obama means going back to the massive investments made by 
Lincoln and FDR, as he exposes in the following pages, with a focus on education at 
all levels, infrastructure and energy, and a renewed social compact based on social 
policies, one of which should of course be affordable health care insurance.481 Linking 
those ideas explicitly to the presidents who implemented them is not innocent, as 
both Lincoln and FDR enjoy a great popularity and are seen as saviors of the nation 
in difficult times. Moreover, Lincoln was the first Republican president and conse-
quently reminds the party that it has not always been against government interven-
tion. 
The principle of Lincoln’s ‘maxim’ that Obama outlined in The Audacity of Hope 
was also a theme in his first Inaugural Address: 
What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them, that the 
stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long no longer apply. The ques-
tion we ask today is not whether our Government is too big or too small, but whether it 
works; whether it helps families find jobs at a decent wage, care they can afford, a re-
tirement that is dignified. Where the answer is yes, we intend to move forward. Where 
the answer is no, programs will end.482  
Obama used the context of the economic crisis and the Great Recession to try to 
make the case for a new attitude regarding government intervention and he high-
lighted the need to overcome the polarized political attitudes that result in legislative 
gridlock and eventually harm the population. He then went on to explain that redis-
tribution actually creates economic prosperity for all. 483 While trying to show that he 
is not a socialist, Obama exposes the harmful effects of unchecked capitalism and 
evokes the mutually beneficial effects of redistribution, which ties in with his under-
standing of the mechanisms of the post-WWII prosperity period. 
Obama’s use of the context of the Great Recession, together with his outreach to 
conservatives by showing his respect of some neoliberal principles, was a recurring 
discursive strategy. He did this in many speeches which pushed for reform. 
Obama acknowledged that he was taking two major paradigms of conservatism 
and neoliberalism into account: he put forward the fact that his intention was not to 
blindly expand government and that he was concerned about the deficit. He then 
went on to explain that the absence of action would have made the situation worse, 
especially at an economic level. He promoted the ARRA, for instance, in terms of 
concerns for economic growth and reducing the deficit, the mantra of neoliberalism. 
Other tenets of laissez-faire economics also underlay his insistence on the fact that 
the ARRA mainly created jobs in the private sector, which also served to deflect accu-
sations of big government.484 
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Obama applied the specific discourse of government intervention to health care. 
On the one hand, Obama denounced the free market as being unfair and harming 
the consumer, contrary to the claims of neoliberals.485 He did this notably in his 2009 
Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Health Care: 
Now, my health care proposal has also been attacked by some who oppose reform as a 
"government takeover" of the entire health care system. As proof, critics point to a provi-
sion in our plan that allows the uninsured and small businesses to choose a publicly 
sponsored insurance option, administered by the government just like Medicaid or Med-
icare. (Applause.) 
So let me set the record straight here. My guiding principle is, and always has been, that 
consumers do better when there is choice and competition. That's how the market 
works. (Applause.) Unfortunately, in 34 states, 75 percent of the insurance market is con-
trolled by five or fewer companies. In Alabama, almost 90 percent is controlled by just 
one company. And without competition, the price of insurance goes up and quality goes 
down. And it makes it easier for insurance companies to treat their customers badly—by 
cherry-picking the healthiest individuals and trying to drop the sickest, by overcharging 
small businesses who have no leverage, and by jacking up rates.486 
Obama had to confront many accusations of government takeover, and he had re-
peatedly been called a socialist. Obama confronted accusations of government takeo-
ver by exposing how harmful and unfair the free market can be, especially regarding 
health care. This was a reality that Americans had increasingly experienced, especial-
ly since the 1990s. Regarding health insurance, Obama showed that the free market 
did not always work and exposed a situation of near monopolies that allowed insur-
ance companies to abuse their clients. He thus painted a situation that required gov-
ernment intervention to address a shortcoming of the free market. Moreover, he in-
sisted on the fact that the freedom of choice that is regularly associated with the idea 
of letting the free market handle things is not necessarily true.  
In the 2009 Address to a Joint Session of Congress he justifies the role of gov-
ernment to intervene in health care by showing how the previous non-intervention 
had created a harmful situation:  
And for that same reason, we must also address the crushing cost of health care. This is a 
cost that now causes a bankruptcy in America every 30 seconds. By the end of the year, it 
could cause 1.5 million Americans to lose their homes. In the last 8 years, premiums have 
grown four times faster than wages. And in each of these years, 1 million more Ameri-
cans have lost their health insurance. It is one of the major reasons why small businesses 
close their doors and corporations ship jobs overseas. And it's one of the largest and fast-
est growing parts of our budget. Given these facts, we can no longer afford to put health 
care reform on hold. We can't afford to do it. It's time.487 
First Obama summarizes the dreadful health care situation of the American popula-
tion, in which he emphasizes the collateral damages of lacking health insurance, such 
as loss of the social status or of economic stability. This presentation in its overall pic-
ture is concomitant with the findings of studies showing the impact of health care 
costs on the financial stability of Americans.488 He also exposes the impact of the fail-
ing health insurance system on the wider economy in a very ingenious way: he turns 
the usual conservative and neoliberal argument of social policies being harmful for 
competitiveness and causing business relocations upside-down by actually present-
                                                        
485	  See	  for	  example:	  Friedman,	  “Economic	  Freedom,	  Human	  Freedom,	  Political	  Freedom.”	  
486	  Obama,	  “Remarks	  by	  the	  President	  to	  a	  Joint	  Session	  of	  Congress	  on	  Health	  Care.”	  
487	  Obama,	  “SOTU	  2009.”	  
488	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  explanations,	  see	  1.4.3.	  Why	  Health	  Care	  Reform?	  
3 — Words Matter 363 
 
ing the absence of health care legislation as being costly for businesses and as causing 
relocations. Obama also plays into concerns raised by neoliberal discourse by em-
phasizing the fact that the reform would bring the deficit down:  
This budget builds on these reforms. It includes a historic commitment to comprehen-
sive health care reform, a down payment on the principle that we must have quality, af-
fordable health care for every American. It's a commitment that's paid for in part by effi-
ciencies in our system that are long overdue. And it's a step we must take if we hope to 
bring down our deficit in the years to come.489 
Obama addressed the deficit issue not only by insisting on how his health care re-
form would help to reduce it, but also by setting the record straight about how the 
deficit situation had been created: not through wasteful spending on social programs, 
but through neoliberal policies as applied by the previous Bush administration. This 
idea can be found in the 2010 State of the Union Address: 
So let me start the discussion of government spending by setting the record straight. At 
the beginning of the last decade, the year 2000, America had a budget surplus of over 
$200 billion. (Applause.) By the time I took office, we had a one-year deficit of over $1 
trillion and projected deficits of $8 trillion over the next decade. Most of this was the re-
sult of not paying for two wars, two tax cuts, and an expensive prescription drug pro-
gram. On top of that, the effects of the recession put a $3 trillion hole in our budget. All 
this was before I walked in the door. (Laughter and applause.)490 
Another aspect of the fear of big government is the label of the tax-and-spend liberal, 
which is linked to the deficit issue. It is the abovementioned perception of Democrats 
as developers of bureaucracy and as wasteful spenders which negatively influences 
the perception of the creation of new programs. Just as Clinton had tried to deflect 
the perception of his reform as yet another big government scheme by having the 
reform drafted by a ‘neutral’ Task Force of experts,491 Obama tried to put forward his 
willingness to engage in bipartisanship and the fact that exterior health care experts 
and professionals would be consulted, as well as businesses and workers—in other 
words, people who would be impacted by the reform: 
Now, there will be many different opinions and ideas about how to achieve reform, and 
that's why I'm bringing together businesses and workers, doctors and health care provid-
ers, Democrats and Republicans to begin work on this issue next week.492 
We now know that bipartisanship did not work out,493 and fears of big government 
could not be deflected just by stating that doctors would be invited into the discus-
sion. 
Obama tried to present his reform as the middle way between total government 
control and a total free market system—as a mixed economy solution, as a bipartisan 
plan regarding its ideas, even if there was no actual bipartisan collaboration. The 
most notoriously Republican idea that had been incorporated into the reform was the 
individual mandate, which the Republicans had put forward during the Clinton re-
form attempt. By the time Obama integrated it into his reform, Republicans would 
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denounce it as a government takeover.494 Obama explained this in a 2010 speech giv-
en in St. Charles, Missouri: 
And I know that people view this as a partisan issue, but the truth is, is that if you set 
aside the politics of it, and what was good for Election Day, it turns out that parties have 
plenty of areas where they agree. And the plan that I’ve put forward is a proposal that’s 
basically somewhere in the middle—one that incorporates the best ideas of Democrats 
and Republicans, even though the Republicans have a hard time acknowledging it.495 
Obama first exposed the far-left reform wish, based on the single-payer model, 
as being impractical. Single payer was never really discussed, and functioned mostly 
as a scarecrow, as an extreme that was supposed to make the proposed reform seem 
minimal and reasonable, like here: 
Now, there are some folks who wanted to scrap the system of private insurance and re-
place it with a government-run health care program, like they have in some other coun-
tries. (Applause.) We’ve got a couple—some applause here. And look, it works well for 
those countries. But I'll just be honest with you: It was not practical or realistic to do here, 
to completely uproot and change a system where the vast majority of people still get 
their health care from employer-based plans. 
Obama then presented the other far end of the ideological spectrum, the neoliberal 
approach: a completely free-market-based system. He did so in an economic populist 
manner, being careful to denounce the insurance industry as the villains who oppress 
and abuse ordinary Americans: 
And on the other side of the spectrum there are those who believe that the answer is to 
simply unleash the insurance industry, and provide less oversight and fewer rules. 
AUDIENCE: Boo! 
THE PRESIDENT: And that somehow that's going to drive down prices for everybody. 
This is called the “putting the foxes in charge of the hen house” approach to health care 
reform. (Applause.) So whatever state regulations were in place, we’d get rid of those and 
so insurance companies could basically find a state that had the worst regulations and 
then from there sell insurance everywhere. And that somehow that was going to be help-
ful to you. All this would do would give insurance companies more leeway to raise pre-
miums and deny care. 
Obama then proceeded to present his own reform as being the sensible middle that 
would empower citizens:  
So I don’t believe we should give either the government or the insurance companies 
more control over health care in America. I want to give you more control over health 
care in America.  
Despite the presentation of health care reform as being bipartisan in substance and 
as representing a pragmatic middle ground between total government control and 
the complete absence of government intervention, fears of big government remained. 
The most incongruous occurrence of such fears surfaced as early as 2009, when peo-
ple started to ask the government to keep their hands off their Medicare.496 In his 
2010 speech in St. Charles, Missouri, Obama reacted to these nonsensical demands. 
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He explained how he answered them by reminding them that Medicare is a govern-
ment-run program and that his reform would make Medicare stronger. First, he pa-
tiently explained how, in his opinion, these demands stemmed from misinformation 
through the media: 
[P]eople have been hit with a lot of bad information. And health care is really im-
portant. And so people get worried and they get nervous. But when you get past the divi-
sive and the deceptive rhetoric, it turns out that most Americans are happy that two gen-
erations ago we made the decision that seniors and the poor should not be saddled with 
unaffordable health care costs or forced to go without needed care. That was a decision 
that we made decades ago. And it was the right decision to make. (Applause.)497 
And by the way, when we made those decisions, folks were saying the exact same thing 
about Medicare: “That’s socialized medicine, this is government-run care,” and blah, 
blah, blah. 
Obama then explained that accusations of socialized medicine are a continuous fea-
ture of health care debates, and that Medicare, Americans’ much-loved program, was 
initially rejected on the same grounds. He then went on to develop this link, by show-
ing how similar the debate was back in 1964-5 and in 2009-10: 
Now, today we face a different choice, but it’s a similar choice to the one that previous 
generations faced, and that is whether we should help middle-class families and business 
owners that are being pummeled by the rising costs of health care. See, back when the 
Medicare debate was taking place, seniors were having problems because they were no 
longer working, and people were getting their health care through their jobs. And so it 
made sense to help them. It made sense to help the poor who might not be em-
ployed. But back then, middle-class folks, they were pretty secure. If you were working, 
you had health care that was affordable. 
But you know what’s happened over the last several decades. What’s happened is, is that 
more and more businesses are saying, we can’t afford to provide health care to our work-
ers because the costs are skyrocketing. So they just drop health care altogether. A lot of 
small businesses, they don’t provide health care to their employees anymore. And large 
businesses, what are they doing? They’re saying to you, we’re going to jack up your pre-
miums, we got to increase your deductibles. If you’re self-employed, you are completely 
out of luck. If you’ve got a preexisting condition, you are completely out of luck. And by 
the way, those of us who are lucky enough to have health care today, we don’t know if 
we’re the ones who are going to lose our job tomorrow, or suddenly it turns out that our 
child has a preexisting condition. And we’ll be stuck in the exact same situation, even if 
we’ve got good health insurance. (Applause.)498 
By showing how the accusations of socialized medicine echo the debate over John-
son’s health reform, Obama tried to capitalize on Medicare’s popularity. Most of all, 
he tried to deflect the fear of government intervention as something bad by highlight-
ing that something that had been decried as “socialized medicine” actually became 
one of the most popular programs in the US alongside Social Security. He thus tried 
to show that the apprehensions people had regarding his reform were just as un-
founded as back then, and that his reform might become just as popular as the John-
son program. Moreover, Obama compared the situation of the middle class in the 
2000s with the situation of the senior citizens in the 1960s, by showing how their 
health care situation had deteriorated since then and deserved the same government 
intervention now. 
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3.5. Conclusion 
In order to defend his agenda of implementing comprehensive and issue fo-
cused health care reform, Obama devised a rhetorical construct that combined sever-
al elements. First, his discourse was carefully adjusted to the racially divisive code 
that had evolved over time in relation to social policies. This included dealing with 
negative stereotypes that underlie this coded discourse, but which could also be det-
rimental, or potentially dangerous, in relation to his own person because of his racial 
origins. Thus Obama’s political persona carefully negotiated those traps by putting 
forward his mixed racial and cultural background while, at the same time, complying 
to a certain extent with the way Americans perceive racial identification. Moreover, 
Obama skillfully used his mixed background in his discursive ethos in order to for-
ward his political agenda.  
To create a new majority in favor of a new social policy, Obama exposed his ide-
ology and worldview in a complex and intricate discursive construct which empha-
sized American unity in order to overcome the racial cleavage that had shattered the 
New Deal coalition. This unity, which Obama greatly based on common values, be-
liefs, and ideas ground in the national founding documents, was completed by a spe-
cifically transcending discourse aimed at fostering understanding between the two 
major racial groups that have historically confronted each other in the US. This 
transcending discourse is strongly buttressed by Obama’s definition of his identity 
and his transcending ethos, which make his discourse authentic. In order to cement 
this transcending, value-driven American unity, Obama also made use of economic 
populism, to create a new class-based enemy that most Americans could feel united 
against, and to give a new outlet to their resentments. However, both racial groups 
had to be reassured, and Obama had a specific discourse to convince both. The black 
population had to be convinced that this unity would also be beneficial for them. As 
for the fear of the white population of not having its interests taken into account in 
this ‘new’ interracial alliance, it too had to be deflected. Obama’s insistence on the 
needs of the middle class was crucial in this respect, which also shows that Obama 
took great care to address the backlash sentiments. Lastly, to counter the prevailing 
neoliberal ideology that had played on the class division resulting from the racial 
cleavage, Obama redefined the doxa of the American Dream to give an inherently 
American dimension to social policies, and crafted a discourse that rehabilitated gov-
ernment intervention, notably by re-appropriating the notion of responsibility, which 
had for a long time played to the advantage of conservatives. 
  
 

  
 
 
4  
The Obama Way: 
 Circumvent the Discourse Problem 
 
 
 
By Adam Zyglis. Published in The Buffalo News on April 1, 2012. 
 

4 — The Obama Way 371 
 
The Obama strategy was not only informed by the assessment of the political 
situation based on a white interpretation, which focused primarily on ways of regain-
ing a presidential majority. The strategy was also informed by black thought, which 
was more concerned with finding political ways to further black interests and to tack-
le racial inequalities. The neutral, but issue-focused approach–or race pragmatic ap-
proach–appears as a means to this end. A close examination of Obama’s political 
thought shows that he adheres to this approach, both for reasons of political feasibil-
ity and efficiency. Despite many black politicians and thinkers seeing the interest and 
relevance of this strategy, Obama has also been criticized for it. Nonetheless, Obama 
managed to apply this strategy in the ACA, which strongly reflects his rhetoric and 
ideology. The ACA shows a neutral, structural, class-based approach, which strongly 
impacts African-Americans, because this population is more concentrated at the low-
er rungs of the social ladder. In addition, the ACA also takes an issue-focused ap-
proach to tackle problems that are more prevalent among the black population, such 
as diabetes or HIV/AIDS. Early statistics show that the ACA has had beneficial ef-
fects, especially on many issues that are of heightened interest for blacks, such as the 
expansion of Community Health Centers. And yet, as the Act built on the existing 
system, old flaws resurfaced, and existing political divisions continued to haunt the 
health care reform. The Medicaid extension has been successfully challenged in the 
Supreme Court. Because of structural inequalities this negatively impacted blacks 
more than other racial populations of the US. Despite this unwanted and negative 
outcome, the relentless Republican attacks against the ACA appear to have contrib-
uted to changing public opinion. Recently, there has been a growing support for sin-
gle payer–an all-government run health care system–among the population, which 
inspires hope that the ACA might be the transition to a truly solid health care system 
in the US. 
 
4.1. “You Have to Go for the Whole Enchilada:”1 Prag-
matic Race Theory 
The ultimate goal of racial equality can be reached by other means than through 
race-specific policies, and many academics and politicians believe that pragmatic 
race theory will provide this means. Pragmatic race theory focuses on two simultane-
ous problems arising from race-specific policies, especially expressed in the form of 
affirmative action. The more obvious problem is of course political backlash. Howev-
er, the more serious problem is its relative inefficiency in creating durable improve-
ments in the socio-economic status of minorities from all social classes. 
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4.1.1. Pragmatic Race Theory 
The emergence of pragmatic race theory is largely due to political considera-
tions (this political strategy is also called deracialized politics, crossover politics, 
transformationist politics, or universalist strategy). Political scientist Georgia A. Per-
sons states that the answer to the question of what constitutes the effective strategy 
for the economic, social, and political liberation of African-Americans is significantly 
defined by the socio-political context and “the tempo of the times.”2 This explains 
that the pragmatic race strategy is mainly a political compromise that is fostered by 
the constraints that the political use of race has created. However, it is also partly fos-
tered by the observation that while neither of the two traditional solutions proposed 
by Democrats and Republicans work entirely, they are not completely wrong either. 
The traditional or conventional view is that Democrats propose solving racial ine-
qualities through more social and race-specific policies, whereas Republicans advo-
cate solutions based on colorblindness and individual responsibility. As has been 
demonstrated above, neither of the offered solutions will manage to solve the issue of 
racial inequality. And more importantly, these two radically opposed approaches 
have created a political stalemate that works to the advantage of the Republicans.  
The switch from a racial political strategy to a deracialized strategy had already 
been proposed by political scientist Charles V. Hamilton in 1973 at the National Ur-
ban League assembly for the development of a new course of action. Hamilton saw 
that the social and economic problems that plighted blacks were not confined to the 
black population. After the polarizing use of race that Republicans had made in the 
1972 presidential election, Hamilton advocated a deracialized strategy to avoid the 
stigmatization of issues that were of vital importance to African-Americans and to 
appeal to the general population across racial lines on issues that were of general in-
terest, such as full employment or health insurance.3 In their analysis of the emer-
gence of the conceptualization of deracialized or crossover politics, political scientists 
Joseph McCormick and Charles E. Jones emphasize the fact that this is very explicitly 
a political strategy that does not deny the reality of race and racism, but which takes 
into account the constraints of electoral politics and the fact that the mainstream 
population would not be willing to support a race-specific political agenda.4 
This political stalemate garnered heightened attention again in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, as shown by the emergence of Clinton’s New Democrats, but also by 
many black, and white, intellectuals and academics. Cornel West described this polit-
ical stalemate in 1993: “The predicable pitting of liberals against conservatives, Great 
Society Democrats against self-help Republicans, reinforces intellectual parochialism 
and political paralysis.”5 West also highlighted the urgent need to find a new path 
both in discourse and concrete social policies. In his 1993 book Race Matters, West 
made a compelling argument for race pragmatism in an attempt to find a middle 
ground between the two opposing positions. As defined by West, pragmatic race the-
ory relies on three major tenets. The first tenet proposes the merging of the two ma-
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jor approaches to solve racial economic inequalities advocated by the two major par-
ties, meaning the structural argument of using social policies to remove economic 
barriers and the behavioral/cultural argument of overcoming defective group values. 
The second tenet is the creation of a broad multiracial political coalition. The third 
tenet is to create issue-focused race-neutral social policies that target populations in 
need according to their class status. Race pragmatism specifically aims at circumvent-
ing the racial divisions that have been used since the late 1970s to dismantle the wel-
fare state. 
West defended the idea of merging the two approaches to solve economic ine-
qualities, because neither corresponds entirely to the situation, while at the same 
time not being completely wrong. West acknowledged the racial progress that has 
been made in the US, especially at the level of economic integration, yet he also 
pointed out the limits of the progress made by insisting on the continued existence of 
hidden racism and white supremacy. In his search for a middle ground, West criti-
cized both the liberal approach of the Democratic Party and the conservative ap-
proach of the Republican Party. In his perception, the two attitudes are radically op-
posed and focus only on one issue respectively: the liberal structuralists (represented 
by the Democratic Party) believe that only circumstances, such as discrimination and 
the lack of economic opportunity, prevent black progress, whereas conservative be-
havioralists (represented by the Republican Party) believe that the lack of Protestant 
work ethic prevents black progress.6  
For West there are major limitations to these approaches. He criticized the sepa-
ration between “structure and behavior.” According to him, “institutions and values 
go hand in hand,” because culture and values are something that are promoted by 
institutions, such as churches, schools, and communication industries. While not 
thinking that a strong will alone is enough to overcome structural barriers, West con-
siders that the fact that liberals treat values as a taboo has a ravaging impact because 
this deprives people of a sense of self-worth and identity. West wrote of a “monumen-
tal eclipse of hope, the unprecedented collapse of meaning, the incredible disregard 
of human life” among certain black populations in the inner city neighborhoods, and 
he qualified this as “the nihilistic threat to [their] very existence.” However, he just as 
sharply criticized the conservative behavioralist discourse for its limited view of indi-
vidual responsibility and not taking into account historical oppression and structural 
inequalities: “In this way crucial and indispensable themes of self-help and personal 
responsibility are wrenched out of historical context and contemporary circumstanc-
es—as if it was all a matter of personal will.”7  
Thus West proposes an alternative middle way that incorporates both, liberal 
structuralism and conservative behavioralism, by taking into account structural bar-
riers while addressing self-destruction and destructive behavior.8 By incorporating 
values-issues, pragmatic race theory also reaches out to working and middle class 
blacks for whom these issues are central and which they emphasize in order to set 
themselves apart from negative stereotypes linked to the ‘underclass.’ Moreover, this 
does not only appeal to a certain part of the black population, but also to a significant 
part of the white population. Indeed, one of the reproaches made to liberal Demo-
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crats of the 1970s and 1980s was their refusal to discuss and admit issues in the ‘un-
derclass,’ and especially issues related to out-of-wedlock births and substance abuse.9  
Political philosopher Elizabeth Anderson, although making a strong argument 
in favor of affirmative action, shares West’s argument. Although being strongly aware 
that the common conservative, or behavioralist, argument is essentially used to op-
pose structural explanations and remedies, she also sees that the sole focus on exter-
nal causes “wrongly exculpates bad behavior and thereby reinforce the very conduct 
that keeps the black community down.”10 The polarized either/or focus is ultimately 
detrimental to the interests of the black population. Anderson, just as West, argues 
for the possibility of combining both. 
Pragmatic race theory does not only propose a different approach regarding the 
causes of the problems in terms of structural or behavioral origins, but also a change 
in terms of racial reasoning. West advised that instead of being only in lock step with 
blacks, black politicians should focus on inclusion and establish a coalition strategy 
with all those who want to fight racism and inequality. In this context West also men-
tioned that black politicians needed to be able to criticize and denounce black medi-
ocrity. He pinpointed the appointment of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, 
who despite deserved criticism was supported by black leaders such as Louis Farra-
khan out of racial solidarity. For West, this inclusion strategy also meant abandoning 
black cultural conservatism (subordinating black women, attacking gays and lesbi-
ans) and replacing it with black cultural democracy. Widening the tent and relying 
less on closed racial solidarity also leads to a different policy approach. West advo-
cated a policy approach focusing on class-based affirmative action. He grounds this 
argument on the efficiency of “white affirmative action” programs, such as the FHA 
programs and the GI Bill,11 which greatly contributed to creating the strong middle 
class of the 1950s and 1960s. West identified two major problems that according to 
him prevent blacks from meaningfully defending redistributive policies. He first 
mentioned the monolithic treatment of the black population that confuses the black 
middle class with the black poor. He argues that a special focus on the working poor 
is needed, and on people who are on the edge of poverty. It could be argued that this 
should include the black lower middle class that has a very fragile social status and is 
always in danger of losing their social position. Second, West sees a need for a multi-
racial alliance and principled coalitions, and thus he sees a need for a non-racial class 
approach that does not ask for special privileges for only one specific racial popula-
tion but for an approach that creates a strong basis for advocating broad redistribu-
tive measures.12 
It is especially the last feature of the pragmatic race theory that finds broad sup-
port. Sociologist Dalton Conley insists on the need for more aggressive policies focus-
ing on the wealth gap between the different racial populations, especially between 
whites and blacks. He insists on the fact that this policy does not need to be a racial 
policy, as long as it is a wealth-based policy, in other words, a policy designed along 
class lines because class so closely reflects race when looking at economic aspects. 
Thus, a wealth policy targeting the “asset poor” would mainly help African-
Americans as they constitute a majority of this group. 13 Conley advocates a race-
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neutral but issue-focused policy targeting a specific structural difference created 
through historical racial oppression. In this context it must be recalled that one of the 
main purposes of racism and racial oppression is to achieve economic exploitation. 
Sociologist Michael P. Jeffries also insists on this stratification effect of past and pre-
sent discrimination that closely links race and class.14 
In 2009 Manning Marable concurred with most of what West had said in 1993, 
although he had criticized the latter in 1995 for his very strong class orientation, his 
heightened focus on coalition building, and the opposition to affirmative action he 
perceived in West. By 2009 Marable had changed his opinion somewhat and advo-
cated the breakdown of the old racial categories and more inclusive politics in order 
to challenge white hegemony. Instead of continuing an old race-based approach, 
Marable encouraged a struggle based on a “have” vs. “have-nots” dichotomy and thus 
essentially a class-based struggle. He saw this class approach primarily as related to 
work conditions, thus differing slightly from Jeffries who focuses also more largely on 
wealth and assets. Marable based this mainly on the observation of the deterioration 
of the work conditions since the 1980s as well as the difficult economic situation in 
the second half of the 2010s. 15 The greater economic insecurity and increasing ine-
qualities between the rich and the poor resulting from Reagan’s application of ne-
oliberal economic theories led Marable to point out the need for changes in the strat-
egy of black politics: “The radical changes within the domestic economy require that 
black leadership reaches out to other oppressed sectors of the society, creating a 
common program for economic and social justice.”16 Marable especially criticized 
identity politics for its lack of focus on social inequality and because he considered 
that identity politics created a “competitive model of group empowerment”—a zero-
sum game that was detrimental to coalition building. He was very adamant about the 
need to see the intersection between race and class, the need to link racial oppression 
with class exploitation. In this sense, he saw the key to dismantling racism in the re-
distribution of wealth.17 
West made a similar appeal to blacks to be more inclusive and to see that their 
claims are linked to the claims of others in the US, that the economic situation makes 
their claims go beyond the boundaries of race: “And we must acknowledge that as a 
people—E Pluribus Unum—we are on a slippery slope toward economic strife, social 
turmoil, and cultural chaos. If we go down, we go down together.”18 It is necessary to 
insist on this appeal to black politics to open up to other populations because so far 
only white exclusionary attitudes have been discussed. However, there is also a 
strong awareness of the need of inclusion stemming from blacks, as well as the reali-
zation that demands for racial policies exclude poor whites who face similar econom-
ic oppression. Marable insists on the underestimation of the class factor and on the 
need to move away from a radicalized discourse based on race to a critique of ine-
qualities that is inclusive. However, he also highlights that both race and class have to 
be taken into account. He focuses on the link between racial oppression and class 
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exploitation that has already been emphasized by Jeffries and that had mostly clearly 
been demonstrated by Myrdal in his American Dilemma.19  
Legal scholar, leader of the Critical Race Theory movement, and pioneer of in-
tersectionality theory Kimberlé Crenshaw insists on the ongoing reality of this crucial 
connection. According to her, Civil Rights only removed symbolic subordination and 
put an end to the rhetoric of white supremacy. This, however, is only a formal equali-
ty: “White race-consciousness, in a new but nonetheless virulent form, plays an im-
portant, perhaps crucial, role in the new regime that has legitimated the deteriorating 
day-to-day material conditions of the majority of blacks.”20 Based on this acceptance 
of the crucial connection of race and class, Marable calls for redistribution of wealth 
as a key to dismantling racism. However, Marable uses a different term and calls this 
approach transformationism.21  
Political scientist and historian Ira Katznelson has an ambivalent position about 
the race pragmatic approach. He advocates taking into account the structural effect of 
inherited inequality and curtailed opportunity, just as Jeffries does, and especially 
pleads for the kind of issue-focused economic measures that helped whites in the first 
place to reach middle-class status: extensive social policies for the expansion of op-
portunity, which include subsidized mortgages, education grants and training, small 
business loans, help with job searches and placement, more Earned Income Tax 
Credit, child care and guaranteed basic health insurance. Despite supporting this 
approach, Katznelson also wants to show the extent of structural white affirmative 
action and white privilege in order to argue for better classical affirmative action as a 
means for compensation,22 which would represent a racial approach that is incompat-
ible with race pragmatism. 
Antiracism activist Tim Wise harshly criticizes race pragmatics for two major 
reasons. In his opinion, the race pragmatic approach does not work because the pub-
lic identifies all social policies with minorities and calls any other understanding “na-
ïve.” Wise insists on the fact that the public will perceive any policy in even more 
neutral areas such as education, health care, and job creation, as essentially benefit-
ing minorities. Moreover, Wise criticizes the universal focus as an insufficient remedy 
since racial inequalities stem from racism. In his opinion, a neutral approach cannot 
fully address this specificity.23 It has been shown above that at the same social class 
level blacks fare worse than whites and face greater difficulties. Notwithstanding the 
statistical reality and foundation of Wise’s criticism, the crucial aspect of pragmatic 
race theory is that it is a political theory and thus heavily focuses on political feasibil-
ity. The universal approach of race pragmatics specifically aims at addressing the 
utopian dimension of race-specific policies: the impossibility of finding in the con-
temporary political context a broad support for race-specific policies. As has been 
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  171–72.	  
23	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highlighted above, in a political and economic climate that is dominated by neoliber-
al economic theories and a divisive racial discourse, which both aim at the disman-
tling of social policies and preventing a class alliance of the have-nots, demanding 
race-specific policies is committing political suicide. Moreover, race pragmatism also 
takes into account the fact that the approach would serve whites with similar eco-
nomic interests. However, a perception of favoring minorities more, as well as the 
perception of a zero-sum game, must be avoided, lest these whites be scared into vot-
ing against their interests out of racial resentment. 
As previously mentioned, the focus on economic issues among black thinkers 
and politicians is hardly new, ranging from Du Bois over Martin Luther King Jr. and 
John Lewis to the Black Panthers. However, it is the universalist focus that is more 
problematic, because it can easily give the impression that more racial claims are be-
ing abandoned. The emergence in the 1980s of a new type of black politicians in elec-
toral politics who started to put forward racial reconciliation and who did not run on 
a black agenda was identified as a strategic dilemma for black politics by political 
scientist Georgia A. Persons. However, in this context, she did not consider the ab-
sence of open racial appeals to black voters to be a problem, contrary to the absence 
of a populist or reformist agenda. Persons expressed these concerns in the context of 
a rise of black conservatives in the late 1980s, such as Republican Representative Gary 
Franks who represented Connecticut’s 5th Congressional district from 1991 to 1997 for 
the Republican Party.24 Frank was the first black Republican to be elected to the 
House since 1935.25 The next black Republican, Julius Caesar Watts, was elected in 
1995 in Oklahoma’s 4th district.26 The Reagan and Bush administration had appointed 
quite a few black conservatives, among them Clarence Thomas (EEOC in 1982, the 
Supreme Court in 1991), Clarence Pendleton Jr. (Chairman of the US Civil Rights 
Commission), Colin Powell (Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989,) Condoleezza 
Rice (Senior Director of the National Security Council on Soviet Affairs and East Eu-
ropean Affairs, 1989), or Louis Wade Sullivan (United States Secretary for Health and 
Human Services, 1989). 
At the time of the emergence of a new deracialized black politics in the 1980s 
and 1990s that was more focused on broader electoral politics, political scientist Da-
vid Covin pointed to the constraints that those politicians faced. Their leadership 
emerged in a context dominated by white interests that were at odds with the per-
ceived interest of blacks. Covin indicated that most Congressional blacks perceived 
their role to be to address specific black problems, but they represent majority black 
districts. The question of racial uplift or self-help, as defined by Du Bois, is not ques-
tioned by these congresspeople, but deracialization is seen as problematic. Covin 
pointed to the conundrum faced by black politicians. If they adopt a universalist 
strategy they fail to serve the more specific needs of the black population, but if they 
pursue black interests “the society at large will expend stupendous energies to limit 
their effectiveness.”27 The pragmatic race strategy addresses this conundrum as best 
as possible. However, it is undeniable that in order to be able to operate politically at 
a national level concessions are required. 
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Persons noted a major change in black electoral politics in November 1989, 
when several black candidates won the mayoralties in majority white cities (New 
York, New Haven, Seattle, Cleveland, and Durham, NC) as well as the Democrat L. 
Douglas Wilder who was elected governor of Virginia the same year.28 Persons noted 
that most black politicians had previously come from predominantly black constitu-
encies, and whites showed a strong and persistent reluctance to support them. Ac-
cording to Persons’ analysis, the interesting common point of these elected officials 
was that these winning candidates had not made any of the familiar appeals to black 
voters and had deemphasized anything that could be interpreted as a black agenda. 
Persons labels this “cross-over politics” and insists on the fact that race is addressed at 
best to appeal for racial harmony. This was a major shift away from the previous 
“new black politics” that had emerged in the 1970s and which had emphasized racial 
appeals in black majority districts to achieve substantive representation for black in-
terests.29 Marable noted that it was really at the beginning of the 21st century that 
blacks started to win elections even in predominantly white areas, for example in 
New Hampshire, Iowa, or Minnesota.30 
The deracialized, or crossover, or universalist, or race pragmatic strategy has al-
lowed many other black politicians to be elected into important positions without 
relying mainly on black votes. A few examples would be Deval Patrick, the Demo-
cratic governor of Massachusetts from 2007 to 2015, Democrat David Paterson who 
served as New York’s governor from 2008 to 2010, Senator Carol Moseley Braun (D-IL 
1993-1999) who was the first black senator for the Democratic Party, and Senator Cory 
Booker (D-NJ) who was elected in 2013, managing the transition from the mayoralty 
of Newark, NJ (2006-2013), a majority black city, to the representation of a majority 
white state in the US Senate. 
Yet, this strategy is not only an appeal to whites. It also corresponds to certain 
changes and to a certain diversity of opinion within the black electorate. Political sci-
entist Frederick Harris noted that there is a division within black political opinion 
regarding the best strategy to adopt to improve the group status of blacks; whether to 
opt for protest or for mainstream approaches; whether to view their identity primari-
ly as black or primarily as American. Harris thinks that these questions are part of 
Obama’s deracialized political strategy.31 Moreover, Harris points out similarities with 
the issue of personal responsibility, which he sees as having been initiated by black 
and white conservatives in the 1980s; issue over which the African-American popula-
tion is divided. There is no consensus over whether society is to blame for the social 
ills that black communities confront, or whether bad individual choices are to 
blame.32 Obama’s mixed approach to the question is based on a discourse that builds 
a reciprocal responsibility between the individuals and the government, seeking to 
reconcile both positions. 
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Political scientist David A. Bositis sees growing generational changes within the 
black electorate. According to his analysis, younger blacks tend to identify more as 
independents, to be less politically active, and to believe less in “political efficacy.” 
Moreover, he noted that blacks identified more with the GOP during midterm elec-
tions.33 
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Diagram 35 Black Partisanship by Age Cohort, 1998-200834 
It appears that the younger generation of people under age 35 particularly tend to less 
strongly identify with the Democratic Party. Although most of those not identifying 
with the Democrats identify as independents, a non-negligible part of almost 10% 
identify with Republicans.  
Black presidential votes differ slightly and have been more consistently in favor 
of Democrats over the past decades. 
 
 
Diagram 36 Black Presidential Votes, 1980-2008, in Percent35 
The comparatively low vote for Clinton in 1992 shows that blacks do not neces-
sarily vote almost exclusively for the Democratic candidate, but that a Republican or 
independent candidate can gain some black votes as well. Moreover, black party 
identification is more nuanced than the black presidential voting pattern, with more 
blacks identifying as Independents than actually voting for an independent candi-
date. 
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Diagram 37 Black Party Identification, 1980-2008, in Percent36 
Of course, the massive, almost unanimous black vote for Obama stands out. Howev-
er, black party identification with Democrats only moderately increased that year. In 
the context of the 2008 Obama election, it must not be forgotten that during the 2008 
primaries, blacks had not yet endorsed Obama and that the little-known candidate 
had to compete with Hillary Clinton, who benefited from Bill Clinton’s popularity. 
Obama also faced criticism from black leaders, such as Al Sharpton, who expressed 
his wariness, when he said that he wanted first to see Obama’s political approach 
before supporting him.37 
Political scientist Kareem Crayton highlighted how Obama had to use surro-
gates from the black political establishment in order to establish his credentials with 
the black electorate. For Obama’s ascendance in Chicago, Crayton cites in particular 
Reverend Wright, who offered him acceptance in the black community and gave him 
a religious and cultural identity. In this context, Crayton insists on the importance of 
the membership in a church as political base. He also cites Illinois Senator Emil Jones 
Jr. who enhanced Obama’s political résumé and who helped him for the Senate 
race.38 Obama’s longest-serving presidential advisor Valerie Jarrett is credited with a 
similar role very early on. Jarrett met the Obamas at the end of the 1980s when they 
were still lawyers in Chicago. Jarrett was a protégé of Chicago Mayor Richard Daley 
of Chicago and was able to introduce the Obamas to the higher-connected circles of 
the city. During the 2008 campaign Jarrett was also essential in working the black 
leadership to convince them that Obama could win.39 
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4.1.2.  “If We Can’t Go Hand in Hand I Don’t Want to 
Go:”40 A Resurrection of the New Deal Coalition? 
Despite these political insights, the mobilization of voters along class lines is not 
an easy task. The 1990s witnessed a revival of the study of class and political behavior. 
41 In this part I will only focus on some theoretical aspects of the political implications 
of class.42 Sociologists Jeff Manza and Clem Brooks see a class dimension to voting 
behavior, but they insist on the fact that there is little political class-consciousness. It 
is more a sharing of the same economic conditions that would indicate that there are 
shared interests. The same hazy and vague class feeling as discussed in PART 2 ap-
plies to the political class-consciousness.43 Brooks and Manza propose for political 
analysis “a more limited, structural conception [of class], defining clusters of actors in 
similar economic locations rather than a group of actors with highly developed con-
sciousness of those interests.”44 Sociologist Dennis Gilbert shares the assumption that 
there is a critical link between objective class position and political behavior. Howev-
er, he explains that this objective position must be strengthened with class-
consciousness or class identification to have a causal effect between class and politi-
cal ideology.45  
Sociologists Earl Wysong, Robert Perrucci and David Wright see a “class war” 
taking place in American politics because the elite class has cultural, economic, and 
political interests directly opposed to the working class; they also see a domination of 
elite interests in the current political landscape. However, they specify that this “class 
war” has nothing to do with the conservative use of the term “class war,” which is 
invoked when taxes on the rich are proposed. To illustrate these power struggles 
around conflicting economic interests that can be described as class warfare, they 
give the example of wage increases, which mean a loss of capital for the rich. Among 
the tactics of class warfare the rich use against the poor, they cite business practices 
outsourcing, union-busting, downsizing, wage and benefit cutting, or plant closing. 
Government policies they cite are tax cuts for the rich, austerity budgets, anti-labor 
laws, or international “free trade” agreements. Cultural aspects include “corporate 
media-disseminated attacks by conservative organizations, pundits, and other super-
class allies against ‘big government’ and trade unions as the primary sources of our 
major economic and social problems”. This also includes social policy bashing, accu-
sations about the “inefficiency” of public institutions like schools, and the heralding 
of the private sector and market as panaceas.46 Gilbert also identifies class warfare in 
the political power that is wielded through financial influence. Money obviously in-
fluences politics through campaign financing and personal fortunes thrown behind 
electoral campaigns, and appointments resulting from money connections/class con-
nections, but it also does so through policy planning groups and think tanks. Gilbert 
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points out that part of this influence is exerted in an indirect way through the econ-
omy and the media.47 Political scientists Sidney Verba and Gary R. Orren describe 
this mechanics as follows:  
Political equality … poses a constant challenge to economic inequality as disadvantaged 
groups petition the state for redress. Egalitarian demands lead to equalizing legislation, 
such as the progressive income tax. But the continuing disparities in the economic 
sphere work to limit the effectiveness of such laws, as the economically advantaged 
groups unleash their greater resources in the political sphere. These groups lobby for tax 
loopholes, hire lawyers and accountants to maximize their benefit from tax laws, and 
then deduct the costs.48 
Verba and Orren’s description highlights two aspects: the two confronting class poles 
do not have the same financial resources and do not work through the same channels 
for their political demands, with the lower pole operating in the public political 
sphere, while the upper pole uses its money resources to wield influence under the 
political surface. Verba and Orren also recognize inequality as a defining element for 
this class confrontation to take place. However, this class war, despite its demonstra-
ble existence, is not openly discussed and admitted. Political scientist Larry Bartels 
thinks that the fact that economic inequality is/was not a major issue on the political 
agenda is linked to the lack of consciousness regarding the political dimension of 
economic inequality in the US. He expresses his puzzlement regarding even scholarly 
explanations of economic inequality, which tend to look at every reason, such as ba-
by-boomers flooding the job market or educational issues, but seem never to examine 
political factors.49 Similarly, sociologist and political scientist Leslie McCall points out 
that inequality, and dealing openly with it, remain a tricky topic that is potentially 
divisive, especially with fast accusations of “class warfare” coming from the elite 
class.50 
 Manza and Brooks give a historical explanation for this absence of open class 
politics in the American political context. According to them “[t]he absence of an 
electorally powerful labor or social democratic party has meant that class divisions 
are not as politicized in the same way as in other countries.” They explain that the 
two-party system and single-member districts prevented the emergence of third par-
ties, which had a negative effect on the attempts to create class-based third parties 
between the 1890s and World War II. Additionally, they argue that the South under-
mined class politics: African-Americans and many white working class individuals 
were disenfranchised. Paradoxically, they think that the early enfranchisement of 
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white workers in the US meant that class-based demands for franchise were not 
linked to demands for social policies, as was the case in European countries, leading 
to a weakened political class alliance in the US.51  
The role of political machines that hampered class-based alliances has also been 
denounced. Sociologist François Bonnet explains that class-consciousness was erod-
ed by the ethnic solidarity extolled by politicians relying on political machines for 
their careers. Thus political machines contributed to preventing the formation of so-
cial-democratic parties as in Europe and blocking a class-based solidarity between 
blacks and whites. This was reinforced by the allocation of resources (redistribution) 
through the political machines in their nepotistic system along ethnic and racial 
lines, instead of class lines.52 McCarty et al. identify a party polarization along income 
lines today that they consider as consistent with a period of high inequality.53 Regard-
ing general trends, this is certainly true. However, more fine-tuned distinctions must 
be drawn to explain contradicting phenomena like the Reagan-Democrats, working 
and middle class people voting Republican against their own economic interests, and 
liberal professionals or higher income people voting Democrat.  
The divisiveness of race in social policies has already been demonstrated. West’s 
development of the pragmatic race theory was greatly influenced by this assessment. 
He insisted on the importance of the race struggle to deflect white struggle. Accord-
ing to him, black oppression serves as a factor of stability in American democracy: 
white unity is created in opposition to blacks.54 Political scientist Joe Feagin makes a 
similar demonstration in White Party, White Government, insisting on the harmful ef-
fects of this for poorer whites. Feagin points out that while US society is clearly dom-
inated by racism, it is is also marked by a strong classism. Thus, ultimately, the com-
bined oppression of race and class privileges a small white minority at the very top.55 
Race pragmatism insists on the need to create a multiracial alliance to defend mean-
ingful redistributive policies. This would mean the re-creation of a New Deal coali-
tion, a multiracial and multiethnic coalition based on common economic interests, 
effectively an alliance based on common class interests.  
There are examples of interracial class-based alliances other than the New Deal 
coalition. Historian Jacqueline Jones evokes some biracial organizations in the US, 
although she points out that they were short-lived. The Populist Party of the 1890s 
was an interracial party united around common economic interests. She mentions 
smaller organizations with narrower goals such as the Southern Tenant Farmers Un-
ion of the 1930s and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, particularly during the 
1930s.56 
However, some major factors have changed compared to the situation that wit-
nessed the emergence of the New Deal coalition. The 1929 stock market crash and 
ensuing Great Depression created a situation that was favorable for a class alliance 
around social policies and strong government intervention, notably because of the 
intellectual backing and popular support for Keynesianism. Since the 1970s, however, 
neoliberal thought has dominated the political economy, making a focus on poverty 
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more difficult. As has been mentioned above, poverty is often presented as self-
inflicted because of a lack of Protestant work ethic and deficient cultural values, in an 
economic system that is presented as fair, based on equal opportunity, and where 
everyone benefits from economic growth. Neoliberalism especially erased the think-
ing of an economic class struggle. The founders of neoliberal thought like Ludwig 
von Mises and Milton Friedman put forward the fundamentally democratic aspect of 
the free market, i.e. the fact that a free private market “is the only mechanism that 
permits a complex interrelated society to be organized from the bottom up rather 
than the top down.”57  
Moreover, Friedman also greatly insisted on the fact that the free private market 
benefits everyone and is not a zero-sum game. In this system everyone can succeed, 
provided they work hard. Of course, this discourse resonates deeply with Americans 
as American tradition strongly emphasizes self-reliance, individualism, and private 
enterprise. Nonetheless, in a period dominated by neoliberal ideas, this creates an 
environment that is not propitious to policies aimed at the poor. The ideological con-
text favorable to claims of more class equality that allowed vast government interven-
tion, in the form of the New Deal and the Great Society, is over. Government inter-
vention itself, no matter to what end, has been heavily attacked and even discredited 
by neoliberal rhetoric, especially by associating any form of government intervention 
with socialism and communism, thus exploiting the context of the Cold War to 
weaken redistribution. 
Moreover, it has been extensively demonstrated how social policies, especially 
measures aimed at the poorest, are heavily associated with minorities. These 
measures have been reduced to ‘welfare,’ which is stigmatized. Political scientist Mi-
chael C. Dawson insists on this problematic aspect. He thinks that programs aimed at 
the black poor could mobilize the black poor, but nobody else. In this context, Daw-
son also insists that blacks, and especially the black poor, are not only a political 
power minority, but also a numerical minority, making their vote less significant.58 
Targeting only the poor, just as targeting only race, would lead to political defeat. 
Moreover, the deteriorating economic conditions since the late 1970s, linked to glob-
alization and the implementation of neoliberal supply-side principles, have eroded 
the middle class, especially hitting the lower middle class, and pushing the working 
class closer to the edge of poverty. These populations are made to believe that the 
profits of the rich will trickle down to benefit them and if this does not happen, it is 
ultimately due to social programs for minorities that syphon away their tax money. 
Thus to mobilize them, they need to be convinced that new programs will benefit 
them as well, and even benefit them primarily. Not only must they be shown that 
their loss of economic power is not caused by social policies, but that they really need 
social policies, for example to meet soaring health care and higher education costs. 
The only possible way to create meaningful social policy that helps alleviate some of 
the greater burden on the population and overcome the class-race division appears to 
be a broad universal policy that seriously aims at the working and middle classes.  
This assessment of the need for a broad, interracial class alliance is further sup-
ported by political scientist Larry Bartels. He demonstrated that policy making was 
more influenced by the preferences of the affluent than by the masses, particularly in 
the case of spending on social policies. Regarding poor citizens, this trend was non-
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existent or even negative, meaning that policy enactment was even contrary to the 
preferences of poor citizens.59  
4.1.3. “Your Dreams Do Not Have to Come at the Expense 
of My Dreams:”60 Obama as a Race Pragmatist 
Obama’s race pragmatic position is first of all influenced by his personal story 
and his identity, which has been discussed previously. The point that most strongly 
informs Obama’s choice of pursuing a race pragmatic strategy stems from the 
makeup of his family, which he describes as follows in The Audacity of Hope:  
As the child of a black man a white woman, someone who was born in the racial melting 
pot of Hawaii, with a sister who’s half Indonesian but who’s usually mistaken for Mexi-
can or Puerto Rican, and a brother-in-law and a niece of Chinese descent, with some 
blood relatives who resemble Margaret Thatcher and others who could pass for Bernie 
Mac, so that family get-togethers over Christmas take on the appearance of a UN Gen-
eral Assembly meeting, I’ve never had the option of restricting my loyalties on the basis 
of race, or measuring my worth on the basis of tribe. 61  
He explained that because of this, he had no other choice than to believe in Dr. King’s 
vision of America, in which people would only be judged on the content of their 
character and not by the color of their skin.62 
The recurrent use of his personal story that emphasized his complex racial 
background in his speeches made Obama’s transcending stance believable and ring 
true. Thus he managed to create a transcending ethos based on a transcending per-
sona, which made him a powerful figure to create the necessary unity for a broad, 
class based interracial coalition. 
Beyond these more personal motivations, Obama’s adherence to race-
pragmatism was based on political considerations. These political motivations come 
in part from his assessment of the relative inefficiency of affirmative action and from 
his vision of the 1970s backlash.63 Obama explained his position at length in The Au-
dacity of Hope, which is based on two major premises: he believes that the race-
neutral but issue-focused approach is both more effective at a social and economic 
level, and a political necessity.64 Obama makes it plain that he believed that US citi-
zens were no longer willing to accept programs based on racial preference. However, 
he does not attribute this to racism: “Rightly or wrongly, white guilt has largely ex-
hausted itself in America”.65 His explanations are based on the political utilization of 
the backlash: “Some of this has to do with the success of conservatives in fanning the 
politics of resentment—by wildly overstating, for example, the adverse effects of af-
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firmative action on white workers.”66 But he also highlights that open and institution-
alized discrimination started to fade in the mist of history, making people feel not 
directly responsible for the effects, and thus less sensitive, to arguments of restitution. 
Given this feeling, and the context of limited resources embodied by the national 
debt and increasing budget deficits, Obama pointed to a situation of intergroup com-
petition over resources that made people less willing to give special preferences to 
some groups.67 Clearly, Obama’s perception of the political and economic situation at 
the time of writing is very close to that of the 1970s. The Crisis of 2008 and the ensu-
ing Great Recession has deepened this problem, if anything else. 
Obama explains what, in his opinion, the consequences of race-specific policy 
demands would be: 
As a result, proposals that solely benefit minorities and dissect Americans into “us” and 
“them” may generate a few short-term concessions when the costs to whites aren’t too 
high, but they can’t serve as the basis for the kinds of sustained, broad-based political co-
alition needed to transform America. On the other hand, universal appeals around strat-
egies that help all Americans (schools that teach, jobs that pay, health care for everyone 
who needs it, a government that helps out after a flood), along with measures that ensure 
our laws apply equally to everyone and hence uphold broadly held American ideals (like 
better enforcement of existing civil rights laws), can serve as the basis for such coali-
tions—even if such strategies disproportionately help minorities.68 
First, Obama is deeply convinced about the greater effectiveness of the econom-
ic approach to alleviate racial inequalities, as he explicitly mentions in The Audacity of 
Hope.69 It is important to note that Obama refutes the traditional stances of both par-
ties: the “surge of affirmative action hiring” refers to Democrats; the “sudden change 
in black work ethic” refers to Republicans. Obama dismisses both arguments and 
suggests targeted government intervention in favor of a better overall redistribution. 
He particularly insists on the fact that the well being of the black population is intrin-
sically linked to the tides of the wider economy and cannot be dissociated from it. In 
this, Obama echoes the argument William Julius Wilson had made in 1978 against 
affirmative action.70  
It has been shown above how Obama tried in his speeches to convince the black 
population to enter an interest-based class alliance and to view their struggle for 
equality in the broader context of other demands for more equality stemming from 
other people who also suffer from an unfair economic system. 71 While Obama point-
ed out that a broad, interracial, class-based coalition had to be created, as advocated 
by Manning Marable for example,72 he was careful not to deny racial discrimination. 
Obama did, however, remain adamant about the fact that inequalities would better 
be addressed through universal instead of race-specific programs: 
Similarly, we should support targeted programs to eliminate existing health disparities 
between minorities and whites (some evidence suggests that even when income and lev-
els of insurance are factored out, minorities may still be receiving worse care), but a plan 
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for universal health-care coverage would do more to eliminate health disparities be-
tween whites and minorities than any race-specific programs we might design.73 
If the black population needed convincing, the white population needed to be reas-
sured as well. It has been pointed out that parts of the white population had been 
alienated from the New Deal coalition because they felt that the Democratic Party 
mainly concentrated on minority demands rather than on the needs of the white 
working and middle class. Obama’s strong rehabilitation of government responsibil-
ity, in other words the denunciation of structural inequalities and barriers, appealed 
more to minorities, but also to a significant portion of the white lower income catego-
ries that continue to vote according to their economic interests.74 Beyond reworking 
some divisive doxic terms, Obama, once elected, openly focused on the middle class, 
be it through the creation of the Middle Class Task Force, or through his discourse on 
the middle class that highlighted the middle class’s need for government interven-
tion. This intervention would come in the form of social policies and tax cuts and the 
measures his administration had already taken or would take, such as the health care 
reform.  
It must be highlighted that Obama’s race pragmatism also takes into account 
some aspects that Lowi’s policy analysis has posited. Lowi pointed to the fact that 
redistributive policies allow for an ideological polarization and are aligned along 
class lines. Obama, in his race-pragmatic approach, tried to break the ideological po-
larization on certain issues, such as the question of responsibility, which had been 
used in a very divisive way to argue against social policies. The discourse used by 
Obama to advocate for universal health care was broad, transcending, and inclusive. 
Through this transcending, economic-interest based unity Obama tried to rebuild the 
class lines that had been weakened when Reagan managed to break the New Deal 
coalition. Thus, Obama’s politics and discourse aligned closely with the needs creat-
ed by the type of policy he wanted to enact.  
In a 2011 interview with journalist Emmett Miller on BET TV, a major black TV 
channel, Obama confronted questions about African-Americans’ ongoing difficult 
economic situation. Obama insisted that even in the face of ongoing difficulties, he 
did not wish to take a race-specific approach, but continued to promote his race-
neutral, but issue-focused approach. Obama highlighted the steps his administration 
had already taken to boost the economy and pointed to the ARRA in this respect. He 
also insisted on the measures of the American Jobs bill,75 which Democrats were try-
ing to push through Congress at the time, which would have had a beneficial impact 
on African-Americans. When Emmett Miller asked him why he would not openly 
make policies for blacks, Obama answered “that’s not how America works,” and in-
sisted on the fact that he only wanted to enact measures that helped all Americans, 
but which targeted pressing problems. In this respect, he insisted again on the Amer-
ican Jobs bill, but he also mentioned the ACA. He explained that the focus his admin-
istration had taken, targeted major health problems, but which were predominant in 
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the African-American and Hispanic populations. He also insisted again on his strong 
downward redistributive approach by saying that “it is a test for American of how 
well those at the bottom do.” When confronted to criticism from black leaders, such 
as Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) who said, regarding the difficult situation 
blacks faced, that to her “it was not clear what [Obama’s] strategy was,” Obama main-
tained that for him the well-being of the black population was very strongly linked to 
the overall economy.76 
4.1.4. Criticism and Defense of Obama’s Pragmatism 
Obama’s pragmatism has been widely criticized, as could have been predicted 
from the strong movement that continued to defend race-specific or color-conscious 
policies. For example, activist Tim Wise criticized Obama’s race pragmatism as re-
sulting from the transcending stance that was needed for his election. Wise pointed 
to the fact that a transcending rhetoric necessarily leads to a race-neutral policy 
agenda. He called the combination of a race-neutral rhetoric and colorblind public 
policy “post-racial liberalism,” a concept that de-emphasized racial inequality and 
focused on universal policies against inequality. Wise seemed to be surprised that 
Obama would adopt this position, noting that “despite his racial identity [Obama] 
seemed at home in the center of the political spectrum.”77 This criticism completely 
overlooks Obama’s deep personal conviction regarding the political strategy he 
chose, just as it undervalues the type of politics that is required for broad redistribu-
tive policies. Moreover, Wise’s assessment that Obama’s racial identity should have 
driven him towards another, more color-conscious type of politics, shows a rather 
monolithic view of black politicians, although they rather readily embrace a more 
economic and class based approach.  
Bonilla-Silva was also among the harsh critics of Obama’s politics. Bonilla-Silva 
did not consider Obama’s election as anything foundational and rejected Obama’s 
centrism and colorblindness. He described Obama’s transcendence as a “post-racial 
persona and political stance” and pointed out the limitations of this transcending 
strategy, as only 43% of whites had voted for Obama in 2008, and even less had in 
2012: 39%. Bonilla-Silva categorized Obama as a post-Civil Rights type of black politi-
cian, who, in Bonilla-Silva’s opinion, favors compromise over deep change. Moreo-
ver, Bonilla-Silva blamed Obama for distancing himself from some civil rights lead-
ers and particularly from Reverend Wright, as well as for not taking a racial position 
in the Gates incident. According to Bonilla-Silva, Obama’s ‘A More Perfect Union’ 
speech was wrong. Obama should not have distanced himself from Wright by admit-
ting that Wright’s sermon was divisive. Along with Wright, Bonilla-Silva views racism 
as endemic and avers that Wright’s speech was not divisive, but that race is. Bonilla-
Silva especially rejected the idea that whites might have some racial grievances too.  
Bonilla-Silva went on to criticize Obama for not taking a race-specific approach 
and for putting “the economy, health care, the wars, and the like” above tackling rac-
ism, which in his view is more important. He particularly rejected Obama’s opinion 
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regarding affirmative action, since for Bonilla-Silva the program works perfectly 
well.78 Bonilla-Silva’s condemnations make it clear that he would have wanted a 
more confrontational stance about race from Obama. This also becomes apparent in 
Bonilla-Silva’s comment that Obama’s transcendence shows that Obama was an “ac-
commodationist par excellence” among those who “teach the ‘wretched of the earth’ 
the wrong political lesson: that electoral, rather than social-movement, politics is the 
vehicle for achieving social justice”—in essence blaming Obama for not being Jesse 
Jackson or Al Sharpton and for not enacting race-specific policies.79  
This shows the first fundamental wrong turn in assessing Obama’s strategy: 
Obama chose electoral politics as the arena in which he wanted to express and apply 
his political ideas; a choice for which he can hardly be blamed. If Obama had chosen 
the social movement arena and had become an activist, he could have taken a far 
more radical stance. His choice, however, to run for president precluded this, due to 
the simple reason that Marable had pointed out as an argument in favor of race 
pragmatism: the black population alone is not big enough to ensure an electoral vic-
tory. This was the conclusion that Jesse Jackson had drawn after his first candidacy 
for the Democratic nomination in 1984 and that led him to reach out to other minori-
ty groups in creating the Rainbow Coalition in 1988, which allowed him to significant-
ly increase his voter share. As a presidential candidate, Obama did not have the luxu-
ry of appearing as the candidate of a numerical and political minority, whose first 
item on the agenda would have been to eradicate racism, especially not in a context 
that was dominated by a decreasing belief in the existence of racism and discrimina-
tion. In addition, Obama never posed as a civil-rights leader figure, and during his 
campaign his advisors were very clear about the fact that this was not to be ex-
pected.80 Bonilla-Silva’s criticism shows the profound misunderstanding of and op-
position to the pragmatic race strategy that focuses primarily on a class alliance.  
Obama’s transcending stance, especially as expressed in ‘A More Perfect Union,’ 
was qualified as “neoslave narrative” by sociologist Tamara K. Nopper, in which neg-
ativity was associated with blackness, while enlightenment was associated with 
whiteness. Nopper viewed Obama’s condemnation of black anger as expressed by 
Reverend Wright as a refusal to view it as a legitimate political response. Nopper 
pointed to the slave narrative as a tool that moderates racial politics because, in the 
end, there is a reconciliation with the power structure. In this context, Nopper saw it 
as problematic that Obama said that the country was on the road of racial progress 
and that a common future was possible because of the values embedded in the Con-
stitution. Nopper claimed that in his will to discuss the legacy of slavery, Obama end-
ed up ultimately denying it.81  
However, a close analysis of the speech shows that Obama was not completely 
denying the legitimacy of Wright’s anger. Rather, he put it back into a Civil Rights 
Movement context that made it easier to understand for the white population. More-
over, Obama highlighted the ongoing effects of slavery and past discrimination in ‘A 
More Perfect Union,’ going so far as to evoke even the more difficult topic of lasting 
psychological effects of past discrimination and abuse. 
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Among the fundamental difficulties in any race-related discussion is the prob-
lem that blacks and whites do not have the same perception of racism and discrimi-
nation. A 2010 PEW study found that while 43% of blacks said that there was a lot of 
anti-black discrimination, only 13% of whites did so. Moreover, overall, Americans 
perceived blacks, at 18%, to be the second group facing discrimination after Hispanics 
at 21%. Interestingly enough, Americans perceived whites to be the next group facing 
discrimination at 10%, just slightly ahead of Asian Americans at 8%.82 These opinion 
trends are confirmed by the fact that after Obama’s election, 61.3% of whites believed 
that racial equality had been achieved.83 
The accuracy of these perceptions can be discussed and criticized; however, it 
does not change the fact that these perceptions have to be politically taken into ac-
count at the level of national politics. To pursue his goal of an expansion of social 
policies, Obama needed a big coalition, he could not antagonize a share of the popu-
lation through confrontational politics. 
Obama’s senior advisor from 2008 to 2017, Valerie Jarrett, explained his relative 
silence on race in a 2013 interview with the National Journal:  
The president gave one of the most powerful speeches about race in history during the 
2008 campaign. He is now interested in results. So he will be judged by his actions... 
Simply talking about race is not as important as actually working toward equality […] He 
is interested ... in describing our challenges in terms of how we are inextricably linked in 
mutuality. […] The president tries to describe our challenges in ways that are inclusive 
[to] keep the broadest possible mandate for moving forward. He does not intend to polar-
ize; he intends to unify.84 
This unification, as it has been discussed above, was partly based on a change of 
tone in the responsibility discourse, which is also advocated in the pragmatic race 
theory, not wishing to leave the values-debate to Republicans. Secondly, as explained 
by Cornel West, for example, in his exposition of the pragmatic race approach, this 
change was also needed in order to help part of the black population. Obama’s stance 
on personal responsibility was also widely criticized, for example by Ta-Nehisi 
Coates, who claims that Obama’s position blames the victim and negates structural 
barriers. Coates in particular pointed out Obama’s wrong understanding of the 
Moynihan report as meaning that more personal responsibility was needed within 
the black population. Coates preferred to read the Moynihan report as urging gov-
ernmental intervention in helping black men find jobs.85 The misreading of Obama’s 
tactic is that he wanted to find a way out of a political stalemate that was working to 
the advantage of the Republican Party and which was detrimental to the black popu-
lation. Moreover, as it has been exposed earlier, Obama’s position was indeed 
grounded in enacting social policies that would help address problems faced by the 
black population.  
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Wise particularly criticized Obama’s universalist strategy, claiming that this led 
to believe that there were no specific institutional barriers for minorities that could 
not be overcome with colorblind policies. Moreover, Wise accused Obama of imply-
ing that whites and minorities faced similar obstacles on a “relatively even playing 
field.” Wise rejected these notions, and concluded that, given Obama’s intelligence, 
his position must result from political calculation.86 Obama is well aware of structural 
inequalities, as has been shown above. Although his position and his motivations are 
more complex than pure political calculation, the race pragmatic strategy is indeed 
based to a great extent on political calculation—if the taking into consideration of 
political feasibility must be named so. Reed pointed out that Obama’s universalist 
position was “readily understandable to politically oriented observers” because of the 
risk of a white backlash, should Obama attempt to adopt a race-specific approach. 
Reed insisted on the fact that despite the disappointment resulting from expectations 
that were too high to begin with, racial justice had to rely more on actions outside of 
the White House.87 
The CBC were among those who had an ambivalent position about Obama’s 
universalist strategy. In 2009, ten members of the CBC (Maxine Waters D-CA, Mel 
Watt D-NC, Gregory Meeks D-NY, Lacy Clay D-MO, David Scott D-GA, Al Green D-
TX, Emanuel Cleaver D-MO, Gwen Moore D-WI, Keith Ellison D-MN, and André 
Carson D-IN) criticized Obama for not having done enough for African-Americans 
and argued that Obama should take more focused measures to help the most vulner-
able through the difficult economic period. They gave examples of policies they 
wanted to see enacted, such as efforts to reduce foreclosures, better access to credit 
for African-American-owned car dealerships, more aid to small and community 
banks that lend to African-Americans, and more federal money to support ad buys in 
African-American radio stations or newspapers. To make their point, these ten repre-
sentatives withheld their votes from a financial reform bill designed to try to prevent 
future financial crises,88 the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, introduced in the House on De-
cember 2, 2009. In May, Obama had signed the Preventing Mortgage Foreclosure and 
Enhancing Mortgage Credit Act of 2009 to help people avoid losing their homes.89 
However, given the more dramatic losses that blacks and Hispanics suffered com-
pared to whites in the 2008 crisis and ensuing Great Recession, the Dodd-Frank Act 
was of heightened interest for minorities. The Dodd-Frank Act also targets predatory 
lending practices in Title XIV Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act. 
Some scholars argue that there was a racial dimension to the subprime crisis and that 
minorities in particular had been targeted by these loans.90 Hilary O. Shelton, the 
director of the Washington NAACP bureau praised the Dodd-Frank Act for this.91 
Actually, one member of the CBC went so far as not to vote for the ACA in 2009 
and 2010. Democratic Representative Artur Davis from Alabama’s 7th district, which 
is the fifth poorest district in the country, voted against the ACA, and explained his 
vote to his constituents as follows: "I didn't vote against health care—I voted against 
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the bill in Washington . . . I just happen to think that we can't keep throwing a trillion 
dollars at every problem that we have."92 It appears that Davis thought that the ACA 
was not sufficiently addressing the problems of his constituents. 
The CBC vocally supported the ACA on their website starting in January 2011. 
On the website, they very explicitly addressed the fact that people might not be able 
to see how the ACA helped African-Americans, and proceeded to explain it by show-
ing health disparities and how the Act would affect black health conditions.93 
The NAACP as well showed strong support for the ACA, as could be seen on 
their website in 2014. They highlighted the ways in which many provisions of the 
ACA would help African-Americans and how many provisions favored people with 
difficult health or financial situations. They estimated that about 500,000 young 
blacks would be eligible to stay covered under their parents’ plans, that about 2.9 mil-
lion blacks would be eligible for subsidies, and that about 2.8 million African-
Americans would be eligible for Medicaid or low-cost health insurance. Moreover, 
the NAACP sharply criticized the Obamacare repeal blackmailing of the 2013 shut-
down and warned about its consequences.94 Among the health issues the NAACP was 
most concerned about were: low access to health care and outreach measures to en-
hance enrollment in health care insurance, targeted measures against HIV, child-
hood obesity, diabetes, and infant mortality. They also criticized the imbalances in 
the health care delivery systems that disproportionately affect African-Americans 
and Hispanics.95 
Reverend Al Sharpton was among those defending Obama’s position from ac-
cusations of not doing enough for African-Americans during his first term. In a 2013 
White House meeting between Obama and activists, Sharpton explained Obama’s 
strategy with an amusing analogy: 
I had a friend when we were in school who told me he was going on a kosher diet. He 
converted his religion. We went to eat, and he ordered a ham sandwich. I said, ‘You can’t 
eat that.’ He said, ‘Why?’ I said, ‘That is pork.’ He said, ‘No, no, no. Pork is pork chops or 
pork loin. I said, ‘No, you don’t have to call it pork for it to be pork. It is still pork.’ Some 
things [Obama]’s done, it may not have been called ‘black.’ But it affected us. It was still 
pork.96 
4.2. Obama’s Rhetoric and Ideology Reflected in the 
Reform 
Obama’s ideology and political strategy of using a race pragmatic approach in 
an attempt to alleviate racial inequalities without creating a white backlash thus 
hinges on several principles: 
- A race-neutral or deracialized strategy that advocates broad univer-
sal social policies through economic populism.  
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- A reorganization of the electorate along class lines with a strong fo-
cus on the middle class.  
- The achievement of a structural impact on minorities through a class 
focus targeting the working poor and the lower middle class.  
- An issue-focused approach to target major areas of racial inequali-
ties.  
- A new definition of responsibility that incorporates personal and 
governmental responsibility to break the counterproductive stale-
mate over values issues. 
Obamacare will be discussed in detail, although many other reform proposi-
tions or legislations enacted during the Obama presidency, such as education reform 
or the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, reflect the same ideology and strategy. Obamacare 
is composed of two legislations: the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
2010 (ACA, signed into law on March 23, 2010) and the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCER, signed into law on March 30, 2010). Although the 
ACA is far more prominent than HCER, the latter nonetheless makes important con-
tributions to the Obamacare system. 
4.2.1. Universal, Affordable Health Care for All  
That’s not a racial stake, that’s a statistical proof.97 
Earl Pomeroy 
 
The first aim of Obama’s health care reform was to create a universal health 
care system that would provide affordable health care insurance for all. This corre-
sponds to two points of the pragmatic race strategy: focusing on a problem that is a 
concern for the whole population, but which also represents a particular interest for 
African-Americans. As detailed earlier, health care insurance plays a particular role 
in maintaining one’s social status and in social mobility. Because blacks face greater 
difficulties of social ascension and have a more fragile middle class status, health care 
insurance plays a major role for them. 
The history of health care legislation has shown that the American system stood 
out due to its lack of universal scope and its high costs. Obama very simply an-
nounced this main focus of the reform project in an Address to a Joint Session of 
Congress on Health Care in September 2009:  
The plan I'm announcing tonight would meet three basic goals. It will provide more se-
curity and stability to those who have health insurance. It will provide insurance for 
those who don't. And it will slow the growth of health care costs for our families, our 
businesses, and our government.98  
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These problems had significantly increased since the 1990s and the previous at-
tempt at reform. 
 
  
Diagram 38 People without Health Insurance by Income 1993 and 2009, in Percent99 
The previously discussed class models do not use the same income brackets to 
define the different classes, but a broad picture emerged. Incomes up to $25,000 in-
clude the ‘underclass’ (defined by Gilbert for incomes up to $15,000) and the working 
poor with incomes between $15,000 and $25,000. The definition of class according to 
income becomes trickier for the middle class, where the overall income categories 
span from $30,000 to $100,000, or even $150,000 for the upper middle class in the 
widest definitions. However, it is possible to distinguish between a working class 
(Wysong et al.’s Contingent class) with incomes from $25,000 to $40,000, and a mid-
dle class (Wysong et al.’s Comfort class) with incomes between $40,000 and 
$80,000.100 
However, the income categories used by academics to define the social classes 
do not necessarily match the income brackets used by government agencies to estab-
lish their statistics. Nonetheless, the diagram above shows that, between 1993 and 
2009, the uninsured rates for what could broadly be termed the working and the 
middle class significantly increased. The increase was highest for the middle class 
with 7.2%, closely followed by the working class with 6.1%. The situation that Clinton 
had already considered as dramatic had worsened.  
This situation stemmed from two interdependent factors: health care costs had 
been steadily increasing, thus fewer employers had been offering health insurance as 
employment benefits. This caused a major problem in a system that relied on em-
ployer-coverage for the working and middle class. 
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Diagram 39 Type of Health Insurance Coverage, 1993 and 2009, in Percent101 
Although the overall increase of the percentage of people without health insur-
ance was not dramatic, it was nonetheless significant. From 1987 to 2009 the number 
of insured persons (any type of coverage) went from 87.1% down to 83.9%, with many 
variations over the years. For example, although there was a low at 84.7% of insured 
persons in 1993, there was a new high at 86.9% in 2000.102 However, the type of cover-
age had changed. Overall, the percentage of private insurance plans had diminished, 
whereas government insurance had increased, which is consistent with the increase 
of uninsured people among the working and middle classes, as they most heavily 
relied on private, employer-sponsored health insurance. 
Another interesting change appears when race is taken into account. Whereas 
the overall uninsured rate increased, the uninsured rate for whites diminished be-
tween 1993 and 2009. 
 
 
Diagram 40 Uninsured Rates 1993 and 2009 by Race, in Percent103 
Although the uninsured rates for blacks and Hispanics hardly changed between 
1993 and 2009, the composition of the American population did change. The white 
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and the black populations increase very slowly, especially the white population. On 
the contrary, the Hispanic population is growing very fast. Thus in the overall com-
position of the population of the US, the white population is decreasing (from 75.6% 
in 1990 to 63.7% in 2010).104 Thus it appears that the increasing overall uninsured rate 
and the decreasing white uninsured rate are absorbed in the growing black and His-
panic populations. 
 
 
Diagram 41 Population by Race 1990 
 
Diagram 42 Population by Race 2010 
 
Moreover, there are racial differences in the type of health care coverage people 
have. Whereas whites mainly rely on private coverage, in particular on employment-
based coverage, blacks and Hispanics more heavily depend on public coverage, on 
Medicaid in particular. This corresponds to the overall lower socio-economic status 
of minorities. 
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Diagram 43 Health Insurance Coverage by Race in Percent, 2009.105 
However, whites have a higher rate for Medicare than other populations, which is 
linked to their higher life expectancy. 
Given this very varied health insurance landscape, the Obama administration 
chose a threefold approach to achieve universal coverage that built on the existing 
system. The single payer system was abandoned for political reasons.106 Instead of 
opting for a unified system administered by the federal government, a kind of Medi-
care for all that would resemble the Canadian single payer system, the Obama ad-
ministration chose to provide coverage through the threefold approach of the em-
ployer mandate, the individual mandate, and the Medicaid extension. The employer 
mandate applied to businesses with more than 50 full-time employees during the 
year. The ACA also provided for a small business tax credit to help employers that 
were not subjected to provide health insurance. This tax credit of 50% (or 35% for tax-
exempt small employers) applies to businesses with less than 25 full-time (or equiva-
lent) employees during the year and whose average annual wages did not exceed 
$40,000 (the amount was defined for the period from 2011 to 2013, subsequently the 
amount would be adjusted for inflation). Additionally, for the employer-provided 
coverage, the employee’s contribution must not exceed 9.5% of the employee’s in-
come.107 
The potential impact of this small business tax credit to help provide health in-
surance coverage must not be underestimated. Most businesses in the US are small 
businesses (96%). Although small black businesses represent only 2% of all business-
es (82.5% are white businesses [including white Hispanics]), almost all of them fall 
within the category of less than 50 employees (97.3%, compared with 96.8% for white 
businesses). However, a smaller proportion of black businesses than white businesses 
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have paid employees: 82.2% of black firms compared with 85.3% of white firms.108 The 
overall weaker black economy has been discussed previously,109 but this can also be 
seen in the lower average annual salaries in black businesses: $28,398 is the average 
annual pay for employees in black businesses, compared with $38,153 for white busi-
nesses (including white Hispanics).110 This means that a substantial portion of black 
businesses should be able to qualify for the small business tax credit. 
The part of the population that could not benefit from this employer mandate 
was subjected to an individual mandate that made it compulsory to purchase indi-
vidual health insurance, or exposed people to a fine. To help people afford health 
care insurance, two measures were taken: an overall cost containment system for 
health care plans, and a system of tax credits. The ACA set requirements and regula-
tions for insurance companies to define qualified health care plans—meaning plans 
eligible for subsidies. These regulations pertain to essential health benefits, limit cost-
sharing, and set criteria for the level of coverage. The categories of health benefits 
comprise: ambulatory patient services, emergency services, hospitalization, maternity 
and newborn care, mental health and substance use disorder services which include 
behavioral health treatment, prescription drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative ser-
vices and devices, laboratory services, preventive and wellness services and chronic 
disease management, as well as pediatric services that include oral and vision care.111 
The coverage of abortion became optional because of conservative pressure in Con-
gress.112 The regulations regarding cost-sharing limit the amount of deductibles, pre-
mium increases, co-insurances, co-payments and similar charges. Furthermore, the 
levels of coverage are defined for 4 levels: bronze, silver, gold, and platinum ranging 
from a 60% coverage for bronze to a 90% coverage for platinum. Individuals under 
age 30 can enroll in a Catastrophic Plan that provides at least 3 primary care visits per 
annum, and which otherwise only provides coverage for catastrophic care.113 Unmar-
ried children can stay as dependents on their parents’ plan until age 26 (before they 
turn 27).114 
The individual mandate applies to all individuals not covered otherwise, but is 
not applicable if a person can prove extreme financial hardship when the premiums 
for the lowest-cost bronze plan (as defined by the cost-containment system) available 
through the health exchange in the state of residence exceed 8% of the individual’s 
income, after deduction of the tax credits/subsidies. The tax credits or subsidies apply 
to incomes up to 400% FPL and the amount corresponds to the excess amount of the 
cost of the second lowest silver plan (as applicable to the taxpayer) so that the premi-
um costs do not exceed a certain percentage of income for the taxpayer/individual. 
This ratio of income is devised on a progressive scale that favors the lowest incomes. 
The income percentage for incomes up to 133% FPL is 2%, and it progressively in-
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  Size	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   and	   States:	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   2012	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https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=SBO_2012_00CSA1
1&prodType=table.	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creases to 9.5% for incomes up to 400% FPL.115 In addition, the ACA provides for cost-
sharing subsidies for people eligible for the tax credits to help them pay for the ex-
penses not covered by the plan. First, the ACA limits the share of out-of-pocket con-
tributions according to income level. Then, it provides subsidies to increase the reim-
bursement level (actuarial value) of the health care plans. These subsidies are most 
heavily concentrated among the lower incomes. The HCER sets the actuarial value 
increase at 93% for incomes between 100% and 150% FPL, at 87% for incomes from 
150% to 200% FPL, and at 73% for incomes between 200 and 250% FPL (compared to 
the actuarial value of 70% of the standard silver plan).116 
To give a rough idea of how these tax credits work and the amount of money in-
volved, a projection of the CBO will be used. 
The model is calculated on the second-lowest silver plan (with a 70% actuarial 
value, in other words, 70% of health expenses would be covered by the plan) availa-
ble through the individual’s health exchange. For a hypothetical family of four of 
modest income at 150% FPL in 2015, the CBO projected that for a family plan roughly 
evaluated at $10,000, the family would have to pay premiums corresponding to 4.02% 
of its income—$1,438—and would receive a tax credit of $8,562 for the remaining 
cost. For the same type of plan a family with a higher income at 300%FPL would re-
ceive a premium tax credit of only $3,160 to cover the amount of premium exceeding 
their 9.5% income share. However, the families could also choose a lower-cost bronze 
plan with an actuarial value of 60%. The amount of the tax credit would still be calcu-
lated on the silver plan, and because the bronze plan is cheaper, the lower income 
family would only pay $983 for their plan. The same applies for higher cost plans.117 
When the ACA was enacted, 65.9% of Americans were eligible for its tax credits. 
Because of the structural inequalities that concentrate minorities in the lower income 
categories, more minorities are eligible for the subsidies; 79,6% of blacks and 76.2% of 
Hispanics were eligible, while 60.7% of whites were.  
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Diagram 44 Population Eligible for Subsidies by 
Race, in Percent, 2010118 
 
Diagram 45 Population Eligible for Subsidies by Race, 
in Percent, 2014119 
 
In 2014, when the individual mandate became effective, these figures were 
slightly lower, but the differential impact had remained the same. Moreover, minori-
ties are less likely to have employer-provided coverage. Thus they are more suscepti-
ble to have to rely on insurance on the individual market for which these tax credits 
are provided. 
The remaining population was to be covered by an extension of Medicaid to all 
low-income people, regardless of their family, pregnancy, or health status—meaning 
that able-bodied childless adults became eligible. The income criterion was set at 
133% FPL by the ACA, which was extended to 138% FPL by 5% income that can be 
disregarded by the HCER.120 This Medicaid extension, which became optional after 
the Sebelius lawsuit, went into effect in 2014. As shows the diagram above, this Medi-
caid extension is particularly beneficial for blacks, as many blacks have very low in-
comes.  
This system is admittedly quite complicated. To help people find adequate 
health care insurance and to find out whether or not they are eligible for Medicaid, 
the ACA established a federal health exchange, but states can also establish their own 
exchanges. They make qualified health plans available for individuals and employers 
and are supposed to make finding an adequate and affordable health care insurance 
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plan easier.121 So far, as of 2017, enrollment operates through state exchanges in 15 
states.122 Moreover, the federal exchange also offers a specific exchange—SHOP—for 
employers. In addition, the exchanges have to maintain a toll-free telephone hotline 
to provide assistance. Such aspects may appear trivial, but they are essential in help-
ing people to find adequate health insurance, especially for low-income people, or 
the working poor who do not have the luxury of spending a lot of time to find a good 
insurance plan or for people with low levels of education who might find it difficult to 
compare many different plans. 
Moreover, the enactment of the ACA brought a number of other measures that 
made health care insurance more accessible and more affordable. One of the most 
well-known and most discussed provisions was the prohibition of preexisting condi-
tion exclusion,123 which had prevented people from contracting health insurance or 
switching plans. The ACA also prohibits discriminatory premium rates, the only var-
iations that are allowed are according to individual or family plan, age (at a specified 
ratio), tobacco use (at a specified ratio), or rating area (as defined by the ACA).124 The 
ACA also provides guaranteed availability and renewability of coverage. Moreover, 
the ACA prohibits discrimination based on health status, including medical condi-
tion (physical and mental illnesses), claims experience, receipt of health care, medical 
history, genetic information, evidence of insurability (including conditions arising 
out of acts of domestic violence), or disability.125 
Such universal measures as provided by the ACA have a structural impact on 
minorities through the progressive focus on incomes that helps low incomes most, 
where minorities, and blacks in particular are disproportionately concentrated. The 
preexisting condition clause and nondiscrimination based on health status should be 
particularly beneficial for blacks as they have overall worse health conditions than 
the total population. This can be seen in overall higher death rates and in the shorter 
life expectancy for blacks: in 2009, life expectancy at birth for the total population 
was 78.5 years, 78.8 years for whites, but only 74.7 years for blacks.126 
The regulations of costs and out-of-pocket contributions should meet, at least in 
part, the needs of the most vulnerable populations. Health expenditures are among 
the factors that contribute to the foregoing or delaying of care, which, of course has a 
negative impact on life expectancy. 
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Diagram 46 Absence or Delay in Medical Care Due to Cost, by Race and Poverty Level, in Percent, 
2010127 
The intersection of race and class becomes obvious once again, as the absences or 
delays in care are concentrated among blacks and among the poorest populations. 
This absent or delayed care was particularly high among individuals aged 18-64, at an 
average of 14.7%,128 which corresponds to the populations that are least covered by 
health insurance. This picture, however, is somewhat inaccurate. When looking at 
the absence or delay of medical care by poverty level within the different racial 
groups another picture emerges. 
 
 
Diagram 47 No or Delayed Medical Care by Poverty Level by Race, in Percent, 2010129 
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It becomes apparent that it is the structural concentration of blacks and Hispan-
ics at the lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder, which makes that, overall, these 
populations have to forego or delay medical care. Within the varying poverty levels of 
the different populations, whites fare worse at lower levels of poverty than blacks for 
example. This highlights the shared economic interest that exists along class lines, 
which is particularly relevant for whites, but which is also a counter-argument to 
race-specific measures. This also helps explain white opposition to race-specific 
measures. As shown above, at the same poverty level, whites can have worse situa-
tions than some minorities. 
There are two additional progressive features in Obamacare. The ACA imposed 
an Excise Tax, also known as the Cadillac Tax. This is a penalty that imposes a 40% 
tax on excess benefits as compared to the coverage of employer-provided high cost-
plans. This tax is to be paid by the coverage provider, i.e. the insurance companies. 
This was modified and delayed to 2018 (instead of 2013) by the HCER, which defines 
the high cost plan as a plan with premiums over $10,200 for an individual and $27,500 
for family coverage.130 The aim was to reduce the number of high-cost plans proposed 
by insurers and to gain additional revenue for some of the expenses of the ACA. 
The other progressive downward redistributional aspect of Obamacare was in-
troduced by the HCER. It is an additional Medicare contribution on unearned in-
comes. The 3.8% tax concerns net investment incomes such as incomes from inter-
ests, dividends, annuities, royalties, rents, etc. (other than normal business or trade 
incomes), as well as the net gain from the sale of property. The tax also applies to cer-
tain trades and businesses if they are a passive activity, or to businesses trading in 
financial instruments or commodities. The tax applies to individuals, as well as to 
estates and trusts. This additional tax also applies to the modified adjusted gross in-
come for incomes over the threshold of $250,000 for a joint return (half of this 
amount for married individuals filing their taxes separately) and $200,000 for indi-
viduals.131 
This corresponds to the idea expressed in the pragmatic race strategy of focus-
ing on interests and measures that are shared among the population but which are of 
crucial importance for blacks. Moreover, as advocated by the pragmatic race ap-
proach, the ACA is strongly downwards redistributional through different measures, 
such as the higher subsidies for lower incomes and the higher contributions for high-
er incomes.  
The notion of personal responsibility is also present in health policy. As men-
tioned previously, the issue of responsibility plays a central role in ideology and dis-
course. It is used by conservatives to argue for less government intervention. Among 
blacks, opinions are divided between those who interpret talk about personal respon-
sibility as “blaming the victim,” and those who think, like some race pragmatists, that 
it is necessary to combine a greater focus on personal responsibility with a strong 
government intervention. As demonstrated above, Obama shares this opinion, and 
the reform reflects this. It must be noted that the reform strictly corresponds to this 
strong interplay between personal and government responsibility. 
 In the Affordable Care Act, personal responsibility is a strategic component of 
the reform, in the subpart entitled “Individual Responsibility” which introduces the 
“individual mandate.” The individual mandate, originally a conservative idea that 
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was for example applied in Mitt Romney’s health care reform in Massachusetts, is the 
obligation for each citizen to hold a health insurance or be penalized by a fine. More-
over, the act also insists on a more responsible health care, at the level of the citizen, 
through incentives to use preventive care, in order to be healthier and thus less of a 
burden on the system by requiring expensive care through delay resulting in aggra-
vated illnesses.132 However, and there is a major difference with the conservative Re-
publican approach, Obama did not stop at personal responsibility. The individual 
mandate is a subpart of a part of the act entitled “Shared Responsibility.”133 In the 
case of the ACA, personal responsibility is not used in a conservative sense to push 
for a disengagement of the government, quite on the contrary, it serves as the build-
ing block of a solid system to the benefit of all. Indeed, a system of health care insur-
ance only functions if everybody participates by contracting insurance. The respon-
sibility in health is organized on different levels and among different social and 
economic agents. The second part of the section “Shared responsibility,” entitled 
“Employer responsibility,” created a shared responsibility with employers. The ACA 
requires businesses with 50 or more full-time employees to provide a minimum 
health insurance as defined by the ACA.134 
Obama’s convictions about a greater government responsibility can be seen in 
the ACA in the form of regulations, redistribution, or the Medicaid expansion, in oth-
er words government-provided health care for low-income individuals who cannot 
afford insurance. Another government form of taking responsibility are the premium 
tax credits that help people with incomes up to 400% FPL afford their insurance 
premiums. 
4.2.2. An Issue-Focused Approach  
As explained in Part 1, a race-specific approach was not among the options to 
tackle racial inequalities, despite the long political awareness about this problem, 
which came to the forefront with the 1965 Moynihan Report. However, an issue-
focused approach was possible, meaning that instead of claiming to do something 
specific for minorities, and blacks in particular, the ACA would focus on some of the 
major problems the black population confronted. This approach, as previously 
evoked, is also favored by many black politicians and thinkers, not only for its greater 
political potential regarding the white population, but also because some, as William 
Julius Wilson or Obama, think that it is more efficient. 
Former Representative Andrews explained that in his opinion more could and 
should have been done for minorities, but through an issue-focused approach. He 
would have liked to see more investment in preventative health care, in research on 
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asthma or type 2 diabetes, both problems that particularly affect the black popula-
tion. However, he also strongly defended the idea that a race-specific approach was 
too great a political challenge. He got input from civil rights advocacy groups like the 
NAACP and the National Urban League, who weighed in on the law. Although they 
asked for more, they were key in focusing on salient issues for the black population. 
According to Andrews, they had asked for a more race-conscious approach, but with 
their help, the issue-focused approach was improved: 
Yes, yes they did [ask for a more race-conscious approach]. And by focusing on, again, 
acute diseases and conditions that had a disproportionate impact on minority communi-
ties, yes they did. And they properly, maybe incorrectly, claim the issues as civil rights is-
sues. It’s hard to vote, or speak, or go get an education when you’re sick. And you know, 
the disproportionate prevalence of illness in the minority community made that a civil 
rights issue.135 
Former Representative Tierney also spoke of exchanges with the NAACP and 
the National Urban League. However, he carefully pointed out that they had no di-
rect influence on any language in the bill.136 Former Representative Braley explained 
that there was a strong awareness about racial health disparities, but that a close 
analysis of the data also showed an even greater class difference: 
There were specific conversations about those disparities and one of the things that we 
discovered is, even though there are clear racial and ethnic health care disparities that 
show up in the health care delivery system, socio-economic disparities were one of the 
biggest disparities we were able to determine. 
In light of this analysis, the issue-focused approach, and especially the abovemen-
tioned structural approach makes sense, both at the level of political and socioeco-
nomic efficiency. When asked about a more open racial focus, he explained that the 
racial disparities were precisely sought to be addressed by focusing on some very 
specific issues or structural elements that affect minorities more: 
Well, no, I mean if you get into the nuance of this very complex bill, there were specific 
provisions designed to address just that. In a lot of times in places that are hard to dis-
cern. So, there is something called DISH-payments, that were a big focus of the debate 
about funding because it gives added payments to providers in areas that are dispropor-
tionately underserved by health care, including many racial and ethnic populations like 
the ones you’re talking about. So, even though it may not state specifically in that provi-
sion of the bill, this is what we are trying to address. The reality is that those payments 
are in place to address those disparities and try to get better health care outcomes for 
those patient populations.137 
Former Representative Earl Pomeroy, who had explained that an openly racial 
approach was not ever considered, despite the urgency of the situation and the bla-
tant inequalities, insisted on the same approach, of focusing efforts on elements that 
were particularly beneficial for the black population: 
I tell you other ways we addressed [racial health inequalities]. You’re not going to ad-
dress this through affirmative action, but one of the things we did in the bill, that I was 
terribly exited about, was eleven billion dollars toward community health centers. Now, 
community health centers are a special delivery system to address the needs of urban 
poor. I think we got some in rural areas as well. But I think the best successes have been 
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in urban areas. And so, I look at that as a response. So, that’s not affirmative action, but 
it’s very responsive to the needs in that area.138 
Former Representative Tierney expressed something similar to Pomeroy’s 
statement. Regarding efforts made for minorities, he said that “we tried as much as 
we could”, but that more obvious steps had not been possible.139 
Yardly Pollas, senior health advisor to Representative Bobby Rush explained 
that indeed many of the issues targeted by the ACA are prevalent in Representative 
Rush’s majority-black district that also has high levels of poverty. Among the major 
concerns is access to quality care: 
[…] we represent basically a… well, our district is vast, and it is… you see different parts. 
Most parts, I have to say, are people who are in the poverty line, right. And so you do see 
a high level of diabetes, and that’s sometimes a cause of malnutrition. And what I mean 
by malnutrition, not eating the right stuff, right, what they call a type 2 diabetes, 
HIV/Aids, yes we have a higher level too, and that’s all because of not having access to 
preventive measures, so… sometimes you can get it from drug abuse.140 
Regarding the initially somewhat lukewarm reaction of some black politicians 
to Obamacare, she explained that a major concern was that the ACA was built on a 
similar system as the one in Massachusetts. The wariness was due to the fear that the 
efforts of the ACA did not go far enough. In light of the consequences of the Sebelius 
decision, their concerns were fully justified. Thomas Dorney, advisor to Congress-
man Lewis expressed similar concerns: 
[…] when the Affordable Care was being discussed and debated, we knew that there 
were probably going to be problems with the bill, there are going to be areas of im-
provement, and we also knew that we would make one of the most comprehensive ex-
pansions of health care coverage that the country had ever seen […].141 
Dorney’s words reflect the ambivalence about the approach chosen in the ACA. Alt-
hough they knew that it was imperfect and insufficient, it was nonetheless a lot better 
than nothing. 
However, as Representative Braley pointed out, the situation did not allow for 
more. He recalled conversations with members of the CBC and the Hispanic Caucus 
and explained that everyone was aware that the ACA was better than nothing, which 
was basically the alternative: 
I think that a lot of members of the Congressional Black Caucus, the Congressional His-
panic Caucus, I certainly would not presume to speak for them, but based on conversa-
tions we had during those times, I think they realized that the dramatic expansion of 
Medicaid and the availability of vouchers to allow millions of uninsured Americans, in-
cluding many African-Americans and Hispanics, to get access to health insurance who 
did not have it at the time would be a better outcome than not passing anything and 
keeping the status quo.142 
Dan Riffle, health advisor to Representative Conyers, who was not involved in 
the ACA and who champions a new single payer bill, explained that the Representa-
tive certainly welcomed the efforts made in the ACA, but that his offices considered 
them as insufficient: 
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 Sure, he’s happy with them. I mean, it’s an improvement over the status quo, we’re in a 
better position than we were, but it’s entirely inadequate, and I think that he would be 
the first to tell you that we’re glad the Affordable Care Act passed, we’re glad the people 
with preexisting conditions are able to get insurance, we’re glad that poor people are 
able to get tax subsidies in order to afford some of the plans that are offered in the mar-
ketplace, but the fact of the matter is, a lot of the people lack the financial or tax literacy 
necessary to know how to get those subsidies, how to access the marketplace, they might 
see just the deductible or just the monthly premium cross and just be scared off without 
knowing that subsidies are out there to help them and how to get them.143 
The major problems highlighted by Riffle are the fact that it is piecemeal and 
that the resulting system is quite complex and difficult to understand. 
Although Obamacare did not manage to address all the needs and issues of the 
black population and could not make a more outspoken effort, it nonetheless man-
aged to focus on certain issues that are of particular interest to the black population. 
Although the overall death rates are higher for blacks for almost all causes of 
death,144 some issues and differences particularly stand out. However, there are two 
marked differences in death rates that will not be discussed here. The first is the 
markedly higher suicide rate for whites, who have a ratio of 2.8 to blacks; the other is 
the homicide rate that is seven times higher for blacks compared to whites. Those two 
issues, although they are among the main causes of death, exceed the strict scope of a 
health care reform. Neither the ACA nor the HCER address the issue of suicide spe-
cifically, although the CDC recognizes it as a public health issue. More and more 
public health specialists claim that gun violence is also a public health issue, for two 
reasons: the black homicide rate and the white suicide rate. It is estimated that gun 
ownership (meaning the availability of a firearm in the home) increases the risk for 
suicide maybe as much as three times.145 However, as these two issues are linked to 
the very tricky and complicated subject of gun control, it will not be discussed here. 
Two other causes of death stand out because of their stark racial differences (mean-
ing a ratio of more than 2): diabetes and HIV/AIDS, which will be discussed in detail. 
The death rates for diabetes show marked racial differences: whereas the death 
rate for the total population was 20.8 per 100,000, it was 18.2 for whites, 38.7 for blacks, 
and 27.1 for Hispanics.146 The black/white ratio was 2.1. The higher mortality rate of 
blacks corresponds to a higher prevalence of the disease among the black population. 
The diagram below also shows that the prevalence of diabetes is strongly linked to 
income, which shows once more the intersection of race and class. 
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Diagram 48 Diabetes by Race and Income, in Percent, 2007-2010147 
Diabetes is particularly problematic because its treatment needs to be constant 
and daily and is very expensive. A Kaiser Family Foundation study showed that in 
2013 the per capita health expenditures for people with diabetes were on average 
$14,999, compared to the average per capita expenditures of $4,305 for people without 
the disease. This even has a serious impact for people with insurance, as the average 
out-of-pocket contributions for these patients were $1,922, compared with the average 
$738 for people without the disease.148 The absence of care or poorly managed care of 
diabetes can lead to complications such as heart disease and strokes, blindness, kid-
ney failure, or lower limb amputation because of the development of diabetic gan-
grene, or hyperglycemic crises that can result in death. In 2009-2012, 65% of patients 
with diabetes also had high cholesterol and 71% had high blood pressure, or already 
used medication to control these. Diabetes, especially Type 2, the most prevalent 
form (accounting for 90-95% of the cases of adult diabetes) is linked to race/ethnicity, 
obesity, inactivity, tobacco use, and family history of diabetes.149 The structural over-
lapping is apparent in the prevalence of diabetes among minorities, who are at-risk 
groups for diabetes, and lower income groups. 
 Moreover, compared to other OECD countries, the US has very poor results re-
garding diabetes care. The US ranked first by a wide margin in diabetes related am-
putations with a rate of 36 per 100,000 populations in 2007 (the OECD average was 
15). The same patterns holds for admission rates for acute complications caused by 
diabetes: the US rate was at 57 per 100,000 populations, compared with 21 for the 
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OECD average. This high prevalence of diabetes-related problems shows that the 
disease and its care are a major problem in the US.150 
The ACA strongly focuses on diabetes, and diabetes-related complications. It 
has been mentioned previously that the regulations defining the contents of health 
care plans also include Wellness and Prevention programs. These wellness and pre-
vention efforts are to focus on smoking cessation, weight management, stress man-
agement, physical fitness, nutrition, heart disease prevention, healthy lifestyle sup-
port, and diabetes prevention.151 Weight loss and a healthy diet are among the 
measures cited to try to manage diabetes. Under the Medicaid improvement section 
of the ACA, states have the option of providing ‘health homes’ for enrollees with 
chronic conditions.152 Those chronic conditions include, among others, diabetes. 
Moreover, states can apply for grants for the prevention of chronic diseases, among 
them the cessation of tobacco use, weight control and loss, lowering cholesterol and 
blood pressure, avoiding the onset of diabetes, or improving the management of the 
disease.153 The ACA established a national diabetes prevention program. Moreover, 
the ACA focuses on better diabetes care at a more administrative level to monitor the 
effectiveness of programs and care.154 
Another very problematic issue for the African-American population is 
HIV/AIDS. The black/white death rate ratio is a staggering 18.7, the highest discrep-
ancy that can be found among the different death rates. Although blacks represent 
about 12% of the American population, they represent 41% of the HIV-infected popu-
lation. 
 
 
Diagram 49 Racial Composition of the HIV Infected 
Population 2012155 
 
In per 100,000.  
Diagram 50 Diagnoses of HIV/AIDS and AIDS, 2009156 
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A similarly alarming picture emerges when looking at new diagnoses. For ex-
ample, in 2009, blacks had distinctively higher rates of diagnoses of HIV/AIDS and 
full-blown AIDS (meaning the outbreak of the syndrome). 
The CDC found an increase of infection due to male-to-male sexual contact and 
to heterosexual contact, whereas the transmission of HIV through injection drugs 
remained stable.157 The lack of health insurance, competing basic needs (such as food 
and clothing), the lack of adequate child-care, and the fear of the stigma associated to 
HIV/AIDS are cited as reasons for the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the black 
population. This fear, which is partly fostered through homophobia in the black 
community, contributes to a lack of treatment of the disease and to a heightened 
transmission of the infection. A significant share of the HIV infections occurs through 
male-on-male sexual intercourse.158  
The ACA urged states to conduct Medicaid enrollment outreach to vulnerable 
and underserved populations that included racial and ethnic minorities and specifi-
cally people with HIV/AIDS.159 Regarding HIV/AIDS, but also the previously dis-
cussed diabetes, the prohibition of denial of health insurance due to preexisting con-
ditions is particularly important, as is the prohibition of annual or life-time limits on 
benefits. Just as diabetes, HIV/AIDS treatment is extremely expensive. However, 
Community Health Centers provide free screening for HIV, and in some cases deliver 
the care, or refer to the next specialist. Payments are made according to the person’s 
ability to pay.160 Additional, HIV/AIDS-specific help for low income, under- and un-
insured people is provided through the Ryan White CARE Act of 1990, to which the 
Aids Drug Assistance Program (ADAP) was added in 1996. Although it is a govern-
mental program for HIV/AIDS care, it is not supposed to be primary care, but a last-
resort solution. The National Alliance of State and Territorial Aids Directors 
(NASTAD) provides an overview of the different ADAPs at the state level. Their an-
nual reports of 2016 and 2017 discuss some of the effects of the ACA on HIV/AIDS 
cost and insurance enrollment that helps illustrate how the ACA managed to impact 
the epidemic. First, the major part of the clients served in 2015 by ADAPs were blacks 
(38%), closely followed by whites (31%) and Hispanics (23%). The share of black pa-
tients was as high as 78% in Mississippi or 70% in South Carolina. The help that 
ADAPs provide can include paying for insurance premiums, paying for deductibles 
and co-payments to filling drug prescriptions, or combinations of these. Because of 
the ACA, the insurance profile of ADAP clients has quite drastically changed. 
Whereas in 2013, 60% of ADAP clients had no form of insurance whatsoever and re-
ceived fully paid medication from ADAP, this number dropped to 42% in 2016. Be-
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tween 2013 and 2014, the number of clients for which ADAP helped pay for premi-
ums, co-payments and deductibles for insurance increased from 33% to 40%, while 
the percentage of persons for whom ADAP had to do both, paying for medication and 
helping with premiums etc. decreased from 7% to 2%.161 
From 2014 to 2015, the first year of the implementation of most of the provisions 
of the ACA, the ADAPs managed to serve over 10,000 more clients, while actually 
decreasing their annual expenditures by $26 million. They report that compared to 
2009, the average cost for purchasing health insurance (or co-insurance etc.) for their 
clients had dropped from $5284 per year and per person to $2,720 thanks to the provi-
sions of the ACA.162 This has allowed them to expand their help to more persons. 
Moreover, since Obama signed the re-authorization of the Ryan White CARE Act, 
which includes the ADAP, in 2009, the program had more than doubled the number 
of clients for which they purchase insurance or provide insurance continuation.163  
Parallel to these developments in the ACA, the Obama administration also 
launched a “National HIV/AIDS Strategy” in 2010 with the aim of reducing the num-
ber of new infections, increasing access to care, optimizing the health outcomes of 
people living with the infection, and of reducing HIV-related disparities. Although 
the increased health care access was based on the Ryan White program that has ex-
isted since 1990, the new strategy wants to focus on the detection of HIV among 
blacks and Hispanics, and more generally wants to target high risk populations with 
measures to reduce transmission and spread of the virus, especially among blacks 
and Hispanics. Additionally, those programs aimed at allocating public funding to 
geographic areas depending on the prevalence of the epidemic.164 For example, in the 
context of this new strategy, the CDC has allocated to health departments in areas 
and communities with the highest HIV concentrations at least $330 million of funds 
for prevention for the years between 2012 and 2015. This includes a new project of 
pre-exposure prophylaxis treatments for high-risk populations, such as gay and bi-
sexual persons of color, and additional funding (115$ million over 5 years) for addi-
tional support for on-the-ground organizations. This new strategy as implemented by 
the CDC also includes culturally-tailored prevention and awareness programs that 
focus on testing and reducing the stigma of AIDS, and that encourage the taking of 
medication and accompany people in keeping health coverage.165 
Moreover, the ACA provided funds for Personal Responsibility Education pro-
grams, which focus on contraceptive education, especially among the younger gener-
ation. The programs also aim at reducing youth pregnancy rates, which are particu-
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larly high among African-Americans. Youth pregnancies have a strong negative in-
fluence on future job prospects and education attainment.166 
 
  
Diagram 51 Teen Pregnancy Rates by Race in per thousand, 2010167 
Similarly, the ACA focuses on improved maternal and childhood care programs. 
Among the actions taken is the identification of at-risk communities on the following 
criteria: the concentration of premature birth, low-birth weight, infant mortality, 
poverty, crime, domestic violence, high rates of high-school drop-outs, substance 
abuse, unemployment, or child maltreatment. Additional funding is provided for 
suited care programs.168 The ACA allots additional funds to supplement existing pro-
grams for pregnant and parenting teenagers and women. These funds are specifically 
aimed at students to help them continue their education when they have children. 
These measures include maternity coverage and the possibility to cover additional 
family members in student health care, the availability of family housing, child care, 
flexible or alternative academic scheduling, education to improve parenting skills 
and to strengthen marriages, but also basic material help such as maternity and baby 
clothing, baby food or even furniture. High schools and community service centers 
are exempt from the requirement to match the federal funds at 25% (money or in-
kind contribution), meaning that the federal government would pick up most of the 
tab.169 
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Diagram 52 Infant Mortality Rate by Race, 2006-8170 
Infant and neonatal mortality rates for blacks far exceed those of the rest of the popu-
lation and are also remarkably higher than in any western country. The infant mor-
tality rate for blacks was close to the one in Mexico at 14.7. Thus the enhanced care 
programs should have a major impact on the black population, especially as the pri-
ority of the programs is set for those at-risk populations. Other priority criteria rather 
obviously match some of the pathological behaviors that can be found in inner-city 
neighborhoods. Thus it is to be expected that these underserved areas should be able 
to get additional funds under the ACA. 
A more conservative, or behavioral, tone is taken in the section of the Act that 
awards funds for programs that promote positive health behaviors and outcomes. 
This is aimed at medically underserved communities and is to be carried out through 
community health workers. The section is explicitly aimed at racial and ethnic mi-
norities. It focuses on outreach, the promotion of healthy behavior and the avoidance 
of risky behavior, enrollment in CHIP, Medicare and Medicaid, but also in other 
health care agencies (such as for example an ADAP) or community organizations that 
provide maternal and prenatal home visit programs. The ACA set a priority for the 
funding of areas with high concentrations of eligible but un- or under-insured popu-
lations, high concentrations of people with chronic diseases or high infant-mortality 
rates. This also builds on existing programs at the community level, as the priority 
goes to areas that already have experience in providing health or related social ser-
vices to underserved communities, have documented activity in this respect and have 
experience with community health workers.171  
The ACA and the HCER awarded increased funding to Community Health Cen-
ters (CHC) for a total of $9.5 billion from 2011 to 2015 and of $1.5 billion for the Nation-
al Health Service Corps (NHSC) over the same period. An additional $1,5 billion was 
made available over the period 2011-2015 for the construction and renovation of 
CHCs.172 CHCs are organizations based in communities that serve populations with 
limited access to health care. Moreover, these centers are directed by patients (51% of 
the board must be constituted by patients). They have to provide comprehensive 
primary health care, but also additional health-related services, such as education, 
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translation, or transportation. They have to provide health services to all and the fees 
are adjusted to the patients’ ability to pay.173 
The NHSC was established in 1972 and focuses on health care providers for un-
derserved communities. In addition, it includes programs to help with medical stu-
dent loan repayments and provides scholarships for people who work, or will work, 
on underserved sites for two years.174  
 In 2013, the US already had a wide network of community health centers of 
about 1,202 CHCs receiving federal funds, 52% of which were in urban areas. These 
centers delivered care to about 21.7 million patients in 9,170 health care delivery sites. 
The type of services included medical and dental care, behavioral health and ena-
bling services. They mostly served low-income minority patients who are mainly 
able-bodied working-age women. People with incomes below 100% FPL represented 
72% of the patients, 23% of the patients were African-American (42% of the patients 
were white, 28% were Hispanics), and 61% of the patients were between 18 and 64 
years old. Most of the CHC patients were either uninsured (35%) or covered by Medi-
caid (41%). A vast majority of the health care visits were for primary medical care 
(71%). In 2013, CHCs already received 40% of their funding through Medicaid. The 
expansion of Medicaid should thus have a beneficial impact on CHCs, as the majority 
of their patients fall within the new Medicaid eligibility guidelines.175 As African-
Americans and other minorities in the lowest income categories disproportionately 
rely on CHCs for their health services, it can be expected that this population will 
benefit directly from funding increases. 
The issue of preexisting conditions was quite complex prior to the enactment of 
the ACA. Prior to the prohibition, there was a patchwork regarding preexisting condi-
tions that varied by state. A 2016 Kaiser poll found that 53% of Americans had a preex-
isting condition or that someone in their household had such a condition. The foun-
dation estimated that, in 2016, about 30% (29.4 million women) of nonelderly women 
and 24% (22.8 million men) of nonelderly men had a preexisting condition. There are 
strong state variations. Colorado had the lowest rate of individuals who could have 
coverage denied due to preexisting conditions at 22%. Southern states had particular-
ly higher rates, the highest being Mississippi at 34% and West Virginia at 36% of their 
non-elderly population. Since not all of these individuals would have had to purchase 
coverage on the individual market (possibly being covered through their employer or 
Medicaid, or other), the study estimates that prior to the ACA about 18% of applica-
tions were denied. In some states the rates of denied applications were as high as 33% 
(Kentucky, North Carolina, Ohio). According to 2008 data from AHIP, denial rates for 
children were 5% and 29% for adults between 18 and 64 years old. However, the study 
considered that these rates were underestimations, as many people did not apply be-
cause they knew their condition made them ineligible or were told so by an insurance 
agent. In addition, regulations regarding preexisting conditions exclusions varied 
widely from state to state. In 19 states a preexisting condition was only considered as 
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such if the individual had received treatment or advice for the conditions over a pre-
vious period ranging from 6 months to 5 years. In other states this included condi-
tions that had not been diagnosed, but for which symptoms would have prompted a 
‘prudent person’ to seek advice and treatment. In 7 states and Washington DC, preex-
isting conditions included any condition, even if it was undiagnosed and asympto-
matic (meaning the symptoms did not correspond to the symptoms usually associat-
ed with the disease) that had begun prior to the coverage. So this could include 
congenital conditions in a newborn baby.176  
The same study conducted an overview of the preexisting conditions commonly 
listed by insurers as reasons for denying coverage: HIV/AIDS, alcohol or drug abuse 
with recent treatment, Alzheimer’s disease, arthritis, cancer (within 10 years), conges-
tive heart failure, coronary artery or heart failure, or any bypass surgery, Crohn’s dis-
ease, diabetes mellitus, epilepsy, Hepatitis C, kidney disease or renal failure (but this 
has been an eligibility criterion for Medicaid since 1972), many mental disorders (se-
vere bipolar or eating disorders), multiple sclerosis, severe obesity, organ transplant, 
paraplegia, paralysis, Parkinson’s disease, pending surgery or hospitalization, preg-
nancy or expectant parent (this means that men could be denied coverage as well), 
stroke, or transsexualism. In some cases specific medication was excluded. This con-
cerned some drugs against arthritis, cancer, diabetes, HIV/AIDS or hepatitis, among 
others. Some insurers also developed lists of occupations that made people ineligible 
for insurance, most of them being high-risk or high-stress professions, such as active 
military personnel, air traffic controllers, bodyguards, aviation and air transportation, 
crop dusters, firefighters and EMTs, law enforcement and detectives, meat packers 
and processors, or taxi drivers, to cite just a few.177  
The study also found a list of conditions that would not result in denial of cover-
age, but could result in coverage with higher premiums. The specific treatment for 
the condition or body part where the condition is located could be excluded, deduct-
ibles could be increased, or benefits could be modified so as to exclude prescription 
drugs, for example. Some of the conditions that could trigger such measures were: 
acne, allergies, anxiety, asthma, depression, ear infections, fractures, high cholesterol, 
hypertension, incontinence, joint injuries, menstrual irregularities, overweight, vari-
cose veins, and vertigo.178 
 The ACA very simply prohibited all preexisting condition exclusions and pro-
hibited discrimination based on health status, meaning the above-mentioned practice 
of charging higher premiums because of certain prior health conditions, such as fre-
quent ear infections or irregular menstrual periods. 
In the case of many of these conditions there are strong racial disparities. Re-
garding hypertension, which can often lead to very serious conditions such as heart 
attacks, strokes, chronic heart failure, or kidney disease, African-Americans have the 
highest rates. 
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Diagram 53 High Blood Pressure by Race in Percent, 2016179 
Although the highest rates are among seniors, who qualify for Medicare, a sig-
nificant proportion of the non-elderly population have hypertension, most notably 
over half of the 55-64 year olds. The CDC also alerts readers to the fact that only 54% 
of the people concerned have their hypertension under control.180 
The trends for cholesterol show less marked racial disparities, though it is some-
thing that significantly affects all populations. Only about 29.5% of affected patients 
have their condition under control and only 48.1% are getting treatment. High choles-
terol doubles the risk of developing heart disease (the leading cause of death in the 
US). Although 31.7% of all Americans have high cholesterol, Mexican American men 
are particularly affected with 38.8%.181 
Obesity has sharp racial disparities. Although the population with obesity prob-
lems is growing overall, blacks have the highest rates. 
 
 
Diagram 54 Obesity Rates by Race in Percent 2007-10 and 2011-14182 
These figures concern obesity of all types. In addition, blacks have markedly higher 
rates of grade 3 obesity (with a Body Mass Index over 40.0) than other populations: 
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11.9% of blacks compared with 5.4% of whites, and 5.3% of Hispanics, or 6% of the total 
population in 2007-10. This is an increasing trend with rates having more than dou-
bled since 1988-1994. For Grade 3 obesity, the rates vary by income level: they were 1.8 
times lower for incomes over 400% FPL than for the highest obesity rate at incomes 
between 100% and 199% FPL. The difference is less marked for overall obesity, for 
which there is a 6% decrease for incomes over 400% FPL, compared to the highest 
obesity rate of 37.3% for incomes between 100%-199% FPL in 2007-10. This, however, 
is changing. The overall obesity rates for incomes below 400% FPL are still growing, 
whereas for incomes over 400% FPL the rate decreased by 1.6% in 2011-14. Thus the 
discrepancy was at 12.9%, more than double the discrepancy between these popula-
tions in 2007-10. The difference with other lower income levels was around 10%. The-
se trends show that obesity is increasingly becoming a problem linked with poor mi-
nority populations. Children are also seeing growing rates of obesity; between the age 
of 2 and 19 years old, the rate grew from 16.9% in 2009-10 to 17.2% in 2013-14.183 
It appears then that the ban on using preexisting conditions exclusion was espe-
cially important for minorities and blacks because they had among the highest unin-
sured rates, which could have resulted partly from the high proportion of preexisting 
conditions among these populations. The high rates of obesity and hypertension and 
other similar conditions were among factors that made health insurance premiums 
more expensive. In this sense, blacks should benefit from the ACA, which prohibits 
this kind of practice. 
However, the issue of obesity is so problematic that the ban on pre-existing con-
ditions is not sufficient. Although some of the abovementioned measures address 
obesity issues, the health care reform cannot address the problem of nutrition, espe-
cially among children, for whom the onset of obesity can be more easily prevented or 
for whom existing obesity can be tackled. Moreover, political scientist Clodagh Har-
rington draws attention to the fact that childhood obesity is recognized as one of the 
most pressing matters of the 21st century by the World Health Organization, as con-
firmed by studies showing the impact of obesity, especially among low-income chil-
dren, on their chances in life.184 
The specific focus on child obesity came through First Lady Michelle Obama’s 
initiative Let’s Move. The initiative launched in 2010, is very complementary to the 
ACA, as it focuses on childhood obesity. It has been shown above that the black 
community disproportionately suffers from obesity, and the trends are similar for 
children. In 2007-2010, among children 12 to 19 years old, overall 18.2% were obese. 
However, this concerned 15.9% of white youths, compared with 24.1% of black youths, 
or 22.5% of Hispanics. For all groups, except for whites, these trends had been in-
creasing from the previous years. Although for 2011-2014 the rates were almost the 
same or increasing for all populations, except for blacks whose rate dropped by 
1.5%,185 it is not possible to say whether or not the FLOTUS initiative is responsible for 
that. Beyond these racial differences, there are also striking differences according to 
income: the obesity rates decline as income increases: whereas in 2007-10 24.3% of 
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youngsters from families with incomes below 100% FPL were obese, this decreased 
steadily along income lines to drop to 14% for incomes over 400% FPL.186 
Thus the initiative launched by Michelle Obama targets a problem that is pre-
sent among all racial groups, but which is prevalent among African-Americans. Thus 
it is perfectly consistent with the race pragmatic approach. Moreover, it has been 
shown above that obesity has implications on health care insurance, as well as on 
health conditions. Let’s Move! focuses on different things, such as improving child 
nutrition, for example through an update of child nutrition policies, providing access 
to healthy, affordable food in schools and communities, promoting physical activity, 
and providing information and support for parents and caregivers. In this respect, the 
elements that aim at parents seem slightly superficial. However, these elements aim 
at establishing new habits at home, such as advice to keep fresh fruit available for the 
children, to go for a family walk after dinner, to plan the menu for the week and to 
involve the children in this and in the preparation of the meals, to make mealtimes a 
family moment without TV, and to address the school principal about healthier food 
in school. Advice to children is in a similar tone and highlights the need to drink wa-
ter instead of soda or insists on the need to move, even when watching TV. The pro-
gram’s website urges schools to create a Health Advisory Council, to incorporate nu-
trition and physical education, or to plant a school garden.187 This focus on unsound 
behavior or negative habits is also perfectly consistent with the race pragmatic ap-
proach, which highlighted the need to openly address such issues and to insist on 
such issues of personal responsibility. 
Such measures might seem trivial or symbolic. However, Harrington points out 
in her analysis of the Healthy Hunger-Free Kids Act that recent studies explain the 
staggering link between a low socio-economic level, the lower educational back-
ground of the parents, and child obesity. Moreover, Harrington points out that, for 
the First Lady, the realization came when starting this initiative, that obesity was not 
only linked to a lack of physical activity, but was strongly linked to many other factors 
in people’s environment. However, Harrington insisted on the fact that at the political 
level this information is not always well received, because it raises the issue of re-
sponsibility. As long as a lack of physical activity is portrayed as the sole cause for 
obesity, structural inequalities need not be addressed. However, obesity raises the 
question of food subsidies and thus interferes with vested interests in the food indus-
try, where junk food is subsidized to a much greater extent than healthy food. An 
additional problem that gained new attention was that children receive a substantial 
part of their meals at school, where junk food often dominates for practical reasons 
and because it is cheap. Given the extent of the problem, and to make her initiative 
viable and meaningful in the long term, Michelle Obama urged her husband to sign 
the Healthy Hunger-Free Kids Act in 2010. The White House Task Force on Child 
Obesity was created at the same time. As pointed out by Harrington, it was a good 
move for the Obamas to carefully dissociate the FLOTUS initiative, which is sup-
posed to be more superficial, from the policy enactment that went through the regu-
lar channels. It is yet another example where some of the Clintons’ mistakes, such as 
a too prominent and too active role for the First Lady, were painstakingly avoided.188 
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This was a continuation of an initiative by Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s, but it 
was triggered by the Obama administration’s focus on health and social justice. Har-
rington explains that early on in the Obama administration, particular attention was 
paid to the problem of childhood obesity and the more general issue of poor diet 
among children from lower-income backgrounds.  
Harrington highlights the fact that the Obama initiative on school lunches does 
not come out of the blue, but dates back to 1945 when the US military informed Con-
gress that 40% of the draftees had to be rejected because of malnutrition. This led to 
the passage of the National School Lunch Act in 1946, which provided free and subsi-
dized school meals. The program enjoyed mixed partisan support over the years and 
fared according to the general wave of social programs: Nixon supported it, Carter 
reduced it, and Reagan made substantial cuts. In addition, the 1980s marked a change 
in attitudes regarding diet. Reagan made his famous comments about tomato ketch-
up being a vegetable, and he allowed fast food chains to sell in schools. The differ-
ence between 1945 and 2009 was that the conclusion of the military report that 
reached the Obama administration was “too fat to fight.” Thus the military was a 
strong ally in support of school lunches. Additionally, it provided good arguments 
regarding the costs of better school lunches: the military claimed that obesity was 
costing them over $1 billion a year.189 
Obama’s bill built on the existing legislation and added $4.5 billion in new fund-
ing to reach a total of $10.1 billion. It established a new nutritional standard for school 
meals including breakfast. Among the most progressive features of the bill was an 
easier enrollment, which would prevent disadvantages for poor children with more 
chaotic family lives. The other progressive feature was the fact that school meals 
would run throughout the year, including vacations to ensure the continuity of 
(healthy) meals. Moreover, eligibility was expanded. The US Department of Agricul-
ture got the authorization to set the standards for school meals, including vending 
machines, which had in the past often provided a junk food alternative to the healthy 
school lunch. Moreover, schools and communities were provided with resources to 
shop for fresh produce at local farms and gardens for a more ecological approach. 
However, Harrington highlighted the fact that Obama had to agree to temporary cuts 
in the SNAP program (food stamps) to get the deal pass Congress, which of course 
brought criticism from liberal Congressmen.190  
Despite these initial problems and the opposition of food interests, Harrington 
lauded the accomplishment of a suddenly unpopular law that was pushed through 
for the greater good of a long-term goal. First evidence seems to indicate that the pro-
gram works and that many schools have taken up additional initiatives. Moreover, 
Harrington underlined the disproportionate racial impact on black children, as they 
suffer from higher obesity rates and are disproportionately poor and thus eligible for 
school lunches.191 
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4.2.3. The Aftermath: The ACA at Age 7 
Most provisions of the ACA and the HCER took effect in 2014, in particular the 
individual mandate and the employer mandate. Other provisions went into effect 
quickly, such as the prohibition of health care exclusion based on preexisting condi-
tions that was effective immediately or the option for early enrollment of newly eligi-
ble Medicaid patients, which became possible starting 2011. The overall Medicaid 
extension, however, went (at least partially) into effect in 2014. With these new provi-
sions, the insurance landscape changed. 
 
  
Diagram 55 Health Insurance Coverage 2013 and 2015, in Percent192 
The gain of new health insurance coverage was particularly strong for direct-
purchase insurance, meaning private insurance not provided by the employer. Medi-
caid enrollment also significantly increased. The decline of uninsured people was 
particularly marked for people age 21 to 28, with a decrease of almost 10%.193 This 
shows that the possibility for people of remaining on a parent’s health plan until 
turning 27 was quite effective.  
Regarding income, not surprisingly, higher incomes continue to rely mostly on 
private coverage. However, the relatively high government insurance proportions 
among the higher incomes mainly reflect Medicare enrollment, which is not depend-
ent on income. The lower incomes have a higher reliance on government insurance, 
which reflects the high Medicaid enrollment based on incomes criteria. 
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Note: the different types of health insurance coverage are NOT mutually exclusive. 
Diagram 56 Type of Health Coverage by Income 2015, in Percent194 
Compared to 2010, the decline in the number of people without health insur-
ance was particularly sharp among the lowest incomes, which shows the effects of the 
Medicaid extension. It may also reflect structural effects on the preexisting conditions 
ban. As seen previously, some diseases or preexisting conditions such as diabetes and 
obesity occur at very varying rates. This exemplifies structural inequalities along in-
come and racial lines. 
 
 
Diagram 57 Decline in Uninsured Rates by Income 2010-2015, in Percentage Points195 
Some provisions went into effect immediately with the enactment of Obamac-
are. Thus it is more revealing to compare the overall changes since 2009. 
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Diagram 58 Type of Health Coverage by Race 2009 and 2015, in Percent196 
The change in health coverage was significant for the whole population, but the 
changes were particularly important for minorities, especially for Hispanics. Black 
and Hispanic uninsured rates dropped by 9.2% and 15.4% respectively. The drop was 
lower for whites at 4.8% but still significant. The health reform had little impact on 
private insurance for whites, but they gained 6.4% in public coverage (mostly Medi-
caid). Although the overall public insurance rate increase was 6.5 percentage points, 
Hispanics increased their public coverage more than other populations with an 8.5 
percentage point increase, and blacks increased their public coverage rate the least 
with 5.2 percentage points.197 The reason for this low increase of public coverage will 
be explained in detail later, because it is due to the non-extension of Medicaid. 
Both blacks and Hispanics significantly increased their private insurance rates 
by roughly 10 percentage points. The overall picture that emerges is that the univer-
sal but class-specific focus has yielded some results due to the structural intersection 
of race and class, while also helping the poorer white populations to increase their 
health insurance coverage rates. 
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Diagram 59 Type of Health Coverage by Income 2015, in Percent198 
 
Diagram 60 Type of Health Coverage by Income 2013, in Percent199 
Among the lowest incomes, the insured rate increased by 8 percentage points, 
mostly through direct-purchase private insurance. The same occurred for the work-
ing and lower middle class, although the overall increase in the insured rate was low-
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er at 6 percentage points. This indicates that the overall lowering of health insurance 
costs and tax credits had some effect. For the middle class, the overall insured rate 
increased as well, although moderately by four percentage points, resulting from a 6 
percentage point increase in direct-purchase private insurance and four percentage 
point Medicaid increase (this probably results from some large families qualifying for 
Medicaid). Overall, all income categories saw a slight increase in employment-based 
coverage, ranging from one to two percentage points for the highest incomes. The 
highest incomes also increased their direct-purchase private coverage by four per-
centage points. 
 
 
Diagram 61 Type of Health Coverage by Income, for Whites, 2015, in Percent200 
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Diagram 62 Type of Health Coverage by Income, for Whites, 2013, in Percent201 
The pattern is slightly different for whites. Although the overall uninsured rate 
for whites fell by only three percentage points, the decrease was strongest among the 
lowest income category with a six percentage point decrease, followed by the working 
and lower middle class with a five percentage point decrease. Because whites are less 
concentrated in these income categories, the effect on the overall uninsured rate was 
not that spectacular. These income categories also experienced an increase in private 
direct purchase insurance and in Medicaid enrollment. For the working and lower 
middle class, employment-based insurance actually decreased slightly. The same 
pattern applied to the middle class and the higher incomes. 
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Diagram 63 Type of Health Coverage by Income, for Blacks, 2015, in Percent202 
 
 
Diagram 64 Type of Health Coverage by Income, for Blacks, 2013203 
The overall uninsured rate for blacks declined by five percentage points. This 
decline was most heavily concentrated among the lowest income category and 
among the middle class with seven and six percentage points respectively. Direct-
purchase private insurance increased for all income categories by five to six percent-
age points. Employment-based insurance increased for the lower incomes by one 
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percentage point, but decreased by the same amount for the two higher income cate-
gories. Interestingly enough, government health care increased along a surprising 
pattern. Among the lowest income categories, only Medicare enrollment increased by 
four percentage points, whereas Medicaid enrollment did not increase. It even de-
creased by one percentage point for the working and lower middle class. However, 
Medicaid enrollment increased by six percentage points for the middle class, indicat-
ing most probably that large households were able to benefit from the Medicaid ex-
tension. Moreover, for the working and lower middle, as well as for the middle class, 
health insurance based on their own employment increased slightly. For the lowest 
income category, coverage based both on their own employment and the employ-
ment coverage for dependents increased by one percentage point. 
 
 
Diagram 65 Type of Health Coverage by Income, for Hispanics, 2015, in Percent204 
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Diagram 66 Type of Health Coverage by Income, for Hispanics, 2013, in Percent205 
Hispanics benefited most from the changes in the insurance system as they had 
the highest uninsured rates to begin with. Overall the uninsured rate among Hispan-
ics declined by eight percentage points. The greatest effect was on the working and 
lower middle class, which experienced a nine percentage point increase in insured 
rates. The working, the lower middle and the middle class also saw significant gains 
in Medicaid enrollment. The six percentage points increase in Medicaid enrollment 
for the Hispanic middle class might reflect large families and households. All income 
categories also substantially increased their direct-purchase private health insurance. 
Regarding employment coverage, the lowest and the highest income categories saw a 
one percentage point decrease in coverage derived from their own employment; 
however, the coverage of dependents increased. For the working and lower middle, 
as well as for the middle class, this type of coverage saw a slight increase. 
Above and beyond the questions purely related to the type of coverage, health 
care expenses have been a continuous problem in the American health care system. 
As shown previously, even people with coverage were often not able to afford some 
health care expenses because of the high co-pays and deductibles. A 2015 study by the 
Urban Institute showed that an increasing number of people were able to meet their 
medical bills as a result of the implementation of the ACA, and especially the Medi-
caid extension. Between 2013 and 2015, the percentage of people unable to pay their 
medical bills declined from 22% to 17.3%. This decrease was slightly more important 
in states that had expanded Medicaid (0.9%). In expansion states, the share decreased 
from 20.5% to 15.4%, whereas in non-expansion states the share decreased from 24.6% 
to 20.4%. However, stark problems remain. In 2015, 24.2% of people with incomes be-
low 138% FLP still reported that they had difficulties meeting medical bills, compared 
with 14.4% of people with incomes above 138% FPL. It should be noted that 73.8% of 
people who had difficulties paying for medical bills reported that they did forego 
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medical care because they could not afford it. For people without difficulties paying 
for care, the rate was 23.2%.206 
By 2015, the share of people unable to pay their medical bills had declined to 
16.5% (a 4.8 percentage point decrease). This was particularly the case for poor fami-
lies whose share decreased from 32.1% in 2011 to 24.5% in 2015. Similarly, for near-poor 
families the share decreased from 34.6% to 27.1%. The decrease was less important for 
families not categorized as poor with their share from 15.2% to 12.2%. This decrease 
was rather evenly distributed among the different racial populations; however the 
decrease was slightly more important for whites at 5.2% (from 19.8% in 2011 to 14.7% in 
2015), compared with a 4.3% decrease for Hispanics (from 24.3% in 2011 to 20% in 2015), 
or the 4.2% decrease for blacks (from 27.3% in 2011 to 32.1% in 2015).207 
The changes that Obamacare brought to the health insurance landscape also 
had an impact on Community Health Centers, which deliver care and health related 
services to the poorer populations. Between 2013 and 2015 the patient profile of CHCs 
had not changed much with African-Americans representing 22% of patients, His-
panics 29% and whites 41%. Seventy-one percent of patients had incomes under 100% 
FPL, with and additional 21% having incomes between 100-200% FPL. Sixty-one per-
cent of the patients were working-aged. However, the insurance status of these pa-
tients had changed: only 24% (11 percentage point decrease) of patients were still un-
insured, 49% were covered by Medicaid, and 17% (a three percentage point increase) 
had private insurance. The revenue for CHCs grew from $15.9 billion in 2013 to $21 
billion in 2015. The increase did not come only from the increased direct ACA fund-
ing, but also from the share of revenue derived from patients, be it through private 
insurance or Medicaid payments, which together increased by five percentage points 
to reach 61%. The share of revenues coming from Medicaid increased by four per-
centage points. Moreover, in addition to these modified insurance profiles, the over-
all number of CHCs has increased to 1,375 (173 new CHCs in two years), which deliver 
care in 9,750 sites, meaning 580 sites were added over a two years). The overall case-
load increased by 10% in two years to about 24.3 million patients.208 This represented 
a total increase of 251 of the number of CHCs compared to 2010, when the CHCs 
served 19.5 million patients and received 77.1 million visits.209  
A study conducted by health policy researcher Janet Weiner, economist Clifford 
Marks and public policy expert and economist Mark Pauly shows that the new cost-
containment measures for Medicare Advantage had some effect. The cost for Medi-
care Advantage was reduced to just above 2% of regular Medicare, generating $65 
billion in savings between 2011 and 2016. Over the same period, enrollment increased 
from 24% to 31%. This is noteworthy, because critics feared that the new provisions of 
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the ACA would reduce enrollment. Other cost saving measures related to Medicare 
or the delivery of service had some small or zero effects, but did not lead to losses.210 
The trickiest part of the impact of Obamacare is the effects on insurance premi-
ums and this deserves some preliminary remarks. The first point is that it is quite 
difficult to know the price of the average health insurance plan because of the variety 
of providers, types of plan, benefits, etc. This is further complicated through the fact 
that the main share of health care insurance is delivered through employment-based 
group plans, while only a small share concerns the non-group market of directly pur-
chased private insurance. In addition, two elements lead to confusion among the 
people and the media. First, it appears that people expected to a certain extent that 
insurance premiums would massively decrease or at least not increase anymore. The 
ACA never promised that. As the discussion above showed, the ACA sought to find 
ways of making insurance affordable through other means, by finding ways of paying 
for the premiums and to rein in the increase of costs. The aim was also to regulate the 
value of the plans, to make sure that people actually got care in return for their pre-
miums. Second, the subsidies for purchasing health insurance follow some strict 
conditions that have been exposed above. It is not to be excluded that there might be 
some confusion within the population as to what type of insurance plan allows for a 
maximum of subsidies. 
The CBO projected, based on past premium increases, that health insurance 
premiums would continue to increase by 5% over the following years. The massive 
increases (9% on average) over the previous decade had mainly occurred between 
2000 and 2005. After that, premium increases slowed a little. However, these premi-
um increases were still on average 2% higher than the increase of the average per 
capita income. Overall, between 2005 and 2014, the premiums for employment-based 
individual insurance massively increased by 48%, whereas family plans increased by 
55%. The CBO, based on several surveys and analyses, estimates that in 2015 the pre-
miums of the average employment-based single plan was $6,400 per annum, and a 
family plan cost around $15,500. The Kaiser Family Foundation evaluated the family 
plan at $17,550. Non-group direct-purchase insurance was less costly on average, but 
it also provided significantly less actuarial value, meaning the reimbursement is sig-
nificantly lower. On average, employment-based insurance has a 83% reimbursement 
rate compared with roughly 60% for non-group direct purchase plans. This means 
that on average, for a family plan, the out-of-pocket contribution is $4,127 for direct-
purchase plans, compared to $1,765 for employment based. The rise in premiums in 
2013 was actually lower than the 5% initially projected. Thus the CBO projected the 
increase for 2014-16 at 3-4% for employment-based insurance. However, in 2011, non-
group plan premiums grew by 6.2%, compared with the 4.5% of growth for group 
plans. There was a similar difference for 2012 when premiums for non-group plans 
increased by 2.4%, compared with 1.9% for group plans. The CBO estimates that 
many of the regulations regarding the quality of coverage, the type of benefits (mas-
sively extended) and the ban on preexisting conditions exclusion affected the indi-
vidual market more strongly.211 
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The way in which the ACA affects the affordability of health insurance is mostly 
in picking up the tab. For 2016, the CBO estimates that the federal government spent 
$300 billion for health care subsidies. These are provided in two ways. As was the 
case before the implementation of the ACA, employer-based health insurance is still 
heavily incentivized through tax exemptions (these apply to nearly all health care 
premiums), meaning that health care premiums are exempted from federal income 
and payroll taxes. This accounts for roughly 30% of the average premium cost. Thus, 
in 2016, the federal government subsidized employment-based health insurance 
through about $260 billion in lost revenue. The subsidies through the income tax 
credit are more modest, accounting for the smaller share of people insured in the 
individual market (16% in 2015). In 2016, the federal government spent $40 billion on 
those tax credits.212 However, the amount of tax credits received for premiums on the 
individual market is higher than the amount provided through the tax exemption for 
employer-based insurances. In addition to that, the CBO estimates that the federal 
government spent an additional $8 billion on cost-sharing subsidies for low-income 
families, which are designed to help paying for health care expenses.213 
Health policy experts Loren Adler and Paul Ginsburg from the Brookings Insti-
tution estimate that Obamacare even had a lowering effect on premiums. According 
to their analysis, the 2014 premiums in the health exchanges were overall between 10 
and 21% lower than the 2013 premiums on the individual market. They concede that 
there are many cost-increasing features in the ACA; however, these features also sub-
stantially increase the quality of the plans, which must be taken into account. Yet, the 
overall premiums also decreased because of the simple increase of the market and 
the influx of healthier individuals. They based their analysis on the silver plan, as this 
plan functions as a benchmark in the ACA. For the average silver plan, the premiums 
were lower, even while the coverage provided by the plan increased by 17%. In 2016 
premiums were still lower than in 2013 (for the same amount of coverage), meaning 
that the premiums were actually lower by 20% than the projections made by the CBO 
in 2009. Employer-based plans were 12% lower than 2009 CBO projections foresaw. 
Although the average silver plan premium increased by 9% over the 5 years between 
2009 and 2014, the nominal dollar amount paid for it actually decreased because of 
the increase in actuarial value. Adler and Ginsburg offer some suggestions to explain 
the confusion about the premium increases. They point to strong local variations de-
pending on the marketplaces, as some regions have higher premiums than others. 
Moreover, they insist on the redistributional aspect of the ACA, as premiums in-
creased for healthier people while they decreased for sicker people.214 
This health redistribution should work to the advantage of blacks, as they have 
overall poorer health conditions than whites. As seen in the previous discussion, pre-
existing conditions or conditions that prior to the ACA led to increased health pre-
miums are strongly present in the black population. Thus a disproportionate effect in 
lower premiums as compared to previous access and costs can be conjectured. 
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4.3. The Fragility of the Reform 
It could have potentially been more thoughtful.215 
Bart Gordon 
 
As explained earlier, the ACA was shaped by important constraints, which re-
sulted in a rather complicated reform. The fact that Obamacare did not establish one 
unified system proved to be a liability, although this resulted from the fact that Dem-
ocrats sought to enact a reform that would be palatable to Republicans. Moreover, 
other aspects of the reform were attacked, showing once again the deep ideological 
divide between the two parties and within the population. 
4.3.1. Lawsuits Against the ACA and Medicaid 
As mentioned previously, the ACA was challenged in a series of lawsuits. Three 
of these lawsuits are of interest here.216 They are Sebelius v. NFIB, 2012, Burwell v. Hob-
by Lobby in 2014, and the latest, King v. Burwell, in 2015. They will be discussed by in-
creasing order of importance. 
First, the 2014 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby decision is interesting because the ruling 
decided against the ACA, and secondly because it concerned the highly divisive cul-
tural issue of abortion. 
The owners of a family business, Hobby Lobby, argued that, based on their reli-
gious beliefs, they refused to comply with a provision of the ACA that required em-
ployer plans to include preventive care and screening for women without extra cost 
or cost-sharing requirements to the patients. The HHS decided that these preventive 
services included contraceptives, notably four contraceptives that were judged to be 
similar to abortion by the owners of the corporations involved in the lawsuit because 
they prevent the fertilized egg from nesting in the uterus. They argued that under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), they should not have to comply 
with this provision because it puts an unusual burden on them due to their religious 
beliefs. The RFRA had been interpreted to date as applying to religious non-profit 
organizations, but the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision extended this to closely held 
for-profit corporations, in other words family businesses. Justice Alito wrote the opin-
ion, he was joined by the other conservative Justices Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia, and 
Thomas. Ginsburg dissented emphatically. She was joined by Justice Sotomayor, and 
in part by Justice Kagan and Justice Breyer. Justice Ginsburg insisted on the unusual 
financial burden that had been placed on women through high co-payments for pre-
ventive care specific to women. She quoted the fact that women in child-bearing age 
had a 68% higher out-of-pocket spending compared to men of the same age, which 
Senator Mikulski had used as argument to add the Women’s Health Amendment to 
the ACA, which had established the inclusion of women specific preventive care in 
the health plans.  
Ginsburg also recalled that the Senate had voted down the conscience amend-
ment, which would have allowed employers to deny coverage based on religious be-
                                                        
215	  Gordon	  interview.	  
216	  Besides	  these	  cases,	  which	  reached	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  other	  lawsuits	  were	  filed,	  but	  they	  will	  not	  be	  
discussed	  here.	  
434 Stephan Social Policies and Racial Questions 
liefs. Ginsburg insisted on the denial of freedom that this decision represented for the 
women employed by these businesses. However, the most interesting point of Gins-
burg’s dissent is her warning of future implications. First, she sees no reason why the 
logic should not be applied to corporations of any size in the future. She moreover 
insisted that in this case the majority’s reasoning might as well be extended to other 
issues, like vaccines, or paying the minimum wage, or equal pay for women, pointing 
out precedents where this had already been attempted. Ginsburg insisted that this 
would also open the door for discriminatory practices disguised behind religious be-
liefs. She pointed to a series of precedents where business owners had attempted to 
refuse to serve patrons or hire employees based on their religious beliefs, one claim-
ing that his religion was against racial integration, others refusing to serve homosex-
uals, or to hire or retain women who worked without their father’s or their husbands’ 
consent, or just generally people antagonistic to the Bible.217 
This case is particularly interesting in illustrating how the issue of abortion re-
surfaced in the context of the ACA. Moreover, the Supreme Court ruling highlights 
again how deeply liberals and conservatives are still divided over the issue. Gins-
burg’s dissent insists on the potential of the Hobby Lobby decision to function as a 
Trojan horse for discriminatory practices.  
The 2015 case King v. Burwell challenged the functioning of the health exchanges 
and the tax credits, and thus attacked a fundamental component of the ACA. The 
four petitioners from Virginia did not wish to purchase insurance. Yet, thanks to the 
tax credits, the premiums were below the threshold that would have exempted them 
from the individual mandate. They argued that the language of the ACA was faulty, 
and that the passage in question could be interpreted as to mean that only plans pur-
chased in exchanges established by the states were eligible for subsidies. Thus, they 
argued, their plans would not be eligible for subsidies because they would have to 
purchase them through a federal exchange since the state of Virginia had not estab-
lished a state exchange. 
The Supreme Court decided that since the ACA sought to expand coverage, the 
ACA regulations must be interpreted as applying to the federal exchange as well. The 
Supreme Court argued that if the justices followed the petitioners’ reasoning a “death 
spiral” would result, leading to the result Congress had precisely sought to avoid. The 
subsidies and the individual mandate, two of the major provisions of the ACA, would 
not work and fewer and fewer people would be covered, driving costs up for those 
remaining in the exchanges. The decision was 6-3 in favor of the ACA. Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote the opinion, he was joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kennedy, Breyer, 
and Kagan. Justice Scalia wrote the dissent, he was joined by Thomas and Alito.218 
The importance of the decision is made clear by the Supreme Court’s descrip-
tion of how the proper function of the ACA depended on the two abovementioned 
mechanisms. Since 2015, 34 states have relied on the federal exchange, thus the Su-
preme Court decision was vital for the functioning of the ACA. Currently in 2016-
2017, more than 12 million persons have purchased plans through the exchanges. Had 
the Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners, in 2016-17, about 8.8 million people 
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would not have been eligible for the tax credits.219 Although whites rely to a greater 
extent on direct purchase insurance, minority coverage rates increased more sharply 
thanks to the individual market between 2013 and 2015. Interestingly enough, more 
whites with modest incomes than with higher incomes rely on direct purchase insur-
ance. For minorities the trend is reversed. In 2015, 16% of the total population relied 
on direct purchase insurance on the individual market. This was an increase of 4% 
compared to 2013.220 This means that a decision in favor of the petitioners in King v. 
Burwell would have had a stronger impact on low-income people and on minorities. 
Perhaps the most important lawsuit against the ACA was the first one brought 
against it in 2012, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. In it, two major 
components of the ACA were challenged based on constitutional arguments: the in-
dividual mandate and the compulsory Medicaid extension to all low-income adults. 
These were, with the employer mandate, two of the three cornerstones aimed at 
achieving universal coverage. The goal was to have an insured pool that would con-
tain a mixed population of healthy people as well as people with health problems, in 
order to have a sustainable insurance system. As shown previously, an insurance sys-
tem only works if everyone is insured, even healthy people, which ultimately drives 
down cost. 
It was argued in the Sebelius case, in which 26 states and several individuals 
joined, that the federal government had no right to penalize non-compliance with the 
new Medicaid extension with the loss of all federal Medicaid funds, as opposed to 
only those pertaining to the expansion to low-income adults. This would have de-
prived states of over 10% of their budget.  
The Supreme Court upheld the individual mandate by arguing that, if it is con-
strued as a tax, it falls within Congress’s authority to lay and collect taxes. The opin-
ion was delivered by Chief Justice Roberts; Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan 
joined. 221 The Medicaid expansion, however, was ruled unconstitutional. Chief Jus-
tice Roberts, who was joined by Breyer and Kagan, argued that the Medicaid expan-
sion violated the Constitution because the threat of losing all Medicaid funds for the 
old Medicaid in case of non-compliance with the new Medicaid program was a form 
of pressure that was against the rules of federalism. They argued, however, that the 
spending clause was constitutional, meaning that the federal government could pro-
vide additional Medicaid funds. It just could not compel states to participate. This 
made the Medicaid extension optional. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion, 
in which he was joined by Breyer and Kagan.222  
Ginsburg filed a partly dissenting concurrence in which Sotomayor joined, and 
Breyer and Kagan joined in part. Ginsburg argued that the compulsory Medicaid ex-
tension was perfectly valid. She pointed out that Congress could have created a 
health care reform on the model of Social Security, on the model of single payer. She 
highlighted the fact that Congress was already generous in building the reform on 
the existing system, which gave a prominent role to private insurers and the states. 
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Moreover, Ginsburg found the argument of the Commerce Clause as allowing Con-
gress to regulate health care and impose the individual mandate was perfectly valid. 
She described Roberts’ interpretation of the Commerce clause as follows: “This rigid 
reading of the Clause makes scant sense and is stunningly retrogressive,“ pointing out 
that the Supreme Court should rather side with the government’s efforts to try to 
regulate the economy in favor of labor. Ginsburg most strongly disagreed with Rob-
erts’ interpretation of the clause that Congress could not compel people to engage in 
unwanted commerce. Ginsburg argued that the uninsured were engaged in health 
commerce because of their reliance on emergency care. Breyer and Kagan joined 
with Ginsburg in the argument that the Commerce clause could apply. However, on-
ly Ginsburg and Sotomayor defended the Medicaid extension as valid. First, Gins-
burg expanded her argument that the federal government could have opted for a far 
more disruptive approach and could simply have recalled the whole existing Medi-
caid system to replace it with a new one. She underlined the fact that the existing 
Medicaid legislation allowed state autonomy only within the boundaries and regula-
tions set by the federal government, which condition the receipt of federal grants. In 
this, the new Medicaid extension that Ginsburg considered to be just a new amend-
ment to the existing Medicaid was perfectly in compliance with existing regula-
tions.223 
The dissent written by Scalia, in which Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined, 
found a relatively easy way out of the problem of whether or not the “tax-and-spend” 
power of Congress extended to the possibility “to coerce” the states into “a massive 
state-administered federal welfare program.” The dissenting justices applied the 
same simplicity to the question of whether or not the commerce clause applies to the 
individual mandate. For the individual mandate they invoked the 10th Amendment—
or the states’ rights amendment—regarding the limits of what the federal govern-
ment can impose on individual conduct or on “sovereign states.” Scalia argued that 
the Medicaid extension was “a blatant violation” of the Constitution, arguing that the 
federal government may provide funds to the states to administer programs that 
would be too big on a federal scale, but that it is unconstitutional if the states have 
“no choice” in how to administer these programs and in how to employ the funds. 
The dissenters further concluded that the whole Act was unconstitutional, since the 
ACA was built around the individual mandate and the Medicaid extension, both of 
which they found unconstitutional.224 Justice Thomas filed a separate, additional dis-
sent stating that in his view Scalia’s dissent was too lenient regarding the Commerce 
clause, and that the Supreme Court had been too liberal in that regard for quite some 
time. He indicated that, in his opinion, the subclause, which allows the federal gov-
ernment to regulate economic activity, which “substantially affects interstate com-
merce,” was dangerously liberal. He made the point that this has led the federal gov-
ernment to abuse its power, as it even wanted to extend this regulation to economic 
inactivity through the ACA.225 
It is interesting to see that the language in Scalia’s dissent includes references to 
states’ rights, revamped into “sovereign states,” and also raises the issue of “choice” 
again, which were two staple arguments in the resistance to civil rights. Similar ech-
oes are contained in Thomas’ dissent, in which he took a position against an over-
reaching and unduly interfering federal government. Of course, the matter at hand 
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dealt with the evaluation of federal power and with federalism in the case of Medi-
caid. However, given the history of the United States, and in particular the issue of 
economic inequalities along racial lines, it is impossible not to notice the choice of 
arguments and the choice of language. 
Political sociologist Daniel Béland, political scientists Philip Rocco and Alex 
Waddan offer an explanation as to the reason why the different states did not extend 
Medicaid in their 2016 book Obamacare Wars: Federalism, State Politics, and the Afforda-
ble Care Act. They explain a path dependency between prior policy patterns and the 
current status of the Medicaid extension. For example, they mention the fact that 
Arizona had already made prior extension efforts, which could have had an influence 
on Arizona extending Medicaid under the ACA.226 The analysis here, however, does 
not focus on factors that could have influenced individual states in opting or not for 
the expansion. The present analysis rather focuses on the disparate impact these de-
cisions have. However, it must be highlighted that the states which did not extend 
Medicaid in 2014 had among the lowest eligibility levels for adults with children (ex-
cept for Wisconsin, which had a 200%FPL eligibility level for parents) in 2010, where-
as a vast majority of expansion states had already high eligibility levels for parents.227 
This indicates a pattern of policy attitude regarding Medicaid coverage. 
This becomes particularly remarkable when looking at the impact of the Su-
preme Court decision. As the Medicaid extension became optional, the most con-
servative states chose to restrict Medicaid eligibility. This had a negative impact on 
two levels: on the universality of coverage and on the black population. 
Prior to the initially mandatory expansion of Medicaid that was scheduled for 
2014, states had the option for an early expansion of Medicaid to able-bodied child-
less adults. By January 2013, 26 states had not requested such a flexibility, with only 8 
states and Washington DC having extended full Medicaid benefits to low-income 
adults. In addition, 16 states provided for limited Medicaid benefits for low-income 
adults, though in 9 of these states enrollments were closed to new applicants.228 The 
2014 mandatory expansion was supposed to fill these gaps. Thus the Sebelius ruling 
undercut the universality of coverage, because the ACA relied on this extension to 
cover the poorest populations. First surveys from this period show that the uninsured 
rate in the states without the Medicaid extension is still significantly higher than in 
the states that have adopted the extension.229  
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Diagram 67 Uninsured Rates by States, in Percent, 2013230 
 
Diagram 68 Uninsured Rates by States, in Percent, 2015231 
The Sebelius decision had a tremendous impact on the poorest populations, and 
especially on the “working poor,” people who work full time but do not manage to 
earn a sufficient living due to low wages and who have to forego health insurance. 
Moreover, this decision had a disproportionately negative impact on blacks because 
Republican states—in the South in particular—did not implement the Medicaid ex-
tension. While these states232 concentrate 37.9% of the American population, 48.3% of 
the black population live there. In fact, before Louisiana adopted the Medicaid exten-
sion in 2015 (to take effect in 2016), the 20 states concentrated over half (51.8%) of the 
black population, compared with 39.4% of the total population. The impact for His-
panics is not disproportionate, as the rate of Hispanics in the 19 states matches the 
percentage of the total population at 37.9%.233 
A 2016 analysis by the Kaiser Family Foundation shows that the coverage gap 
resulting from the non-extension of Medicaid and the fact that people with incomes 
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below 100% FPL are not eligible for tax credits affects about 2.6 million people. They 
are concentrated in a few states with the highest uninsured rates: 26% in Texas, 18% 
in Florida, 12% in Georgia, 8% in North Carolina, and 36% in the remaining 15 states. 
Ninety-one percent of these people are in the South, 6% in the Midwest, and 3% in 
the West. More poor uninsured live in the South, where a higher share of states (10 
out 0f 19) did not expand Medicaid. Moreover, these states have among the lowest 
Medicaid eligibility thresholds for parents, many below 50% FPL. The population in 
the coverage gap also has a racial profile, 46% are white, 31% black, 18% Hispanic, and 
5% other. The abovementioned population concentration has an effect: a dispropor-
tionate share of blacks falls within the coverage gap, whereas it is proportionally low-
er for whites, and almost proportional for Hispanics. Among these people falling in 
the coverage gap, 77% are childless adults who were not eligible under the previous 
Medicaid system and 23% are parents who are not eligible because these states have 
such low-income thresholds—the lowest being 16% FPL for non-disabled parents in 
Alabama in 2014.234 
A 2017 analysis by economists Marc Duggan and Valerie Scimeca found that 
blacks had the lowest Medicaid enrollment ratio compared to their poverty rate. The 
ratio was 1.28 for blacks, compared with 1.46 for the total population, 1.52 for whites, 
1.48 for Asians, and 1.57 for Hispanics. However, the same study found that there is a 
“compensation effect” among blacks because of a higher enrollment in the federal 
programs of SNAP (food stamps) and SSI. They suggest that one of the possible ex-
planations for the low Medicaid ratio stems from the fact that the black population is 
more concentrated in non-expansion states.235  
When looking at regional Medicaid enrollment data, this picture becomes much 
clearer. For the total population, Medicaid enrollment has been increasing overall 
between 2010 and 2015 and this over all regions. The increase was particularly spec-
tacular in the North East and in the West from 16.9% in the North East in 2010 to 
20.7% in 2015, and 16,7% in 2010 in the West to 23.3% in 2015.236 For the Midwest and 
the South there was roughly a 2.5 percentage points increase. Medicaid enrollment 
for whites has been increasing in all regions, according to the pattern exposed for the 
overall population. For Hispanics, the same trends across all regions apply, although 
they experienced a more important increase in the Midwest and in the South (respec-
tively 3.9 percentage points and 2.7 percentage points). For blacks, however, the pat-
tern is different. In the South, their enrollment rate increased by 2 percentage points, 
the lowest increase, but in the West, their rates decreased by 1.8 percentage points. In 
the same region, Hispanic Medicaid enrollment increased by 11.1% over the same pe-
riod.237 These regional discrepancies explain the overall more important increase in 
Medicaid enrollment for Hispanics due to the different regional populations concen-
trations. 
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However, one problem remains unexplained. Overall, black Medicaid coverage 
did not grow between 2013 and 2015 during the Medicaid expansion. It grew very 
slightly in the Northeast and the Midwest, and even in the South. This is due to the 
fact that the regional definition of the South by the Census includes expansion states 
such as Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, and Kentucky, as well as Washington, 
DC. However, blacks experienced a regional drop in the West of 5.4 percentage 
points. During that same period, Hispanics saw a substantial increase in Medicaid 
enrollment in all the regions except in the South, which is consistent with the Medi-
caid non-extension and the concentration of the Hispanic population. The fact that 
four states had a limited expansion of Medicaid prior to 2014 but did not chose to fol-
low the full extension in 2014 cannot explain these differences, as less than 1% of the 
black population lives in these states (Idaho, Utah, Oklahoma, and Maine on the East 
Coast). Although enrollment rates across incomes were still roughly similar between 
blacks and Hispanics in 2010, this changed in 2013 when significantly more Hispanics 
with incomes between $25,000 and $49,000 were enrolled than blacks. The enroll-
ment discrepancies became more sharply accentuated after 2014. In the West only a 
few states have black populations of more than 100,000 (or even 50,000) that would 
affect black enrollment in Medicaid: California, Nevada, Washington, Arizona, and 
Colorado. Among those states only Nevada saw an increase in black Medicaid en-
rollment between 2013 and 2015, with a peak in 2014 that decreased in 2015. The fig-
ures for 2015 in Washington are not available yet, but the enrollment decreased from 
2013 to 2014. So far, it is not possible to find an explanation for this. 
More specifically, the non-extension of Medicaid had a negative impact on 
HIV/AIDS patients, because their concentration is higher in the South. NASTAD 
report that 50% of their clients reside in the 19 states, many of them in the South, that 
did not expand Medicaid.238 The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported that 
44% of all people infected with HIV/AIDS lived in the South in 2015, although these 
states represent roughly 37% of the American population. The South had the highest 
rates of HIV diagnoses per 100,000 population at 16.8% (compared with 11.6% for the 
North East, 9.8% for the West, and 7.6% for the Midwest). In 2015 the South accounted 
for 52% of the new diagnoses. Moreover, of the deaths directly linked to HIV/AIDS in 
2015, 53% occurred in the South (compared with 19% in the North East, 17%in the 
West, and 11% in the Midwest). According to the analysis of the CDC’s HIV Division, 
people in some southern states are three times more likely to die from their 
HIV/AIDS condition than in other parts of the country.239  
A 2017 sample study by the Kaiser Family Foundation shows that the non-
extension of Medicaid had a strong impact on the HIV population. Although not eli-
gible, people with HIV could qualify for Medicaid based on income once their disease 
had progressed enough to be considered as disability status. The coverage nation-
wide for people with HIV improved between 2012 and 2014, increasing from 36% to 
42%. In expansion states the share of people with HIV with incomes below 100% FPL 
covered by Medicaid increased from 58% in 2012 to 73% in 2014; the uninsured rates 
for HIV patients with incomes between 100% and 138% FPL decreased from 13% to 
6%, and from 13% to 8% for incomes between 139% and 399% FPL. In non-expansion 
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states, no major changes were observed over that period, except a gain of private in-
surance for those below 100% FPL, from 5% to 13%. Although the uninsured rate of 
people living with HIV changed between 2012 and 2014 as it dropped from 18% to 14%, 
the decrease was stronger in expansion states where the rate fell from 13% to 7%. In 
non-expansion states the rates decreased only from 26% to 23%. One of the major 
reasons for this is that, in 2014, about 53% of HIV patients with incomes below 100% 
FPL lived in the non-expansion states.240 
The NASDAT report of 2017 shows that 50% of the ADAP clients were in non-
expansion states and that 58% of their clients had incomes below 138% FPL (133% + 5% 
disregard). Although they had registered a slight increase of clients with Medicaid 
(9% in 2016, plus an additional 4% of dual-eligible Medicaid-Medicare), many people 
could not access Medicaid because they were in states that did not expand.  
Among these states, Idaho and Alabama had a concentration of ADAP clients 
under 139%FLP of over 80%, and many others had concentrations of clients with in-
comes under 139% FPL between 60% and 80%: Wyoming, Utah, Texas, Mississippi, 
Georgia, North Carolina, Florida, and Virginia. Some of these states have also very 
high concentrations of black ADAP clients, at over 50%: the highest was for Missis-
sippi at 78%, South Carolina at 70%, Georgia at 67%, Alabama at 66%, North Carolina 
at 64%, Virginia at 61%, Tennessee at 58%, and Missouri at 52%. NASTAD estimated 
that 32% of their overall clients in 2015 could have entered Medicaid if all the states 
had expanded.241 In this context it must be remembered that the Ryan White CARE 
Act and the ADAPs do not provide full coverage, but only last-resort solutions for 
HIV/AIDS. 
The non-extension of Medicaid also had a negative impact on Community 
Health Centers (CHCs). Although CHCs, which deliver essential primary care and 
many additional services to medically underserved populations, have experienced a 
significant growth thanks to ACA funding and the additional revenue derived from a 
higher rate of insured patients, this trend was less seen in the non-expansion states, 
precisely because the CHCs in those states did not receive the additional revenues 
through Medicaid. The CHCs in expansion states got 49% of their revenue through 
Medicaid payments, compared to 29% for non-expansion states. These states relied to 
a greater extent on federal grants for their revenues, 25% compared to 15% for expan-
sion states. However, more CHCs in non-expansion states reported increased revenue 
from private insurance, which may be due partly to more patients with low incomes 
purchasing private insurance who would have been eligible for Medicaid, had the 
expansion taken place. The greater fragility of the populations in non-expansion 
states becomes apparent in the higher percentage of CHCs reporting an increase in 
coverage lapses or patients who are unable to pay their deductibles or cost-sharing. 
Forty-five percent of CHCs reported an increase in the number of patients with laps-
es or breaks in their coverage, compared with 49% in non-expansion states; 55% of 
expansion CHCs reported patients who were unable to pay their deductibles or their 
cost-sharing, compared with 64% of non-expansion CHCs. Forty-two percent of ex-
pansion CHCs reported an increase of privately insured patients who pay sliding fees 
(adjusted according to ability to pay) compared with 55% of non-expansion CHCs. 
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Moreover, overall CHCs in expansion states had slightly more service sites, provided 
a wider range of services, and higher treatment provider-to-patient ratios. Overall, 
CHCs in expansion states served 40% more patients and provided 60% more visits 
than CHCs in non-expansion states. Although many CHCs in expansion states have 
increased their hours of operation and their number of sites, they have some difficul-
ties in managing the caseload. This is also due to increased services, such as dental 
and mental care.242 
Thus the non-expansion of Medicaid had a negative impact on the black popu-
lation in three major areas: a lower Medicaid enrollment ratio for blacks because they 
are disproportionately concentrated in non-expansion states, a negative impact on 
the HIV/AIDS population that is disproportionately black, and a negative impact on 
CHCs on which blacks and Hispanics disproportionately rely for health care and 
health-related services. In light of these negative impacts, it must be remembered 
that the Medicaid extension was fully federally funded in 2014. The funding is set to 
phase down slowly to 90% by 2020 and for the subsequent years.243 The high level of 
federal funding makes it obvious that the non-extension is primarily a political deci-
sion, and not the result of a practical or budgetary consideration. All the states that 
did not expand have been held by Republicans since 2014, with the only exception of 
Maine that had a Democratic legislature in 2014, which is now split, and Missouri that 
had a Democratic governor until 2017, but a Republican legislature.244 
As explained earlier, partisan polarization is particularly strong about issues like 
the role of government in general, and social policies in particular. Moreover, given 
the history and racialization of social policies, it is not surprising that Medicaid was 
hit both by the decision of the Supreme Court and by the choice of the states not to 
expand. It confirms Medicaid’s weaker status as a program that benefits the poor, but 
also mainly minorities.  
Former Representative Earl Pomeroy commented in a 2016 interview on the 
Medicaid expansion. He first explained that the fully federally funded extension was 
a way of addressing existing patterns of inequality along racial lines in the former 
system. As mentioned before, Southern states have particularly low eligibility 
thresholds, many of them below 50% FPL. Pomeroy was very upset about the non-
extension of Medicaid: 
It’s pathetic. It’s pitiful. In some states… again, you have to ask a state to have responsibil-
ity where most will have coverage to spend tax dollars for those who don’t. And what I 
have seen, particularly in Southern states, where those who don’t have coverage are ra-
cial minorities, there is very little heart to want to do anything for them. And it is a 
statement about the moral fabric of those states, and the vestiges of our s… sorry system 
that persists a 150 years after slavery ended. And that’s just the truth of it.245 
Pomeroy very explicitly linked the low social policy, and in particular low Medicaid 
effort, to Southern states and vestiges of institutional racial oppression. These are 
reflected in current practices regarding redistributional efforts that aim at alleviating 
the effects of past discrimination and structural inequalities. He then explained that 
                                                        
242	  Rosenbaum	  et	  al.	  
243	  HCER	  Sec.	  1201.	  
244	  “State	  and	  Legislative	  Partisan	  Composition,”	  National	  Conference	  of	  State	  Legislatures,	  September	  7,	  
2016,	   http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Elections/Legis_Control_2016_Sept7.pdf;	   “2014	   State	  
Legislative	   Partisan	   Composition”	   (National	   Conference	   of	   State	   Legislatures,	   June	   9,	   2014),	  
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/legiscontrol_2014.pdf.	  
245	  Pomeroy	  interview.	  
4 — The Obama Way 443 
 
the new Medicaid extension was designed to overcome these inequalities through 
full federal funding. In this context it must be remembered that the standard Medi-
caid system functions on match grants, in which federal funds match state funds. 
However, there is a scale according to the per-capita income in the states, meaning 
that poorer states obtain more federal funds. These rates range from 50% in richer 
states to 74% in poorer states, to help them cover their overall poorer populations, 
especially as these states have less income tax revenue. Overall, the federal govern-
ment paid for 57% of all Medicaid expenses on average in 2012. With the Medicaid 
extension, this rate is even more advantageous for the states, especially the poorer 
ones, because the federal rate remains at 90% at its lowest point, meaning that states 
have only to pay for 10% of the costs.246 Given the high funding, Pomeroy explained 
that he actually did not imagine that any state would refuse additional money out of 
political calculation: 
But… so we wanted to address that with Medicaid expansion and have a floor, a national 
floor for which we would federally pay. We really didn’t imagine that a… that Republi-
can governors trying to extract the last bit of political advantage from this, what had be-
come a very unpopular bill, would refuse a hundred percent funding from the federal 
government to cover their poor people. We really didn’t imagine that level of venal and 
evil behavior in the name of politics.247 
He further explained that, after the Sebelius lawsuit, the Democratic Party had at 
first not fully understood the impact of the ruling, precisely because the Medicaid 
extension was free money: 
And so that part… came on strong in the historic Supreme Court opinion. We were so 
happy the whole law hadn’t been tossed out, and it came very, very close to being tossed 
out, that, I think, there was maybe not enough attention paid about the terrible hit the 
law had taken. So now it’s a state decision, and I like to think that some moral guidepost 
we just establish as a nation, and that would be the kind of… well, all of the people, re-
gardless where they live, are assured access to medical care and quality medical care, and 
we don’t have that now because of the Medicaid situation.248 
Similar to Pomeroy’s disappointment about the Supreme Court decision and the new 
inequalities it generated, former Representative Robert E. Andrews expressed his 
discontent in a 2016 interview: 
I think that the… I respectfully think that the Supreme Court was wrong on that part of 
its decision. The legal issue at stake there was whether or not under our Constitution the 
Congress could condition a federal subsidy, a payment of money by the federal govern-
ment to the states, on some behavior by the states. […] Then my examples would be 
transportation and education funding [which are tied to compliance with specific federal 
rules], so I respectfully think that the Supreme Court got that bit wrong. But because it’s 
the Supreme Court, their decision is final, it’s final for all of us and we got this.249 
Former Representative Bruce Braley, in a 2016 interview, regretted the Sebelius 
ruling and its ultimately discriminatory outcome, especially in the context of attempt-
ing to create a program more strongly influenced by the federal government: 
That was a terrible decision because it resulted in the denial of access to health care for 
those states controlled by legislatures and governors who would not take advantage and 
expand the availability of health care to their population. So that led to a discriminatory 
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outcome where your access to the benefits of the ACA depended on what state you lived 
in. And that’s not how federal programs are supposed to work.250 
Not only did Braley point out the contradiction of a federal program resulting in ma-
jor inequalities, he also insisted on the fact that the decision not to expand Medicaid 
was made based on short-term electoral calculations: “It’s purely political. They fear 
the backlash from the Tea Party in their state if they agree to Medicaid expansion, 
even though there is no short-term cost for the taxpayer of their state.” The fact that 
the Medicaid expansion was funded so massively by the federal government pushed 
Medicaid closer to a federal program, especially as the federal government also set 
the eligibility criteria that were formerly a state matter. By rendering the expansion 
optional, Medicaid remained more closely associated to a state program, which expe-
riences very strong variations. 
4.3.2. Single Payer: Reborn? 
The abovementioned problems occurred primarily because Obama chose the 
same approach as Clinton in 1993, meaning he built on the existing system and pre-
ferred a market based system, instead of opting for a federally administered one on 
the model of Medicare or Social Security, which would have been similar to the 
much-lauded Canadian single-payer system. Even before the complications arising 
from the Sebelius decision, and before the Republicans massively started to call for 
the repeal of Obamacare, some critics, such as Bonilla-Silva, criticized Obama for not 
having passed a reform with the single payer system.251 In a 2016 article that Obama 
published in the Journal of the American Medical Association he explained and defended 
the choice of a mixed system: 
The third lesson is the importance of pragmatism in both legislation and implementa-
tion. Simpler approaches to addressing our health care problems exist at both ends of 
the political spectrum: the single-payer model vs. government vouchers for all. Yet the 
nation typically reaches its greatest heights when we find common ground be- tween the 
public and private good and adjust along the way. That was my approach with the ACA. 
We engaged with Congress to identify the combination of proven health reform ideas 
that could pass and have continued to adapt them since.252 
In this context he also insisted on the problems posed by Republican obstruc-
tion and the health care interests, which undermined the reform efforts and which 
pushed the Democrats towards a less radical solution. He particularly pointed to big 
PhRMA, who refused any discussion about drug prices “no matter how justifiable 
and modest, because they believe it threatens their profits.”253 Health care specialists 
Rosemary Gibson and Janarad Prasad Singh criticized the Obama administration for 
not having struck a better deal with health care interests. They particularly insists 
that the thirty-two million new customers should have been used as leverage in nego-
tiating better deals to make health care more affordable.254 However, in this respect it 
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must be recalled that the health care interests had played a major role in the defeat of 
the Clinton health reform attempt, which could explain to a certain extent the fact 
that the Obama administration was hesitant to ask for more. 
As discussed previously, political feasibility is the point where opinions often 
vary between academics and politicians. In the 2009 context single payer was a nearly 
impossible bet. It was difficult enough to get the moderate reform through Congress. 
Furthermore, the single payer system as applied in Canada is very different 
from the American market-based system and would have required an almost com-
plete overhaul of the health care insurance system. Economist Robert G. Evans com-
pared the Canadian and the American health care systems. He found virtually no 
difference in the manner in which health services are provided: both systems feature 
highly trained doctors and nurses, dispense care in hospitals and in public and pri-
vate clinics, and both provide some home care. The pharmaceutical companies are 
broadly the same, due to their international scope. However, national regulations 
have led to major differences in prices, and in some cases in the authorization of 
some drugs. These features are common to high-income countries. According to Ev-
ans, the big differences are to be found in the way the health care systems are fi-
nanced. These differences pertain to taxation, insurance premiums, the extent of 
coverage of the population, and the terms and conditions of this coverage, such as 
out-of-pocket payments. For example, not all industrialized countries have private 
insurers.255 
Evans avers that the American system is exceptional indeed, especially regard-
ing the system performance: it has by far the worst cost-to-care ratio among high-
income countries. In other words, the US spent more for worse care overall. In Cana-
da most of the costs are borne by the government: in 2006 it was 70.3%, compared 
with 46.8% in the US. Both systems rely on public subsidies through the income tax 
system for employer-paid private insurance, which represent about 4% of the cost in 
Canada, compared with 13% in the US. Private insurance contribution is about 7.5% in 
Canada compared with 25% in the US. However, the real difference lies in the total 
amount of costs and the percentage of the population that is covered and actually 
receives the bulk of the care. In this, the US is exceptional for its levels of inequality. 
The US spends more, but fewer people receive care than in other countries. Evans 
points out that this results in unnecessary deaths, which were estimated at around 
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18,000 per year in 2000 and in a high rate of family and personal bankruptcies result-
ing from inadequate health insurance.256 
Regarding cost, the main difference is that the other Western countries intro-
duced cost-control mechanisms in the 1970s, which was immediately achieved in 
Canada with the creation of its Medicare system in 1966. Only the US failed to intro-
duce such a mechanism. The lack of government control allowed health care interest 
to make costs grow.257 This also occurred through Medicare, which refunded provid-
ers on a fee-for-service basis without any control, which encouraged the multiplica-
tion of procedures. In 1983, Reagan introduced Diagnosis-Related Groups that regu-
late prices in Medicare, which was one way of limiting this. Carter had attempted 
something similar but it had failed to pass.258 Thus the absence of government regula-
tions has led to a system that is still to a certain extent very unequal, in which Ameri-
cans spend more overall for poorer health care, and in which high-technology care is 
only available to a few.259 
The traditional argument for single payer is based on the previously exposed 
statistical differences regarding costs, overall quality of care, and the availability of 
care, in other words unequal access to care. However, because of political considera-
tions, a single payer or Medicare-for-all system is deemed more or less impossible in 
the US. As mentioned earlier, in politics it is not the objectively best solution that is 
chosen, but a solution that will be politically feasible. In this context it must be re-
membered that the Democrats paid a very high price for their imperfect centrist re-
form that sought to be acceptable to both parties.260 
However, public opinion polls show that single payer is not quite the Boogey-
man it is often said to be. A Kaiser Family Foundation poll of July 2009 found that, 
although the single payer system got the lowest support of all health care expansion 
possibilities, it was nonetheless substantial. An astounding 24% of all respondents 
strongly favored single payer, and 27% somewhat favored it. Interestingly, the word-
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ing had some importance. KFF asked the same question about an all-government 
plan in two different ways. The second question worded it as Medicare-for-all: this 
yielded 34% of strong favor and 24% of somewhat favor.261 The wording for the single 
payer question contained the term “single payer” and “government plan,” which can 
both trigger negative reactions associated to established welfare rhetoric. The Medi-
care-for-all question did not contain a reference to government and seems to point to 
the previously evoked confusions regarding Medicare. It appears that some people do 
not seem to know that Medicare is one of the two exclusively federally controlled 
social programs. The results of this poll also denote that the support for single payer 
substantially hinges on presentation and wording, essentially on the discourse used 
to promote it. 
However, the political context also plays a major role. The Sebelius lawsuit and 
the subsequent crippling of the Medicaid extension have brought new attention to 
single payer. For example, in her concurring opinion in the 2012 Sebelius lawsuit, Jus-
tice Ginsburg made an interesting argument for single payer. She first mentioned 
that Congress had had the option to design health care reform on the model of Social 
Security, i.e. fully administered through the federal government, paid for in part 
through payroll taxes and individual tax contributions, and in part through general 
revenue. She then went on explaining the necessity of federal intervention in health 
care. She first exposed the vicious cycle of increasing costs, which the uninsured 
place on the health care system. This is due to the fact that the uninsured receive 
emergency treatment for which they cannot pay, and hospitals are not fully refunded 
for these expenses (she quoted the sum of $43 billion of unrecovered expenses out of 
$116 billion for care provided to the uninsured in 2008). These costs, in turn, are shift-
ed onto the insured. She mentioned that Congress estimates that the average family 
plan costs $1,000 more per year because of this cost shifting. More importantly, she 
argued that states on their own could not effectively address this issue of establishing 
a universal health system only within their boundaries, as Massachusetts had done. 
Ginsburg explained that this would put the states in a difficult competitive situation 
because, just as it was the case for Massachusetts in 2009, thousands of people from 
other states went there to seek care. She insisted on the difficult situation of the state 
of Massachusetts because of the influx of unhealthy individuals who were attracted 
by its better health care system, which ultimately also drives costs up. She insisted 
that with these risks, other states would not have established universal health care 
systems, and thus federal action was needed.262  
Ginsburg highlighted the fact that Congress chose a more centrist approach for 
health care reform, instead of enacting “a tax-and-spend federal program like Social 
Security.” Although she called the ACA “a practical, altogether reasonable, solution” 
it is clear that she would have preferred the single payer system, because it would 
have avoided all these problems. Ginsburg particularly insisted on the fact that the 
problems of the ACA, such as the individual mandate and the Medicaid extension 
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being challenged in the Supreme Court, occurred precisely because Congress had 
wanted to find a political compromise instead of adopting a radically liberal sys-
tem.263 
Similarly, the historically discriminatory impact of Medicaid, which has been 
reinforced by the Sebelius decision, has led some representatives to strongly support 
single payer. This is the case for Representative John Conyers (D-MI).264 In a 2016 
interview, Rep. Conyers’ health advisor Dan Riffle explained: 
I think that it is certainly true that the way that Medicaid is administered, the discretion 
that states have, tends to disproportionately impact minority communities, it’s certainly 
true that we want to help poor people, and that poor people tend to disproportionately … 
minority communities tend to be disproportionately poor, but the overarching reason 
why we support the single payer system is because to make health care affordable, so af-
fordable that you can make it available universally as a right, you have to have the sim-
plicity that comes with the single payer system. 
Riffle also insisted on the cost-saving argument of single payer and its greater effi-
ciency in providing universal coverage. In a 2016 interview Yardley Pollas, health ad-
visor to Representative Bobby Rush who has represented Illinois 1st congressional 
district since 1993 (majority black), insisted on the qualities of single payer in fighting 
racial discrimination. In this context she explained that the initially somewhat luke-
warm support of the CBC for the ACA was due to the fact that in their opinion the 
ACA did not go far enough. She said that Congressman Rush would definitely sup-
port a single-payer bill and, as a long time advocate of universal health care, he is 
strongly in favor of single payer. However, she said that she was not in favor of reo-
pening the debate and the fights with Republicans now (the interview was conducted 
during the presidential primaries, before Donald Trump, who had started a cam-
paign centered on the repeal of Obamacare and the Wall with Mexico, became the 
official Republican candidate).265  
Representative Bart Gordon, one of the conservative Blue Dogs, admitted that in 
retrospect single payer would have been a better solution: 
Well I think that, in retrospect, that may have been a better approach, but I think the 
general feeling was that was just politically undoable. […] At that time it was not possi-
ble, I don’t think, to get that passed. And we certainly couldn’t now.266 
 Moreover, he believes that the support for single payer in Congress stems from 
genuine convictions about the greater efficiency of the system and that initial talks 
about single payer were not just to make the public option appear as the lesser evil. 
However, he is equally convinced that single payer was politically impossible in 
2009/10, and that it continued to be in 2016.267 
Meg Sussman, senior legislative assistant to Representative Doris Matsui, who 
represented California’s 5th district from 2005 to 2013 and has represented its 6th dis-
trict since 2o13, explained that in her opinion the complete overhaul of the health 
care system required by the introduction of the single payer system is simply not pos-
sible. In this context it should be remembered that in 2010, only 31.2% of the Ameri-
can population was already covered by a government health care plan. Sussman also 
insisted that every health care system has its flaws, which is true when one considers 
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the problems regarding dental care in the Canadian system. Sussman appeared less 
dissatisfied with the mixed system the US had chosen. Regarding racial inequalities, 
she insisted on Matsui’s support for CHCs, which deliver care and health education 
to the very diverse population of Matsui’s district (however, the 5th district was major-
ity white, although just barely. It also had a more than double than average strong 
Asian population. On average, Asians tend to fare well in the US and have among the 
highest economic indicators. The 6th district, however, is majority-minority). Suss-
man also lauded the early steps California had taken in the Medicaid expansion.268 
Sussman’s more moderate appreciation of the situation can be partly explained 
through the fact that in California the system is actually functioning rather well. Prior 
to 2013, the 5th district included Sacramento and most of its metropolitan area. In 
short, it is not among the poorest districts of the nation, quite to the contrary. 
Although Earl Pomeroy was very upset about the Medicaid issue and uttered 
very harsh comments in that respect, he is nonetheless convinced that single payer 
was never an option and never will be. He made this comment in the context of the 
debates between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders in the 2016 Democratic prima-
ries: 
Well, the debate continues in the presidential primaries between Hillary Clinton and 
Bernie Sanders. Bernie Sanders is saying the whole… all of this should just be stopped 
and we should go to single payer. It’s very easy to say. It’s impossible to achieve political-
ly. You can only do which you can pass and get the population to accept. And so moving 
from where we were to single payer was not going to happen.269 
Pomeroy put this into perspective with the Hillarycare defeat, when the moder-
ate, centrist mixed-system approach had been discredited. He insisted on the fact that 
Obama had faced a similar situation, meaning that around 70% of the people had 
coverage, and an equal share of these liked their coverage. In his opinion single payer 
would have been too disruptive, too new and unknown for people to adhere to, espe-
cially since they were not that dissatisfied with the existing system. Pomeroy ex-
plained the political difficulty he faced in his district even with the moderate 2009 
proposal. Most people in his at-large district were opposed to the Obama reform. 
Single payer, in Pomeroy’s opinion, would have been too heavy to defend politically 
given the issue of taxes and the role of government: 
And so this business of… you know, coming from a small district, that only represents 
economically disadvantaged people, and saying, we should do more, we should do more, 
we should do more, had no understanding of the district I dealt with, where 2/3rds hated 
this bill. And in representing them, I was going vote for the bill and try to explain why. 
So, really, I believe the… for example the evolution of the Congressional Black Caucus 
thinking they wanted more, the politics of the system couldn’t produce more. The poli-
tics of the system could never produce single payer as called for by Bernie Sanders. The 
tax burden would be unacceptable. People wouldn’t trust the federal government to 
move to a system like that.270 
Regarding the issues of taxes and government he insisted on the fact that Re-
publicans would have had a field day. And indeed, given the conservative rhetoric on 
taxes and big government, Pomeroy’s interpretation is perfectly logical. It was diffi-
cult enough as it was to get the moderate Obama reform through. Now, the situation 
is changing. The support for Bernie Sanders in the Democratic primaries is one indi-
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cator of that. Sanders enjoyed strong support, even though he called himself a social-
ist or sometimes a democratic socialist, to draw the distinction with Soviet-style ty-
rannical government. His version is more centered on European socialism, meaning 
more government intervention, more progressive taxation, and more social policies. 
In addition, Sanders’ stance has led to a new debate about the meaning of the term.271 
In April 2016, Sanders was even ahead of Hillary Clinton in the polls. For the overall 
polls, it was a narrow 47%-46% tie, but Sanders was far ahead among Democratic-
leaning independents (61% to 32% for Clinton) and in particular among younger vot-
ers (almost 75% among the 18 to 29 years old).272 A 2012 PEW poll showed that espe-
cially among younger Democrats, lower-income people, and minorities the term ‘so-
cialism’ is viewed positively.273 A 2016 Gallup poll identified the same trends. Among 
Democrats, even slightly more people had a positive view of socialism than of capital-
ism.274 These trends are consistent with the increasing support for government inter-
vention in health care. In this sense, it can be said that the Obama reform might have 
had an effect in showing people that reform and government intervention can result 
in more coverage and lower health care expenses. At least, the ACA seems to have 
brought people closer to the idea that the government should have a role to play in 
health care.  
Although sharp partisan divisions remain, a 2017 PEW poll showed that overall 
58% of the respondents thought that it is the government’s responsibility to ensure 
that all Americans have health care coverage. Even within the 38% who think that 
government has no such responsibility, a staggering 87% want to keep Medicare and 
Medicaid. This shows once again the confusion that reigns about many programs and 
to what degree it is not necessarily understood where, and to what extent, the gov-
ernment intervenes. Among Republicans a greater share (66%) do not see a govern-
ment responsibility for health care coverage, nonetheless 86% of these want to keep 
Medicare and Medicaid. There is even some support for single payer among Republi-
cans (phrased a ‘single national government program’) from a low 8% among con-
servative Republicans, to 20% among moderate and liberal Republicans. This makes 
an average of 12% of support for single payer among Republicans. Of course, Demo-
crats more strongly see a government responsibility in health care, with only 14% dis-
agreeing, but these still want to retain Medicare and Medicaid. Just as for the overall 
population, support for single payer is now greater than support for the mixed sys-
tem. The average support for single payer among Democrats was 52%, with 42% 
among moderates and conservatives, and a strong 64% among liberal Democrats. The 
overall support for single payer for the total population was 33%, in a tie, with those 
who saw no government responsibility, but who wanted to keep Medicare and Medi-
caid, and ahead of the 25% who saw a government responsibility but favored the 
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mixed system, and of course well ahead of the 5% who wanted no government in-
volvement whatsoever. Since 2014, support for single payer has been increasing 
sharply by 12%.275 
Attitudes are consequently changing. People are getting used to the idea of gov-
ernment intervention in health care and start asking for it. In 2009/2010, single payer 
was not a political possibility, but events since then, including the expanded coverage 
and more affordable premiums, have apparently started to influence the thinking of 
the population. The repeal of Obamacare, which Republicans had promised, failed 
spectacularly in the summer of 2017 because of opposition in their own ranks. As Dan 
Riffle pointed out when he commented on Rep. Conyers’ single payer advocacy since 
the 1960s, Congress alone cannot do much about single payer given the political situ-
ation with Republicans, but activists have to show their support for it, have to de-
mand the government intervention they see as appropriate. This in turn would break 
the vicious media cycle in which the media do not cover an issue because they deem 
it dead, which leads to fewer people supporting it and on it goes. It is self-evident that 
Congress has difficulties moving on such a critical and disruptive issue without 
strong support among the population.276 
However, this growing support has now propelled single payer into the media. 
In July 2017 several national newspapers discussed the issue. During the same period 
Senate minority leader Chuck Schumer said that single payer was being discussed 
among Democrats and that they aimed at defining their party more clearly along the 
lines of giving Americans better tools to survive in the 21st century and actively work 
on increasing wages.277 The media have been very active discussing single payer in 
late July 2017, partly because of the failed single payer vote on July 27th, 2017 in the 
Senate, when Senator Steven Daines (R-MT), who is opposed to single payer, intro-
duced such a proposal in an attempt to embarrass Democratic senators. However, 
among the many publications that discussed single payer over the first weeks of Au-
gust 2017 (among them Salon, The Hill, Newsweek, The Atlantic, the Business Insider, 
Rolling Stone, Forbes, The Nation, Time, the LA Times, The Huffington Post, The Washing-
ton Post, The New York Times and many others), most discussed single payer on its 
principles, and not only in reference to the failed Senate vote. Headlines strongly in-
dicate that most view the rise of single payer in light of Trump and the Republicans’ 
repeated failures to repeal Obamacare. Some other more conservative media, like 
The Federalist, Forbes (in part), Breitbart, and even surprisingly the progressive online 
magazine MotherJones discussed single payer to warn about its cost and potentially 
catastrophic consequences. Nonetheless, all this shows that the idea is being exam-
ined in earnest. Right now growing public and congressional support have created a 
virtuous media cycle that might contribute to an increasing support for single payer. 
In comparison, in 2016, media discussions were almost exclusively linked to the 
Sanders campaign and his advocacy of single payer and to a much lesser extent to the 
Colorado single payer initiative, which had failed in 2016. 
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On January 24, 2017 Representative Conyers introduced a new single payer bill 
in the House entitled Expanded and Improved Medicare for All Act. Representative 
Lewis was among the 51 original co-sponsors of the bill. Representatives Matsui and 
Rush were among the many who joined in the following months. The latest count as 
of early August 2017, is at a total of 116 co-sponsors,278 out of the 194 Democrats cur-
rently sitting in the 115th Congress. It is noteworthy to see that Conyers chose a name 
for the bill based on the more popular Medicare-for-all theme, which avoids the 
chilling effect of ‘single payer’ and which benefits from Medicare’s strong popularity. 
Among senators as well support for single payer is growing. Recently Elizabeth 
Warren (D-MA), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Kamala Harris (D-CA), and Cory Booker 
(D-NJ) have voiced support for single payer. This is all the more interesting as these 
senators are seen as progressive rising stars and some are deemed possible presiden-
tial candidates in 2020. Moreover, in several states, gubernatorial candidates are run-
ning on platforms including single payer or are voicing their support for such an ap-
proach. Among these are Ben Jealous, a Democrat running in Maryland, Democratic 
Lieutenant-Governor of California Gavin Newsom who is running for the 2018 gu-
bernatorial election, several Democratic candidates running in the New Jersey gu-
bernatorial primaries, such as Jim Johnson, who said he would be open to it, or Ray-
mond Lesniak, John Wisniewski, and Mark Zinna, who voiced strong support and 
affirmed legislative intentions. These are just a few examples to show that the tide 
may be turning.279 
The California state legislature is considering a single payer bill (SB 562) at the 
moment, and New Jersey Democratic Senate majority leader Loretta Weinberg said 
that the New Jersey legislature was considering following California’s example.280 
New York, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island are contemplating the idea as well.281 In 
2016, Amendment 69, which would have created a single payer system, was rejected 
in Colorado, and in 2014 Vermont finally abandoned its single payer initiative started 
in 2011.282 These failed and abandoned initiatives can be viewed as a negative rejec-
                                                        
278	  John	  Conyers,	  “H.R.676	  -­‐	  115th	  Congress	  (2017-­‐2018):	  Expanded	  &	  Improved	  Medicare	  For	  All	  Act,”	  
webpage,	  (February	  10,	  2017),	  https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-­‐congress/house-­‐bill/676.	  
279	   Jeff	   Stein,	   “It’s	   Time	   to	   See	   If	  Democrats	  Are	   Serious	   about	   Single-­‐Payer,”	  Vox.com,	   July	   24,	   2017,	  
https://www.vox.com/2017/7/24/15915406/bernie-­‐sanders-­‐medicare-­‐single-­‐payer;	   Claude	   Brodesser-­‐
Akner,	   “How	  Each	  N.J.	  Governor	   Candidate	  Would	  Handle	   a	   Repeal	   of	  Obamacare,”	  NJ.com,	  May	   25,	  
2017,	  
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/04/we_got_every_nj_governor_candidates_plan_on_health
.html;	   Josh	  Hicks,	   “Candidate	   for	  Md.	  Governor	  Says	  State	  Should	  Start	  Single-­‐Payer	  Health	  Program,”	  
Washington	   Post,	   June	   23,	   2017,	   sec.	   Maryland	   Politics,	   https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-­‐
politics/candidate-­‐for-­‐md-­‐governor-­‐says-­‐state-­‐should-­‐start-­‐single-­‐payer-­‐health-­‐
program/2017/06/23/3ebd3a26-­‐5795-­‐11e7-­‐a204-­‐ad706461fa4f_story.html;	  Phil	  Willon,	   “ Gavin	  New-­‐
som	  adds	  a	  new	  plank	  to	  his	  2018	  campaign	  for	  California	  governor—a	  statewide	  universal	  healthcare	  
system,”	   Los	   Angeles	   Times,	   March	   13,	   2017,	   http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-­‐pol-­‐ca-­‐
essential-­‐politics-­‐updates-­‐gavin-­‐newsom-­‐adds-­‐a-­‐new-­‐plank-­‐to-­‐his-­‐1489439179-­‐htmlstory.html.	  
280	  Patrick	  McGreevy,	  “How	  California	  Lawmakers	  Have	  Tried	  and	  Failed	  to	  Fix	  the	  State’s	  Housing	  Cri-­‐
sis,”	   Los	   Angeles	   Times,	   June	   1,	   2017,	   http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-­‐pol-­‐ca-­‐essential-­‐
politics-­‐updates-­‐single-­‐payer-­‐healthcare-­‐plan-­‐advances-­‐1496361965-­‐htmlstory.html;	  Brodesser-­‐Akner.	  
281	  Alexander	  Burns	  and	  Jennifer	  Medina,	  “The	  Single-­‐Payer	  Party?	  Democrats	  Shift	  Left	  on	  Health	  Care,”	  
New	  York	  Times,	  June	  3,	  2017,	  sec.	  US,	  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/us/democrats-­‐universal-­‐
health-­‐care-­‐single-­‐payer-­‐party.html.	  
282	   Jeffrey	   Young,	   “Single-­‐Payer	   Health	   Care	   Dream	   Dies	   In	   Colorado,”	  Huffington	   Post,	   November	   8,	  
2016,	   sec.	   Politics,	   http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/colorado-­‐single-­‐payer-­‐
vote_us_581cdf8be4b0d9ce6fbbf369.	  
4 — The Obama Way 453 
 
tion of single payer. But they can also be seen positively: there were state legislatures, 
and there are more now, willing to seriously consider this approach and to do the 
hard work of putting single payer forward as a viable solution. 
4.4. Conclusion  
The race pragmatic theory stemmed from the combined realization that a solely 
race-specific approach had its limits, both regarding its actual effectiveness and its 
political viability. Nonetheless, the resulting political strategy, an inclusive class 
based approach, which focuses on issues that are particularly problematic for minori-
ties, also has its limits, particularly in its relative constraint in denouncing racial 
problems. However, especially during the presidential campaign and the first term, 
Michelle Obama was the racial element of the presidential couple. Despite its com-
paratively recent political application dating back to the 1980s, it is deeply rooted in 
African-American thought, going back to the 19th century and is not at odds with 
many claims of the Civil Rights era. The application of the strategy to reach the high-
est American office can be partially seen with Jesse Jackson’s second campaign for 
the Democratic presidential nomination. The successful application of it to reach the 
highest office of the US and its implementation in policy, however, was a first with 
Barack Obama. With his health care reform, he managed to effectively apply the 
strategy of gathering an interracial majority around an issue of shared interests, 
which also strongly affected the middle class, in order to avoid a 1970s-type backlash. 
Moreover, the system created by the reform is strongly downwardly redistributional, 
which structurally impacts minorities more. In addition, the ACA emphasizes some 
issues that are particularly problematic for minorities, such as HIV/AIDS, diabetes, 
teenage pregnancies, preexisting conditions, or lack of insurance and affordability. 
However, the choice of building on the existing system, which directly resulted 
from the negative view of too much government intervention, had its host of negative 
consequences. Provisions of the ACA were challenged and resulted in a crippling of 
the reform, creating a Medicaid coverage gap that left millions of low-income people 
uninsured. This highlights once more the role played by strong federal intervention 
in ensuring racial equality, as the optional Medicaid extension disproportionally im-
pacted blacks. 
Despite the ACA being a rather moderate reform, Republicans have attempted 
to repeal it many times. They have vowed to do so immediately after Obama signed 
the Act.283 In 2016 Donald Trump ran a successful presidential campaign centered on 
two issues: the repeal of Obamacare and building a wall with Mexico to stop illegal 
immigration and drug trafficking.284 Efforts to repeal Obamacare and enact a con-
servative health care law have met with public resistance and resistance within Re-
publican ranks. The American Health Care Act narrowly passed the House on May 4, 
2017, with 20 Republicans voting against it.285 On July 27, 2017, the Senate voted 
against the proposed amendments that would have repealed the individual mandate. 
Three Republican senators joined the Democrats to defeat the proposal: Senator Su-
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san Collins from Maine, Lisa Murkowski from Alaska, and Senator John McCain 
from Arizona.286 Senator Collins, in her statement explaining her vote, harshly criti-
cized the ACA, but equally emphasized that the various Republican proposals would 
have been worse, be it regarding the number of uninsured people, reduced funding 
for many areas, or impact on women’s health. Collins also sharply criticized both par-
ties for their partisanship and attempts (or success) at passing partisan legislation. 
She called for renewed bipartisan efforts to find an effective solution for health care 
reform.287 The developments since the passage of the ACA show how deeply polar-
ized the two parties still are over the issues of social policy and government interven-
tion. 
These repeated attacks on the ACA have lead to an increasing support for single 
payer and several states are considering legislation in that direction. Although among 
the public support is growing, the issue remains complex arising especially from 
America’s complicated relationship with government intervention. 
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In many respects the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 is a re-
flection of the United States’ racial history. Its inception was based on the difficulties 
arising from the US’s history of social policies, which is deeply marked by racial 
cleavages and political polarization, but it was also based on the wish to address ra-
cial inequalities deeply embedded in the American society and economy. The final 
legislation is marked by the constraints of American politics; it is an unsatisfying 
compromise that proved vulnerable to attacks. Although the ACA is still alive, con-
servative attacks are in the process of eviscerating it. Due to the fact the ACA was 
built on the existing system, the attacks have proven to be most detrimental to racial 
and economic minorities, showing the ongoing relevance of the structural intersec-
tion of race and class and how deeply entrenched this structure is. 
Obama’s commitment to social policies stems from a genuine wish to improve 
the conditions for the black population and to provide more opportunity, but also 
from the aspiration to create a better safety net for the whole of the American popula-
tion. This is based on his own experience and history. The will to provide more op-
portunity and support for the black population is less grounded in his own life, as he 
was raised in a white family, although his skin color made him think about the issue 
of race from an early age. His experience with the black population and the condi-
tions in inner city neighborhoods dates back to his work as a community organizer in 
Harlem and the South Side of Chicago in the 1980s that made him aware of the lack 
of government intervention for many people, as well as of the destructiveness of job-
lessness and drug abuse.1 Moreover, his awareness of how some government pro-
grams provided opportunity for his family and his personal understanding and expe-
rience of the benefits of a good social network fostered in him the will to extend 
governmental ladders of opportunity. Moreover, Obama appears to be convinced 
about the effectiveness of Keynesianism for the economy. 
However, in his quest for the expansion of social policies, Obama was acutely 
aware of the political constraints he faced. These political constraints, which are ex-
emplified in the sharp partisan division over social policies and government interven-
tion, are deeply rooted in American history and the development of the welfare state 
in the US. Since the late 1970s, the partisan divide over social policies and govern-
ment intervention has played out in favor of the Republicans, notably because of the 
greater intellectual dominance of neoliberal principles that strongly oppose taxes and 
any form of government intervention, apart from the military. Taxes, however, are 
the condition sine qua non for redistribution. 
The forceful opposition to social policies for the poor and minorities—be it in 
the form of welfare or affirmative action programs—which is exemplified by the tax 
revolt, by claims of reverse discrimination, and legal attacks against affirmative action 
programs, made it obvious to Obama that a race-specific approach focused only on 
the poorest populations would fail to garner sufficient support. This conclusion had 
been already reached in the 1990s, but had arisen from two slightly different schools 
of thought. The first was more concentrated on mainstream politics and posited that 
Democrats must change their discourse to adapt to the new conservative discourse 
that had developed since the late 1960s. This conservative discourse had developed in 
response to white resentment at increased economic competition with various minor-
ity groups during a period of deteriorating economic conditions. In response to the 
disaffection of working and middle class voters from the Democratic Party, who 
                                                        
1	  Obama,	  Audacity,	  43,	  68.	  
460 Stephan Social Policies and Racial Questions 
turned to support Reagan and his promises of less government intervention—which 
were understood as meaning fewer handouts for minorities—many political scien-
tists and analysts suggested a detachment from the old image of tax-and-spend liber-
als who advocated for continuously increasing civil rights and programs for the poor, 
while refusing to discuss the failure of some programs in regard of the entrenched 
poverty in the inner city neighborhoods. These academics, such as Edsall and Edsall 
in the early 1990s, or Judis and Teixeira in the early 2000s, recommended a more cen-
trist approach, a greater focus on the problems of the middle class, which had been 
suffering since the economic downturn in the 1970s, and a greater emphasis on a val-
ues discourse, especially on personal responsibility, in pursuit of recapturing a Dem-
ocratic majority. The first electoral successes of this strategy came with Clinton and 
the New Democrats, who openly distanced themselves from the old image and em-
phasized their difference, primarily in regard to the social policy and welfare legacy 
of the 1960s. 
This, however, constitutes the mainstream reaction. In black political and aca-
demic circles the problem was seen from a different point of view. Here the hitch was 
to reach mainstream politics beyond black congressional districts, and especially to 
find ways around the racial backlash against means-tested programs and affirmative 
action. Moreover, some black thinkers also concentrated on the values issue and the 
question of personal responsibility, although from a point of view and for a purpose 
quite different from the conservative use of the notion. Whereas conservatives tend 
to use the notion of personal and family responsibility to argue for cuts in social pro-
grams, black thinkers argue for personal responsibility in a more uplifting manner 
that is centered on self-help, also to make up for failing government institutions and 
lacking government intervention. Moreover, part of this thinking is also motivated by 
the clear view of how any societal problem or flaw within the black population would 
be exploited to racist ends, especially if they corresponded to the negative stereo-
types. This thinking dates back at least to Du Bois, but similar ideas can be found 
even earlier. The black conclusion to the conundrum of conservative political power 
that was unfavorable to social policies was put forth by West in the early 1990s or 
Marable in the late 2000s. They advocate a strategy based on an interracial alliance, 
not unlike the New Deal Coalition, that would emphasize shared economic interests 
and racial transcendence. This relies on de-emphasizing race-specific measures and 
victimization, while at the same time emphasizing issues of personal responsibility 
and the advocacy of social policy issues that are salient for working and middle class 
whites, such as health or education. However, in this approach, race-specific 
measures are a no-go. To overcome this difficulty, they advocate an issue-specific 
approach, meaning race-neutral intervention on specific issues that are particularly 
problematic for blacks. Moreover, a more sociological insight concerns the particular 
salience of middle-class programs for the black middle class that is significantly more 
fragile than the white one. This approach is strongly backed by Feagin or Katznelson 
who argue that social policies have very much functioned to the advantage of whites. 
They argue that a similar neutral, but tailored focus on the black population could 
yield the same beneficial effects. Lieberman underscores this by arguing that regard-
ing policy, the racial intent is less important than the racial outcome, meaning that a 
neutral policy can have a racist outcome, just as a race-specific policy does not neces-
sarily produce the racially most effective results, as the case of affirmative action 
shows to a certain extent. 
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This race pragmatic approach is grounded on both the lack of political power of 
the black population, resulting from the smaller population count and from the racial 
backlash, and the assessment for some such as West, that the purely racial approach 
and the exclusively structural focus on barred opportunity has its limits regarding the 
refrainment of so-called ‘pathological’ behavior in the ‘underclass’ of the inner city 
neighborhoods. 
Very clearly, Obama’s political thought is influenced by both the mainstream 
and the black race pragmatic approach, since he details and discusses both, without 
naming them, in The Audacity of Hope, and since both approaches are reflected in his 
political discourse. 
Obama’s two main social policy goals corresponded to these approaches, be it 
health care or education reform. Both are of critical importance for social mobility, 
although this is less obvious for health care, despite the fact that lacking health care 
insurance hampers upward social mobility and is one of the main reasons for loss of 
socioeconomic status. Obama seems to have a greater personal passion for education, 
which might stem in part from his teaching career, but the initial education reform 
he promoted in 2009 and 2010 died in Congress. Obama seemed to be less passionate 
about health care, although he peppered his speeches with personal health stories, be 
it the cancer of his mother, his daughter Sasha’s meningitis, or even the multiple scle-
rosis of his father-in-law. Nonetheless, health care was, (and still is due to the imper-
fect reform and the current attacks against Obamacare), the pressing matter of the 
beginning of the new millennium. Moreover, by the time Obama reached the presi-
dency, health care, due to the haphazard health care policies enacted by the Johnson 
administration, had become a very acute problem for the middle class, although the 
same argument can be made about soaring university tuition fees. Thus health care 
was for Obama a good policy domain in which to apply the race pragmatic approach 
advocated by many black thinkers and politicians. It was also a good policy domain in 
which to apply the precepts of the mainstream political thought on the need to show 
the white middle class that the Democratic Party has not abandoned them. Moreover, 
health care was a good issue to show the white middle class that their have their 
stakes in social policies and that a strong welfare state is advantageous for them. 
Despite the fact that Obama scrupulously applied both precepts, meaning a re-
form that would not look too much like a ‘tax-and-spend’ big government monster, 
and which targeted some specific minority issues, such as diabetes or HIV/AIDS, 
while having a structural impact through strong downwards redistribution, the re-
form was not immune to stark partisan division. Republican cooperation was abso-
lutely minimal verging on the nonexistent regarding the crafting of the reform or 
voting for it at one moment or another (only Representative Joseph Cao (R-LA) voted 
once in the House for it, and Olympia Snowe (R-ME) voted the ACA out of a commit-
tee in the Senate, and three Republican senators participated in the reform debates). 
The enactment of the ACA and the HCER and the subsequent attacks against it, with 
Republicans vowing shortly after Obama signed the bill into law to repeal it as soon 
as possible, shows how deep and strong the partisan divide over redistributive issues 
continues to be. The immediate Republican opposition to the ARRA early in 2009, 
even before Obama had exposed the content of the bill, is yet another example of this 
strong divide that started with Reagan, but which was carried to an extreme by Newt 
Gingrich in the 1990s. 
The sharp partisan division between Republicans and Democrats is articulated 
over the scope of government intervention, which hinges on redistribution through 
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taxation and social policy. This division has evolved over the history of the welfare 
state, with Democratic president Roosevelt setting the first massive building block, 
although some programs had been developed prior to that. Gradually the Democratic 
Party became the party of social policies, as well as minorities, leading to a definite 
inversion of the racial stance of the parties by 1968; the Republicans no longer being 
the abolitionist party championing civil rights for blacks, and the Democrats no long-
er being the party of slavery and segregation. Moreover, Civil Rights brought about 
political correctness that made open racial appeals to whites a political liability. The 
racial appeals, which built on white racial resentment over increased economic com-
petition, had to be coded in order to avoid open rejection and condemnation. Neolib-
eral economic ideology and discourse proved to be a fortuitous discursive vessel for 
this coded discourse. Although Carter had applied some neoliberal ideas in the 1970s, 
and even in the early 1980s some Democratic politicians such as Senators Paul Tson-
gas (D-MA) and Gary Hart (D-CO) thought it could be beneficial for the Democratic 
Party to integrate some neoliberal aspects,2 it was the Republican Party that most ef-
fectively promoted and applied neoliberal ideas. Reagan appeared to be genuinely 
convinced that neoliberalism would provide solutions for the economy and the ne-
oliberal ideology proved to most effectively integrate coded racial appeals. 
Although not explicitly mentioned by Edsall and Edsall, who most adroitly ex-
plained Reagan’s use of the white backlash by parlaying his discourse on race and 
taxes as a way to gain a new Republican majority, neoliberalism offered the economic 
backbone to Reagan’s racial populism. The strength of the neoliberal Weltbild lies in 
the fact that it draws on old American values, such as individualism and work ethic, 
and builds on an idealized conception of America as the land of freedom and oppor-
tunity, integrating elements such as the American Dream. Moreover, neoliberalism 
based its ideology in opposition to Soviet-style socialism, creating a simple good-bad 
dichotomy that also tapped into American history by positing America as the land of 
freedom in contrast to economic and political tyranny. The free market became the 
symbol of political freedom and democracy, devoid of discrimination and oppression, 
which empowered the individual. Government regulation, incarnated by the Soviet 
Union, was the oppressive enemy. In the free market, as portrayed by neoliberalism, 
anyone could succeed if they worked hard. Those who failed to thrive in this perfect 
economy lacked work ethic or had not tried hard enough. This ideology managed to 
transform the resentment of paying taxes for social programs that appeared to benefit 
mainly minorities into a positive economic argument.  
Interpretations vary as to the political changes occurring during the 1970s. The 
economic narrative is that the crisis following the 1973 oil shock discredited Keynesi-
anism and paved the way for neoliberal economic principles, which were most deftly 
incorporated into conservatism by Reagan and allowed the creation of a new Repub-
lican majority. Others, like Edsall and Edsall, defend a different theory. In 1991 they 
argued that Reagan managed to politically exploit the 1970s backlash over taxes and 
social policy to drive a racial wedge through the class-based New Deal coalition. By 
playing on the backlash sentiments, the Reagan discourse emphasized and exacer-
bated the perception of white tax money being wasted for social programs that fos-
tered dependency and immorality, that were harmful to the very people they were 
supposed to help. By insisting on the dimension of abuse of the system, they created 
the image of greedy people living on comfortable social benefits that they did neither 
need nor deserve. The emergence of the ‘underclass’ in the 1970s lent credibility to 
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this portrait. Edsall and Edsall posit that Reagan managed to convince white working 
and middle class voters, who formerly voted Democratic according to their economic 
interests—the so-called Reagan-Democrats—to vote for Republicans based on 
shared values, such as personal responsibility.  
This discourse worked because it drew upon old American myths and corre-
sponded to the image people wanted to have of their country. It also worked because, 
as Suzanne Mettler points out, most of government intervention is hidden and many 
people fail to identify government programs as such. “Get your government hands off 
my Medicare” is just one of the most amusing examples. Nonetheless, due to the his-
torically strong association of federal intervention with Civil Rights and social policy 
efforts for minorities, as well as the use of states’ rights as tool for racial oppression in 
the form of slavery and segregation, attacks against big government cannot be viewed 
in a racially neutral way. However, with neoliberalism, attacks against the federal 
government were given the coat of economic respectability. 
The Reaganite discourse intertwining racial populism and neoliberalism works, 
and has proven very lasting, because it is also built on the structure of American soci-
ety that is stratified along race and class lines. There are social classes that can be de-
fined along income lines, occupation, and to a certain extent educational attainment, 
but more importantly, the long history of racial oppression causes society at the same 
time to be stratified along racial lines that concentrate minorities on the lowest rungs 
of the social ladder. 
The intersection of race and class has long been noted and discussed. Du Bois 
and Myrdal saw more the fixed and immutable dimension of this intersection that 
situated African-Americans at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy. This was 
linked, of course, to the fact that they analyzed American society when de jure segre-
gation still existed. Although Civil Rights brought the promise of upward social mo-
bility, very quickly the economic dimension came back to the forefront, because, as 
Myrdal or John Lewis pointed out, racial oppression strongly worked through its 
economic dimension. In this sense, racism can be viewed as a justification for the 
economic oppression of a whole group or groups of people based on their skin color. 
In the US, slavery and segregation had this economically stratifying effect along color 
lines, the effects of which persist today, partly through the transmission of social sta-
tus from parents to children, but also through ongoing discrimination and de facto 
residential and school segregation. However, because of Civil Rights, affirmative ac-
tion, and a greater emphasis on non-discrimination, the purely economic stratifica-
tion has gained even more importance. 
In the late 1970s, Wilson noted that affirmative action had little to no impact on 
the black populations in the inner city neighborhoods. Affirmative action, the tool 
that had been devised by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to make up for 
past discrimination, did not take structural inequalities into account because it was 
based on equal qualification for hiring. For entering university, affirmative action 
indeed compensates for lower SAT scores to allow minority students to enroll, but it 
does not make up for the lower-quality education that many children receive in poor 
neighborhoods. Hence, more minority students fail to complete their college educa-
tion. Lower-quality education is compounded by the lower incomes of the parents 
and often a lack of health insurance, which are other factors that negatively influence 
college completion rates. In this sense, Wilson identified that affirmative action, a 
purely racial policy that did not treat the cause of inequalities but only its symptoms, 
was useless for populations who had no access to the structural advantages that most 
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whites enjoy. Similarly in the late 1990s, Oliver and Shapiro pointed to the lack of 
human capital of the populations in the inner city neighborhoods that prevent these 
populations from competing in the regular job market. 
Affirmative action does work for the black middle class that has access to similar 
socio-economic advantages as whites, although the black middle class status remains 
much more fragile than that of whites because of blacks’ late access to social mobility. 
Blacks were largely excluded from social policies during the booming years of the 
welfare state and were largely excluded from the regular economy during the post-
WWII prosperity period that witnessed the rise of the massive and prosperous white 
middle class. During this period of explosive economic growth and upward social 
mobility that propelled many poor and working-class whites into the middle class, 
blacks were largely excluded through de jure and de facto segregation. Their access to 
social programs was limited, be it through structural exclusion—as it was the case 
with social security until 1950, de jure segregation and exclusion, or through discrimi-
nation—as it was the case for the FHA housing and mortgage programs and the GI 
Bill, or ADC (later AFDC, now TANF).  
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that 
granted access to the mainstream society and promised political empowerment oc-
curred shortly before the economic downturn and the oil shock of 1973 that opened a 
decade of economic crisis. Would things have been different without the economic 
crisis? Would there have been a backlash against racial equality in any case? It is im-
possible to say, but the timing was the worst possible as the claims for a fair share in 
the economy arrived at a moment when shareable amounts diminished rapidly. The 
population experienced massive inflation and thus money loss, while being confront-
ed with high unemployment after decades of easily-found and well-paying jobs with 
low qualification requirements. The claims for more equality, politically and eco-
nomically, from many minority groups—blacks, women, homosexuals—during the 
1960s and 1970s, were met with a white backlash. At a moment of increased economic 
competition and shrinking real wages, many middle class whites resented paying 
taxes for social programs that seemed to mainly benefit minorities, and this, appar-
ently, to little positive effect.  
This perception was created through a host of factors. Indeed, the welfare rolls 
were swelled quite ‘suddenly’ by a new influx of minorities, and blacks in particular, 
because of the Second Great Migration to Northern cities and because of Civil Rights. 
Although the War on Poverty had many positive effects and lifted many people out of 
poverty, it was also limited because of changes in the economy and the urban land-
scape. The well-paid low-qualification jobs of the industrial era were vanishing; the 
service industry required more education and unemployment became a normal 
component of the economy. Moreover, the urban landscape had been transformed, 
since the 1950s the white middle class had been moving to the suburbs, leaving the 
inner city neighborhoods as poor islands with few job prospects that fostered en-
trenched poverty and reliance on social programs. Barred opportunity and the ab-
sence or insufficiency of many public services also led to an increase of criminality, 
out-of-wedlock births, and drug consumption that contributed to the perception of a 
distinct ‘underclass’ that was marked by ‘pathological’ behavior. This so-called ‘un-
derclass’ justified cultural racism, which incorporated previous tenets of biological 
racism—laziness, hyper-sexuality, dependence—but transformed them into cultural 
population traits. Two main rationalizations emerged to explain the existence of the 
‘underclass’: the cultural explanation, mostly defended by conservatives, attributed 
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the condition of the ‘underclass’ to the ‘underclass’ and claimed that a lack of empha-
sis on morality, good education, and work ethic among this population was the rea-
son for their low socio-economic status. The structural explanation, mostly defended 
by liberals, attributed the situation to structural barriers of discrimination and lack of 
opportunity.  
Over time, since the inception of the welfare state, a racialization or welfariza-
tion of the various programs has occurred. Some programs, Medicare and Social Se-
curity in particular, have become seen as something other than social programs and 
even tend to not be seen as government intervention. They are viewed in very posi-
tive terms, notably because they are contributory (these programs are not exclusively 
paid for through contributions, they are also funded through general revenues, i.e. 
taxes). People seem to have forgotten that Medicare and Social Security are the two 
most federally controlled programs in the US. On the other hand, means-tested pro-
grams, or welfare, gradually gained a negative image, especially as more blacks and 
other minorities moved onto the rolls. These programs—such as AFDC (now TANF) 
or food stamps (now SNAP), but to a certain extent also Medicaid (although health 
programs have a better image)—are viewed negatively and are heavily associated 
with minorities, although the latter are not, in absolute numbers, the main benefi-
ciaries of the programs. However, it is true that, because of their subordinate econom-
ic status, a greater share of the black or the Hispanic population often benefits from 
social programs (this is not the case for Medicare and Social Security, because of the 
shorter life expectancy for blacks, and the overall younger Hispanic population). Mis-
representations in the media, which disproportionately illustrate issues of poverty 
with black faces especially during booming economic periods, have contributed to 
the perception that it is mainly minorities who unduly benefit from means-tested 
programs. This welfarization creates a negative image of programs as sustaining un-
deserving people who should work and as fostering dependency and immorality. The 
stereotype is so heavily racialized that for many whites, if they or their family benefit 
from the same programs “it’s different.” This strong welfarization was notably fur-
thered and used by Reagan in his political campaigns. 
The issue of affirmative action crystallized the backlash sentiment and the op-
position to policy efforts on behalf of minorities. The backlash against affirmative 
action even created the concept of ‘reverse discrimination,’ meaning the idea that 
these policies unduly hurt white people (and white men in particular). The ongoing 
attacks against affirmative action programs, especially for university admissions, il-
lustrate the impossibility of race-specific policy efforts, just as the attacks against 
‘welfare’ illustrate the impossibility of major policies that would target only the poor. 
Moreover, the backlash against affirmative action also highlights that even in a social 
policy domain that enjoys a rather positive connotation, such as education, measures 
that are too openly and strongly dedicated to minorities are met with robust re-
sistance.  
The Reagan years opened onto a new era, leaving the parties strongly polarized. 
The Keynesian consensus was dead and buried. Now the parties are sharply opposed 
over issues of taxation, government intervention, and social policies. The more gen-
erally conservative turn became obvious with Clinton and his New Democrats, who 
emphasized the importance of bringing down the deficit, to reform welfare, and to 
get tough on crime. Although Clinton was called the “first black president,” the as-
sessment of his racial and social policy record is more mitigated. Although Clinton 
managed to regain a Democratic majority, it appears that at the level of racial equali-
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ty the strategy backfired somewhat. The same applies to his social policy agenda 
since Clinton’s health care reform project was defeated. Although it had proposed a 
centrist, market-based approach that was supposed to appeal to conservatives, his 
reform was decried as a bureaucratic nightmare, a government-run health system 
that would result in shortages and higher costs for the middle class. The racial ap-
peals were heavily coded, but the specter of big government loomed and turned an 
initial support for health care reform into a disastrous defeat. 
Obama has shown extensive knowledge of this historical legacy, and in The Au-
dacity of Hope it appears that he shares much of this assessment of the Clinton reform. 
Moreover, though Obama congratulated the positive effect of economic growth on 
the black population during the two Clinton terms, his assessment of the Clinton 
years regarding racial outcomes, especially for the so-called ‘underclass’ is mitigated 
at best. The ongoing, although slightly diminishing support for the Democratic Party 
among black voters shows the relative political weakness of this population, who has, 
despite the lukewarm Clinton record, no real political alternative and often remains 
the loser in the two-party system. 
 Obama wanted to maintain a centrist approach that aimed, pointlessly, at a bi-
partisan collaboration, but with a greater emphasis, although not outspokenly, on 
specific black issues. The Democrats in 2009 were strongly aware that the enactment 
of health policy would be difficult, considering the recent Clinton reform disaster, 
but also a century of failed attempts that preceded it. The health care system is one of 
the main features of the welfare state that sets the health system of the US apart from 
other Western countries. Its early halt in development led to its distinguishing fea-
ture of being the most costly system achieving the lowest coverage with rather poor 
public health results in many areas, such as infant mortality. Regarding the Clinton 
failure, two elements stand out. The first is that the Obama administration chose to 
keep a similar system, meaning a system building on the existing health care system 
that kept a market-based approach instead of introducing single payer, just as the 
Clinton reform had planned to do. Despite this centrist approach, the enactment 
came at a very high price for the Democrats. In the midterm elections following the 
passage of the Act, they lost their majority in Congress and have not been able to re-
cover since then. Beyond that, Democrats have kept losing power in Congress.  
The second element is that Obama and the Democrats in power avoided the 
Clinton mistake of a strong association of the reform with the President and the First 
Lady, which had been detrimental to the Clinton reform attempt. Despite the efforts 
to keep Obama within the role defined by his function as President, the reform still 
got nicknamed Obamacare. However, this time it did not turn out as a defeat; the 
Democrats seized the nickname that was meant as a slander, and adopted it, repeat-
ing the strategy they had used for the Harry-and-Louise ads, or actually the strategy 
Obama had adopted regarding his private life. Similar attacks to the ones made 
against Clinton, against Obama’s darker secrets from his youth was simply not possi-
ble because he had already disclosed everything in his autobiography. Quite on the 
contrary, Obama used his sometimes tumultuous past to call for second chances and 
to relate to teenagers. 
Although Obama strongly influenced the reform in the background—through 
extensive communication between the White House and Congress, and establishing 
a White House Office of Health Reform by Executive Order 13057 in April 2009—for 
the outside world he strictly kept to the role a president can have regarding redistrib-
utive issues. This role includes marshaling his troops as leader of government and 
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working on the members of his party. Towards the population it includes using his 
singular and forceful position of being able to speak with a strong single voice, by 
using the bully pulpit to work on public opinion. This meant the crafting of an ex-
tended and intricate discourse that painted his Weltbild, his view of the US as a racial-
ly transcending and united country whose generous and pioneering spirit Obama 
saw as a proof that social policies are something inherently American. Obama crafted 
a discourse that carefully took the backlash sentiment into account and countered 
neoliberal tenets and racial divisiveness. First, Obama insisted on racial transcend-
ence and the efforts both groups, blacks and whites, had to make in order to come 
together, but he also used his biracial experience to foster mutual understanding in 
order to find a middle ground. This racial transcendence served to create a new, 
class-based, American unity that was heavily focused on the middle class. He tried to 
convince both blacks and whites that they could be stronger together to fight for their 
economic interests, and showed that they both had their stakes in a neutral, but class-
focused redistributive policy. 
To cement this class unity, Obama used economic populism in which hazy 
elites, greedy and abusive health insurance companies, and globalization served as 
new enemies, in order to redirect the animus of the old racial division. Obama very 
consciously tried to refocus economic resentment onto an economic target, instead of 
having it play out at the racial level, as conservatives did. Economic populism also 
served as a counter-discourse to neoliberalism. And lastly, Obama heavily insisted on 
legitimizing government intervention, by making it part of American values, and by 
portraying it as an inherent part of the American Dream; he posited government in-
tervention as an enabler of the Dream, while depicting health care insurance as one 
of its essential element, through the safety and stability it provided. In order to fore-
ground the importance of his health reform for the middle class, Obama insisted par-
ticularly on the universality of vulnerability regarding health issues and the fact that 
lacking health insurance was mainly a middle class problem. 
The more centrist approach became apparent in his racially transcending stance 
that heavily emphasized personal responsibility to meet conservatives, but that he 
further used to legitimate and call for more governmental responsibility and inter-
vention. Moreover, Obama’s centrism was also apparent in his acknowledging some 
neoliberal tenets that enjoy a certain bipartisan consensus, such as the need to con-
trol the deficit, but he used them to his advantage to push for health care reform, by 
arguing that the reform would bring down costs. 
However, Obama’s conciliatory stance and his strong belief in bipartisan com-
promise resulted in a reform that was vulnerable to attacks. As the ACA built on the 
existing system, the old flaws that had already haunted the Johnson health system of 
Medicare and Medicaid, resurfaced in Obamacare. The conservative attacks against 
the ACA, whose major result was to make the much-needed Medicaid extension op-
tional, not only had a detrimental impact on the universality of coverage, but due to 
the racial stratification of American society and the racialized development of the 
welfare state, also had a negative impact along racial lines. The old history of the US 
resurfaced in the Medicaid extension. Many of the states that chose to use their pre-
rogatives, their states’ rights, to decide for a non-implementation of the fully federal-
ly-funded Medicaid extension, are southern states that concentrate about half of the 
black population, and that are, in addition, among the poorest states in the US Thus, 
through a decision that appeared to be linked only to the scope of government, the 
black population got hit worst of all. 
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However, recent developments have shown that states’ rights, in the sense of the 
states’ autonomy to enact their own social policies, can also function as a laboratory 
for bolder policies and can push the federal government to the left. A few examples 
spring to mind, such as the fact that many states, and even some cities, have mini-
mum wages much higher than the federal one. Many states used the leeway given by 
Supreme Court decisions in lowering the gap between crack and cocaine sentences 
before the Fair Sentencing Act was passed. As for health policy, before the ACA, 
Massachusetts had enacted pioneering health care legislation that served as a model 
and as an argumentative weapon against conservatives. And recently more and more 
states have been contemplating single payer. Although so far the attempts at passing 
such legislation have failed, the fact that some states are either putting it to the vote 
or are considering it, with some governors even running on platforms promoting sin-
gle payer, is a hopeful sign that contrary to the Medicaid experience, state autonomy 
can be used again in a progressive way at the state level and help pave the way for 
single payer at the federal level. 
Nonetheless, it is very clear that single payer would never have passed in 
2009/2010; the sacrifice of the much more moderate public option is an additional 
proof of that. However, the enactment of the ACA and its positive results on both un-
insured rates and limitation of health care cost increases (despite all the debate 
around this), have led to a change in public opinion. Americans seem now to accept 
more readily the idea of government intervention in health care. The repeated de-
feats of the Republican repeal attempts, despite the Republican majority in Congress, 
is a hopeful glimpse towards a turning tide. Moreover, public opinion increasingly 
favors single payer, supporting it to the same extent as other solutions like a mixed 
approach or less government intervention. It can only be hoped that Obamacare, im-
perfect though it is, might function as a stepping stone for a truly universal health 
care system that would not allow for discrimination, just as Johnson’s Medicare and 
Medicaid policies served as stepping stone for the ACA.  
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HEALTHCARE REFORM
Since March of 2010, the American people have had to suffer
under the incredible economic burden of the Affordable Care Act
—Obamacare. This legislation, passed by totally partisan votes
in the House and Senate and signed into law by the most
divisive and partisan President in American history, has
tragically but predictably resulted in runaway costs, websites
that don’t work, greater rationing of care, higher premiums, less
competition and fewer choices.
READ MORE
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Obamacare means never having to worry about getting sick and running up against
a lifetime cap on insurance coverage. It gives parents the comfort of knowing their
kids can stay on their insurance until they're 26, and that a "pre-existing condition"
like an ear infection will never compromise their child's coverage.
It's about ending the practice of letting insurance companies charge women 50
percent more -- just because they're women.
And Obamacare can save seniors hundreds of dollars a year on prescription drugs --
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fighting with insurance companies, too.
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So next time you hear someone railing against Obamacare, remember what they're
actually saying they want to take away.
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Yesterday, Republicans in the House of Representatives voted to repeal Obamacare
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they ran a presidential candidate who promised to "kill it dead." 
Americans need to have Obamacare fully implemented -- not repealed.
Join me and tell House Republicans to stop playing politics with
Americans' health care and do their job.
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access to quality, affordable health insurance. And we've gotten results -- 98
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plan we passed in 2006 -- which is the model for Obamacare -- has only grown
more popular with people in our state over time. The more people experience the
benefits in their lives, the more they like it.
That's also happening with Obamacare. While Republicans try to repeal it, over
three million young adults are able to get coverage through their parents' plans,
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Republicans to work with, not against, President Obama and for the American
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Introduction 
Le Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act a été signé par le président Barack 
Obama le 23 mars 2010. Une semaine plus tard, il a signé le Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act, qui a amendé et élargi le Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(Affordable Care Act ou ACA). Ensemble ils constituent Obamacare, la législation phare 
d’Obama, et sont une réussite majeure après presque cent ans de tentatives échouées 
de créer une couverture de santé universelle aux États-Unis. 
Le système de couverture de santé qui résulte du ACA a été fortement influencé 
et contraint par la politique et l’histoire étatsunienne. Le système mis en place par le 
ACA s’appuie sur le système existant, ce qui a créé un système mixte basé sur le mar-
ché, mais qui inclut une certaine intervention de l’État. La couverture universelle 
repose sur trois piliers : un mandat pour les employeurs les obligeant à fournir une 
assurance maladie à leurs employés, un mandat individuel obligeant toute personne 
à contracter une assurance maladie, et une extension de Medicaid, l’assurance mala-
die pour les pauvres payée par l’État. Comme auparavant, Medicare couvre les per-
sonnes âgées de plus de 65 ans. 
Avant la promulgation d’Obamacare, une majorité d’Américains avaient une as-
surance maladie par leur employeur, mais celle-ci n’était pas obligatoire. Medicaid 
existe depuis 1965, mais le ACA a fortement élargi les critères d’éligibilité afin 
d’inclure les adultes sans enfants (sur la base de leur revenus). Le mandat individuel 
est une nouveauté, mais cette idée a été défendue par les conservateurs depuis la fin 
des années 1980. 
Obamacare cherchait aussi à répondre au problème grandissant des coûts de 
santé, pour lesquels le ACA a établi une série de mesures afin de réduire ces derniers. 
Ces mesures ciblent particulièrement les coûts croissants des polices d’assurance. 
Ainsi le ACA règlemente les polices d’assurance et définit le type de prestations 
qu’une police doit prendre en charge. Afin de rendre les assurances maladie plus 
abordables pour les Américains, l’État subventionne fortement l’achat des polices 
d’assurance. Pour les personnes qui contractent leur assurance maladie sur le marché 
privé, l’État offre des crédits d’impôts en fonction du revenu afin d’aider les per-
sonnes à assumer les coûts. Concernant les assurances fournies  par l’employeur, le 
ACA perpétue le système déjà en place, c’est-à-dire l’exemption d’impôt pour les dé-
penses liées aux assurances maladie. L’extension de Medicaid devait fournir une assu-
rance maladie gratuite aux personnes les plus pauvres. 
De plus, le ACA a mis en place les health exchanges, des plateformes au niveau de 
l’État fédéral et au niveau des États fédérés. Ces plateformes sont des marchés qui 
permettent aux personnes de savoir si elles sont éligibles à Medicaid ou à des subven-
tions, et les aident à trouver une police d’assurance adéquate en fonction de leurs 
besoins en fournissant des outils de comparaison entre les différentes offres des assu-
reurs privés. 
Le ACA répond aussi à plusieurs problèmes majeurs présents dans le système 
de santé étatsunien. Par exemple, les assureurs pouvaient exclure ou faire payer plus 
cher des clients en fonction d’une longue liste de maladies préexistantes. La prohibi-
tion de cette pratique par le ACA est particulièrement importante, car pour de nom-
breuses personnes l’assurance maladie était liée à leur travail, ce qui rendait tout 
changement d’emploi difficile. Ainsi, si elles changeaient d’emploi, certaines per-
 sonnes risquaient de voir leur tarif d’assurance augmenter ou de ne pas pouvoir con-
tracter une nouvelle assurance. De ce fait, la prohibition de l’exclusion pour cause de 
maladie préexistante est un des éléments centraux de la nouvelle législation. 
Obamacare est une législation fortement redistributive, qui répond à certains des 
problèmes graves liés au précédent système de santé, et à certains des problèmes 
auxquels était confrontée la population étatsunienne. 
Bien que la promulgation d’Obamacare ait représenté une victoire majeure pour 
le Parti Démocrate et bien que celle-ci ait marqué un changement important dans les 
politiques sociales étatsuniennes, la législation est imparfaite et insatisfaisante par de 
nombreux aspects. La réforme a été critiquée d’emblée, et de nombreuses personnes 
ont soutenu qu’elle ne fonctionnait pas ou qu’elle provoquerait des problèmes ma-
jeurs et des difficultés pour l’économie. Les Républicains ont immédiatement juré de 
la faire abroger. De plus, à cause de son incroyable complexité, la législation est vul-
nérable aux attaques, et certaines mesures-clés ont déjà été révoquées, ce qui a créé 
des failles dans l’universalité de la couverture de santé.  
Le rôle de la race dans la réforme  
Mon questionnement pour cette recherche a commencé à la lecture d’une 
phrase dans The Audacity of Hope, le livre de Barack Obama détaillant sa philosophie 
politique qui a été publié en 2006 quand il était encore Sénateur de l’Illinois. Dans le 
chapitre intitulé « Race », Obama écrit : “An emphasis on universal, as opposed to race-
specific, programs isn’t just good policy; it’s also good politics.”1 Quelles étaient les raisons, 
les idées, les évaluations politiques qui ont influencé cette déclaration ? Pourquoi 
écarter une approche spécifiquement raciale lorsque l’intention ouvertement décla-
rée dans le chapitre était de réduire les inégalités raciales ? La continuation de la lec-
ture et une analyse plus approfondie ont montré qu’Obama était convaincu à la fois 
des limites de l’efficacité de mesures spécifiquement raciales (particulièrement sous 
la forme de discrimination positive, ou affirmative action) et de l’impossibilité poli-
tique de créer de nouveaux programmes spécifiquement raciaux. Obama semblait 
convaincu du fait que de nouvelles politiques sociales dans les domaines de 
l’éducation et de la santé, par exemple, pourraient avoir un impact nettement plus 
bénéfique sur la population afro-américaine que la discrimination positive, puisque 
les Afro-américains font face à des difficultés particulières dans ces domaines. La par-
tie de la déclaration insistant sur les « good politics » (« de la bonne politique ») fait ré-
férence à une pensée plus stratégique, qui résulte du constat fait par Obama que la 
population blanche était largement réticente à de nouveaux programmes spécifi-
quement raciaux et que toute nouvelle législation de ce type serait probablement 
vouée à l’échec. 
Le résultat politique de ce constat est Obamacare, une législation de santé uni-
verselle fortement centrée sur la redistribution et qui cherche à répondre à certains 
problèmes auxquels la population noire est spécifiquement confrontée. Parmi ces 
problèmes se trouvent des taux plus élevés de personnes sans couverture maladie, 
ainsi qu’un plus grand risque de faillite personnelle, et par la suite, de perte de statut 
socioéconomique due à des dépenses de santé imprévus. On trouve aussi de plus forts 
taux de diabète et d’obésité au sein de la population afro-américaine. De plus, dans le 
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système précédent, les assurances maladies existantes étaient un frein à la mobilité 
sociale pour les pauvres ou les personnes à revenus très modestes. Un nouvel emploi 
pouvait amener à la perte de la couverture Medicaid, mais sans pour autant fournir 
une assurance d’employeur ou un revenu suffisant permettant d’acheter une police 
d’assurance.  
L’hypothèse de recherche à propos de cette législation imparfaite était 
qu’Obama avait candidaté à la présidence avec l’idée de renforcer l’État providence 
étatsunien en général, mais aussi avec l’idée—moins mise en avant—de réduire les 
inégalités raciales, et surtout les inégalités économiques affectant majoritairement les 
Noirs. Le résultat final de ceci fut Obamacare. La réforme de santé n’était pas le pre-
mier choix d’Obama, ce qui est illustré par le fait que celle-ci n’était pas initialement 
un élément central de la campagne présidentielle. Toutefois, le contexte politique et 
les problèmes urgents du moment ont mis cette réforme de santé au premier plan. De 
plus, en termes de politique générale, la santé n’apparait pas spontanément comme le 
choix le plus évident pour répondre à des problèmes d’inégalités raciales. Le chô-
mage ou l’éducation apparaissent comme beaucoup plus logiques. Obama a montré 
une passion toute particulière pour la réforme de l’éducation, mais celle-ci est morte 
au Congrès. Les problèmes de chômage sont particulièrement liés aux aléas de 
l’économie. L’assurance santé, quant à elle, et encore plus son absence, joue un rôle 
fort dans la mobilité sociale et le maintient du statut social. Par ailleurs, le système de 
santé étatsunien se distingue parmi les systèmes de santé des pays industrialisés pour 
ses coûts élevés et ses résultats décevants, tant en termes de couverture de santé que 
d’accès aux soins, ce qui affecte particulièrement les minorités raciales. Si l’on aborde 
la question des inégalités raciales dans une perspective économique, par opposition à 
une approche centrée sur les droits ou le pouvoir politique, concernant les inégalités 
raciales, alors la santé devient un domaine valide et intéressant pour essayer 
d’améliorer la mobilité sociale des Noirs et de consolider la classe moyenne noire. 
Pourtant, en poursuivant ce but, l’administration Obama a été confrontée à des 
contraintes politiques de taille. Les décennies récentes de l’histoire étatsunienne 
n’ont pas été favorables aux politiques sociales en général, et certainement pas aux 
mesures raciales dont le but était d’améliorer la situation des Noirs en particulier. Le 
lien entre politiques sociales et question raciale peut être observée dans la polarisa-
tion extrême des deux partis au sujet des politiques sociales et de l’intervention de 
l’État, ce qui est mis en exergue par les attaques virulentes du Parti Républicain 
contre Obamacare. L’histoire particulière des États-Unis et la composition raciale de 
la société étatsunienne ont créé un contexte particulier pour les politiques sociales. 
Ceci est particulièrement vrai pour les politiques visant à réduire les inégalités carac-
térisées par une double dimension raciale et économique. 
Ces observations ont mené à la question de savoir comment Obama contourne 
les problématiques raciales dans la réforme de santé. La réponse est simple et com-
plexe à la fois. Obama a choisi une approche de pragmatisme racial, c’est-à-dire la 
création d’une politique sociale neutre et fortement redistributive qui cible particu-
lièrement certains problèmes majeurs auxquels la population noire est confrontée. 
En d’autres termes, au lieu d’identifier la population noire dans sa dimension raciale, 
la loi a ciblé cette population par ses caractéristiques socio-économiques. Cette ap-
proche impliquait de se concentrer sur un domaine qui était aussi pertinent pour la 
population blanche, en particulier la classe ouvrière et la classe moyenne, afin de 
réunir une majorité suffisante pour soutenir la réforme. La santé, puisqu’elle est un 
problème majeur pour la classe moyenne blanche, est apparue comme un choix rai-
sonnable pour appliquer cette stratégie, malgré la longue histoire d’échecs politiques 
 en matière de législation de santé. Cette stratégie est construite sur une certaine com-
préhension de l’histoire des politiques sociales aux États-Unis et de la polarisation 
des deux partis concernant les politiques sociales. Obama a précautionneusement 
pris en compte les divisions raciales liées aux les politiques sociales, la réaction néga-
tive des Blancs contre les mesures raciales et les programmes sociaux, ainsi que le 
rejet des politiques sociales en général. Afin de surmonter ceci, il a élaboré un dis-
cours spécifique basé sur la transcendance raciale, sur l’unité de classe cimentée par 
du populisme économique, et sur une défense de l’intervention Étatique afin d’unir 
l’opinion publique derrière son projet de réforme. 
Méthodologie 
Afin d’analyser la stratégie politique d’Obama, ses fondements, son application, 
et ses résultats, la thèse discute d’abord les concepts de race et de classe, fait ensuite 
une présentation historique des politiques sociales et de leur racialisation en poli-
tique étatsunienne, puis analyse le discours développé par Obama pour atteindre son 
but politique, et finalement évalue le résultat politique d’Obamacare. 
Il a été décidé d’examiner uniquement les populations noire et blanche à cause 
de leur passé historique particulier (expliquant leur interaction politique et socioéco-
nomique). À des fins comparatives, certaines caractéristiques économiques de la po-
pulation hispanique, et dans certains cas, de la population asiatique, sont évoquées, 
afin de souligner la spécificité de la situation de la population noire ou pour faire res-
sortir des convergences d’intérêts. Toutefois, il n’a pas été jugé possible de faire une 
analyse systématique des trois principaux groupes raciaux des États-Unis, car la si-
tuation de la population hispanique aurait ajouté la question trop complexe de 
l’immigration dans le débat politique, ce qui mérite une étude séparée. 
Afin d’évaluer les fondations de l’approche d’Obama, c’est-à-dire son choix de 
se concentrer sur la classe plutôt que la race, deux dimensions sont étudiées: la race 
et la classe en tant que réalités socioéconomiques et facteurs impactant la mobilité 
sociale, mais aussi le contexte historique qui a amené Obama à choisir cette ap-
proche. Les concepts de race et classe sont examinés en fonction de leur dimension 
sociologique et idéologique. La définition qu’Obama pouvait avoir de ces concepts est 
analysée afin d’examiner l’arrière plan idéologique de son approche politique. 
L’intersection structurelle2 entre race et classe est étudiée afin d’évaluer la permuta-
bilité des deux catégories. Les définitions conceptuelles de race et classe sont basées 
sur des écrits universitaires remontant jusqu’au début du XXème siècle lorsque la di-
mension économique de la race a commencé à être étudiée, comme par exemple 
ceux de W.E.B. Du Bois. 
La présentation socioéconomique est basée à la fois sur des études universitaires 
qui analysent les classes sociales, et sur la description des inégalités raciales et de 
classe actuelles à partir des données statistiques récoltées par de nombreuses agences 
gouvernementales, telles que le Census Bureau, la Current Population Survey à 
l’intérieur du Census Bureau, le Bureau of Labor Statistics, le Department of Health and 
Human Services, le Office for Minority Health and Health Equity, le Center for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention, les Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, le US Department of 
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Justice, ainsi que des rapports de statistiques de la Kaiser Family Foundation, le Broo-
kings Institute, et l’Urban Institute, par exemple. 
Afin de continuer l’évaluation de cette permutabilité entre race et classe, 
l’analyse deleur dimension structurelle est basée sur des recherches précédentes 
dans ces domaines, ainsi que des facteurs de mobilité sociale. Des études concernant 
le rôle de la santé dans la mobilité sociale et la stabilité économique sont passées en 
revue afin de déterminer la pertinence d’une nouvelle législation de santé pour les 
deux groupes concernés. 
Bien qu’une dimension de classe soit indéniable, le facteur race a toutefois un 
impact très fort sur les inégalités, pour des raisons diverses allant des effets présents 
de discrimination passée jusqu’à la discrimination actuelle et aux inégalités systé-
miques. Ainsi, les opinions actuelles, politiques et universitaires, concernant les poli-
tiques raciales sont examinées afin d’extraire les arguments principaux en faveur 
d’une approche racialement neutre qui pourraient aider à justifier le choix d’Obama. 
L’argument principal qui s’est détaché est celui de la faisabilité politique, une préoc-
cupation partagée par Obama. 
Le deuxième volet de l’analyse de la fondation de la stratégie d’Obama porte sur 
le contexte historique qui a amené Obama à la conclusion que les politiques raciales 
sont une impossibilité politique. Il a donc été nécessaire d’examiner l’État providence 
étatsunien, en particulier son développement et ses opposants, tout comme l’histoire 
spécifique des différentes tentatives de faire passer une législation de santé aux États-
Unis, afin d’avoir une vue d’ensemble de la situation à laquelle Obama était confron-
té pour son projet de réforme. Étant donné le sujet, il était aussi nécessaire 
d’examiner attentivement la dimension raciale des politiques sociales. Toutefois, il 
n’y a ni consensus politique, ni consensus universitaire sur une dimension spécifi-
quement raciale des politiques sociales, tout comme il n’y a pas de consensus sur le 
fait que des formes de discrimination continuent, ou que des appels raciaux persis-
tent en politique. Il a donc été décidé de séparer une présentation plus factuelle et 
consensuelle de l’histoire des politiques sociales d’une analyse des théories sur la 
racialisation de ces politiques. Cette séparation permet de mettre en avant les atti-
tudes et idées, en bref, une perception racialisée des politiques sociales, distinguant 
entre programmes nécessaires et allocations qui façonnent les choix électoraux. Ceci 
se fonde sur des études précédentes concernant ces questions, mais aussi sur des 
sondages d’opinions de l’époque, menés par des organismes tels que Gallup, PEW, ou 
encore le Joint Center of Political and Economic Studies, ainsi que certains journaux con-
nus pour la qualité de leurs sondages, tels que le New York Times ou le Washington 
Post. 
Un soin particulier a été accordé à l’analyse basée sur des statistiques actuelles 
quant à savoir s’il y avait une base statistique pour la perception d’une partie de la 
population blanche que les programmes sociaux bénéficient principalement à des 
minorités raciales. Medicaid est apparu comme le programme le plus pertinent pour 
cette analyse, car il s’agit d’un programme de santé. Au contraire de Medicare, c’est un 
programme sur critères sociaux, et Medicaid ne jouit pas de la même popularité au-
près de la population que Medicare. 
De plus, au-delà de l’hostilité générale contre les politiques sociales perçues 
comme bénéficiant principalement aux minorités raciales, le cas particulier de la dis-
crimination positive est analysé. Bien que la discrimination positive ne soit pas un 
programme social en soi, puisqu’elle redistribue de l’opportunité plutôt que des res-
sources, elle incarne et cristallise pourtant le rejet des politiques raciales et a grande-
ment contribué au rejet de toute mesure perçue comme du favoritisme racial. Le 
 point de vue et les interprétations d’Obama sur la question de la discrimination posi-
tive et le rejet de cette politique par les Blancs ont été analysés, ainsi que les réactions 
racistes et de rejet contre Obama lui-même, afin d’évaluer la pertinence de la notion 
de race autant pour la pensée politique d’Obama que pour sa présidence. 
Ceci est complété par une analyse de la division partisane entre les deux partis 
concernant les politiques sociales, division qui avait émergée du contexte historique. 
La continuité de cette division est analysée durant la présidence Obama et particuliè-
rement durant la promulgation de la réforme de santé. Les interprétations du con-
texte politique des législations de politique sociale et l’analyse des efforts de réforme 
sont confrontés à, vérifiés et corroborés par des interviews menées avec des représen-
tants Démocrates ou des aides juridiques de représentants Démocrates impliqués 
dans le processus législatif de la réforme de santé. 
La présentation du contexte historique a permis  d’identifier les problèmes 
idéels et idéologiques majeurs, ainsi que certains problèmes de représentation et de 
perception. L’analyse s’est donc portée sur la façon dont ces problèmes, ces représen-
tations, ces perceptions, et même certains stéréotypes ont été utilisés dans le discours 
politique pour attaquer les politiques sociales et en particulier pour créer une divi-
sion raciale au sein des classes sociales. Il a été jugé nécessaire d’avoir une vue claire 
du discours de l’opposition, en particulier parce que le discours visant à diviser établi 
par Reagan a perduré et a fortement marqué ces perceptions. Ceci sert à montrer 
avec quelle précision Obama répond à ce discours et avec quel soin il a façonné un 
contre-discours qui vise à créer une unité de classe qui transcende les divisions ra-
ciales afin de réunir une majorité en faveur de sa réforme. Bien que toute la construc-
tion rhétorique d’Obama ait été expliquée selon les paramètres identifiés auparavant 
par le contexte historique et la polarisation des deux partis concernant les politiques 
sociales, une attention particulière a été consacrée à la question de la responsabilité, 
car celle-ci réunit toutes les autres questions sous-jacentes. De plus, la notion de res-
ponsabilité est centrale dans le débat concernant l’intervention de l’État, qui se 
trouve au cœur de la question des politiques sociales et qui contient une forte dimen-
sion raciale.  
L’identité raciale d’Obama est aussi analysée. Premièrement parce que l’identité 
raciale avait attiré beaucoup d’attention lors de la campagne présidentielle de 2008, 
mais aussi parce que la méthode d’analyse du discours établie par Ruth Amossy3  
insiste sur l’importance de l’identité publique (persona) de l’orateur, ainsi que de son 
identité discursive (ethos). Ceci est apparu comme particulièrement pertinent car 
Obama utilise très ouvertement son identité raciale dans ses discours, ainsi que son 
histoire personnelle et familiale. 
L’application de la stratégie d’Obama est aussi analysée en rapport à la pensée 
politique noire. Le point de vue selon lequel l’attention portée par le Parti démocrate 
aux mesures raciales est un trop grand facteur de risque politique est principalement 
un point de vue blanc. L’analyse de la pensée politique noire est apparue comme né-
cessaire afin de situer Obama en tant qu’homme politique noir, mais aussi afin de 
trouver des éléments qui permettent d’éclairer la question de comment trouver des 
moyens de réduire les inégalités raciales. Ceci n’est pas forcément un élément central 
dans le constat politique des Blancs. Ceci impliquait d’examiner le type de stratégie à 
adopter afin de réduire les inégalités raciales et d’améliorer la situation de la popula-
tion noire. 
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L’application de la stratégie d’Obama est ensuite examinée en terme de résultat 
politique. Ainsi les deux législations, le ACA et le HCER (qui amende le ACA), sont 
analysées afin de voir à quel degré elles reflètent la pensée politique d’Obama. Les 
aspects redistributifs, c’est-à-dire l’approche de classe, sont examinées. L’attention 
s’est portée particulièrement sur les mesures qui pouvaient avoir un impact structurel 
sur la population noire en fonction de leur situation socioéconomique. Ensuite, 
l’analyse détermine si certaines clauses traitant de problèmes de santé spécifiques 
avaient un intérêt particulier pour la population noire. Bien que la question centrale 
porte sur le fait de savoir si Obamacare correspond ou non à la stratégie d’Obama, les 
premiers effets de la législation sont aussi évalués. Des données et rapports gouver-
nementaux sont analysés quant à un impact racial bénéfique. En relation avec cela, 
une analyse est faite de la décision de la Cour Suprême dans l’affaire National Fede-
ration of Independent Business v. Sebelius de 2012.4 Cette décision a profondément muti-
lé Obamacare, car elle a rendu l’extension de Medicaid facultative. Ceci est particuliè-
rement important, car Medicaid représente l’intersection entre race et classe au niveau 
de la santé, mais aussi parce que cela soulève la question du pouvoir fédéral par op-
position aux pouvoir des états, ce qui joue un rôle majeur dans la question de la por-
tée de l’État, et en particulier dans les politiques sociales. Cette analyse est faite selon 
la même méthode que pour le ACA (c’est-à-dire le contenu idéel et idéologique est 
analysé, ainsi que l’impact racial de la décision). 
Travail de terrain 
Afin de donner une dimension plus pratique à ces travaux de recherche, une 
enquête de terrain a été menée à travers une série d’interviews avec des représentants 
du Congrès qui ont été impliqués dans le processus législatif de la réforme de santé 
d’Obama.5 Ces interviews n’étaient pas destinées à servir de base pour la présente 
analyse, mais ont été plutôt utilisées comme moyen de corroborer l’analyse et les ré-
sultats. Cette approche a été choisie parce que le nombre de personnes impliquées 
dans le processus législatif était trop limité pour une recherche quantitative. 
Dans la Chambre des Représentants trois comités étaient impliqués dans la ré-
forme : Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, et Ways and Means. Au Sénat, le 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, ainsi que le Senate Finance Committee 
ont travaillé sur la réforme. Hormis le Gang des six au Sénat qui incluait trois séna-
teurs Républicains, seuls les Démocrates de ces comités du Congrès ont participé à la 
réforme. Très rapidement les sénateurs n’ont plus été considérés pour les interviews, 
car ils sont peu disponibles. Ainsi, il a été décidé de se concentrer uniquement sur les 
représentants car ils sont plus disponibles. Ceci n’a pas été jugé problématique, bien 
que la législation finale s’appuie essentiellement sur la proposition du Sénat, car les 
questions des interviews se concentrent principalement sur le processus, les principes 
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 ayant guidé la réforme, et l’interaction avec l’exécutif. Ceci a réduit l’échantillon po-
tentiel à 91 représentants ainsi que leur aides juridiques, ce qui est trop peu pour 
pouvoir servir de base analytique, d’autant plus qu’il était clair que seulement 
quelques uns allaient répondre favorablement à la requête d’interview. 
Il a donc été décidé de mener une enquête qualitative, c'est-à-dire un nombre 
réduit d’entretiens longs en fonction de la disponibilité des répondants. Ces entre-
tiens ont duré entre 30 minutes et une heure. Les interviews étaient semi-directives, 
guidées par quelques questions larges et un nombre de questions très spécifiques, 
mais toujours très ouvertes, afin de susciter une réponse libre et des informations 
supplémentaires. Afin de pouvoir élaborer un questionnaire pertinent il a été décidé 
de mener ces interviews relativement tard dans la thèse, au milieu de la troisième 
année. Cette période a été choisie afin de s’assurer que les bases théoriques étaient 
solides, mais suffisamment tôt pour pouvoir prendre en compte de nouvelles con-
naissances. 
Bien qu’initialement un plus grand nombre de représentants et d’aides juri-
diques aient accepté d’être interviewés, j’ai réussi à mener neuf interviews au total, 
dont cinq anciens représentants et quatre aides juridiques d’autres représentants. 
Certaines de ces interviews ont été menées par téléphone ou Skype, d’autres ont eu 
lieu sur place à Washington, soit dans les bureaux des représentants dans les bâti-
ments du Congrès, soit aux lieux de travail des anciens représentants. 
Les personnes suivantes ont été interviewées : 
Robert E. Andrews a représenté le 1er district du New Jersey de 1989 à 2014. Il 
s’est décrit comme un Démocrate modéré et a fait parti du Education and Labor Com-
mittee. Il était le président du sous-comité Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions, et 
était très impliqué dans le processus législatif. Son district était à majorité blanche 
avec environ 17% de Noirs et plutôt solidement Démocrate. 
Bruce Braley était le représentant pour le 1er district de l’Iowa de 2007 à 2015. Il 
siégeait au Committee on Energy and Commerce. Son district est à plus de 90% blanc et 
est maintenant représenté par un Républicain. Braley s’est décrit en tant que popu-
liste progressiste. En 2009, il a fondé le Congressional Populist Caucus, dont l’attention 
semble se porter essentiellement sur les intérêts de la classe moyenne. 
Bart Gordon a représenté le 6ème district du Tennessee de 1985 à 2011. Il était au 
Committee on Energy and Commerce. Son district est à majorité blanche et plutôt con-
servateur. Gordon est un des Blue Dogs, les Démocrates conservateurs, mais il s’est 
décrit comme étant personnellement plus libéral que son district. 
Earl Pomeroy a représenté le district général du Dakota du Nord de 1993 à 2011. 
Il est un des Blue Dogs conservateurs et siégeait au Ways and Means Committee, ainsi 
que au sous-comité à la santé et à la Social Security (Pensions). Son district est majori-
tairement blanc. Il a fait partie de la Rural Health Care Coalition, une coalition biparti-
sane. Avant d’être élu au Congrès, il avait travaillé en tant que insurance commissioner, 
qui régule l’industrie des assurances maladie, une position d’élu exécutif au niveau 
de l’État du Dakota du Nord de 1985 à 1992. Tous les deux, Gordon et Pomeroy, ont 
terminé leur carrière suite à leur vote pour le ACA. 
John F. Tierney a représenté le 6ème district du Massachusetts de 1997 à 2015. Il a 
siégé au Committee on Education and Labor. Son district était à majorité blanche avec 
un taux de pauvreté assez faible. Son district était assez solidement Démocrate et il 
s’est décrit lui-même comme très progressiste. 
Thomas Dorney est un aide juridique pour le Représentant John Lewis, qui re-
présente le 5ème district de Géorgie depuis 1987. Lewis siège au Ways and Means Com-
mitee. Son district est majoritairement noir, avec des problèmes de pauvreté, et qui est 
  
solidement Démocrate. Lewis fait partie du Congressional Progressive Caucus et du 
Congressional Black Caucus.  
Yardly Pollas est la conseillère en matière de santé du Représentant Bobby 
Rush, qui représente le 1er district de l’Illinois depuis 1993. Il siège au Committee on 
Education and Labor. Son district est majoritairement noir et solidement Démocrate. 
Rush est un membre du Congressional Black Caucus et du Congressional Diabetes Cau-
cus. 
Megan Sussman est une conseillère juridique de la Représentante Doris Matsui 
qui a représenté le 5ème district de la Californie de 2005 à 2013. Depuis 2013, elle repré-
sente le 6ème district de la Californie, qui est un district à majorité de minorités et soli-
dement Démocrate. Le 5ème district avait tout juste une majorité blanche et une forte 
population asiatique. Le district était aussi très fortement Démocrate. Matsui siège au 
Committee on Energy and Commerce. De plus, elle fait partie du Asian Pacific American 
Caucus et elle est coprésidente du Caucus on Women’s Issues. 
En plus de ces entretiens, Dan Riffle, conseiller en matière de santé du Repré-
sentant John Conyers, a accepté de se faire interviewer. Conyers représente le 13ème 
district du Michigan depuis 1965. Le district est majoritairement noir, avec de forts 
taux de pauvreté et de revenus modestes. Conyers est le doyen de la Chambre des 
Représentants. Il a été décidé de mener cette interview car Conyers s’est fait le cham-
pion de single payer depuis longtemps et il a réintroduit une proposition législative 
pour single payer en 2017. Il fait partie du Congressional Black Caucus et du Congressional 
Progressive Caucus, entre autres. Il ne siège dans aucun des comités qui ont juridiction 
sur les questions de santé. 
En complément de ces interviews avec des représentants ou aides juridiques, 
une interview a été menée avec le journaliste David Herszenhorn du New York Times. 
Avec Robert Pear, Herszenhorn a couvert la réforme de santé pour le Times. Pear était 
plus spécialisé concernant les questions techniques se rapportant au domaine de la 
santé ; Herszenhorn s’est plus concentré sur les processus politiques. 
Bien que l’échantillon soit de taille modeste, il est toutefois très représentatif de 
la diversité politique, puisqu’il contient des membres des trois comités de la Chambre 
des Représentants qui étaient impliqués dans la réforme de santé avec des positions 
différentes au sein des comités. Il y a aussi une diversité idéologique qui parcourt tout 
l’échiquier politique du Parti démocrate, depuis les progressistes, en passant par les 
modérés, jusqu’aux conservateurs. Les districts sont très diversifiés aussi, allant des 
districts presque entièrement blancs aux districts à majorité minoritaire, incluant un 
district avec une forte population asiatique et hispanique. De plus, ces districts repré-
sentent aussi une bonne diversité géographique et couvrent les quatre grandes ré-
gions des États-Unis. Ainsi l’échantillon permet une bonne représentation des diffé-
rents intérêts politiques et des situations dans différentes régions des États-Unis. 
Plan 
Afin d’analyser les fondements, l’application, et les résultats de la stratégie 
d’Obama (utiliser une approche racialement neutre mais qui cible des problèmes 
spécifiques [pragmatisme racial] afin de contourner la problème racial dans les poli-
tiques sociales appliquée à la réforme de santé) plusieurs étapes sont faites. 
La première partie traite les concepts de race et de classe, leur utilisation (uni-
versitaire, sociologique, politique) et la différence entre la perception de ces notions 
et leur réalité socio-économique. La position et les conceptions d’Obama concernant 
 ces notions sont analysées. Une attention particulière est accordée à l’intersection 
structurelle entre race et classe, ainsi qu’aux questions où les intérêts, basés sur la 
réalité matérielle, entre les populations noire et blanche pourraient converger ou 
diverger. Dans ce contexte, l’influence de la santé sur la mobilité sociale et la stabilité 
du statut social est expliquée. La partie se termine sur l’analyse du débat actuel con-
cernant l’approche colorblind v. color-conscious (approche neutre contre approche ra-
ciale) à propos des inégalités raciales, ce qui souligne le caractère décisif de la faisabi-
lité politique dans le choix d’une approche neutre, mais fortement basée sur la classe. 
La deuxième partie se concentre sur le développement factuel de l’État provi-
dence et  sur une présentation des tentatives précédentes de réformes de santé. Ils 
sont présentés séparément car les tentatives de réformes à elles seules sont suffisam-
ment complexes. Cette présentation est suivie d’une analyse plus interprétative des 
politiques sociales basée sur des théories autant d’universitaires noirs que blancs, qui 
posent l’idée d’un facteur racial ayant fortement influencé l’État providence. Cette 
section introduit le concept de racialisation (ou welfarisation) et la distinction entre 
les programmes sociaux, bons ou mauvais, selon la perception du programme 
comme étant contributoire et bénéficiant principalement aux Blancs, ou comme 
étant fondé sur des critères sociaux et bénéficiant principalement aux minorités. Le 
point d’ancrage est l’impact de la réaction blanche contre les politiques sociales dans 
les années 1970 et les effets continus de cette réaction. Les opinions et pensées 
d’Obama concernant cette réaction sont détaillés, ainsi que les réactions raciales 
contre Obama. Ceci établit un contexte historique dans lequel une division de classe 
opère selon des lignes raciales sur des questions de politiques sociales. Ce contexte 
sert d’arrière plan au choix d’Obama de faire une réforme neutre qui cible la classe 
moyenne. De plus, cette section introduit la continuité d’une forte polarisation parti-
sane concernant les politiques sociales. Le processus de réforme d’Obama est présen-
té, avec une attention particulière sur les contraintes créées par le parti pris partisan, 
ainsi que par la composition de la majorité Démocrate, contraintes qui ont influencé 
et déterminé la marge de manœuvre des réformateurs.  
La troisième partie porte spécifiquement sur la dimension discursive de 
l’analyse. Ainsi elle explore le fonctionnement du discours incorporant un code racial 
et sa relation aux stéréotypes. Ceci est complété par une étude de l’impact des médias 
sur la politique et sur le discours politique, suivie par une discussion de la perception 
du rôle des medias en relation avec le ACA. Plusieurs termes du code racial sont ex-
pliqués dans une perspective historique. Ils ont été sélectionnés par l’exploration du 
contexte historique et l’histoire spécifique des tentatives de réformes de santé. Leur 
pertinence est montrée à travers des exemples de comment soit Obama soit la ré-
forme de santé ont été critiqués. Une attention particulière est accordée au discours 
sur la responsabilité, de Reagan à Obama, car cette question englobe et renferme 
toutes les autres questions qui apparaissent dans le débat sur les politiques sociales, 
en particulier d’un point de vue racial. De plus, cela illustre l’approche centriste 
d’Obama, qui intègre certains éléments conservateurs afin de les retravailler dans un 
but progressiste. Ceci s’inscrit dans une longue lignée d’intellectuels noirs, comme 
Du Bois par exemple. Pour finir, la construction rhétorique d’Obama est détaillée. 
Les thèmes ont été sélectionnés en fonction de leur pertinence basée sur le contexte 
historique, le discours racial codé, et de leur fonction dans l’argumentation en faveur 
d’une unité interraciale basée sur la classe, favorable aux politiques sociales et à la 
réforme de santé. Ainsi des thèmes tels que l’unité, la transcendance raciale, le popu-
lisme de classe,  mais aussi le rêve américain et une forte légitimation de 
l’intervention gouvernementale sont analysés. 
  
La quatrième et dernière partie explore la théorie du pragmatisme racial et dans 
quelle mesure Obama semble adhérer à la théorie. Ceci est suivi par une discussion 
des réactions à l’approche d’Obama. Ensuite, les deux législations de la santé sont 
analysées afin d’éclairer les aspects de l’approche universelle basée sur la classe qui 
ont un impact structurel positif sur la population noire. Suit une analyse des provi-
sions qui ciblent des questions particulièrement problématiques pour la population 
noire. Certains résultats préliminaires de la mise en œuvre d’Obamacare sont exami-
nés, ainsi que la fragilité de la réforme. Ceci est étudié en grande partie à travers le 
procès Sebelius de 2012 et l’impact que la décision de la Cour Suprême a eu sur la po-
pulation noire. Dans le contexte de la fragilité de la réforme la question du single 
payer et son nouveau potentiel politique sont examinés. 
 
1 Concepts de race et classe: notions et réalité  
Race 
Plusieurs ouvrages forment les pierres d’angle du contexte théorique et histo-
rique. La présentation de l’intersection entre classe et race est en partie basée sur des 
ouvrages datant de la fin du XIXème et du début du XXème siècles, tels que des analyses 
faites par le sociologue W.E.B. Du Bois dans The Souls of Black Folk ou The Conserva-
tion of Races,6 car ce sont des ouvrages fondateurs concernant les effets structurants de 
la race. L’ouvrage publié en 1944 de l’économiste et sociologue Gunnar Myrdal, An 
American Dilemma: the Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, est tout aussi important 
car il insiste sur le fait que le problème des Noirs est principalement un problème des 
Blancs et que le statut subordonné des Noirs reflète primairement les intérêts éco-
nomiques des Blancs.7 La continuité de cet effet structurant a été étudiée par le socio-
logue et théoricien racial Howard Winant qui affirme qu’à ce niveau la situation n’a 
pas changé de manière significative entre l’ère pré- et post-Droits Civiques.8   
L’analyse de ces effets structurants, et plus précisément des mécanismes so-
ciaux, économiques et politiques qui ont contribué à leur renforcement et à leur 
maintien a été fortement basée sur le travail de l’historien et politologue Ira Katznel-
son dans son ouvrage de 2005 When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of 
Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America, ainsi que sur le travail du sociologue 
Joe R. Feagin dans son livre de 2012 White Party, White Government: Race, Class, and 
U.S. Politics.9 Katznelson a analysé la façon dont les programmes sociaux ont contri-
bué à produire un avantage supplémentaire pour la population blanche par rapport à 
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 la population noire qui subissait déjà des barrières structurelles négatives. Ceci a con-
tribué à l’agrandissement du fossé entre les deux populations. Feagin a un point de 
vue plus politique sur la question en démontrant le racisme systémique qui a fait 
pencher la balance vers les Blancs dans l’allocation des ressources. Une évaluation 
des inégalités raciales plus récentes au niveau économique est basée en grande partie 
sur l’étude présentée par les sociologues Melvin L. Oliver et Thomas M. Shapiro dans 
leur ouvrage de 1995 Black Wealth/ White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality, 
ainsi que sur le livre paru en 2010 du sociologue Dalton Conley Being Black, Living in 
the Red: Race, Wealth, and Social Policy in America.10 Tous deux évaluent l’impact de la 
discrimination sur les inégalités raciales au niveau économique, et Conley insiste par-
ticulièrement sur le rôle que peuvent jouer les politiques sociales pour y remédier. 
Oliver et Shapiro expliquent la plus grande fragilité de la classe moyenne noire com-
parée à la classe moyenne blanche. La description de la situation économique de la 
population noire durant la période de la reforme de la santé est complétée par des 
données statistiques tirées de rapports gouvernementaux récents. 
Le célèbre livre The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and the Changing Ameri-
can Institutions écrit par le sociologue William Julius Wilson publié pour la première 
fois en 1978 présente la première analyse majeure des limites de la discrimination 
positive, ainsi que de la nécessité de prendre en compte des facteurs de différence de 
classes sociales au sein de la population noire.11 Le travail de la sociologue Karyn R. 
Lacy dans son ouvrage de 2007 Blue-Chip Blacks: Race, Class, and Status in the New Black 
Middle Class a fourni la base pour analyser les différences de classe à l’intérieur de la 
population noire.12 Les attitudes récentes concernant la race et les questions raciales 
sont basées sur diverses études menées par le sociologue Lawrence Bobo. 
L’analyse de la question des différences raciales dans les conceptions et attitudes 
concernant la mobilité sociale et les inégalités s’appuie grandement sur le livre de 
Jennifer Hochschild paru en 1995 Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the 
Soul of the Nation.13 La pertinence présente des tendances identifiées par Hochschild a 
été vérifiée à partir de sondages faits durant la période étudiée sur les mêmes ques-
tions. La discussion des questions de classe s’appuie principalement sur l’ouvrage de 
2008 du politologue Larry Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The New Political Economy of 
the New Gilded Age,14 qui met en avant le lien entre la politique et les inégalités éco-
nomiques croissantes. L’ouvrage paru en 2014 des sociologues Earl Wysong, Robert 
Perrucci et David Wright intitulé New Class Society: Goodbye American Dream?15 offre 
une analyse historique des changements de la structure de classe aux États-Unis et 
insiste sur les inégalités croissantes. 
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Il y a un débat continu sur l’importance de la notion de race aux États-Unis, qui 
s’est intensifié juste après l’élection présidentielle d’Obama. Cette élection historique 
a été acclamée par de nombreuses personnes comme étant le signe de l’avènement de 
l’Amérique post-raciale, mais tout autant de personnes voient la race comme un fac-
teur toujours prédominant dans la société étatsunienne.16 Le concept/terme de ‘race’ 
est très difficile et sa signification a changé au fil du temps, d’où l’importance de défi-
nir le terme clairement et de décrire son contexte d’utilisation.  
Le concept de race est très complexe, et il est difficile de distinguer entre race, 
racisme, et préjugé, et de rendre compte des utilisations changeantes du terme 
« race » en tant que catégorie, de l’utilisation du mot « racisme », ou plutôt de la ma-
nière dont le racisme est exprimé, ou défini, selon la période. Ceci est particulière-
ment compliqué parce que l’appartenance race est une question très sensible, dans 
laquelle les gens sont émotionnellement impliqués, soit parce qu’ils voient la race 
comme un facteur déterminant dans leur vie, soit parce qu’ils veulent se conformer 
au politiquement correct.17 Cette question est sensible car dès le début de la création 
de catégories raciales basées sur des différences phénotypiques, ces catégories ont été 
utilisées de manière négative et destructrice (racisme) afin de justifier l’oppression de 
populations natives en Afrique et dans les Amériques. Selon le contexte du pays et le 
problème soulevé, les gens se méfient de l’utilisation de la race en tant que catégorie, 
précisément à cause de son histoire difficile. Par exemple, aux États-Unis le recense-
ment inclut l’identification de l’appartenance raciale, l’État autorise et établit des sta-
tistiques raciales, et voit aujourd’hui ces données comme un moyen de combattre la 
discrimination. En revanche, en France, les statistiques raciales, quelle que soit 
l’utilisation qui en est faite, sont vues comme racistes, puisque les statistiques raciales 
pourraient impliquer qu’il y a bien des différences selon les races. Mais de quel type 
de différence parle-t-on ? Cela signifie-t-il forcément une différence de nature biolo-
gique qui implique une notion de supériorité/infériorité, comme l’entendent les théo-
ries de racisme biologique, de suprématie blanche, ou l’idéologie aryenne des Nazis ? 
S’agit-il d’une différence culturelle, comme l’entendent les conservateurs aujourd’hui 
aux États-Unis ? Est-ce que la différence raciale implique forcément une relation de 
supériorité-infériorité ? Et dans ces circonstances, comment expliquer les différences 
structurelles au niveau économique et social qui apparaissent selon des lignes ra-
ciales ? Et de manière beaucoup plus importante : qui est la cause de quoi ? Est-ce que 
la race est à l’origine des différences structurelles ou est-ce que les différences struc-
turelles sont à l’origine de la race ? 
Classe 
Déjà en 1944 dans son ouvrage novateur, An American Dilemma : The Negro Pro-
blem and Modern Democracy, le sociologue et économiste Gunnar Myrdal, rejetait le 
terme ‘race’ pour sa seule connotation biologique. Il insistait sur le besoin de trouver 
une autre catégorie pour expliquer la séparation des Noirs du reste de la société après 
l’Emancipation en 1863. Il rejetait le terme ‘classe’ car cela impliquait la notion de 
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 mobilité sociale qu’il considérait impossible en 1944 pour les Noirs à cause de la sé-
grégation (de facto et de jure), bien qu’il ait constaté une stratification de classe au sein 
de chacune des populations, noire et blanche. Myrdal rejetait aussi les termes ‘groupe 
minoritaire’ et ‘statut minoritaire’ car il considérait que ces termes prêtaient à confu-
sion avec les statuts temporaires de nouveaux immigrés blancs. Finalement, Myrdal a 
opté pour le terme ‘caste’ dans sa signification de « type de grande différentiation so-
ciale systématique. » 18  Le concept de caste de Myrdal n’est clairement plus adapté 
aujourd’hui, particulièrement parce que le Civil Rights Act de 1964 permet une plus 
grande mobilité sociale et une plus forte participation des Noirs dans la vie politique. 
Pourtant, au vu des profondes inégalités raciales, l’insistance de Myrdal sur le con-
cept de caste pour sa connotation de manque de mobilité sociale ne semble pas si 
hors de propos. 
Les politologues Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, et Howard Rosenthal, dans leur 
ouvrage Polarized America : The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches publié en 2006, 
écartent le facteur race en tant que catégorie analytique pour étudier la société état-
sunienne à partir des années 1980, et préfèrent se concentrer sur le facteur classe.19 
Cependant, il doit être remarqué que leur analyse de la pertinence de la race reposait 
uniquement sur des occurrences de racisme et de tensions raciales ou la présence du 
terme race dans des législations, ce qui laisse de côté le racisme systémique ou struc-
turel, le discours racial codé en politique, et la racialisation sous-jacente des poli-
tiques sociales. Bien qu’on puisse considérer que leur une approche méthodologique 
prête à discussion, leur travail met en avant une évolution importante dans la re-
cherche contemporaine : une attention croissante portée à l’analyse de la classe aux 
États-Unis. Le sociologue Joe Feagin, dans son ouvrage publié en 2012 intitulé White 
Party, White Government : Race, Class, and US Politics, fait remarquer que la discrimina-
tion de classe est présente dans le système politique des États-Unis depuis ses ori-
gines, tout comme le racisme et le sexisme. Bien que les hommes blancs aient accédé 
assez tôt et de manière graduelle au droit de vote, Feagin note toutefois une domina-
tion politique forte de la part des élites financières et il dénonce le classisme, entendu 
comme la discrimination basée sur la classe.20 Le sociologue William Julius Wilson, 
dans son ouvrage The Declining Significance of Race publié en 1978, argumente le fait 
que l’importance du facteur classe a pris le pas sur le facteur race à cause de la dimi-
nution du nombre d’institutions ouvertement racistes. Son raisonnement en 1978 était 
que les Droits Civiques de 1964 avaient changé la forme que prennent l’oppression et 
la structure sociale : d’une oppression raciale organisée on en est arrivé à une struc-
ture de classe. Il insistait sur le fait que la nouvelle structure n’avait pas de fondement 
racial au niveau institutionnel, mais avait un résultat racial, dans le sens où les inéga-
lités économiques apparaissaient selon des lignes raciales. Selon Wilson, depuis les 
années 1970, les États-Unis ont évolué de l’oppression raciale à une subordination de 
classe.21 
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Intersection Structurelle 
Autant la race que la classe ont pour fonction d’organiser la hiérarchie sociale. À 
travers le racisme, la race est devenu un moyen de subordination sociale et écono-
mique qui a créé des inégalités structurelles profondes entre les populations raciales 
dans la société étatsunienne dans les domaines de l’économie, de l’éducation, des 
réseaux sociaux, du logement, et de la santé. Bien que la discrimination institution-
nelle ouverte soit prohibée, des pratiques discriminatoires persistent et les effets de la 
discrimination continuent à impacter la vie des minorités. Par cet effet structurant de 
la fonction subordinatrice, la race et la classe sont devenues des catégories qui se che-
vauchent. Ainsi, le caractère raciste de la subordination sociale étatsunienne fait qu’il 
est impossible d’ignorer le facteur race. En effet, à statut socioéconomique similaire, 
la situation des minorités raciales est presque systématiquement plus mauvaise, en 
particulier lorsque le patrimoine actif est pris en compte. De plus, les normes cultu-
relles exprimées à travers le racisme et le classisme touchent deux fois plus les minori-
tés pauvres, et font aussi que l’expérience de la classe moyenne noire est différente. 
La concentration des mêmes populations raciales aux niveaux les plus bas de 
l’échelle sociale a créé un cercle vicieux de reproduction de la même hiérarchie so-
ciale, qui occulte les désavantages structurels (tels que le manque d’accès à une édu-
cation de qualité et de bons réseaux sociaux) derrière des notions mythiques d’égalité 
des chances et de méritocratie. Le racisme institutionnel et structurel dans les poli-
tiques sociales a fortement réduit l’accès des minorités à l’État providence après la 
Seconde Guerre mondiale, au moment où la population blanche en a largement bé-
néficié pour accéder au statut de classe moyenne. 
L’aspect le plus saillant est le fait que cette hiérarchisation sociale et écono-
mique tourne autour de la distribution de ressources, que ce soit de bons emplois, des 
avantages en matière de santé, une éducation de qualité, ou la part des revenus. Dans 
cette partie, seule la question de la distribution des ressources est présentée. La partie 
suivante traitera de la manière dont la redistribution des ressources a été influencée 
par des facteurs raciaux. De manière plus importante, le développement historique 
des politiques sociales et les positions des partis politiques sur les politiques sociales 
permettra d’expliquer l’impossibilité politique de promouvoir des politiques raciales. 
2 La racialisation des politiques sociales 
Concernant le problème que représente la race en termes de stratégie politique, 
deux livres ont été particulièrement importants. Le premier est des politologues et 
journalistes Thomas et Mary Edsall, publié en 1991 et intitulé Chain Reaction: The Im-
pact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics qui explique le mieux la division 
raciale qui a eu lieu dans la coalition du New Deal ; coalition basée sur la classe so-
ciale. Les auteurs portent une attention particulière au type de discours que le prési-
dent Ronald Reagan avait développé pour réussir cette division. De plus, Edsall et 
Edsall proposent des solutions pour des contre-stratégies Démocrates basées sur leur 
analyse des victoires électorales de Reagan et son discours mettant l’accent sur les 
valeurs. Ceci implique plus d’attention politique portée à la classe moyenne blanche, 
mais aussi moins d’insistance sur les politiques raciales, et un discours sur les valeurs 
 plus prononcé.22 L’importance du pouvoir diviseur de la race sur la Gauche est souli-
gnée par les politologues Paul Sniderman et Edward Carmines dans leur livre 
Reaching Beyond Race paru en 1997.23 Seule une analyse faite par la politologue et so-
ciologue Frances Fox Piven a fourni une dimension supplémentaire à l’analyse des 
Edsall en incorporant la question de la mondialisation dans l’analyse.24 Les autres 
ouvrages présentant des points de vue similaires font référence à la théorie des Ed-
sall. 
Du côté des Afro-américains, une analyse similaire a été faite par Cornel West 
dans son livre Race Matters paru en 1993.25 Son point de vue est clairement plus racial 
que celui des Edsall, mais il arrive à une conclusion analogue par un cheminement 
différent : l’impasse politique entre conservateurs et libéraux et leurs discours figés 
ont des conséquences néfastes pour la population noire. West propose une stratégie 
différente afin de promouvoir les intérêts de la population noire. Il s’agit d’une al-
liance interraciale basée sur des intérêts communs basés sur la classe qui intègrerait 
même des idées conservatrices telles qu’une plus grande insistance sur des valeurs 
constructives. Des opinions et des arguments plus récents concernant ce point de vue 
sont basés entre autres sur plusieurs ouvrages de l’historien et professeur d’affaires 
publiques Manning Marable, tels que son ouvrage paru en 2009 Beyond Black and 
White: From Civil Rights to Barack Obama.26  
La réflexion théorique sur les différents types de politique est basée sur le livre 
Arenas of Power écrit par Theodore Lowi paru en 2009. Lowi catégorise les différents 
types de législations en politiques constitutionnelles, régulatrices, distributives, et 
redistributives. Cette catégorisation est faite en fonction de l’aire d’application de la 
politique, ainsi que du degré d’intervention des différents acteurs politiques, ce qui 
inclut l’exécutif, dans le processus législatif. Cette typologie prend en compte le po-
tentiel idéologique des différentes politiques, ce qui affirme le rôle du président sur 
les politiques sociales et met en avant leur potentiel à provoquer de la polarisation 
idéologique.27 En complément de cela, pour la dimension spécifiquement raciale, le 
politologue Robert Lieberman fournit une grille de lecture dans son ouvrage paru en 
2007 Shaping Race Policy: the United States in Comparative Perspective. L’analyse de Lie-
berman et sa typologie ne catégorisent pas les politiques en fonction de leur intention 
raciale, mais en fonction de leur impact racial.28 
L’analyse du contexte historique dans une perspective raciale et particulière-
ment la racialisation des politiques sociales s’appuie en grande partie sur certains des 
ouvrages de Katznelson et Feagin cités ci-dessus, mais aussi sur le travail très détaillé 
fait par la sociologue et politologue Theda Skocpol dans Social Policy in the United 
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States: Future Possibilities in Historical Perspective paru en 1995.29 Dans cet ouvrage elle 
explique les contraintes exercées par l’histoire des politiques sociales sur la création 
et le développement de nouveaux programmes. D’autres ouvrages ont éclairé ceci, 
notamment l’ouvrage paru en 1999 de Martin Gilens, intitulé Why Americans Hate 
Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy, ainsi que l’ouvrage The Wel-
fare State Nobody Knows: Debunking Myths About U.S. Social Policy du politologue 
Christopher Howard, paru en 2007.30 Gilens a fait une analyse minutieuse des percep-
tions négatives des politiques sociales et des allocations, en particulier en fonction de 
la perception raciale. Il parle de ‘racialisation’ des politiques sociales lorsque un pro-
gramme est perçu de façon négative et comme bénéficiant principalement à des mi-
norités raciales. Les tendances dégagées par Gilens ont été vérifiées pour la période 
étudiée soit par des études ultérieures répliquant certaines des analyses faites par 
Gilens, telles que l’étude menées par le politologue Bass van Doorn,31 ou par des son-
dages d’opinions récents sur les facteurs et termes clés identifiés par Gilens. Howard, 
de son côté, insiste fortement sur le fossé entre la perception et la réalité de nom-
breux programmes. Les éléments mis en avant par Howard ont été vérifiés pour la 
période étudiée à partir des données statistiques mises à disposition, entre autres, par 
les Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.  
La perspective historique sur la racialisation des politiques sociales permet de 
comprendre les raisons pour lesquelles les Américains continuent à s’opposer aux 
politiques sociales et pourquoi leurs choix électoraux sont souvent contraires à leurs 
intérêts économiques. Cela explique aussi pourquoi des réformes de politiques so-
ciales significatives sont un défi politique majeur, surtout s’il y a aussi une volonté de 
lutter contre les inégalités raciales. Ceci était le cas pour Obama, qui ne voulait pas 
seulement créer un système d’assurance maladie universelle, mais qui avait aussi 
l’intention d’aider spécifiquement la population noire. Cette partie retrace l’évolution 
historique et politique des politiques sociales, qui rend cette entreprise difficile. 
Obama a été confronté à une opposition forte de la part du Parti républicain et de la 
part de la population. 
La perspective historique permet de retracer comment les politiques sociales ont 
contribué aux inégalités structurelles, comment la compétition raciale pour les res-
sources économiques dans le cadre des politiques sociales a empêché la création 
d’une alliance interraciale basée sur la classe, et comment les deux grands partis état-
suniens sont devenus fortement polarisés concernant les politiques sociales. Le déve-
loppement purement historique des politiques sociales est traité séparément des dif-
férentes théories expliquant les raisons de ce développement problématique et le 
rejet des politiques sociales survenu plus tard. La racialisation des politiques sociales 
sera donc traitée séparément de la présentation de l’État providence. 
La politologue Theda Skocpol insiste sur la nécessité d’adopter une perspective 
historique. De plus, dans son ouvrage Social Policies in the United States : Future Possibi-
lities in Historical Perspective (1995), elle met en avant le fait de ne pas seulement adop-
ter une perspective historique pour étudier le développement des politiques sociales 
elles-mêmes, mais aussi pour analyser le développement de la politique générale 
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 étatsunienne. La différence de position entre le Parti démocrate et le Parti républicain 
sur les politiques sociales est souvent expliquée en termes d’idéologie concernant 
l’intervention de l’État. D’autres explications se concentrent sur des différences 
d’ordre moral. Skocpol argumente que ces explications simplifient trop la question, 
et que l’évolution historique et politique des politiques sociales doit être prise en 
compte car cela montre le racialisation graduelle de ces politiques, qui a été possible 
parce que des inégalités structurelles raciales y ont été intégrées dès le départ. 
L’existence d’inégalités raciales structurelles dans les politiques sociales développées 
au XXème siècle est démontrée par le politologue Ira Katznelson dans son ouvrage de 
2005 When Affirmative Action Was White : An Untold History of Racial Inequality in 
Twentieth Century America.32 Ce point de vue est partagé par le politologue Joe R. 
Feagin dans son livre White Party, White Government : Race, Class, and US Politics paru 
en 2012. Cependant, Feagin insiste plus sur la manière dont, dans le contexte étatsu-
nien, la racialisation des politiques sociales a contribué à empêcher le développement 
d’une alliance forte basée sur la classe.33 Finalement, ce sont les journalistes poli-
tiques Thomas et Mary Edall qui expliquent dans leur ouvrage paru en 1992 Chain 
Reaction : the Impact of Rights, Race, and Taxes on American Politics comment ces élé-
ments ont été exploités dans la stratégie électorale du Parti républicain depuis les 
années 1970, et par le président Ronald Reagan en particulier. La stratégie de Reagan 
a consisté, en partie, à exploiter le ressentiment racial afin de briser la coalition du 
New Deal. Il a présenté les politiques sociales comme bénéficiant principalement aux 
minorités raciales et il a présenté le Parti démocrate comme étant principalement 
dévoué aux causes et intérêts des minorités. Ainsi il a convaincu une partie de 
l’électorat blanc des classes ouvrière et moyenne que la politique du Parti démocrate 
n’était pas dans leurs intérêts. Par cette stratégie, Reagan a convaincu une partie de 
cet électorat de voter pour le Parti républicain et contre leurs intérêts économiques.34 
En élisant Reagan en 1980, les classes ouvrière et moyenne blanches se sont pa-
radoxalement détournées des mesures redistributives durant une période de difficul-
tés économiques majeures. En considérant les évènements de la Grande Dépression, 
où une période de crise économique a résulté dans la création de l’État providence 
étatsunien, on aurait pu penser que la population serait favorable à de nouvelles me-
sures redistributives lors d’une nouvelle période de difficultés économiques, mais 
cela n’a pas été le cas. Ces deux exemples montrent qu’il est difficile de dire si la crise 
de 2008 et la Grande Récession qui en a résulté ont représenté un contexte favorable 
pour Obama pour créer de nouvelles mesures redistributives, que ce soit au niveau 
politique ou au niveau de l’opinion publique. 
Au niveau politique, Obama a expliqué dans une interview de 2016 qu’il était 
parti du principe que les Républicains se montreraient plus coopératifs et seraient 
prêts à faire des efforts bipartisans puisque la crise de 2008 avait débuté sous un 
mandat Républicain. Il a expliqué qu’il avait compris son erreur quand le Chef de la 
minorité de la Chambre des Représentants, John Boehner, avait déclaré publique-
ment que les Républicains ne soutiendraient pas la « stimulus bill », le projet de re-
lance proposé par les Démocrates pour surmonter la crise, et ce même avant que les 
Démocrates aient présenté le premier jet de la proposition de loi.35 Il n’y a eu que de 
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rares exemples de collaboration bipartisane durant la présidence Obama. En ce qui 
concerne la réforme de santé, l’opposition Républicaine a été frappante. Pour 
l’élaboration du projet de loi, il y a eu seulement une collaboration superficielle au 
Sénat. Le Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act de 2010 a été votée sans un seul oui 
Républicain. De plus, les Républicains ont attaqué la constitutionnalité et certaines 
clauses du ACA dans deux procès majeurs.36 Les Républicains au Congrès ont promis 
à plusieurs reprises, et le font toujours, d’abroger le ACA. Les candidats présidentiels 
Républicains de 2012 (Mitt Romney) et 2016 (Donald Trump) avaient promis tous les 
deux dans leurs campagnes qu’ils révoqueraient le ACA.37 Au niveau politique, la 
crise économique ne s’est pas traduite par des conditions plus favorables pour les 
mesures redistributives (du point de vue de la collaboration du GOP). 
La population, et surtout le mouvement Tea Party, a protesté contre la réforme 
de santé. En août 2009, six mois avant le vote final sur la proposition de réforme, 
seule une minorité de 37% de l’opinion publique était en faveur de la réforme, 39% y 
étaient opposés, et 24% n’avaient pas d’opinion.38 
Des inégalités croissantes et des besoins économiques accrus ne se transforment 
pas automatiquement en une plus forte demande pour des mesures redistributives. 
Le politologue Larry M. Bartels a exprimé son étonnement quant à ce manque de 
revendications pour plus de redistribution. Il a remarqué la divergence entre 
l’hypothèse théorique que des inégalités croissantes devraient résulter en une de-
mande politique pour une augmentation des impôts et plus de politiques redistribu-
tives de la part de la population avec des revenus plus modestes. Cependant, ce n’est 
pas le cas aux États-Unis, bien au contraire. Malgré le fort taux d’inégalités dans le 
pays, les réductions d’impôts pour les riches faites par le président George W. Bush 
(et ses prédécesseurs Républicains) n’ont pas provoqué une forte opposition.39 Selon 
la sociologue et politologue Leslie McCall, les préoccupations concernant les inégali-
tés de revenus ne veulent pas forcément dire que les personnes soutiennent l’idée 
d’augmenter les impôts pour les riches ou de faire plus de redistribution. D’après ses 
analyses, les Américains ont tendance à être plutôt en faveur de plus d’opportunités à 
travers l’éducation ou d’autres mesures qui favorisent l’indépendance et 
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   a	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   Suprême.	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  King	   v.	   Burwell,	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   clause	   concernant	   les	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  que	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  pouvait	  être	  comprise	  de	  ma-­‐
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  assurances	  achetées	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  pas	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 l’autonomie.40 Et pourtant, la grande réforme de l’éducation d’Obama est morte au 
Congrès et la réforme de santé a coûté cher aux Démocrates.41  
La racialisation des politiques sociales basée sur la compétition entre groupes et 
le discours négatif autour des politiques sociales qui en découle permet en partie 
d’expliquer pourquoi les Américains se sont opposés à une réforme qui met l’accent 
sur l’autonomisation et l’égalité des chances, qui vise à réduire le déficit, et qui a 
fourni une assurance maladie à des millions de personnes.  
Pourquoi la réforme de santé ? 
Lorsque l’on analyse les inégalités raciales et économiques et les moyens d’y re-
médier, la santé n’est pas le premier élément qui vient à l’esprit. Pourtant, il y a plu-
sieurs raisons—historiques, politiques, économiques, et raciales—de prendre en con-
sidération la santé. Avant tout, parce que le ACA a été, depuis les années 1960, la 
première grande réforme progressiste de politiques sociales à avoir été passée, bien 
que le degré progressif de la réforme prête à discussion. De surcroît, le domaine de la 
santé se détache du reste car il a été marqué par presque un siècle de tentatives légi-
slatives infructueuses. Depuis 1966, quand le Canada a passé le Canadian Medical Care 
Act qui a introduit une couverture de santé universelle, les États-Unis se sont distin-
gués (et dans une certaine mesure le font toujours) comme le seul pays occidental 
doté d’un système de santé réduit et inégalitaire, et assez peu efficace en matière de 
rapport qualité-prix. Un rapport de 2012 montre qu’en 2009 les États-Unis ont dépen-
sé 48% de plus le pays de l’OECD classé derrière eux, la Suisse, et 90% de plus que la 
plupart des autres pays occidentaux. La part de la santé dans le PIB des États-Unis 
dépasse d’au moins 5% celle des autres pays industrialisés. Par contre, les soins reçus 
ne sont pas beaucoup mieux que dans les autres pays.42 
Au delà de ces considérations historiques, il y a aussi des raisons politiques de se 
pencher sur la santé dans le contexte des inégalités raciales. Certains universitaires et 
intellectuels préconisent la formation d’une coalition interraciale basée sur des inté-
rêts économiques communs afin de créer une majorité pour défendre plus de poli-
tiques sociales. Parmi ces universitaires on peut trouver par exemple l’historien 
Manning Marable, qui met en avant cette stratégie dans son ouvrage paru en 2009 
Beyond Black and White: From Civil Rights to Barack Obama.43  Il avance cet argument 
particulièrement dans le contexte de la détérioration de la situation économique gé-
nérale et des inégalités croissantes : “The radical changes within the domestic economy 
                                                        
40	  Leslie	  McCall,	  The	  Undeserving	  Rich	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  225.	  
41	  Pourtant	  Obama	  a	  réussi	  à	  faire	  passer	  quelques	  mesures	  de	  réforme	  de	  l’éducation	  dans	  le	  American	  
Recovery	  and	  Reinvestment	  Act	   de	   2009	  qui	   a	   établi	   le	   programme	  Race	   to	   the	   Top	   qui	   distribue	  des	  
fonds	  sur	  compétition	  aux	  écoles	  et	  qui	  a	  aussi	  réformé	  les	  bourses	  et	  prêts	  étudiants.	  L’administration	  
Obama	   a	   arrêté	   les	   subventions	   aux	   assureurs	   privés	   et	   a	   instauré	   un	   système	   de	   prêts	   financés	   par	  
l’État.	  Certaines	  mesures	  ont	  aussi	  été	  passées	  dans	  le	  Health	  Care	  and	  Education	  Reconciliation	  Act	  de	  
2010	   qui	   complète	   le	   ACA.	   Le	  HCER	   a	   étendu	   les	   bourses	   étudiantes	   (Pell	   Grants),	   créé	   de	   nouveaux	  
investissements	  dans	  les	  Community	  Colleges	  et	  les	  HBCUs.	  
42	   “Health	   Care	   Costs:	   A	   Primer	   2012	   Report”	   (Kaiser	   Family	   Foundation,	   March	   30,	   2016),	  
http://kff.org/report-­‐section/health-­‐care-­‐costs-­‐a-­‐primer-­‐2012-­‐report/.	   Des	   études	   suggèrent	   que	   ces	  
différences	  de	  coût	  pourraient	  être	  dû	  à	  des	  prix	  plus	  élevés,	  une	  utilisation	  plus	  forte	  de	  la	  technologie,	  
et	  des	   taux	  plus	  élevés	  d’obésité,	  plutôt	  qu’à	  des	   revenus	  plus	  élevés,	  une	  population	  vieillissante,	  ou	  
une	  plus	  grande	  utilisation	  des	  services	  de	  santé.	  
43	  Marable,	  Beyond	  Black	  and	  White,	  25.	  
  
require that black leadership reaches out to other oppressed sectors of the society, creating a 
common program for economic and social justice.”44 En 1993 Cornel West avait défendu 
un argument similaire dans Race Matters, livre dans lequel il met en avant une al-
liance multiculturelle et une coalition de principes afin de défendre des mesures re-
distributives conséquentes.45 Dans le contexte d’une création d’une coalition interra-
ciale de défense de politiques redistributives, la santé fait sens. 
La santé représente une part significative de l’économie étatsunienne qui a aug-
menté de 5,6% du PIB en 1965 à 17,3% du PIB en 2009 (pour atteindre 17,8% en 2015).46 
De plus, la santé est parmi les domaines sociaux auxquels les Américains sont plutôt 
attachés.47 La santé joue aussi un rôle fort dans la mobilité sociale. L’historien Mi-
chael B. Katz insiste sur le rôle primordial de l’assurance santé pour la stabilité éco-
nomique des familles et le lien qui a été fait très tôt entre santé et pauvreté.48 Le poli-
tologue Yeheskel Hasenfeld et le juriste Joel Handler mettent en avant que les 
problèmes de santé sont souvent un facteur pour le retour à la pauvreté des individus 
qui se trouvaient au dessus du seuil de pauvreté. De plus, ils insistent sur le fait que la 
plus grande partie des fonds de l’État providence est allée historiquement aux per-
sonnes non-pauvres à travers la Social Security, le programme des retraites, et à tra-
vers Medicare, le programme de santé pour les personnes âgées.49 Toutefois, ce cons-
tat ne doit pas occulter le fait que la classe moyenne est devenue de plus en plus 
fragile depuis les années 1970 et ce en partie à cause des dépenses de santé.  
Ceci signifie qu’une réforme de santé peut potentiellement réunir les intérêts des 
pauvres, de la classe ouvrière et de la classe moyenne, sans distinction de race. La 
nécessité politique de se concentrer sur la classe moyenne est expliquée plus en détail 
plus tard.50 
Le constat de la fragilité de la classe moyenne est basé pour certains sur le Misery 
Index, l’indexe de misère, qui inclut les coûts liés à la santé (mais aussi l’impôt sur le 
revenu, les impôts de Social Security, et les frais d’intérêts). Ces postes consommaient 
24% d’un budget familial en 1960, mais ont atteint 42% en 1990. Le politologue Jacob 
Hacker a développé le Economic Insecurity Index, l’index d’insécurité économique, un 
outil qui permet de mesurer les coups durs financiers tels que des pertes de 25% du 
revenu ou plus, des dépenses de santé excessives, ou l’épuisement des réserves finan-
cières de la famille. Selon ses estimations, en 1985 cela concernait environ 10% des 
familles, comparé à 20% en 2010, ce qui montre la vulnérabilité croissante des fa-
milles. Ceci est confirmé par le nombre croissant de faillites personnelles qui sont 
déclarées, que Smith identifie comme un phénomène lié à la classe moyenne, 
puisque cela permet de protéger certains biens essentiels, comme la maison ou les 
fonds de retraite.51 
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 Une étude de 2011 a montré que les problèmes de santé et les dépenses qui en dé-
coulent contribuent aux faillites personnelles, plus que d’autres coups durs tels que 
les divorces ou le chômage. Les problèmes de santé et les dépenses médicales qui 
dépassent 5% du revenu annuel augmentent le risque de faillite personnelle de 9,2%. 
Les ménages avec des problèmes de santé avaient deux fois plus de risque de déclarer 
une faillite personnelle (33,3%) que les ménages sans de tels problèmes (15,2%), ce qui 
fait des problèmes de santé un des facteurs majeurs des faillites personnelles. Il faut 
remarquer, cependant, que les habitudes de dépenses, c'est-à-dire, les dépenses ex-
cessives, sont la cause première de ces faillites personnelles. L’indicateur le plus fort 
est un emprunt immobilier trop élevé (qui augmente la probabilité de faillite de 
53,4%), suivi de l’endettement par carte de crédit (35,6%). Ceci contraste nettement 
avec les années 1980 quand les dettes liées aux dépenses de santé étaient un facteur 
plus fort que l’endettement de consommation.52 
Entre 1984 et 2005 les faillites personnelles se sont multipliées par sept. D’après 
l’analyse de Smith, ceci est dû en partie au déplacement des coûts de santé. Depuis 
1980 (quand environ 70% des employés à plein temps dans des entreprises de plus de 
100 employés avaient une assurance maladie fournie par leur employeur), les coûts 
ont été de plus en plus déplacés vers les employés, ou les assurances ont été aban-
données complètement. En 2005, seuls 18% des employés bénéficiaient d’une assu-
rance maladie prise en charge entièrement, 37% avaient une prise en charge partielle, 
et 45% n’avaient aucune prise en charge par l’employeur.53  Cette prise en charge dé-
croissante par l’employeur est une cause directe de la fragilité croissante de la classe 
moyenne, en particulier à cause de l’augmentation concomitante du coût de la santé. 
Le sociologue et politologue Paul Starr fait remarquer que la situation de la santé a 
atteint un stade extrêmement problématique : entre 2000 et 2006, période 
d’augmentation extrême des coûts, les primes d’assurance pour les familles ont aug-
menté de 87%, alors que l’inflation cumulée n’était que de 18% et l’augmentation cu-
mulée des salaires n’était que de 20%. De plus, Starr insiste sur le fait que 
l’augmentation des salaires concernait principalement les salaires les plus élevés, 
alors que le revenu médian des ménages a baissé de 3% depuis 2000.54 A cause de 
cette augmentation des coûts des assurances maladie, le pourcentage de personnes 
sans assurance a augmenté. Cette tendance était particulièrement prononcée pour les 
classes ouvrière et moyenne. 
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Graphique 69 Personnes sans assurance maladie par revenus, en pourcent, 1993 et 200955 
Que les personnes aient ou pas une assurance maladie, toutes rencontrent des 
difficultés à cause des coûts liés à la santé ; avec, bien entendu, de plus grandes diffi-
cultés pour les personnes sans assurance. Un sondage de 2011 montre que sur les 
douze derniers mois, 19% des personnes avec une assurance ont eu des difficultés 
pour payer les factures médicales. Ceci était le cas pour 56% des personnes sans assu-
rance. Ainsi une part importante de la population avait opté de ne pas utiliser des 
services médicaux.56 
Il y a des différences majeures en matière de santé selon la classe et la race, et 
particulièrement au sein de la classe moyenne inférieure. Contrairement à l’intuition 
initiale, les conditions de santé générale ne sont pas particulièrement marquées par la 
classe, bien que de moins bons états de santé soient un peu plus concentrés parmi les 
classes inférieures et, de ce fait, à cause du chevauchement entre classe et race, parmi 
les minorités. 
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  un	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Graphique 70 Conditions de santé par race et revenus, en pourcent, 201057 
Malgré une légère tendance à de meilleures conditions de santé parmi les 
classes plus aisées, il n’est pas surprenant que ces mêmes classes utilisent plus les 
services médicaux que les personnes à faibles revenus. 
 
 
 
Graphique 71 Utilisation de services médicaux par race, en pourcent, 201058 
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Diagram 72 Utilisation de sevices médicaux par revenus, en pourcent, 201059 
L’absence d’assurance maladie est fortement liée au revenu : en 2010, 29,6% des 
personnes vivant dans des familles avec des revenus en dessous de 200% du seuil de 
pauvreté (SP) n’avaient pas d’assurance maladie et 33,6% dépendaient de Medicaid. 
Parmi les familles avec des revenus supérieurs à 200% du SP, 10,2% n’avaient pas 
d’assurance maladie et seulement 5,3% dépendaient de Medicaid.60 De plus, il y a eu 
une baisse dans les assurances maladie fournies par l’employeur, tant pour les assu-
rés principaux, que pour les membres de famille dépendants. En 2010, 56,5% de la 
population totale avait une couverture de santé fournie par l’employeur (34,8% cou-
verts par leur emploi, 21,7% couverts en tant que dépendants), comparé à 64,4% en 
1997 (39,9% par leur propre emploi, 24,4% en tant que dépendants).61 Cette baisse des 
couvertures santé fournies par l’employeur illustre bien la fragilité croissante de la 
classe ouvrière et de la classe moyenne, car l’emploi garantit moins l’accès à une as-
surance maladie. Ainsi, des efforts politiques axés sur la santé sont économiquement 
pertinents pour une population très large.  
D’autres universitaires, comme Ira Katznelson, ont mis en avant des idées simi-
laires (créer une coalition interraciale afin de promouvoir les politiques sociales), 
mais dans un but plus ouvertement affiché de favoriser l’égalité raciale. Dans son 
ouvrage de 2005, When Affirmative Action Was White, Katznelson plaide pour le même 
type de mesures ciblant des problèmes spécifiques qui avaient aidé tant de Blancs à 
atteindre le statut de classe moyenne (c'est-à-dire, des politiques sociales importantes 
pour l’augmentation des chances, telles que les subventions pour les crédits immobi-
liers, des bourses universitaires et des formations professionnelles, des prêts aux pe-
tites entreprises, de l’aide à la recherche d’emploi, une augmentation de crédits 
d’impôts sur le revenu salarial, des crèches, et une assurance maladie de base et ga-
rantie).62 Bien entendu, l’assurance maladie est juste un élément parmi d’autres, mais 
c’est la seule politique sociale majeure à avoir été votée ces dernières années. Comme 
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 Katznelson, William Julius Wilson, dans The Declining Significance of Race (1978) ar-
gumentait que l’oppression raciale était avant tout une oppression économique et qui 
affecte toutes les races : 
The situation of marginality and redundancy created by the modern industrial society 
deleteriously affects all the poor, regardless of race. Underclass whites, Hispano-
Americans, and Native Americans all are victims, to a greater or lesser degree, of class 
subordination under advanced capitalism.63 
De plus, selon son analyse, les tendances plus récentes montrent que la mobilité 
sociale et économique des Noirs a été plus fortement affectée par des facteurs éco-
nomiques de classe plutôt que par des facteurs de race. De ce fait il privilégiait des 
programmes basés sur la classe pour s’attaquer aux éléments destructeurs et omni-
présents de la subordination de classe. Selon lui, de tels programmes permettraient 
d’améliorer la situation pour toutes les populations souffrant d’oppression écono-
mique et pour les Noirs en particulier.64 Wilson appelait à une grande coalition mul-
ticulturelle afin de renforcer les facteurs et institutions qui aident à atténuer les iné-
galités de classe, telles que l’éducation, l’État providence, ou les syndicats.65 
Bien qu’il y ait un besoin général de meilleur système concernant l’assurance 
maladie, il y a aussi une dimension raciale bien spécifique. Au delà de l’impact des 
coûts médicaux sur la probabilité de faillite personnelle, la situation de santé a aussi 
un impact sur les facteurs de mobilité sociale, tels que l’éducation. L’économiste Hea-
ther Rose liste « une mauvaise santé » parmi les raisons pour lesquelles les étudiants 
ne finalisent pas leurs études, bien que ces raisons comprennent aussi la perte de mo-
tivation, l’insatisfaction avec la vie sur le campus, le changement de projet profes-
sionnel, les problèmes familiaux, et les difficultés financières. De plus, elle insiste 
particulièrement sur les inégalités dans la préparation aux études pour expliquer 
l’écart racial de réussite universitaire.66 
Les tendances exposées plus hauts sont multipliées pour les minorités à cause 
de l’intersection entre classe et race. L’absence d’assurance maladie a une dimension 
raciale. Malgré des populations noires et hispaniques moins nombreuses, le nombre 
absolu de personnes noires et hispaniques sans assurance maladie (respectivement 
8,1 millions ou 20,8% et 15,3 millions ou 31,6% pour un total de 23,4 millions) dépasse 
légèrement le nombre absolu de personnes blanches sans assurance maladie (23,1 
millions ou 11,7%).67 
Il y a aussi des différences raciales concernant les conditions de santé. Avant 
tout, les Noirs ont un taux de mortalité général plus élevé. 
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Graphique 73 Taux de mortalité toutes causes confondues, par race, 2008-1068 
Une réalité raciale distincte émerge aussi concernant les maladies. Blancs et 
Noirs ne meurent pas des mêmes causes, ni aux mêmes taux. Concernant la mortali-
té, il apparaît que les Noirs ont des causes de mortalité bien distinctes. Leur taux de 
mortalité est de loin le plus élevé aux États-Unis. Leur taux était 1,2 fois plus élevé que 
celui des Blancs. Pour la plupart des causes de mortalité les Noirs ont des taux plus 
élevés, hormis pour les maladies chroniques des voies respiratoires inférieures, les 
maladies hépatiques chroniques et les cirrhoses, les blessures accidentelles, les bles-
sures liées aux accidents de voiture, l’empoisonnement, et le suicide. La différence de 
taux de mortalité pour la grippe et les pneumonies est insignifiante. Pour d’autres 
causes de mortalité les différences sont très marquées et contribuent à créer une 
image de la santé noire bien distincte. Les maladies cardiaques et cérébrovasculaires 
provoquent beaucoup de morts dans la population noire, tout comme le diabète et le 
sida. Par ailleurs, bien qu’il ne s’agisse pas d’un problème de santé au sens propre, il 
faut remarquer que les Noirs ont de très loin de taux d’homicides le plus élevé. Com-
paré à la population blanche, les taux de mortalité pour la population noire étaient 1,3 
fois plus élevés pour les maladies cardiaques, 1,5 fois plus élevés pour les maladies 
cérébrovasculaires, 1,2 plus élevés pour les néoplasmes malins (cancers), 2,2 plus éle-
vés pour le diabète, 11,5 fois plus élevés pour le sida, et 7,5 fois plus élevés pour les 
homicides. Le sida et le diabète en particulier causent des taux de mortalité dispro-
portionnés dans la population noire. 
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Graphique 74 Principales causes de mortalité par race, 201069 
D’autres différences marquées de santé existent entre les populations noire et 
blanche, telles que le nombre de personnes qui ont du diabète ou le sida. Les deux 
sont des maladies mortelles à assez court terme et les traitements sont très chers. 
                                                        
69	  Health	  United	  States	  2012,	  80–82.	  Per	  100.000.	  
5.3	  
5.9	  
25.8	  
2.8	  
27.1	  
13.7	  
13.7	  
19.6	  
119.7	  
32.1	  
132.8	  
17.7	  
5.2	  
31.3	  
20.6	  
38.7	  
6.7	  
16.8	  
29	  
203.8	  
53	  
224.9	  
2.5	  
15	  
42.4	  
1.1	  
18.2	  
9.4	  
14.9	  
46.6	  
176.5	  
37.8	  
179.9	  
5.3	  
12.1	  
38	  
2.6	  
20.8	  
9.4	  
15.1	  
42.2	  
172.8	  
39.1	  
179.1	  
Homicide	  
Suicide	  
Blessures	  accidentelles	  
VIH/SIDA	  
Diabète	  
Maladies	  hépatiques	  chroniques	  et	  cirrhoses	  
Grippe	  et	  pneumonie	  
Maladies	  chroniques	  des	  voies	  respiratoires	  inférieures	  
Néoplasme	  malin	  
Maladies	  cérébrovasculaires	  
Maladies	  cardiaques	  
Population	  totale	   Blanc	   Noir	   Hispanique	  
  
D’autres différences majeures concernent le taux de grossesses chez les adolescentes, 
par exemple. 
 
« Cela n’a jamais été envisagé sérieusement, même pas une minute70 » : 
Un quasi-consensus politique 
 
Étant donné la situation présentée jusqu’ici, de discrimination, de racisme cul-
turel et d’inégalités persistantes et pourtant niées, il est nécessaire de se poser la ques-
tion de savoir s’il y a encore la possibilité d’établir des politiques raciales ou s’il s’agit 
d’une utopie d’équité absolue. La réponse apparaît assez simple : cela dépend à qui 
on pose la question. Au niveau politique, la réponse est principalement non. Obama 
partage cet avis. Son opinion se fonde en partie sur les limites de la discrimination 
positive, sur la plus grande efficacité qu’il perçoit dans des mesures économiques 
ciblées, et surtout sur le contexte politique. Pour ces raisons, Obama a préféré une 
approche de pragmatisme racial qui préconise d’aider les minorités en ciblant des 
problèmes particuliers qui affectent celles-ci.  
Les acteurs du monde politique sont assez fermes concernant l’impossibilité 
d’une approche spécifiquement raciale, mais il y a quelques opinions divergentes. Les 
attaques contre la discrimination positive, et le soutien de ces attaques par la Cour 
Suprême, ont montré que l’atmosphère politique n’est décidément pas en faveur des 
mesures spécifiquement raciales. Une décision de la Cour Suprême de 2007, Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, a annulé une décision précé-
dente qui maintenait le programme d’intégration et de transfert scolaire (busing) en 
déclarant que le programme était anticonstitutionnel car la ville de Seattle (état de 
Washington) n’avait pas une histoire passée de ségrégation légale et n’était donc pas 
soumise à un programme d’intégration raciale.71 Ce qui rend plus difficile de 
s’attaquer à la ségrégation de fait. Cette décision a aussi été invoquée dans l’affaire de 
la prohibition de la discrimination positive dans le Michigan (Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality by any 
means Necessary (Bamn), et al.). La Cour Suprême a annulé la décision précédente, qui 
avait rejeté cette interdiction en 2012, avec l’argument que la prohibition de la discri-
mination positive ne représentait pas une atteinte spécifique aux droits des minorités. 
De plus, dans Schuette, la Cour Suprême a décidé qu’il était impossible de déterminer 
les intérêts politiques d’une minorité raciale et qu’il serait raciste de le faire.72 La Cour 
Suprême a dit clairement (et en cela elle s’est faite l’écho de nombreuses interpréta-
tions conservatrices de revendications de la part de minorités), qu’accéder à ces de-
mandes créerait des divisions raciales. La Cour Suprême a décidé que la question 
principale n’était pas, en fait, une question de protection des droits des minorités ra-
ciales, mais des droits des états (states’ rights). De plus, la Cour Suprême a fait remar-
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 quer que si elle n’avait pas annulé le rejet de la prohibition de la discrimination posi-
tive dans la décision de 2012, cela aurait potentiellement mis en péril le maintien de 
telles interdictions dans d’autres états. 
Laisser les États décider si oui ou non ils veulent protéger leurs populations mi-
noritaires ou les laisser bénéficier de programmes sociaux a une longue tradition. 
Ceci a refait surface dans l’affaire Sebelius qui attaquait le ACA : la Cour Suprême a 
décidé que les États avaient le droit de refuser d’étendre le programme de Medicaid et 
ainsi de priver leurs populations pauvres, et parmi elles, beaucoup de minorités, 
d’argent fédéral et de l’accès aux soins. 
La juge de la Cour Suprême Sonia Sotomayor n’était pas d’accord avec l’opinion 
de la majorité dans l’affaire Schuette. Dans son opinion minoritaire, rejointe par la 
juge Ginsburg, elle mentionne que les universités avaient d’autres programmes 
d’admission spéciale, qui prennent en compte des critères d’admission variés (le cas 
des enfants d’anciens étudiants, les athlètes, des facteurs géographiques ou des do-
maines d’études), et a fait remarquer que seule la prise en compte du facteur racial 
était exclue. 
Sotomayor a argumenté qu’une intervention de la Cour Suprême en faveur de 
la discrimination positive était justifiée par la longue histoire de discrimination par 
les États qui était contraire à la loi fédérale, et elle a particulièrement insisté sur 
l’exemple de la discrimination électorale. De plus, elle a fait remarquer que la déci-
sion dans Schuette était contraire à des décisions prises lors des années précédentes, 
dans lesquelles des amendements d’États et des décisions de villes avaient été rejetés 
car ces initiatives heurtaient les intérêts des minorités. De façon très intéressante, 
Sotomayor a insisté sur le coût de ces initiatives d’États organisées sous forme de pé-
tition (publicité et collecte des signatures). Dans ce contexte elle a attiré l’attention 
sur les inégalités financières qui désavantagent les intérêts des minorités dans ce pro-
cessus politique. 
De plus, Sotomayor a particulièrement critiqué le fait que le juge Scalia prête 
autant d’attention aux states’ rights et sa conception presque sans limite de la souve-
raineté des États. Elle était aussi en désaccord avec l’interprétation de la majorité que 
l’interdiction de la discrimination positive ne portait pas atteinte aux minorités. Elle a 
démontré, à l’aide de statistiques sur les étudiants inscrits dans des universités dans 
des états qui ont déjà interdit la discrimination positive, que le nombre d’étudiants 
minoritaires diminuait après l’interdiction et que leur proportion dans les universités 
était inférieure à la proportion de minorités dans la population dudit État. Pour finir, 
elle était complètement en désaccord avec l’idée que la race n’était plus un facteur 
important.73 Sotomayor liste toutes les raisons communément mises en avant par des 
universitaires, intellectuels, et militants dans la défense de la prise en compte du fac-
teur racial en politique sociale : la discrimination passée, les inégalités socioécono-
miques présentes dues à la discrimination passée et présente, la persistance de la dis-
crimination et des préjugés. Pour ces raisons, elle continue à défendre le maintien 
d’une approche raciale. 
Bien qu’Obama ait nominé Sotomayor à la Cour Suprême en 2009, il 
n’approuve pas l’approche spécifiquement raciale, du moins en ce qui concerne sa 
propre position politique, puisqu’il n’a pas la même liberté qu’un juge de la Cour Su-
prême nominé à vie. À plusieurs occasions, Obama a exprimé son opposition aux 
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politiques ouvertement raciales, notamment dans son rejet partiel de la discrimina-
tion positive, dans son soutien d’une approche universelle mais focalisée sur des pro-
blèmes précis et surtout des questions économiques. Obama a notamment justifié 
son opposition par la spécificité de sa position en tant que président qui l’oblige à 
adopter une position universelle. À plusieurs reprises Obama a été critiqué pour ne 
pas avoir fait plus pour les minorités et les Noirs en particulier. Ces critiques éma-
naient de tous les niveaux, du Congressional Black Caucus, des militants, des universi-
taires, des intellectuels.  
La situation est très différente pour un représentant au Congrès qui est supposé 
représenter une circonscription précise avec des besoins précis. Cette position est 
comprise et acceptée. Cependant, malgré cette compréhension, il y a une impossibili-
té forte d’accéder à ces demandes spécifiques lorsqu’il s’agit de demandes spécifi-
quement raciales, car cela mettrait en péril le projet de loi. Les électeurs dans d’autres 
États risqueraient alors de rejeter le projet de loi s’ils perçoivent que des minorités 
raciales bénéficient de ce qu’ils pourraient voir comme un traitement de faveur. Dans 
le cas du ACA, des mesures ou avantages raciaux n’ont jamais été sérieusement envi-
sagés. Pourtant, d’autres besoins spécifiques ont été pris en compte, comme le montre 
le Frontier Amendment, qui a augmenté le remboursement de Medicare pour le Dakota 
du Nord et du Sud, ainsi que du Montana, du Wyoming et du Nevada. Par contre, un 
meilleur financement de Medicaid demandé, et initialement obtenu, par le Sénateur 
Ben Nelson du Nebraska avait été virulemment critiqué par des membres des deux 
partis et a été rapidement annulé.74 Ceci montre entre autres qu’il est plus facile de 
défendre des mesures pour Medicare que pour Medicaid, tout comme il est plus facile 
de défendre des mesures pour la population blanche que pour la population noire. 
La construction de l’État providence et ensuite les attaques contre cet État pro-
vidence montrent donc l’intersection de la classe et de la race. Ceci montre tout 
d’abord que le début de l’État providence a renforcé et accentué des différences éco-
nomiques entre les populations raciales et a ainsi créé un plus fort chevauchement 
entre classe et race. Ce chevauchement est présent dans l’utilisation de politiques 
sociales pour atténuer ces disparités raciales, et finalement le chevauchement est vi-
sible dans la manière dont la race a été utilisée comme facteur de division dans ce qui 
pourrait être une alliance de classe basée sur des intérêts économiques communs. Il 
est important de garder en tête que l’État providence est attaqué précisément à cause 
de son efficacité à réduire les inégalités, ce que montre l’émergence de la forte classe 
moyenne (surtout blanche) suite au New Deal et autres programmes créés après la 
Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Le conflit des classes initié par les élites économiques 
depuis les années 1970 a réussi avec un certain succès à convertir une redistribution 
vers le bas en une redistribution vers le haut, comme en témoignent les inégalités 
croissantes. Il apparaît que la critique des programmes et leur représentation sont 
basées principalement sur une réalité déformée. La redistribution est une question 
hautement idéologique à cause de la nature même des politiques sociales et de leur 
                                                        
74	  Annie	  Lowrey,	  “What	  If	  Senators	  Represented	  People	  by	  Income	  or	  Race,	  Not	  by	  State?”	  Washington	  
Post,	   February	   7,	   2010,	   sec.	   Opinions,	   http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­‐
dyn/content/article/2010/02/05/AR2010020501446.html.	   Il	   faut	   préciser	   qu’une	   meilleure	   défense	  
avait	  été	  faite	  du	  Frontier	  Amendment.	  Le	  Louisiana	  Purchase,	  l’augmentation	  de	  Medicaid	  pour	  la	  Loui-­‐
siane,	  constitue	  un	  cas	  particulier	  car	  cette	  augmentation	  n’est	  pas	  explicitement	  liée	  à	  cet	  état,	  mais	  à	  
la	  situation	  d’un	  état	  en	  recouvrement	  après	  une	  catastrophe	  naturelle.	  Dans	   les	   faits,	  au	  moment	  du	  
passage	  du	  ACA,	  cela	  s’appliquait	  uniquement	  à	   la	  Louisiane,	  d’où	   le	  surnom	  péjoratif	  de	  cette	  clause	  
qui	  avait	  été	  obtenue	  par	   la	  sénatrice	  Démocrate	  Mary	  Landrieu	  en	  échange	  de	  son	  vote	  pour	   le	  ACA,	  
disent	  certains.	  L’argument	  de	  catastrophe	  naturelle	  fait	  donc	  la	  différence.	  
 envergure. Ainsi la redistribution divise les partis en les polarisant selon la classe et la 
race, les Républicains représentant les intérêts des puissances économiques. La stra-
tégie politique des Républicains a fait pencher le débat politique vers la droite et a 
contribué à créer une impasse politique. Cette polarisation très forte et le refus de 
faire des compromis ont continué durant la présidence Obama. Étant donnée cette 
confrontation partisane sans compromis et sa dimension idéologique forte, une 
bonne partie du conflit se fait à travers le discours. L’enjeu n’est pas de donner la 
meilleure description de la réalité, mais de convaincre que les idées mises en avant 
sont les meilleures. Tout un discours a été construit autour des politiques sociales qui 
a créé un contexte politique dont la prise en compte est nécessaire pour la mise en 
place d’une nouvelle réforme. Ceci constitue aussi autant de pièges politiques et rhé-
toriques à éviter à tout prix. Obama a autant essayé de contourner ces pièges, 
qu’essayé de surmonter les problèmes en retravaillant le discours politique et en pei-
gnant une vision différente de la réalité dans son discours, qui favorise et légitime la 
création de nouvelles politiques sociales.  
3 L’importance des mots  
L’analyse du discours et des opinions d’Obama, c’est-à-dire la construction rhé-
torique de sa vision du monde et son idéologie politique, a été menée sur une série de 
textes qui comprend certains des écrits d’Obama, des discours politiques, ainsi que 
des interviews menées par des journalistes avec Obama. 
Deux livres écrits par Obama avant qu’il ne devienne président ont été sélec-
tionnés. Il s’agit de Dreams from my Father: A Story of Race and Inheritance, et de The 
Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream.75 Le premier, son auto-
biographie, a été inclus car il détaille la recherche identitaire d’Obama, ce qui était 
pertinent pour la discussion de sa persona et même de son ethos. L’autobiographie 
présente aussi l’arrière plan familial et professionnel d’Obama, ce qui permet 
d’éclairer la sensibilité qu’Obama concernant le questionnement des notions de 
classe et race, ainsi que son intérêt pour la spécificité de la situation économique de la 
population noire. Dreams from my Father, qu’Obama avait écrit après avoir été élu 
premier président noir de la Harvard Law Review, a l’avantage de présenter la pensée 
d’Obama concernant la race et la classe sans le filtre contraignant de la politique élec-
torale. Le deuxième livre est particulièrement intéressant et est analysé en profon-
deur afin de présenter l’idéologie politique d’Obama. Comme cela a été expliqué par 
David Plouffe, le directeur de campagne d’Obama en 2008, la tournée de présenta-
tion organisée suite à la publication de The Audacity of Hope en 2006 s’est transformée 
petit à petit en base pour sa campagne pour la nomination présidentielle. Plouffe in-
siste sur le fait que le programme de la campagne d’Obama était fortement basé sur le 
contenu du livre.76 Au delà de cela, le livre présente l’intérêt supplémentaire de pré-
senter des explications bien plus détaillées et argumentées que n’importe quel dis-
cours politique ne saurait le faire. De plus, les formulations et prises de positions sont 
souvent bien plus radicales que ce qu’Obama a pu exprimer dans ses discours prési-
dentiels, car le livre était écrit depuis le point de vue du sénateur, et non pas du prési-
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dent ou du candidat à la présidence. De ce fait, le livre a moins souffert de contraintes 
politiques. 
Les discours politiques qui ont été sélectionnés commencent par la keynote ad-
dress qu’Obama a donnée lors de la Democratic National Convention de 2004 qui a for-
tement attiré l’attention sur lui et qui avait été un grand succès. L’analyse continue 
avec des discours durant la première campagne présidentielle, et se termine avec des 
discours présidentiels en 2010, car Obamacare a été votée en mars de cette année-là. 
Ainsi les discours ultérieurs ont été exclu car considérés moins pertinents. La période 
est longue car l’intention était d’analyser la construction rhétorique et idéologique 
d’Obama dans son ensemble. Des discours présidentiels majeurs, tels que son dis-
cours inaugural en 2009, son Address to a Joint Session of Congress de 2009 et le State of 
the Union Address de 2010 ont été inclus pour leur large éventail thématique et à cause 
de l’attention portée par le public à ces discours. D’autres discours présidentiels pro-
noncés durant la période 2009-2010 ont été inclus pour leur contenu, soit concernant 
la classe, la race, l’économie, soit les politiques sociales en général, et les questions de 
santé en particulier. 
Trois interviews avec Obama ont été incluses, dont deux ont été menées après la 
période définie, mais ces interviews concernaient des rétrospectives sur ses mandats. 
Pour cette raison leur contenu a été utilisé pour une mise en perspective de certains 
évènements, plutôt que de servir pour définir l’idéologie politique d’Obama. 
Deux livres ont servi de base à l’analyse discursive en termes de contenu, en 
plus de l’ouvrage mentionné précédemment, L’argumentation dans le discours de Ruth 
Amossy. L’analyse du discours racial codé est fortement basée sur le livre de la polito-
logue Tali Mendelberg paru en 2001, The Race Card : Campaign Strategy, Implicit Mes-
sages, and the Norm of Equality.77 Le discours racial dans les politiques de santé est dé-
codé par le politologue Gerard W. Boychuck dans son ouvrage comparatiste National 
Health Insurance in the United States and Canada : Race, Territory, and the Roots of Diffe-
rence publié en 2008.78 L’approche comparatiste permet de mettre en avant l’impact 
de la race sur le développement des politiques de santé aux États-Unis. Les questions 
connexes de l’impact de l’opinion publique, en particulier sur des questions de poli-
tique de santé, ont été étudiées à partir de l’ouvrage paru en 2000 Politicians Don’t 
Pander : Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness par les polito-
logues Lawrence Jacobs et Robert Shapiro.79 Cet ouvrage présentait l’intérêt supplé-
mentaire de faire une étude de cas de la défaite de la réforme de santé du président 
Bill Clinton, ce qui a permis d’identifier certains éléments qui pourraient être cri-
tiques pour la réforme d’Obama.  
Au niveau politique le discours joue un rôle central en tant que moyen de faire 
connaître son idéologie, pour mettre en avant ses idées, pour défendre et promouvoir 
des choix politiques. Dans une démocratie l’opinion publique joue un rôle crucial, 
dans le sens où il faut être élu ou réélu, mais aussi dans le sens où l’opinion publique 
est utilisée comme outil dans le jeu politique. L’opinion publique est utilisée pour 
modeler le discours, pour trouver ce que les gens veulent entendre et comment le 
message doit être construit pour convaincre. Mais l’opinion publique peut aussi être 
utilisée pour saper une proposition politique. Il est très difficile pour un gouverne-
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 ment de passer une proposition de loi que la population oppose fortement, non-
seulement parce que les politiciens craindraient la vengeance le jour des élections, 
mais aussi parce que cela dénote un manque de légitimité, l’absence de mandat pour 
passer telle ou telle loi.  
Un gouvernement démocratique est sensé représenter la volonté du peuple, ce-
pendant, cette volonté peut être manipulée par le discours. Comme l’a fait remarquer 
le philosophe Arthur Schopenhauer dans son traité sur la rhétorique, L’Art d’avoir 
toujours raison, la chose la plus importante à garder à l’esprit, pour ce qui concerne la 
dialectique, est que la vérité n’a pas d’importance. L’aspect fondamental dans la dis-
pute n’est pas de dire la vérité, ce n’est pas important d’avoir raison dans le sens 
d’avoir dit la vérité en ce qu’elle correspond à la réalité, mais d’être perçu comme 
ayant raison. Il est important d’être vu par le public comme étant le gagnant.80 Afin 
d’être le gagnant rhétorique dans la confrontation, il est important de persuader, de 
faire adhérer le public à son opinion, à ses mots, même s’il s’agit d’un mensonge 
éhonté. Des réponses faciles sont données à des questions complexes. La définition 
de Schopenhauer de la dialectique éristique peut être appliquée au discours politique 
car il s’agit d’une dispute au sens large. Le discours d’un politicien n’existe pas seul, 
de manière isolée. Il est influencé par les discours de politiciens précédents, la di-
mension doxique de nombreux termes, le système de valeur de la nation, et le con-
texte politique donné. Ainsi, même lorsqu’un politicien fait un discours, il ne parle 
pas seul, il est en dispute, en argumentation avec des discours précédents, il essaie de 
modeler une vision du monde différente à travers une autre représentation de la réa-
lité afin de faire adhérer le public à ses idées et propositions. 
Le pied-de-biche racial qui a été inséré entre les différents groupes raciaux des 
classes moyennes et ouvrières est l’une de ces réponses faciles à la situation actuelle 
d’inégalités économiques. Cette explication fait apparaître les Républicains comme 
les gagnants du débat politique, même si cela repose sur une représentation défor-
mée de la réalité et relègue à l’arrière plan la redistribution vers le haut qui résulte de 
leur agenda politique. Cette division raciale, pourtant, est devenue plus difficile à 
identifier, particulièrement dans le discours politique, parce que le politiquement 
correct a repoussé le discours racial sous la surface. 
Bien que des appels racistes ouverts soient rejetés, un discours plus subtil par-
vient à déclencher la réaction liée à des stéréotypes et des préjugés profondément 
enfouis. De plus, il faut remarquer que le chevauchement structurel entre classe et 
race, bien que créé et maintenu par des choix politiques, a tendance à renforcer ces 
préconceptions et stéréotypes, en particulier parce qu’ils sont véhiculés par les mé-
dias. En d’autres termes, il y a bien un discours de division raciale pour attaquer l’État 
providence, enfoui dans des mots-code et des images chargées racialement. 
Un contre-discours doit être développé par les défenseurs de l’État providence 
afin de s’adapter à ce changement discursif. Le discours permet d’influencer le con-
texte politique, même si la réalité fondamentale n’a pas changée. Ceci est le cas, par 
exemple, du discours qui nie la discrimination ou les conséquences de la discrimina-
tion passée, malgré l’abondance de preuves statistiques qui montrent les effets de la 
discrimination passée et présente. Un politicien qui veut atténuer les inégalités ra-
ciales, comme Obama, doit adapter son propre discours afin de prendre en compte ce 
déni, les accusations de discrimination inversée, et la perception d’un avantage in-
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juste pour les minorités à travers des programmes sociaux, même si cela n’est pas 
vrai. Le rejet de la discrimination positive par l’opinion publique et la contre-réaction 
des années 1970s ont montré que le public n’était plus réceptif pour un discours et des 
solutions politiques qui se focalisent sur les inégalités raciales et la culpabilité 
blanche, ce qui est une conséquence partielle du populisme racial de Reagan. Obama 
devait donc façonner un nouveau contre-discours qui prend en compte les para-
mètres de la contre-réaction et du populisme racial, un discours qui permet de sur-
monter la division raciale et de créer une nouvelle coalition basée sur la classe. 
L’influence de ce discours de populisme racial, et ce que les gens veulent croire, 
fait que la solution politique sera très probablement ni idéale, ni juste, mais basée sur 
une nouvelle approche idéologique. Une approche idéologique n’est pas rationnelle, 
mais basée sur des idées et des croyances, et n’est pas nécessairement la meilleure 
solution d’un point de vue objectif et scientifique. L’idéologie se développe dans un 
contexte politique et prend en compte ce qui devrait être atteint ou fait selon les inté-
rêts et les croyances, mais tout en tenant aussi compte des paramètres économiques, 
sociaux, et politiques. Ceci expose forcément le fossé entre ce qui devrait idéalement 
atteint et ce qui est réellement possible d’obtenir. 
Afin de défendre son agenda politique de créer une réforme de santé complète 
qui cible des problèmes spécifiques, Obama a façonné une construction rhétorique 
qui combine plusieurs éléments. Tout d’abord son discours était soigneusement ajus-
té au code racialement diviseur qui s’est développé au fil du temps concernant les 
politiques sociales. Ceci incluait de se charger des stéréotypes négatifs qui sous-
tendent ce discours codé, mais qui pouvaient aussi être néfastes ou potentiellement 
dangereuses par rapport à sa propre personne à cause de ses origines raciales. De ce 
fait, la persona politique d’Obama a précautionneusement négocié ces pièges en met-
tant en avant son arrière plan racial et culturel mixte, tout en se conformant à un cer-
tain degré à la manière dont les Américains perçoivent l’identification raciale. De 
plus, Obama a utilisé adroitement ses origines mixtes dans son ethos discursif afin 
d’avancer son agenda politique. Dans le but de créer une nouvelle majorité en faveur 
d’une nouvelle politique sociale, Obama a exposé son idéologie et sa vision du monde 
dans une construction rhétorique intriquée dont le point fort est l’unité étatsunienne 
pour surmonter le fossé racial qui avait brisé la coalition du New Deal. Cette union, 
qu’Obama a fortement basée sur des valeurs, des croyances, et des idées communes 
qui reposaient fortement sur les documents fondateurs, était complétée par un dis-
cours spécifiquement transcendant qui visait la compréhension entre les deux prin-
cipaux groupes raciaux qui se sont historiquement opposés aux États-Unis. Ce dis-
cours transcendant est renforcé par la définition d’Obama de son identité et par son 
ethos transcendant qui rendent son discours authentique. Afin de cimenter cette 
union étatsunienne basée sur la transcendance et poussée par des valeurs communes, 
Obama a aussi utilisé du populisme économique, dans le but de créer un nouvel en-
nemi basé sur la classe contre lequel une majorité d’Américains pouvaient se sentir 
unis et qui fournissait une nouvelle échappatoire aux ressentiments. Toutefois, les 
deux groupes raciaux devaient être rassurés et Obama avait un discours pour con-
vaincre chacun. La population noire devait être convaincue que cette union pouvait 
aussi être bénéfique pour eux. La population blanche devait être rassuré que leurs 
intérêts ne seraient pas oubliés. Dans ce contexte, l’insistance d’Obama sur les be-
soins de la classe moyenne était cruciale, ce qui montre aussi qu’Obama a fait atten-
tion à prendre en compte les sentiments de la contre-réaction. Et pour finir, afin de 
contrer l’idéologie néolibérale qui domine l’économie et qui avait joué sur la division 
raciale des classes moyennes et ouvrières, Obama a redéfini la doxa du rêve améri-
 cain afin de donner un caractère profondément étatsunien aux politiques sociales. 
Dans le même but, Obama a façonné un discours qui a réhabilité l’intervention de 
l’État, notamment en se réappropriant la notion de responsabilité, qui pendant long-
temps avait joué à l’avantage des conservateurs. 
4 La façon Obama : contourner le problème du dis-
cours 
Pour trouver les points d’ancrage dans le processus de la réforme de santé et 
pour comprendre la législation de santé, trois livres ont été essentiels. La relation par-
ticulière entre le pouvoir exécutif et les efforts de réforme et le rôle joué par les prési-
dents dans les politiques de santé depuis les années 1910 ont été étudiées par le polito-
logue James Morone et l’expert en politique de santé David Blumenthal, dans leur 
ouvrage The Heart of Power: Health and Politics in the Oval Office paru en 2009.81 Le so-
ciologue Paul Starr a fait une présentation des problèmes spécifiques en matières de 
réforme de santé rencontrés aux États-Unis dans son livre paru en 2011, Remedy and 
Reaction : the Peculiar Struggle over American Health Care Reform.82 Une présentation de 
la réforme Obama a été faite dans une analyse précoce par Jacobs and Skocpol dans 
Health Care Reform and American Politics : What Everyone Needs to Know, paru en 2012.83 
Le but ultime de l’égalité raciale peut être atteint par d’autres moyens que les 
politiques raciales et de nombreux universitaires et intellectuels pensent que le 
pragmatisme racial peut fournir ce moyen. La théorie du pragmatisme racial se con-
centre sur deux problèmes simultanés qui émanent des politiques raciales, surtout 
sous forme de discrimination positive. Le problème flagrant est une contre-réaction 
politique violente. En revanche, le problème plus profond est le manque relatif 
d’efficacité de la discrimination positive à créer une amélioration socioéconomique 
durable des minorités de toutes classes sociales confondues. 
L’émergence de la théorie de pragmatisme racial est surtout due à des considé-
rations politiques (cette stratégie politique est aussi appelée politique déracialisée, 
politique crossover, politique transformiste, ou stratégie universaliste). La politologue 
Georgia A. Persons déclare que la réponse à la question à savoir ce que constitue une 
stratégie efficace pour la libération économique, sociale, et politique des Afro-
américains est largement définie par le contexte socio-politique et la cadence du 
temps.84 Ceci explique le fait que la stratégie du pragmatisme racial est principale-
ment un compromis politique qui émane des contraintes que l’utilisation politique de 
la race ont créées. Néanmoins, cette stratégie émane aussi en partie de l’observation 
que bien qu’aucune des deux solutions proposées traditionnellement par les Démo-
crates ou les Républicains ne fonctionne entièrement, elles ne sont pas non plus à 
rejeter entièrement. 
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La vision traditionnelle ou conventionnelle est que les Démocrates proposent de 
résoudre les inégalités à travers plus de politiques sociales et plus de mesures ra-
ciales, alors que les Républicains mettent en avant des solutions basées sur la neutra-
lité raciale et la responsabilité personnelle. Comme démontré plus haut, aucune des 
deux solutions parviendra à résoudre le problème des inégalités raciales. Et de ma-
nière plus importante, ces deux approches radicalement opposées ont créé une im-
passe politique qui avantage les Républicains. 
L’idéologie et la stratégie politique d’Obama d’utiliser une approche de pragma-
tisme racial dans le but d’atténuer les inégalités raciales sans provoquer de contre-
réaction blanche repose sur plusieurs principes : 
- une stratégie de neutralité raciale ou dércialisée qui met en avant de 
grandes politiques sociales universelles par le biais du populisme éco-
nomique 
- Une réorganisation de l’électorat selon la classe sociale avec une atten-
tion particulière portée à la classe moyenne 
- L’obtention d’un impact structurel sur les minorités par une approche de 
classe qui cible les travailleurs pauvres et la classe moyenne inférieure 
- Une approche ciblée qui vise des problèmes d’inégalités raciales majeurs 
- Une nouvelle définition de la responsabilité qui incorpore la responsabi-
lité personnelle et la responsabilité étatique afin de briser l’impasse con-
treproductive créée par la question des valeurs 
Obamacare sera analysé en détail, mais bien d’autres propositions de réforme ou 
législations passées durant la présidence Obama se prêteraient à la même analyse. 
Par exemple, le projet de réforme de l’éducation ou le Fair Sentencing Act de 2010 
pourraient faire l’objet d’une étude similaire. Obamacare est composé de deux législa-
tions, le Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act de 2010 et le Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act de 2010. Bien que le ACA soit beaucoup plus connu que le HCER, ce 
dernier fait des modifications essentielles au système Obamacare. 
L’approche du pragmatisme racial provient de la réalisation combinée qu’une 
approche purement raciale a ses limites, autant concernant son efficacité réelle que 
sa viabilité politique. Néanmoins, la stratégie politique qui en résulte, c'est-à-dire une 
approche inclusive basée sur la classe qui cible des problèmes particulièrement aigus 
pour les minorités a aussi des limites, en particulier concernant la possibilité de dé-
noncer les problèmes raciaux. De ce fait, surtout pendant la première campagne pré-
sidentielle, Michelle Obama était l’élément racial du couple qui parlait plus ouverte-
ment de problèmes et injustices raciales. Malgré son application politique 
relativement récente depuis les années 1980, le pragmatisme racial a des racines plus 
anciennes dans la pensée afro-américaine datant du XIXème siècle et n’est pas en 
opposition totale avec de nombreuses revendications de l’ère des Droits Civiques. 
L’application de cette stratégie dans l’effort d’atteindre la présidence de la nation 
peut être vu en partie dans la deuxième campagne de Jesse Jackson pour la nomina-
tion Démocrate. L’application avec succès d’Obama autant pour atteindre la prési-
dence que pour la réforme de santé par contre était une première. Avec sa réforme de 
santé il a réussi en effet à appliquer la stratégie de réunir une majorité interraciale 
autour d’une question qui représentait des intérêts partagés qui concernait aussi for-
tement la classe moyenne, afin d’éviter une contre-réaction comme celle des années 
1970. Le système mis en place par Obamacare est fortement axé sur la redistribution 
vers le bas, ce qui a un impact structurel plus fort sur les minorités. De plus, le ACA 
se concentre particulièrement sur certains problèmes très critiques pour la popula-
tion noire, tels que le sida, le diabète, les grossesses chez les adolescentes, les mala-
 dies préexistantes, ou le manque d’assurance maladie et l’accessibilité des primes 
d’assurance. 
Cependant, le choix de construire la nouvelle réforme sur le système existant, ce 
qui était une conséquence directe de la mauvaise perception d’une trop forte inter-
vention étatique, s’est traduit par une série de conséquences négatives. Certaines 
provisions du ACA ont été attaquées avec succès ce qui a mutilé la réforme, notam-
ment en créant un trou dans la couverture de Medicaid qui a laissé des millions de 
personnes sans couverture de santé. Ceci souligne encore une fois le rôle fort joué par 
l’intervention fédérale pour assurer l’égalité raciale, étant donné que l’extension fa-
cultative de Medicaid touche de façon disproportionnée la population noire. 
Bien que le ACA soit une réforme somme toute assez modérée, les Républicains 
ont essayé de nombreuses fois de l’abroger, et avaient promis de faire cela immédia-
tement après qu’Obama a signé la loi.85 En 2016, Donald Trump a fait une campagne 
couronnée de succès qui tournait autour de deux thèmes : la révocation d’Obamacare 
et la construction du mur à la frontière du Mexique pour arrêter les immigrés illé-
gaux et le trafic de drogue,86 réunissant encore une fois les thèmes d’opposition aux 
politiques sociales et les mesures contre une minorité raciale. Les efforts pour abro-
ger Obamacare et faire passer une réforme de santé conservatrice à sa place ont fait 
l’objet de résistance, même au sein du Parti républicain. Le American Health Care Act 
est passé de justesse dans la Chambre des Représentants le 4 mai 2017, mais 20 Répu-
blicains ont voté contre.87 Le 27 juillet 2017, le Sénat a voté contre les amendements 
qui avaient été proposés pour révoquer le mandat individuel. Trois sénateurs Répu-
blicains ont voté avec les Démocrates pour rejeter la proposition : la sénatrice Susan 
Collins du Maine, la sénatrice Lisa Murkowski de l’Alaska, et le sénateur John 
McCain de l’Arizona.88 Dans sa déclaration justifiant son vote, la sénatrice Collins a 
sévèrement critiqué le ACA, mais elle a tout autant insisté sur le fait que les diverses 
propositions Républicaines auraient été pires, que ce soit concernant le nombre de 
personnes sans assurance maladie, la diminution de fonds pour de nombreux do-
maines, ou l’impacte sur la santé des femmes. Collins a aussi sévèrement critiqué les 
deux partis pour leur côté trop partisan et leurs tentatives ou succès à faire passer des 
lois partisanes. Elle a appelé à faire de nouveaux efforts sur une base bipartite afin de 
trouver une véritable solution pour réformer le système de santé.89 Les développe-
ments depuis le passage du ACA ont montré à quel point les deux partis étaient tou-
jours polarisés concernant la question des politiques sociales et de l’intervention de 
l’État. 
Ces attaques répétées contre le ACA ont amené à un soutien croissant pour le 
single payer. Plusieurs états sont en train d’envisager des législations allant dans ce 
sens. Bien que parmi le public le soutien soit croissant, la question demeure com-
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plexe, ce qui résulte surtout de la relation difficile qu’ont les États-Unis avec 
l’intervention de l’État. 
Néanmoins, en ce qui concerne la stratégie plus large de faire passer des législa-
tions redistributives et ciblées sur des problèmes spécifiques, l’administration a eu 
quelques succès, tels que le Fair Sentencing Act de 2010 qui a réussi de réajuster en 
partie le résultat biaisé des peines pour certains délits liés à la drogue. En revanche, 
d’autres propositions intéressantes et fortement redistributives axées sur une forte 
intervention de l’État n’ont pas pu être passées. 
Conclusion 
Par de nombreux aspects, le Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act de 2010 est 
un reflet de l’histoire raciale des États-Unis. Son début était basé sur les difficultés 
émanant de l’histoire des politiques sociales aux États-Unis, qui est profondément 
marquée par la division raciale et la polarisation politique. Mais cette réforme était 
aussi basée sur la volonté d’atténuer les inégalités raciales profondément ancrées 
dans la société et l’économie étatsunienne. La législation finale est marquée par les 
contraintes de la politique étatsunienne ; c’est un compromis insatisfaisant qui s’est 
avéré vulnérable aux attaques. Bien que le ACA soit toujours vivant, les attaques con-
servatrices cherchent encore et toujours à le vider de sa substance. À cause du fait 
que le ACA est construit sur le système existant, les attaques ont surtout fait du tort 
aux minorités raciales et économiques, ce qui montre la pertinence continue et la 
profondeur de l’intersection entre race et classe. 
L’engagement d’Obama pour les politiques sociales provient d’une volonté sin-
cère d’améliorer les conditions de vie de la population noire et de créer une plus 
grande égalité des chances. Mais cet engagement provient aussi de l’aspiration de 
créer un meilleur filet de sécurité pour toute la population étatsunienne. Ceci résulte 
en partie de sa propre histoire et expérience. La volonté de créer une plus grande éga-
lité des chances et de mettre à disposition plus de soutien pour la population noire est 
moins motivée par sa propre vie, étant donné qu’il a été élevé par sa famille blanche, 
bien que la couleur de sa peau l’ait amené très tôt à se questionner sur la race. Son 
expérience avec la population noire et les conditions dans les quartiers urbains noirs 
date de la période durant laquelle il a travaillé en tant qu’organisateur communau-
taire à Harlem, puis dans le South Side de Chicago durant les années 1980. Ce travail 
lui a permis de se rendre compte du manque d’intervention de l’État auprès de beau-
coup de personnes, ainsi que du côté destructeur et dévastateur du chômage et de la 
consommation de drogue.90 De plus, Obama avait fortement conscience de la ma-
nière dont certains programmes sociaux ont contribué à l’ascension sociale de sa fa-
mille, ainsi qu’une bonne compréhension et expérience des avantages créés par un 
bon réseau social, ce qui a fait naître en lui la volonté de faire bénéficier plus de per-
sonnes d’opportunité créée par l’État. De plus, Obama apparaît convaincu de l’effet 
bénéfique d’une approche Keynésienne de l’économie. 
Et pourtant, dans sa quête d’expansion des politiques sociales, Obama avait for-
tement conscience des contraintes politiques auxquelles il faisait face. Ces con-
traintes, qui sont illustrées par la profonde division partisane concernant les poli-
tiques sociales et l’intervention de l’État, ont des racines profondes dans l’histoire des 
États-Unis et le développement de l’État providence aux États-Unis. Depuis les an-
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 nées 1970 la division partisane concernant les politiques sociales et l’intervention de 
l’État avait joué en faveur des Républicains, notamment à cause de la domination 
intellectuelle plus forte de principes néolibéraux qui s’opposent fortement aux im-
pôts et à toute forme d’intervention de l’État, excepté l’armée. Les impôts, par contre, 
sont la condition sine qua non de la redistribution. 
La forte opposition contre les programmes sociaux pour les minorités et les 
pauvres, que ce soit sous la forme d’allocations ou de discrimination positive, qui est 
illustré par la révolte contre les impôts des années 1970, des accusations de discrimi-
nation inversée, ou des attaques en justice de la discrimination positive, ont fait com-
prendre à Obama qu’une approche spécifiquement raciale ou uniquement concen-
trée sur les pauvres ne trouverait pas le soutien nécessaire. Cette conclusion avait 
déjà été tirée dans les années 1990, mais elle provenait de deux écoles de pensées lé-
gèrement différentes. La première est plus concentrée sur la politique générale et 
postule que les Démocrates doivent changer et adapter leur discours afin de s’adapter 
au nouveau discours conservateur qui s’est développé depuis la fin des années 1960. 
Ce discours conservateur s’était développé en réponse à des ressentiments de la part 
de certains Blancs contre une augmentation de la compétition économique avec di-
vers groupes minoritaires durant une période qui a vu les conditions économiques se 
détériorer. En réponse à la désaffection d’électeurs des classes ouvrière et moyenne 
blanches du Parti Démocrate pour donner leur soutien à Reagan et ses promesses de 
moins d’intervention étatique, qui ont été comprises comme voulant dire moins de 
favoritisme pour les minorités, des politologues et analystes ont suggéré une déta-
chement de la vieille image qui collait à la peau des Démocrates. Cette image les 
montrait comme des libéraux qui taxent et dépensent, qui mettent en avant toujours 
plus de droits civiques et programmes pour les pauvres, tout en refusant de discuter 
de l’échec de certains programmes quant à la pauvreté profonde dans les quartiers 
urbains. 
Ces chercheurs et universitaires, tels que Edsall et Edsall au début des années 
1990, ou Judis et Teixeira au début des années 2000, ont recommandé une approche 
plus centriste, une plus grande attention aux problèmes de la classe moyenne qui a 
soufferte depuis le déclin économique des années 1970, et une plus grande emphase 
sur le discours des valeurs, particulièrement sur la responsabilité personnelle, dans la 
poursuite d’une nouvelle majorité Démocrate. Le premier succès électoral suite à 
l’application d’une telle stratégie était pour Clinton et les Nouveaux Démocrates, qui 
se sont distanciés ouvertement de l’ancienne image, et qui ont souligné leur diffé-
rence, surtout par rapport à l’héritage des années 1960 des Démocrate en matière de 
politique sociale. 
Ceci constitue la réaction générale. Dans les cercles politiques et universitaires 
noirs, le problème était vu d’un angle différent. Ici, le point crucial était de trouver un 
moyen d’atteindre la politique générale au-delà des circonscriptions noires, mais tout 
particulièrement de trouver des moyens de contourner la contre-réaction raciale 
contre les programmes sociaux sur critère sociaux et contre la discrimination posi-
tive. En outre, certains penseurs noirs se sont aussi penchés sur la question des va-
leurs et de la responsabilité personnelle, mais d’un point de vue et dans un but assez 
différent de l’utilisation conservatrice de la notion. Alors que les conservateurs ten-
dent à utiliser la notion de responsabilité personnelle et familiale pour proposer et 
justifier des coupes dans les programmes sociaux, les penseurs noirs tendent à mettre 
en avant la responsabilité personnelle dans un but plus constructif qui est centré sur 
l’idée de s’aider soi-même, aussi dans la perspective de compenser un manque de 
soutien de l’État et des institutions défaillantes. Ceci viendrait donc non pas à la place 
  
de l’intervention de l’État en tant que tel, mais bien comme une mesure compensa-
toire, tout en œuvrant en parallèle pour une meilleure intervention de l’État. De plus, 
une partie de cette réflexion est motivée par la vision claire que n’importe quel pro-
blème sociétal ou faute au sein de la population noire pourrait être exploité à des fins 
racistes, en particulier si cela correspond à des stéréotypes négatifs existants. Cette 
pensée remonte au moins à Du Bois, mais des idées similaires doivent pouvoir se 
trouver déjà avant. La conclusion noire à la problématique posée par le pouvoir poli-
tique conservateur hostile aux politiques sociales a été mise en avant par West au 
début des années 1990 ou encore Marable à la fin des années 2000. Ils défendent une 
stratégie basée sur une alliance interraciale, similaire à la coalition du New Deal, qui 
mettrait l’accent sur les intérêts économiques communs et la transcendance raciale. 
Cela repose sur l’a minimisation des mesures spécifiquement raciales et de la victimi-
sation, tout en mettant l’accent sur la responsabilité personnelle et la défense de poli-
tiques sociales qui représentent une intérêt accru pour les classes ouvrière et 
moyenne blanches, comme l’éducation ou la santé. Toutefois, dans cette approche, 
les demandes pour des mesures spécifiquement raciales ne sont pas possibles. Afin 
de surmonter cette difficulté, ils mettent en avant l’approche du ciblage de problèmes 
spécifiques, c'est-à-dire une intervention racialement neutre, mais sur des problèmes 
particulièrement aigus pour la population noire. De plus, un constat plus sociolo-
gique concerne la pertinence particulière de programmes plus destinés à la classe 
moyenne pour la classe moyenne noire, qui est bien plus fragile que son pendant 
blanc. Cette approche est fortement soutenue par Feagin ou encore Katznelson qui 
pensent que les politiques sociales ont beaucoup œuvré à l’avantage des Blancs. Ils 
font l’argument que une approche similaire, racialement neutre mais sur mesure 
pour la population noire, pourrait engendrer des effets similairement bénéfiques. 
Lieberman fait une réflexion semblable en soulignant que l’intention raciale d’une 
politique est moins importante que ses effets raciaux. Une mesure neutre peut en 
effet avoir un résultat raciste, ou un résultat racialement bénéfique, tout comme une 
approche spécifique n’est pas toujours aussi efficace que l’on souhaiterait, comme le 
montre à un certain degré le cas de la discrimination positive. 
Cette approche de pragmatisme racial est fondée autant sur le manque de pou-
voir politique de la population noire, qui résulte de la population plus réduite et de la 
contre-réaction raciale, que sur le constat, fait par des personnes comme West, 
qu’une approche purement raciale et uniquement axée sur l’aspect structurel sur le 
manque d’opportunités et les barrières sociales a des limites concernant 
l’endiguement de ce qui est souvent appelé comportements ‘pathologiques’ parmi les 
populations les plus pauvres dans les quartiers urbains. 
Il apparaît très clairement que la pensée politique d’Obama est tout autant in-
fluencée par l’interprétation générale de la situation politique que par le pragma-
tisme racial, puisque il discute les deux de façon détaillée, bien qu’il ne les désigne 
pas explicitement, dans The Audacity of Hope, et que les deux approches se reflètent 
dans son discours politique.  
Le deux grands projets de politique sociale qu’Obama avait durant ses mandats 
correspondaient tous les deux à ces approches, à savoir la réforme de santé et la ré-
forme de l’éducation. Les deux jouent un rôle crucial dans la mobilité sociale, bien 
que cela soit moins flagrant pour la santé, alors que l’absence d’assurance maladie est 
un facteur qui réduit la mobilité sociale et une des raisons de la perte de statut so-
cioéconomique. Obama semble avoir une plus grande passion personnelle pour 
l’éducation, ce qui est peut être partiellement dû à sa carrière d’enseignant, mais la 
 réforme de l’éducation qu’il a initialement défendue en 2009 et 2010 est morte au 
Congrès. 
Obama avait l’air moins passionné par la santé, bien qu’il ait parsemé ses dis-
cours avec des histoires de santé tirées de sa vie familiale, comme le cancer de sa 
mère, la méningite de sa fille Sasha, ou la sclérose en plaques de son beau-père. 
Néanmoins, la santé était (et est toujours, à cause du caractère imparfait de la réforme 
et les attaques continues contre Obamacare), le problème urgent de la période. De 
plus, la santé, à cause des programmes morcelés qui ont été créés par l’administration 
Johnson, était devenu un problème majeur pour la classe moyenne (le même argu-
ment peut être fait pour l’éducation à cause de l’augmentation dramatique des frais 
d’inscription aux universités). Ainsi, la santé s’est présentée comme un domaine favo-
rable à l’application du pragmatisme racial et des préceptes énoncés par rapport à la 
politique Démocrate en général concernant une  nouvelle attention marquée pour la 
classe moyenne. La santé était aussi un domaine favorable pour rappeler à la classe 
moyenne qu’ils avaient leurs intérêts dans un État providence actif et développé. 
Bien qu’Obama ait scrupuleusement appliqué les deux préceptes, en créant une 
réforme qui ne ressemblait pas trop à un programme monstrueux d’intervention éta-
tique basé sur l’impôt et la dépense, et qui ciblait certains problèmes majeurs aux-
quels les minorités font face, comme le diabète ou le sida, tout en ayant aussi un im-
pact structurel à travers une redistribution vers le bas, la réforme n’était pas 
imperméable à la division partisane. La collaboration Républicaine a été absolument 
minimale, presque inexistante, et ceci que ce soit pour la création de la réforme ou 
pour le vote (seul le Représentant Joseph Cao (R-LA) a voté une fois dans la Chambre 
des Représentants pour la réforme, et la Sénatrice Olympia Snowe (R-ME) a voté 
pour faire sortir le ACA d’un comité au Sénat, et seulement trois—initialement 
quatre—sénateurs Républicains ont participé dans les débats de la réforme. 
La promulgation du ACA et du HCER et les attaques qui ont suivies montrent la 
profondeur et la continuité de la division partisane concernant la redistribution. 
L’opposition immédiate des Républicains au ARRA au début de l’année 2009, même 
avant d’avoir vu le projet de loi, est encore un autre exemple de cette division parti-
sane marquée qui avait débutée avec le président Reagan, mais qui avait été poussé 
bien plus loin par Newt Gingrich dans les années 1990.  
Cette division partisane tranchée entre Républicains et Démocrates s’articule 
notamment autour de la portée de l’intervention étatique, qui repose grandement sur 
la redistribution à travers la levée d’impôt et des politiques sociales. Cette division a 
évoluée durant l’histoire de l’État providence, pour lequel le président Roosevelt a 
posé la première pierre massive de fondation, bien que certains programmes eussent 
été développés auparavant. Petit à petit le Parti démocrate est devenu le parti des po-
litiques sociales et aussi des minorités, ce qui a résulté en 1968 dans la finalisation de 
l’inversement des positions des partis concernant les questions raciales. Les Républi-
cains n’étaient plus le parti de l’abolition qui demandait des droits civiques pour les 
Noirs, et les Démocrates n’étaient plus le parti de l’esclavage et de la ségrégation. De 
plus, les droits civiques ont imposé le politiquement correct, ce qui a fait que les ap-
pels racistes ouverts sont devenu un danger politique. Les appels raciaux, qui 
s’appuyaient sur le ressentiment racial de la part de certains Blancs contre une plus 
grande compétition économique, devaient se faire de manière codée afin d’éviter le 
rejet ou la condamnation morale. 
L’idéologie et le discours néolibéral sont apparus comme un conteneur discursif 
opportun pour ce discours codé. Bien que le président Jimmy Carter ait appliqué 
quelques idées néolibérales dans les années 1970, et que même au début des années 
  
1980 certains Démocrates, comme les sénateurs Paul Tsongas (D-MA) et Gary Hart 
(D-CO), pensaient que cela pourrait s’avérer bénéfique pour le Parti démocrate 
d’intégrer des idées néolibérales,91 c’était le Parti républicain qui a le mieux réussi la 
promotion et l’application des idées néolibérales. Si Reagan apparaissait sincèrement 
convaincu que le néolibéralisme pouvait apporter des solutions à l’économie, 
l’idéologie néolibérale s’est aussi avérée très utile pour intégrer des appels raciaux 
codés. 
Bien qu’Edsall et Edsall, qui expliquent de manière extrêmement bien articulée 
l’utilisation de la contre-réaction blanche par Reagan dans son discours sur les taxes 
et la race pour capturer une nouvelle majorité Républicaine, ne le mentionnent pas 
de manière explicite, le néolibéralisme a fourni le pilier économique au populisme 
racial de Reagan. La force de la vision du monde néolibérale réside dans le fait qu’elle 
puise dans les vieilles valeurs étatsuniennes, telles que l’individualisme et l’éthique 
du travail, qu’elle se construit sur une conception idéalisée des États-Unis comme 
pays de la liberté et de toutes les possibilités, et qu’elle intègre des éléments comme le 
rêve américain. De plus, le néolibéralisme s’est aussi défini en opposition au socia-
lisme soviétique, et a créé une opposition simple entre le bien et le mal, qui elle aussi 
a puisée dans l’histoire étatsunienne en montrant les États-Unis comme le pays de la 
liberté par opposition à la tyrannie économique et politique du système socialiste et 
communiste. Le marché libre est devenu le symbole de la liberté politique et de la 
démocratie, dénué de discrimination et d’oppression, et qui favorisait l’individu. La 
régulation ou l’intervention étatique, incarnées par l’Union soviétique, était l’ennemi. 
Dans le marché libre, tel qu’il était présenté par le néolibéralisme, tout un chacun 
pouvait réussir s’ils travaillent dur. Ceux qui ne réussissent pas dans ce système par-
fait manquent d’éthique du travail ou n’essaient pas suffisamment fort. Les impôts, 
disait la doctrine néolibérale, sont mauvais pour les affaires et les entreprises et em-
pêchent la croissance. L’intervention étatique quelle qu’elle soit, mais surtout par les 
politiques sociales, est mauvaise, notamment parce que cela exige de lever des im-
pôts. De toute façon, les programmes sociaux ne servent à rien, puisque ceux qui en 
ont besoin ne les méritent pas, puisque visiblement ces personnes sont trop fei-
gnantes pour travailler. Cette idéologie est parvenue à transformer le ressentiment de 
devoir payer des impôts pour des programmes sociaux qui semblaient profiter prin-
cipalement à des minorités en un argument économique positif. De plus, cela propo-
sait aussi une issue de la culpabilité blanche pour l’esclavage, la ségrégation, et la dis-
crimination : le marché est libre, basé sur l’égalité des chances, et promet 
l’enrichissement à tous ceux qui sont prêts à faire l’effort de travailler dur. 
Les interprétations varient quant aux changements politiques qui ont eu lieu 
durant les années 1970. Le récit économique est que la crise qui a suivi le choc pétro-
lier de 1973 a discrédité le Keynésianisme et a contribué à l’avènement des principes 
économiques néolibéraux. Ces principes,  bien que le président Carter ait fait les 
premières applications des ces principes en politique, ont été le plus adroitement in-
corporés dans le conservatisme par Reagan, ce qui a permis la constitution d’une 
nouvelle majorité Républicaine. D’autres, comme Edsall et Edsall, défendent une 
autre théorie. En 1991 ils ont argumenté que Reagan a réussi à exploiter à des fins po-
litiques la contre-réaction contre les impôts et les politiques sociales des années 1970 
afin d’opérer une division raciale de la coalition du New Deal qui était basée sur la 
classe. En jouant sur les sentiments de la contre-réaction, le discours de Reagan a mis 
l’accent et a gonflé la perception que l’argent des impôts des Blancs était gaspillé pour 
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 le financement de programmes sociaux qui créaient de la dépendance et de 
l’immoralité, qui nuisaient aux les personnes mêmes que ces programmes étaient 
censés aider. En insistant sur la dimension de l’abus du système, cela créait l’image de 
personnes cupides qui vivaient sur des allocations sociales confortables dont ils 
avaient ni le besoin, ni le mérite. L’émergence de la classe pauvre des quartiers ur-
bains donnait une certaine crédibilité à cette image. Edsall et Edsall mettent en avant 
que Reagan a réussi à convaincre des électeurs blancs des classes ouvrière et 
moyenne, qui auparavant votaient Démocrate en fonction de leurs intérêts écono-
miques, ce qu’on appelle les Reagan-Democrats, de voter pour les Républicains en 
fonction de valeurs partagées, telles que la responsabilité personnelle. 
Ce discours fonctionne car il s’appuie sur des vieux mythes étatsuniens et qu’il 
correspond à l’image que les gens veulent avoir de leur pays. Cela fonctionne aussi, 
car, comme la politologue Suzanne Mettler le fait remarquer, la majeure partie de 
l’intervention étatique est submergée, et que beaucoup de personnes ne parviennent 
pas à identifier correctement des programmes gouvernementaux en tant que tels. 
« Enlevez vos sales pattes gouvernementales de mon Medicare »92 est juste un des 
exemples les plus amusants. Néanmoins, à cause de l’association historique forte 
entre l’intervention de l’État fédéral et les efforts en matière de droits civiques et de 
politiques sociales, ainsi que de l’utilisation des states’ rights comme outil de 
l’oppression raciale sous la forme de l’esclavage et de la ségrégation, les attaques 
contre le big government ne peuvent pas être vues de manière racialement neutre. Ce-
pendant, avec le néolibéralisme, ces attaques contre l’État fédéral ont reçu un air de 
respectabilité économique. 
Le discours reaganien qui entremêle populisme racial et néolibéralisme fonc-
tionne, et s’est avéré très durable, notamment parce qu’il s’est construit sur la struc-
ture de la société étatsunienne qui est stratifiée selon la classe et la race. Il y a bien des 
classes sociales qui peuvent être définies selon le revenu, l’occupation, et dans une 
certaine mesure selon le niveau d’éducation, mais de manière plus importante, à 
cause du passé d’oppression raciale, ces classes peuvent aussi être définies selon la 
race, qui concentre les minorités aux niveaux les plus bas de la société. 
L’intersection entre race et classe a été remarquée depuis longtemps. Du Bois et 
Myrdal voyaient une dimension plus figée et immuable à cette intersection qui situait 
les Afro-américains tout en bas de l’hiérarchie socioéconomique. Ceci est dû, bien 
entendu, à la période historique de leur analyse de la société étatsunienne. Bien que 
les Droits Civiques aient amené la promesse de la mobilité sociale, très rapidement la 
dimension économique est revenue au premier plan, puisque, comme l’avaient fait 
remarquer Myrdal ou John Lewis, l’oppression raciale opère de manière significative 
à travers sa dimension économique. Dans ce sens, le racisme peut être vu comme une 
justification de l’oppression économique de tout un groupe ou plusieurs groupes de 
personnes basée sur la couleur de leur peau. Aux États-Unis, l’esclavage et la ségréga-
tion avaient cet effet de stratification économique selon la couleur de peau, dont les 
effets sont toujours présents aujourd’hui. Cette continuité de la stratification est due 
en partie au fait que le statut social est transmis des parents aux enfants, hérité en 
quelque sorte, mais aussi à la discrimination actuelle et la ségrégation de fait des 
quartiers d’habitation et des écoles. Pourtant, grâce aux Droits Civiques et à la dis-
crimination positive, et une plus grande attention à la non-discrimination, la dimen-
sion purement économique de la stratification a pris encore plus d’importance. 
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Vers la fin des années 1970, Wilson avait remarqué que la discrimination posi-
tive avait peu ou pas d’impact sur les populations noires dans les quartiers urbains. 
La discrimination positive, l’outil qui avait été créé par les administrations Kennedy 
et Johnson pour compenser la discrimination passée, ne prenait pas en compte les 
inégalités structurelles car le recrutement en priorité des minorités s’applique uni-
quement à qualification égale. L’obtention de cette qualification égale n’était pas gé-
rée suffisamment par la discrimination positive. En effet, pour l’accès à l’université la 
discrimination positive compense certes en partie les résultats au SAT plus bas et 
permet aux étudiants minoritaires de s’inscrire à l’université, mais cela ne compense 
pas la scolarité de mauvaise qualité que ces étudiants ont reçu, en particulier s’ils 
viennent des quartiers pauvres. Ainsi, plus d’étudiants minoritaires ne parviennent 
pas à finir leurs études supérieures. Les conséquences négatives de l’éducation de 
plus mauvaise qualité sont aggravées par les revenus modestes des parents et souvent 
par l’absence d’assurance maladie, qui sont d’autres facteurs qui contribuent à 
l’abandon des études supérieures. En ce sens, Wilson a identifié la discrimination 
positive, une mesure purement raciale qui ne traite pas les causes de l’inégalité mais 
uniquement les symptômes, comme inutile pour des populations qui n’avaient pas 
d’accès aux avantages structurels dont bénéficient la plupart des Blancs. De la même 
manière vers la fin des années 1990, Oliver et Shapiro dénonçaient le manque de 
« capital humain » qui empêche ces populations des quartiers urbains de rivaliser sur 
le marché du travail. 
La discrimination positive fonctionne pour la classe moyenne noire qui a accès à 
des avantages socioéconomiques similaires que les Blancs, bien que le statut de classe 
moyenne des Noirs reste bien plus fragile que celui des Blancs à cause de l’accès tar-
dif à la mobilité sociale de ces premiers. Les Noirs ont été largement exclus des poli-
tiques sociales durant les années fastes de l’État providence pendant les années 
d’après-guerre qui ont vu l’émergence d’une classe moyenne blanche massive et 
prospère. Durant cette période de croissance forte et de mobilité sociale qui a propul-
sé bon nombre de Blancs pauvres ou issus de la classe ouvrière vers la classe 
moyenne, les Noirs étaient largement exclus soit par la ségrégation, soit légale soit de 
fait. Leur accès aux programmes sociaux était limité, que ce soit à travers l’exclusion 
structurelle, comme cela était le cas de la Social Security jusqu’en 1950, la ségrégation 
légale et l’exclusion, ou par la discrimination, comme cela était le cas pour le pro-
gramme de logement et de crédit immobilier de la FHA et la GI Bill ou le ADC (appelé 
ensuite AFDC, et maintenant appelé TANF). 
Le passage du Civil Rights Act de 1964 et du Voting Rights Act de 1965 qui a donné 
accès à la société blanche et qui faisaient la promesse d’un gain de pouvoir politique a 
eu lieu peu de temps avant le déclin économique et le choc pétrolier de 1973 qui a 
amené à une décennie de dépression économique. Est-ce que les choses auraient-
elles été différentes sans la crise économique ? Y-aurait-il eu une contre-réaction 
contre l’égalité raciale dans tous les cas ? C’est impossible à dire, mais l’enchainement 
des évènements était des plus infortunés, puisque les demandes pour une part équi-
table de l’économie arrivaient à un moment où les quantités à partager diminuaient 
rapidement. La population subissait une inflation forte et donc une perte d’argent, se 
voyait confronté au chômage et à la difficulté de trouver de l’emploi après des années 
de travail abondant et bien rémunéré, même avec peu de qualifications. Les de-
mandes pour plus d’égalité, que ce soit au niveau politique ou économique, de la part 
de nombreux groupes de minorités—les Noirs, les femmes, les homosexuels—
pendant les années 1960 et 1970 ont été accueillis avec une contre-réaction blanche. 
Durant une période de compétition économique croissante et des salaires réels en 
 baisse, beaucoup de personnes des classes ouvrières et moyennes n’appréciaient pas 
de payer des impôts pour des programmes qui semblaient profiter principalement à 
des minorités, et ce, apparemment, avec peu d’effets positifs. 
Cette perception résulte d’une série de facteurs. En effet, les listes des pro-
grammes sociaux avaient augmenté de façon assez ‘soudaine’ à cause d’une nouvelle 
affluence de minorités, et de Noirs en particulier suite à la deuxième grande migra-
tion vers le Nord et aux Droits Civiques. Bien que la War on Poverty ait eu beaucoup 
d’effets positifs et a permis de sortir beaucoup de personnes de la pauvreté extrême, 
ces effets ont néanmoins été limités par le changement économique et les change-
ments dans la structure des villes. Les emplois bien rémunérés accessibles avec peu 
de qualifications de l’ère industrielle disparaissaient, l’économie de services exigeait 
plus d’éducation, et le chômage est devenu une composante normale de l’économie. 
De plus, la structure de la ville avait changée ; depuis les années 1950 la classe 
moyenne blanche avait déménagée dans les banlieues, et avait laissé les quartiers 
urbains comme des îlots pauvres et isolés avec peu de perspectives d’emploi qui 
créaient une pauvreté fermement enracinée et une dépendance aux programmes 
sociaux. Le manque d’opportunité et l’absence ou insuffisance de nombreux services 
publics ont aussi contribué à une augmentation de la criminalité, de naissances hors 
mariage, et de consommation de drogue qui ont amené à la perception d’une ‘under-
class’ ou sous-classe distincte marquée par des comportements ‘pathologiques.’ Cette 
soi-disante ‘sous-classe’ justifie le racisme culturel, qui incorpore de nombreux prin-
cipes du racisme biologique—la paresse, l’hypersexualité, la dépendance—mais qui 
les a transformés en traits culturels. Deux rationalisations principales ont émergé  
pour expliquer l’existence de cette ‘sous-classe’ : l’explication culturelle, défendue 
principalement par les conservateurs, qui attribue la condition de la ‘sous-classe’ à la 
‘sous-classe’ même et qui prétend que le manque de mise en avant de la moralité, de 
l’importance d’une bonne éducation, et le manque d’éthique du travail, bref, le 
manque de responsabilité personnelle, parmi cette population est la cause de leur 
statut socioéconomique très bas. L’argument structurel, principalement défendu par 
les libéraux, attribue la situation aux barrières structurelles de la discrimination et du 
manque d’opportunité.  
Au fil du temps, depuis le début de l’État providence, une racialisation ou wel-
farisation des divers programmes sociaux s’est faite. Certains programmes, tels que 
Medicare ou la Social Security en particulier, ont fini par être vus comme quelque 
chose d’autre que des programmes sociaux, et ne sont parfois même plus vus comme 
de l’intervention de l’État. Ces programmes sont vus de façon très positive, notam-
ment parce qu’ils sont sur une base de contribution (bien qu’il faille remarquer que 
ces programmes ne sont pas uniquement financés par les cotisations, ils sont aussi 
financés par les recettes de l’État, c'est-à-dire les impôts). La citation évoquée plus 
haut illustre le fait que les gens ont apparemment oublié que Medicare et la Social 
Security sont les deux programmes les plus contrôlés et gérés par l’État aux États-
Unis. De l’autre côté, les programmes sur critères sociaux, les allocations (welfare), 
ont graduellement été perçus de façon négative, en particulier au moment où plus de 
Noirs ont bénéficié de ces programmes. Ces programmes, comme le AFDC (qui 
s’appelle maintenant TANF) ou les bons alimentaires (qui s’appellent maintenant 
SNAP), mais dans une certaine mesure aussi Medicaid (bien que les programmes de 
santé jouissent d’une meilleure image), sont perçus de manière négative et sont for-
tement associés avec les minorités, bien que ces derniers ne soient pas, en nombre 
absolus, les principaux bénéficiaires de ces programmes. Toutefois, il est vrai que, à 
cause de leur statut économique subordonné, une plus grande proportion de Noirs 
  
ou d’Hispaniques bénéficient de programmes sociaux (ce qui n’est pas le cas de Me-
dicare et de la Social Security à cause de l’espérance de vie plus courte des Noirs et la 
population plus jeune des Hispaniques). La déformation dans les médias, qui conti-
nue aujourd’hui, en illustrant disproportionnément les sujets sur la pauvreté avec des 
visages noirs, en particulier durant des bonnes périodes économiques, a contribué à  
la perception que ce sont principalement des minorités qui bénéficient sans raison 
des programmes sur critères sociaux. La welfarisation crée une image négative de 
programmes comme entretenant des populations qui ne le méritent pas car ils de-
vraient travailler et comme créant de la dépendance et de l’immoralité. Le stéréotype 
est si fortement racialisé que pour certains Blancs, si eux mêmes ou des membres de 
leur famille ont bénéficié des mêmes programmes, « c’est différent. » Cette forte wel-
farisation a été poussée par Reagan et a été exploitée dans ses campagnes politiques. 
La question de la discrimination positive cristallise le sentiment de la contre-
réaction et l’opposition des efforts faits pour les minorités. La contre-réaction contre 
la discrimination positive a même amené à la création du concept de ‘discrimination 
inversée,’ qui veut dire que ces programmes ou politiques font excessivement tort aux 
Blancs, et surtout aux hommes blancs. Les attaques continues et toujours actuelles 
contre les programmes de discrimination positive, en particulier pour l’admission 
aux universités, illustrent l’impossibilité de faire des politiques spécifiquement ra-
ciales, tout comme les attaques contre le ‘welfare’ illustre l’impossibilité de faire des 
efforts politiques qui ciblent uniquement les pauvres. De plus, la contre-réaction 
contre la discrimination positive met aussi en lumière le fait que même si un domaine 
de politique sociale jouit d’une connotation positive, comme c’est le cas pour 
l’éducation, des mesures qui sont trop ouvertement et trop fortement en faveur des 
minorités sont confrontés à une résistance forte. 
Bien que les actions menées durant la présidence de Reagan n’étaient pas tou-
jours parfaitement cohérentes avec son discours et que la révolution reaganienne 
était restée inachevée, cela a amené à une nouvelle ère de polarisation politique. Le 
consensus Keynésien qui avait dominé durant la période d’après-guerre et qui avait 
continué à influencer la politique de Nixon, bien que cela n’ait pas été le cas de son 
discours, était mort et enterré. Maintenant les deux partis sont radicalement opposés 
concernant les questions des impôts, l’intervention de l’État, et les politiques sociales. 
De plus, Edsall et Edsall ont insisté sur le fait que le refus des Démocrates de 
parler de la ‘sous-classe’ et de certaines limites de la War on Poverty ont laissé le 
champs discursif libre aux Républicains. Clinton et ses New Democrats ont partagé cet 
avis. Ils se sont concentrés sur la classe moyenne et se sont distanciés de l’ancienne 
image dépensière du parti en mettant l’accent sur l’importance de réduire le déficit 
(qui dans le discours néolibéral résulte des programmes sociaux), de réformer les 
programmes sur critères sociaux, et de combattre fermement la criminalité. 
Bien que l’élection de Clinton ait permis de reprendre une partie du vote des 
Blancs, et bien que Clinton ait réussi à créer un excédent budgétaire, aidé par le 
boom économique des années 1990, le constat concernant la politique raciale et so-
ciale du ‘premier président noir’ est plus mitigé. Ses résultats pour la classe moyenne 
sont plutôt bons, pour les minorités et les pauvres ils sont plutôt mauvais. Ceci est dû 
surtout à la règle des trois coups (three strikes) de sa législation sur le crime et la dure 
réforme conservatrice qui a transformée le AFDC en TANF, un programme plus sé-
vère et limité. Bien que Clinton ait réussi à regagner une majorité Démocrate, il appa-
raît que Clinton, du moins pour l’égalité raciale, la stratégie se soit quelque peu re-
tournée contre lui. De plus, le fait que Clinton avec son approche centriste se soit 
aventuré du côté conservateur s’est avéré être au détriment de son projet de réforme 
 principal, un système de santé universel. Le projet de réforme de Clinton a été un 
échec, malgré le côté centriste du projet, bien qu’il ait été basé sur une approche de 
marché, sensée plaire aux conservateurs. Malgré ces efforts, sa réforme a été décriée 
comme cauchemar bureaucratique, un système de santé contrôlé par l’État qui aurait 
résulté en pénurie de soins et en augmentation de coûts pour la classe moyenne. Les 
appels raciaux étaient fortement codés, mais le spectre du big government a réussi à 
tourner le soutien en faveur de la réforme en opposition et finalement en défaite dé-
sastreuse. 
Obama a fait preuve d’une connaissance approfondie de ce contexte historique, 
et dans The Audacity of Hope il apparaît qu’Obama partage assez largement cette in-
terprétation des faits. De plus, bien qu’Obama ait félicité les effets positifs de la crois-
sance économique sur la population noire durant les deux mandats Clinton, les résul-
tats des années Clinton concernant les minorités sont au mieux mitigés, en particulier 
pour la soi-disante ‘sous-classe.’ Le soutien persistant de la population noire, bien que 
légèrement en diminution, pour le Parti démocrate montre la faiblesse politique rela-
tive de cette population, qui a, malgré ces résultats mitigés, pas de vraie alternative 
politique et se retrouve souvent perdante dans ce système à deux partis. 
Obama a voulu maintenir une approche centriste, qui visait, sans succès, une 
collaboration bipartisane, mais avec une attention plus grande, bien que cachée, aux 
problèmes spécifiques de la population noire. En 2009, les Démocrates ne savaient 
que trop bien que le passage d’une législation de santé serait difficile, vu le désastre 
de la réforme de Clinton, mais aussi basé sur presque un siècle de tentatives échouées 
qui avaient précédé. Le système de santé est un des éléments principaux qui dis-
tingue l’État providence étatsunien du reste du monde occidental. L’arrêt précoce du 
développement du système de santé a amené à son trait distinctif d’être le système le  
plus coûteux, qui couvre la plus petite part de population et qui obtient des résultats 
de santé publique assez médiocres dans de nombreux domaines, comme la mortalité 
infantile. 
En ce qui concerne la prise en compte de l’échec de Clinton, deux éléments se 
détachent. L’administration Obama a choisi un système similaire que ce que projetait 
la réforme Clinton, c'est-à-dire un système construit sur l’existant et qui conserve 
l’approche de marché au lieu d’appliquer un système entièrement géré par l’État 
comme le single payer. Malgré cette approche centriste, la promulgation de loi a coûté 
très cher aux Démocrates. Dans les élections du Congrès qui ont suivi la signature du 
ACA, ils ont perdu la majorité au Congrès et ils n’ont pas réussi à la regagner depuis. 
L’autre élément est qu’ils ont évité de reproduire certaines des erreurs faites par 
Clinton, comme l’association forte entre le projet de réforme avec le président et la 
Première Dame qui s’était avérée désastreuse pour la tentative Clinton. Malgré les 
efforts de garder les actions d’Obama dans les limites définies par la fonction de pré-
sident, la réforme a tout de même été affublée du surnom d ‘Obamacare. Par contre, 
cette fois-ci, cela n’a pas résulté en défaite ; les Démocrates se sont approprié le sur-
nom qui se voulait calomnieux et l’ont adopté. Ainsi ils ont reproduit la stratégie 
qu’ils avaient adoptée avec les publicités Harry-et-Louise, et cela ressemblait à la stra-
tégie qu’Obama avait concernant sa vie privée. Une attaque contre les sombres se-
crets de la vie privée d’Obama, semblable à celle faite contre Clinton, n’était pas pos-
sible, car Obama avait déjà tout dit dans son autobiographie. Bien au contraire, 
Obama a utilisé son passé parfois tumultueux pour appeler à donner des secondes 
chances et pour établir un lien avec les adolescents.  
Bien qu’Obama ait fortement influencé la réforme de la santé à l’arrière plan, 
par une communication extensive entre la Maison Blanche et le Congrès, et par le fait 
  
d’avoir établi par l’ordre exécutif 13057 en avril 2009 un bureau pour la réforme de 
santé à la Maison Blanche (White House Office of Health Reform), envers le public il s’en 
tenait au rôle qu’un président peut avoir en matière de politique redistributive. Ce 
rôle consiste à mobiliser les troupes en tant que chef du gouvernement et de travailler 
au corps les membres de son parti. Envers le public, ce rôle inclut, en tant que chef de 
la nation qui utilise sa position unique et forte de pouvoir parler avec une seule voix 
bien définie pour travailler l’opinion publique. Ceci incluait la mise en place d’un 
discours élaboré et complexe qui décrit la vision du monde d’Obama, sa vision des 
États-Unis en tant que pays racialement transcendant et solidaire dont Obama voyait 
l’esprit pionnier et généreux comme preuve que les politiques sociales sont quelque 
chose de fondamentalement étatsunien. Obama a élaboré un discours qui a soigneu-
sement pris en compte le sentiment de la contre-réaction et qui a tout aussi soigneu-
sement contré les principes néolibéraux et la division raciale. Premièrement, Obama 
a insisté sur la transcendance raciale et les efforts que les deux groupes, autant Blancs 
que Noirs, devaient faire pour se réunir, mais il a aussi utilisé son expérience biraciale 
afin de favoriser la compréhension mutuelle pour le point de vue de chacun des deux 
groupes dans le but de trouver un terrain d’entente. Cette transcendance raciale a 
servi à créer une nouvelle unité étatsunienne basée sur la classe qui était fortement 
orientée vers la classe moyenne. Il a essayé de convaincre autant les Noirs que les 
Blancs qu’ils pourraient être plus forts ensemble pour se battre pour leurs intérêts 
économiques, et il a montré qu’il y avait des enjeux pour les deux groupes dans une 
législation redistributive neutre, mais orientée vers la classe. 
Afin de bien cimenter cette union de classe, Obama a utilisé le populisme éco-
nomique dans lequel des élites peu définies, des compagnies d’assurance maladie 
avides, et la mondialisation servaient de nouveaux ennemies, afin de réorienter les 
ressentiments de la division raciale. De manière très consciente, Obama a essayé de 
recentrer les ressentiments économiques sur une cible économique, au lieu de laisser 
cela se déchainer au niveau racial, comme le faisaient les conservateurs. Ce popu-
lisme économique servait aussi de contre-discours au néolibéralisme. Et pour finir, 
Obama a lourdement insisté sur la légitimation de l’intervention de l’État, en la pré-
sentant comme faisant partie des valeurs étatsuniennes et comme étant part inhé-
rente au rêve américain. Il a présenté l’intervention de l’État comme un facilitateur 
du rêve américain. De plus, il a décrit l’assurance maladie comme un élément essen-
tiel du rêve américain, à travers la sécurité et la stabilité que cela apportait. Il a parti-
culièrement insisté sur l’universalité de la vulnérabilité face aux problèmes de santé 
et le fait que le l’absence d’assurance maladie était principalement un problème de 
classe moyenne dans le but de mettre en avant l’importance de sa réforme pour la 
classe moyenne. 
L’approche plus centriste était plus apparente dans sa position de transcendance 
raciale qui a mis l’accent sur la responsabilité personnelle afin de faire un pas vers les 
conservateurs, mais qu’il a surtout utilisé pour légitimer et appeler à plus de respon-
sabilité de l’État et plus d’intervention de l’État. Ce centrisme était aussi apparent 
dans la prise en compte d’Obama de certains principes néolibéraux qui jouissent 
d’un consensus bipartisan, tels que la nécessité de limiter le déficit, mais il a utilisé 
cela à son avantage pour défendre sa réforme de santé, en mettant en avant le fait 
qu’elle allait faire diminuer les coûts. 
Pourtant, le ton conciliateur d’Obama et sa croyance forte en un compromis bi-
partisan se sont traduits par une réforme qui s’est avérée vulnérable aux attaques. 
Étant donné que la réforme a été bâtie sur le système existant, les anciens défauts, qui 
avaient déjà hanté le système Medicare-Medicaid conçu par l’administration Johnson, 
 ont refait surface dans Obamacare. Les attaques conservatrices contre le ACA, dont le 
résultat principal était de rendre optionnelle l’extension de Medicaid dont il y avait 
tant besoin, n’a pas seulement eu un impact très négatif sur le caractère universel de 
la couverture santé, mais, à cause de la stratification raciale de la société étatsunienne 
et le développement racialisé de l’État providence, cela a aussi eu un impact négatif 
en fonction de la race. La vieille histoire raciale des États-Unis a refait surface dans 
l’extension de Medicaid. Parmi les états qui ont choisi de faire usage de leur préroga-
tives, leurs states’ rights, de ne pas appliquer l’extension de Medicaid, bon nombre sont 
des états du sud qui concentrent environ la moitié de la population noire, et qui en 
plus sont parmi les états les plus pauvres des États-Unis. Ainsi, une décision qui en 
surface semble liée seulement à la question de la portée de l’État fédéral heurte beau-
coup plus la population noire. 
Toutefois, des évènements récents ont montré que les states’ rights, dans le sens 
de l’autonomie des états de faire leurs propres décision notamment en matière de 
politiques sociales, peuvent aussi fonctionner comme un laboratoire pour des poli-
tiques plus audacieuses et peuvent pousser l’État fédéral vers la gauche. Quelques 
exemples viennent à l’esprit, comme le fait que bon nombre d’états, et même cer-
taines villes, ont des salaires minimum bien plus élevés que le salaire minimum fédé-
ral. De nombreux états avaient déjà utilisé la marge de manœuvre accordée par la 
Cour Suprême pour diminuer l’écart entre les peines encourues pour des délits de 
crack et de cocaïne avant que le Fair Sentencing Act soit promulgué en 2010. Avant le 
ACA, le Massachusetts avait mis en place un système de couverture de santé pionnier 
qui a servi de modèle et d’arme dans le débat avec les conservateurs. Et plus récem-
ment, de plus en plus d’états ont ou sont en train d’envisager le single payer. Certes, 
pour l’instant les tentatives de faire passer une telle loi n’ont pas encore porté leurs 
fruits, mais le simple fait que ces propositions soient mises au vote ou que les états 
envisagent de le faire, et que quelques candidats pour les élections au poste de gou-
verneur font campagne en se prononçant en faveur de single payer, sont autant de 
signes d’espoir qu’au contraire de ce qui s’est passé pour Medicaid, l’autonomie des 
états peut être utilisée dans un but progressiste et pourrait aider à frayer un chemin 
pour le single payer au niveau fédéral. 
En revanche, il est tout à fait clair que single payer n’aurait jamais pu passer en 
2009/2010, comme le montre le sacrifice de l’option publique bien plus modérée. 
Mais il apparaît que la mise en place du ACA et ses résultats positifs, autant sur le 
taux de personnes ayant pu contracter une assurance maladie que sur le coût (malgré 
le débat à ce sujet), ait eu un impact sur l’opinion publique. Les Américains semblent 
maintenant plus ouverts à l’idée de l’intervention de l’État dans la santé. Les défaites 
successives des efforts des Républicains à révoquer le ACA, malgré leur majorité au 
Congrès, laisse espérer un changement. De plus, l’opinion publique est de plus en 
plus favorable au single payer, dans une proportion similaire que pour d’autres solu-
tions comme l’approche mixte ou moins d’intervention de l’État (ceci est encore un 
autre sujet de discussion, puisque une grande majorité de toutes les tendances poli-
tiques sont en faveur du maintien de Medicare and Medicaid, même ceux qui veulent 
moins d’intervention de l’État). On peut seulement espérer qu’Obamacare, aussi im-
parfaite que soit la réforme, puisse servir de marchepied pour un système de santé 
vraiment universel qui ne permette pas de discrimination, exactement comme le sys-
tème Medicare-Medicaid de Johnson a servi de marchepied pour le ACA. 
   
 
 
